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While doing a Masters in Piano Performance here at Michigan in 1992, I was fortunate to cross 
paths with Kevin Korsyn, then a visiting professor.  The two remarkable seminars he taught that 
year—one in the history of theory, the other in musical intertextuality—gave me the music theory 
bug.  When I returned to Michigan several years later to pursue a Ph.D., I was received by a warm 
and welcoming faculty that included not only Professor Korsyn but also Professors Patricia Hall, 
Wayne Petty, and Ramon Satyendra, all of whom sit on my committee.  These and several other 
professors across the School of Music have been extremely supportive of my work, exceedingly 
generous with their time and knowledge.  My other two readers, Professors Frederick Amrine and 
Silke-Maria Weineck, both from the German department and with each of whom I took 
unforgettable seminars in German philosophy, indulged my somewhat unorthodox request for two 
outside referees.  I thank my entire committee for their insightful commentary.  In addition, 
Professor Janet Schmalfeldt, during a residency here in the Fall of 2012, graciously agreed to read 
my third chapter and discuss it with me at length, which resulted in several crucial clarifications.  I 
am most appreciative of her time and wisdom.  I also thank Professor Stefano Mengozzi for several 
lively discussions on all things musical and for commenting on my prospectus.  Dr. Jennifer Goltz 
was unbelievably generous with her time and talent in agreeing to rehearse and record four 
different interpretations of “Du Ring an Meinem Finger,” without which Chapter 4, as I conceived 
it, would not have been possible.  My parents’ unflinching support of my decision to change 
careers midstream, as it were, has meant a great deal to me.  Finally, my wife, Dr. Rachel Swinkin, 
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was equally supportive, and her own scholarly work and accomplishments have given me much 
inspiration and motivation.  In her I have a most resourceful and empathetic companion, for 
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This study seeks to redress three deficiencies, as I see them.  First, music scholars tend to view the 
musical work as an abstract entity, as conceptually prior to its performances.  I propose instead a 
music-ontological model that includes interpretation, both analysis- and performance-based, as 
integral components of the musical work.  Second, performers and theorists alike tend to forget 
how much more heterogeneous music-making used to be, both within and among performances, 
as evidenced by the earliest recordings.  My analytically-informed interpretive recommendations 
implicitly strive to recapture this “Romantic” style of performance.  Finally, many older studies in 
performance/analysis, and some recent ones, mandate that a performance must somehow 
instantiate analytical assertions to be cogent, on the assumption that those assertions are factual.  I 
argue that, on the one hand, analytical features are metaphorical and contingent rather than 
factual and immanent; and on the other hand, performed music, due to its semantic 
indeterminacy, cannot convey concepts, only the sentient states underlying them.  
 The first chapter identifies some academic trends that betray these deficiencies, in 
particular the authentic-performance movement and Platonic music ontologies.  Against the latter, 
I propose that the musical work is not some idealized entity transcending performances but rather 
a repository of potentialities, both structural and emotive, that require interpretation to be 
actualized.  In support of this view, I invoke Wolfgang Iser’s reader-response theory, which deems 
the literary text performative, as always engaging the reader and relying on his capacity to make, 
rather than excavate, meaning.  The second chapter expounds on two ways in which analysis—
xvi 
Schenkerian analysis in particular—is performative.  First, it unearths ambiguities that elicit the 
performer’s response.  Second, it poses metaphors for sentient experience that the performer can 
sonically embody.  The third chapter applies the theory to the first movement of Beethoven’s 
String Quartet, Op. 18, no. 4, the fourth to Schumann’s “Du Ring an meinem Finger.”  In the 
latter, I use analysis not just performatively but provocatively, using it to generate subtexts by 







     Fig. I-1: A Venn diagram 
 
 
Music theory—or, more particularly, music analysis—and performance have less to do with each 
other than one might care to believe.  As represented by the simple Venn diagram above, there is a 
relatively small area, I submit, in which they intersect.  Many aspects of performance simply have 
nothing to do with analysis—sonic colors that express no analytic insight, technical demands that 
are impervious to theoretical thought.1  Conversely, many aspects of music analysis simply have 
nothing to do with performance—aspects, for example, that are more concerned to exemplify a 
theory than to elucidate particular pieces.  This might seem a strange concession with which to 
open a dissertation on the relationship between music performance and analysis, but I believe it is 
a necessary, intellectually honest one.  Moreover, accepting the mutual autonomy between the two 
                                                


















Fig. 1: A Venn Diagram 
2 
domains opens a space in which we can come to grips with that relatively small but precious area 
of overlap—to codify it more precisely and appreciate it more fully.  Hence, I do not presume or 
posit an ideal or inevitable marriage between the two endeavors but rather aim to explore their 
potential for a fruitful relationship within rather circumscribed parameters.   
 
1. A PRELIMINARY EXAMPLE 
Prior to theoretical exposition, a brief example—Scriabin’s Prelude in G@ major, op. 11, no. 13 
(Ex. I-1)—will hopefully serve to capture the spirit of my approach and foreshadow its particulars.   
 
Analysis  
The form is rounded binary, with the second part beginning in m. 19 and the return occurring in 
m. 25.  The first part comprises an interrupted period, the consequent of which (m. 9) expands the 















  Example I-1: Scriabin, Prelude in G@, op. 11, no. 13 
 
motive of m. 5; mm. 21–23 liquidate the two-bar module of mm. 19–20, alighting on a 
retransitory dominant.  A lead-in figure, m. 24, provides an anacrusis to the main theme, which 
Example 1: Scriabin, Prelude in G  , 
 op. 11, no. 13 
b 
4 
originally had none.  The return is truncated in relation to the beginning, reaching tonal closure 
on I, with   
€ 
ˆ 1 in the soprano, “prematurely,” in m. 28.  Mm. 29–31 merely extend this sonority, 
after which the piece closes with two mysterious elements: a lone D@ in the tenor, evocative of a 
horn tone fading into the distance, and an imperfect authentic cadence whose melodic   
€ 
ˆ 3 partially 
undermines the tonal resolution of m. 28.  The piece ends on something of a question mark.   
This last observation marks the first of a few ambiguities we will encounter in this brief 
piece (consult Ex. I-2 throughout).  Does the piece traverse a   
€ 
ˆ 3 –  
€ 
ˆ 2 –  
€ 
ˆ 1 Urlinie or does it ultimately 
prolong just a single scale degree,   
€ 
ˆ 3 ?  A factor supporting the latter interpretation is that the 
ostensible melodic resolution that is   
€ 
ˆ 1 (  
€ 
ˆ 8 ) in m. 28 is harmonically supported only weakly (the G@ 
in the bass is something of an afterthought).  Also, that   
€ 
ˆ 1 , G@5, does not occur in the obligatory 
register, which would require G@4.  On the other hand, that G@5 is perhaps the terminus of an 
ascending Urlinie,   
€ 
ˆ 5 –  
€ 
ˆ 6 –  
€ 
ˆ 7 –  
€ 
ˆ 8 ,2 in which case the   
€ 
ˆ 3 at the end would merely embellish the final   
€ 










                                                
2 Neumeyer (1987) has compellingly argued for the feasibility of such a structure.   
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Indeed, one might ask: which is the true Kopfton,   
€ 
ˆ 5  or   
€ 
ˆ 3 ?  (Notice how Scriabin brings the 
antagonism between these two pitches to the fore in the last four bars, pitting   
€ 
ˆ 5  in the tenor 
against   
€ 
ˆ 3 in the soprano.)    
€ 
ˆ 5  as the Kopfton (this structural narrative is mapped out with red 
overlays in Ex. I-2) is supported by the ascending   
€ 
ˆ 5 –  
€ 
ˆ 6 –  
€ 
ˆ 7 –  
€ 
ˆ 8 but is partially undermined by the 
piece closing on   
€ 
ˆ 3 .   
€ 
ˆ 3 as the Kopfton is at once supported and undermined by the fact that the 
piece begins and ends with it: if the piece does ultimately prolong   
€ 
ˆ 3 , the latter proves an ultimately 
unsatisfactory or illusory Kopfton since it is unable to linearly resolve.  
More localized factors exacerbate rather than resolve this Kopfton ambiguity: the first phrase 
describes   
€ 
ˆ 3 –  
€ 
ˆ 2 , yet m. 2 establishes a recurrent motive, a descending fourth from D@ that seems to 
aim at a 5th-gesture but that does not reach   
€ 
ˆ 1 , G@4 (Ex. I-3).  Granted, since D@ in m. 2 is non-
harmonic (an appoggiatura), this motive is contra-structural—it falls outside a triadic framework.  
Still, the motive can be seen subtly to manifest or reinforce a global   
€ 
ˆ 5 –line.  The   
€ 
ˆ 5  in m. 2 also 
strives upward toward G@5; that pitch, however, is displaced by a poignant A@ neighbor in m. 4 (see 
Ex. I-3).  (The possibly illusory quality of this A@ is supported by the fact that the motive of m. 2 is 
reiterated in the alto voice of m. 4, creating a slight ambiguity as to which voice, soprano or alto, is 
more melodic in that measure.)  The thematic reprise redresses both “deficiencies”: the D@ (m. 26) 
is now supported by a consonant G@ in the bass, a tonic pedal tone, which readies it for structural 
motion and resolution; and the line now leads up to G@5 (m. 28) without equivocation.   
In short,   
€ 
ˆ 5  may be a somewhat dubious Kopfton in competing with   
€ 
ˆ 3 and in leading 
upward rather than downward.  Yet, the correspondence between the descending and ascending 
lines from   
€ 
ˆ 5 —the former halting on A@ (m. 2), the latter displaced by A@ (m. 4)—ultimately 
reinforces the putative   
€ 
ˆ 5  Kopfton.  Likewise, the fact that G@5 is consistently evaded until m. 28 can 
7 
be seen not as undermining but actually as underlining the -line, insofar as it piques the 
listener’s expectation as to the fulfillment of that line.  Indeed, when we finally reach G@5 in m. 28, 
the melodic resolution is perhaps satisfying enough as to mitigate its initially weak harmonic 
support.  This piece demonstrates Schenker’s notion that interesting pieces reach their goal not 
directly but only after having taken reversals and faced various obstacles along the way.   
Another ambiguity pertains to the secondary tonalities ii and vi.  The import of ii is 
established by its spacious expansion, mm. 5–7, the import of vi by being the key to which the 
second phrase modulates (see Ex. I-2).  Notice the 5th-progression in the bass, mm. 15–17, leading 
decisively to E@ (this line rendezvouses with its own inversion in the soprano, which leads to F5; see 
dotted slurs in Ex. I-1).  The two keys are not merely successive, however, but intertwined and 
interactive.  In the antecedent, the ii in mm. 5–7 is expanded by means of a vi in m. 6.  In the 
consequent, conversely, ii is co-opted by vi.  That is, vi proves resistant to ii, pushing beyond it by 
means of the descending-5th line at the point (m. 15) where it yielded to ii in the previous phrase 
(m. m. 7).  That this phrase goes beyond the previous phrase tonally, rather than merely aims at a 
different tonal target, is borne out by the phrase expansion this tonal redirection generates.  That, 
in other words, vi metaphorically goes beyond ii is confirmed by the consequent phrase literally 
going beyond the antecedent.  Hence, vi does not merely succeed ii but overtakes it, with a burst of 
aggressive energy that culminates in the emotional apex of the piece (m. 18).  The  
relationship between the two tonal agents becomes murkier in the next part, starting in m. 19.  
Here, as in the opening phrase (starting in m. 5), ii is ostensibly composed out.  After only one 
measure, the melody seems ready to settle into ii, by way of a melodic cadential figure in m. 20.  





shown in Ex. I-4, it gets waylaid instead, arriving on E@ and thus attenuating the stability of A@ in 
the soprano.  The resulting Ĺ chord turns out not to be a cadential Ĺ within ii but rather a 
contrapuntal displacement of E@ minor, vi, which congeals in the next measure, m. 21 (see Ex. I-2).  
In summary, the competitive struggle between the two tonalities in the first part gives way to a 
more subtle and complicated entanglement in the second.     
Next, let us briefly consider some motives.  If the G@5 in m. 28 achieves a crucial tonal goal, 
it achieves a crucial motivic one as well.  As shown in Ex. I-5, motive x, a mere latency in m. 1, is 
subsequently actualized as a full-fledged motive by means of the various permutations it assumes.  
Some of those are inexact or approximate.  For example, D&–C@–B@ in m. 4 initially appear to 
describe RI(x) but the C@–B@ corrupt that permutation, as they enact R but not I.  Likewise, B@–
C@–E@ of the next measure initially gesture toward T5(x) but then C@–E@ perform I.  However, the 
successive apices of A@5 in m. 4 (the climax of the theme), F5 in m. 18 (the end of the opening 
section, delineated by a fermata), and G@5 in m. 28 (the point of structural resolution) together 
describe an exact RI permutation.  The partial permutations involving R and I find a wholeness in 
that large-scale motive.  This process, moreover, help accounts for why that G@ in m. 28 is so 
satisfying and resolute: it is the point at which both tonal and motivic procedures coincide, where 




Another motive that begins as a latency and is eventually brought to fruition is the F–E@–
D&–D@–C@ in the left hand of mm. 4–5 (Ex. I-6).  Here, however, these pitches do not yet form a 
motivic unit, for they are not rhythmically distinguished as a group.  In mm. 19–20, however, that 
figure begins on a downbeat (tenor voice) with the first note (now F@) accented agogically and the 
last three accented with tenuti.  That figure, in other words, is now presented with greater metric 
clarity and stability such that we realize, in retrospect, it held motivic potential from the start.  No 
  5           4   3  2 ^ ^  ^ ^ 
^ 
5                           6               7         (8 displaced) ^ ^ ^ 
5                              6                  7 ^                              ^                 ^ 
8 ̂ 




Example I-3: Fourth parallelism 
and ascending Urlinie from 5 ̂ 
10 
sooner, however, does this motive crystallize at the foreground than it recedes to a deeper, 
subthematic3 layer, traversing mm. 21–23, as shown in the example.   
 
 Example I-4: Recomposition of mm. 19–20 
 
                                                







     
~I2(x) 






 looser variations of x 
(permutations only approximate) 
T5(x) 
notes of x rearranged, linearized 








The above analysis, though brief, has yielded several intriguing possibilities for interpretation (Ex. 
I-7 and Web Ex. 1).  At the most basic level, it has proposed various features, in terms of tonal 
structure and motive, for instance, that the performer might delineate in some way.  But more 
interestingly, the analysis has suggested various ambiguities for the performer to resolve and 


















latencies for her to actualize.  It has also hinted at the emotive—and, by extension, narrative—
dimensions of such features that in turn might motivate interpretive choices.  I will offer some 
examples. 
On the most basic level, the analysis uncovers entities the performer might choose to 
project in some way, and of which she might not otherwise be aware.  For example, once the 
analysis has brought to light the 5th-motive in the bass, mm. 14–17, and has underlined its 
significance—it helps establish vi as a central tonal agent—the performer might well opt to 
delineate this line.  Yet, such delineation, to be effective, is not, is never, simply a matter of 
“bringing something out,” as performers are often urged to do.  It is equally a matter of shaping 
the line.  In other words, to do justice to a line as a line, one must play it with a line, as it were—















Example I-7: Some performance outcomes 
 
 
Ex. 7: Some performance outcomes 
similar shaping  
distinct shape 
subito p 
hint at motivic import 
(   ) 
p, so as not to obscure asc. line 
voice 
linger, catch in ped 
shape line, bring to resolution, even within dim. 
extra time, let fade 
unstable, murky      increasing security . . . 










































sub p  
as if leading toward goal as if surpassing goal 
15 
hairpin dynamic, depending on the context and on the composer’s notations.  In this case, a 
crescendo is indicated (m. 13).  But the precise execution of this dynamic will depend largely upon 
the particular emotion or intention as exposed, in part, by the analysis.  Following that analysis, 
the performer might play with the intention to surpass (recall the struggle between ii and vi) and 
also to lead inexorably to the E@, the goal of the motivic 5th.  These tactics will create particular 
gradations of timing—both the tempo and the precise rate at which the crescendo unfolds—that 
might not otherwise arise.  Granted, the resultant temporal profile will not necessarily convey to 
the listener the proposition, “this harmony/phrase surpasses the previous,” or, “this phrase leads 
inexorably toward E@,” and so on, but it will convey on some level the general qualities of surpassing 
and leading inexorably, or something to that effect.  I believe that the listener on some level perceives 
these qualities—even if unconsciously, and even if he would not put his perceptions into those 
exact words—from such a tempo profile.  This is because, as I will later argue, variances of 
dynamic, tempo, and articulation create gestures that are isomorphic with human ones, through 
which, in turn, emotional and psychological states are conveyed, or from which they are inferred.    
 We saw how some tonal or motivic entities arose only retroactively.  Recall, for example, 
the F–G@–E@ of m. 1, which comes into its own as a result of the various permutations, both 
partial and complete, it undergoes.  Also recall the F(@)–E@–D–D@–C@ motive, which is merely 
latent in mm. 4–5 and is subsequently actualized at the foreground in mm. 19–20 and 
subthematically in the bass, mm. 21–23.  In each case, one might wonder whether the subsequent 
clarification of a figure as motivic means the performer should initially downplay the figure, 
allowing it to be latent and gradually to become, or whether, conversely, he should imbue it with 
motivic import from the start, on the basis of what he knows to transpire later in the piece.  In 
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other words, should the player approach the latencies as a “first-time listener” or a “second-time 
listener,” applying his synoptic vision of the piece throughout?4  There is no simple answer to this 
complex question, and it is one to which I will return.  The performer might also mediate between 
these two extremes, hinting at the motive in mm. 4–5, then momentarily revealing it in m. 20, 
then rendering it with increasing certainty in mm. 20–23.  There is no one exact way to render 
such actions, and whatever the interpretive outcome, the listener will not necessarily be cognizant 
of those actions or label them using the same terms the analyst used.   
 A phenomenon related to these initially nebulous or nascent modules is ambiguity, of 
which I proposed multiple instances in this prelude.  I contend that any, even relatively simple 
piece will be rife with ambiguities; or more precisely, such ambiguities lie at the intersection of 
music and the analytical model(s) used to elucidate it.  My applying to the prelude a Schenkerian 
model—a model that entails the presence of a single Kopfton from which the primary linear 
progression of the piece unfurls—yields an ambiguity by which the prelude wavers between two 
possible Kopftöne:  and .  Such tonal indistinctness—also evinced by the intricate interplay 
between ii and vi—is simply a hallmark of advanced chromatic music generally, Scriabin’s music in 
particular.  Hence, the music by itself posits no undecidable binary opposition (“  is structurally 
antecedent to ” or vice versa); rather, such an opposition arises from applying a theoretical 
paradigm to the score.  The Schenkerian model exploits the general tonal haziness of Scriabin’s 
language, culling from it a more distinct tonal tension.    
 The question remains as to how the performer should treat such ambiguities.  She may 
choose to express the ambiguity in some way, perhaps playing the prelude with a murky sound 
                                                
4 I borrow this useful typology from Cone (1977). 
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generally and avoiding linear dynamics, not pointing toward particular tonal goals.  Alternatively, 
though ambiguities are by definition undecidable, she may choose in this scenario, for the purpose 
of performing the piece in a decisive, distinct way on a particular occasion, to focus on one or the 
other Kopfton.  Supposing she opted for  and the ascending Urlinie it entails, she might create 
shadings that revolve around  in its various contexts.  See, for example, mm. 2 ff. in Ex. I-7.  The 
line in m. 2 is a bridge to nowhere, whereas m. 3 is a bridge to an unexpected place—A@, which 
displaces the G@ that is the ostensible goal of the linear span.  The crescendi leading to these 
respective points would thus be subtly different in character, rendered differently.  The first 
crescendo leads to a goal that never arrives, the second overreaches it.  The first thus has a left 
hanging quality, the second a surpassing quality.  For another example, the middle section unfolds a 
dynamic of increasing realization or security, proceeding from the murky ii that settles on the 
dubious Ĺ in m. 20 to the vi, which in turn serves as a predominant of the home key.  The 
chromatic 4th-motive here, as we discussed, congeals along with the harmony.  This analysis thus 
calls for the performer to play with increasing security, strength, and solidity.  Different pianists 
will no doubt realize this intention in different ways.   
Three main caveats apply to the above interpretive endeavor.  First, any one analytical 
insight might imply for different people slightly or even vastly different physical and emotional 
connotations.  Second, even those who derive from an analysis basically the same such 
connotation will probably use different language to describe it, which in turn will likely reflect 
subtly different conceptions.  Third, even those who share basically the same analytic-cum-
interpretive conception might realize that conception at the instrument very differently.  That said, 








likely produce emotional and somatic states that are in the same family; and those, in turn, will 
likely produce a set of performance realizations that are also related.   
 
2. THE CENTRAL ISSUES  
The following three issues—the work concept, interpretive specificity and freedom, and the 
traditionally hegemonic stance of analysis toward performance—form the backdrop to my entire 
project.  Hence, I consider them generally here, along with important theoretical literature relating 
to them.  I will expose the set of ideological and disciplinary tensions to which my dissertation on 
some level responds.   
 
The Work Bias 
The preceding section harbors a host of assumptions and principles, ones relating to (a) the various 
ways a performer can respond to a preexistent analysis; (b) the non-objective nature of analysis and 
the non-propositional nature of performance; (c) the metaphorical and hermeneutic potential of 
seemingly formalistic analysis; and (d) the mechanisms by which performance can convey 
expressive states.  I will expound on these and other points in the course of this dissertation.  
None of these points, however, is more central to my discussion than the idea, also implied above, 
that the score is a repository of potentialities, latencies, ambiguities, and lacunae, all of which 
directly implicate the interpreter and beg his involvement.  Simply put, the musical work 
necessitates and thus entails performance—performance is one of its constituents.  By this, I mean 
not merely that music is in essence a sonic artform and thus that the score requires sonic 
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realization, although this is true.  I mean, more precisely, that the score is conceptually open—it 
wants elucidation through analysis and performance, not mere sonic embodiment.   
Such a view—that performance and interpretation are integral rather than ancillary to the 
musical work—runs counter, in part, to the manner in which theorists and musicologists typically 
talk about music.  They have tended to frame it, explicitly or implicitly, as an abstract entity, one 
conceptually prior to and independent of performances.  They have in mind an idealized object, a 
structural substratum common to most if not all performances of that work.  They have also 
tended to regard the score—its notations, and sometimes the various structural relations that 
supposedly inhere in such notations—as defining the work.  When music scholars discuss music, 
they usually refer to a score, not an actual or hypothetical performance.  
 Dillon Parmer (2007) contends that this bias toward the work arises from a kind of academic 
insecurity: the music scholar, feeling the weight of more established, time-honored disciplines 
within the liberal arts and sciences, strives to make his claims verifiable and objectively grounded, 
at least to a high degree.  For this purpose, the visual security of the score is preferable to the 
perceived elusiveness and evanescence of sounding music.  Performing music entails its own kind 
of knowledge (practical and otherwise), but this is not regarded as genuine musicological 
knowledge.  Parmer trenchantly states that 
 musicologists are programmed from the outset of their academic deformation not only to  
suppress performing (how-to knowledge), to look down upon it and those who undertake it as an 
inferior form of engaging with music; but also to uphold as superior, as more prestigious, those forms 
of knowledge about music (knowledge about) which can be produced without any recourse to actual 
music making (2007, 12, his italics). 
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In another, even more provocative paper, Parmer attributes this valuation of knowing over doing, 
or of abstract over practical knowledge, to a ruler-ruled mentality, one undergirding slavery, that 
can be traced back to Aristotle (Parmer, 2011).  
The irony of this attitude, Parmer points out, is that musicologists claim to be concerned 
with the Real, but in actuality practice on imaginary objects—works as opposed to performances, 
which, though elusive, are real.  Indeed, music is arguably first and foremost an activity—it truly 
exists only in performance.  Christopher Small, in his landmark Musicking (1998), argues this point 
but also that the necessity of musical activity and participation extends to audiences as well, and 
that such participation is suppressed in modern concert culture.  In particular, he unapologetically 
lays bare the conventions of the modern symphony orchestra concert, conventions that, he argues, 
encourage passive rather than active engagement on the part of audience and players alike.  He 
calls for a return to the kind of participatory involvement that would have been de rigueur at the 
time in which much of the standard repertory was composed.  For Small, music is in essence not 
about abstract works but about doing music, in whatever form.5  Small reminds us that listening 
was not always such an asocial and disembodied affair, and is not in all cultures still.  He recounts, 
for example, the initial Parisian performances of the Beethoven symphonies, where “spectators 
applauded particularly striking passages and erupted into storms of applause at the end of each 
                                                
5 Another groundbreaking study in this regard is Goehr (1992), who claims that the concept of the musical 
work is historically contingent, beginning only around 1800 with Beethoven and arising from the complex 
shift of cultural values occurring at that time.  Here and in Goehr (1989), she also exposes the contingency 
of the Werktreue concept—the notion that the performer ought to be “true to the work,” true to the 
putative intentions of the composer and to his notations.  
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movement, sometimes forcing its repetition” (1998, 44).  These and other noises “do not suggest 
inattention, and certainly not disrespect, but betoken rather an audience that is active rather than 
passive in its attention, that considers, in fact, that its own audible responses are a legitimate 
element of the performance” (ibid.).6   
 
*  *  * 
Some disciplines, such as ethnomusicology and the burgeoning ones of recording analysis and 
gesture and embodiment theory, do take performance very seriously.  Ethnomusicology, of course, 
has always taken performance as its primary domain of inquiry, since the traditions of non-
Western and popular musics it deals with rarely revolve around written scores or the hypostatized 
works they are typically considered to indicate.  Ethnomusicologists have been applying this 
performance-based paradigm to classical music with increasing frequency.7  The turn away from 
work-centrism is also evident in the plethora of recent studies devoted to the analysis of 
                                                
6 For an exasperated blog-post on this issue, see “The Awfulness of Classical Music Explained,” by Richard 
Dare, the recently-appointed managing director of the Brooklyn Philharmonic.  A representative harangue:  
And there are a great many “clap here, not there” cloak-and-dagger protocols to abide by.  I found 
myself a bit preoccupied—as I believe are many classical concert goers—by the imposing 
restrictions of ritual behavior on offer: all the shushing and silence and stony faced non-expression 
of the audience around me, presumably enraptured, certainly deferential, possibly catatonic (Dare, 
2012). 
He proceeds to recount, as Small does, the much more extroverted, by modern standards unruly concert 
etiquette of pre-twentieth-century audiences.   
7 See Kingsbury (1988), Shelemay (2001), and Taylor (2007), to cite just a few examples.  
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recordings.8  (The publication in 1992 of Robert Philip’s important study of twentieth-century 
performance trends as evidenced on recordings effectively kick-started the discipline of classical-
music performance studies.)  Practitioners of this subfield regard performances as worthy of study 
in their own right, apart from the works they are usually, or were previously, taken merely to 
instantiate.  Many of these studies come from CHARM (Centre for the History and Analysis of 
Recorded Music), which is spearheaded by the indefatigable Nicholas Cook.  Scholars at this 
institution have rigorously compiled, contextualized, and analyzed performances as captured on 
record.9  While their aims are laudable, their methodology, in my view, is problematic.  
To explain why, I compare two essays—one by Joel Lester, the other by Cook—from the 
volume, The Practice of Performance (1995).  Lester affirms that the role of performance is not 
merely to manifest invariable properties of the work as identified by analysis.  Rather, performance 
can itself uncover structural properties and expand the range of analytical possibilities.  Lester 
contends that analysis, although it makes certain factual (descriptive) claims, is mostly concerned 
with interpretation and can thus benefit greatly from the wisdom (if often intuitive) of performers.  
                                                
8 See Auslander (2001), Barolsky (2008), Barolsky and Martens (2012), Cook (1995, 2009a and b), Dodson 
(2009 and 2012), Leech-Wilkinson (2009 and 2012), and Leikin (1996 and 2011). 
9 See their website at http://www.charm.rhul.ac.uk/index.html, which features extensive discographies, 
abstracts of and links to projects (both past and ongoing), and an e-monograph by Daniel Leech-Wilkinson 
(2009).  CHARM’s more recent offshoot, CMPCP (Centre for Musical Performance as Creative Practice), 
deals with questions such as “what knowledge is creatively embodied in musical performance?”; “how does 
music in performance . . . take shape over time?”; and “how does understanding musical performance as a 
creative practice vary across different global contexts, idioms and performance conditions . . . ?”  Taken 
from their website’s homepage: http://www.cmpcp.ac.uk/. 
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In this way, analysis and performance can interact on a coequal basis in the interpretive process—
they are both moments within an interpretive continuum.  Accordingly, Lester compares the 
structural interpretations by a theorist and a pianist—namely, Schenker and Horowitz, 
respectively—of a single piece, Mozart’s Piano Sonata in A, K. 331, second movement. 
Whereas Lester offers cogent insights into Horowitz’s interpretation in relation to 
Schenker’s using nothing but his naked ear, Cook, in the same volume, uses a computer equipped 
with a CD-ROM player to parse Furtwängler’s interpretation of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in 
relation to Schenker’s.  Cook argues that Furtwängler, in his two recorded performances of that 
piece (both from the early 1950s), intuitively produced what are essentially analyses in sound, ones 
that evince a distinct Schenkerian sensibility.  The maestro achieved this primarily through flexible 
tempo: “Furtwängler’s dynamic tempo profiles convey the same organisation of the music into 
large spans that Schenker strove to express in his analyses.  In fact, Furtwängler sometimes seems 
more successful in his articulation of these spans than Schenker managed to be at the relatively 
early stage of his career when he wrote the Ninth Symphony monograph” (1995, 120).   
The thesis is intriguing, but the method, which ultimately led to the creation of more 
sophisticated software for recording analysis, gives me pause.10  Admittedly, this method is useful 
in comparing several performances (by the same artist or several) of a single piece, and in lending 
empirical support to assertions about broad trends in performance styles.  In other words, it is 
useful in gathering statistical data.  For those like myself, however, who are primarily concerned 
with how a particular piece, analytically-informed or –intuitive performer(s), and engaged, 
                                                
10 I refer to the sonic visualizer and Expression Algorithm software, which compute fine gradations of 
tempo and dynamic change and yield spectral graphs.  
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empathic listener(s) collectively generate structural and emotional/narrative meaning, this 
methodology is of little use.  The minute variances Cook et al. are preoccupied with are largely 
irrelevant to that enterprise.  For example, that a performer “phrase-archs”11 a particular passage 
might indeed hold significance in the context of a particular voice-leading or motivic analysis; but 
the quantitatively precise degree to which the performer does so will likely not.  Moreover, I am 
concerned with what can be picked up by the human ear, with the meanings that can be generated 
in ordinary acts of listening, without the assistance of technology.   
A second, broader concern is that, for Cook, a primary motive for studying recorded 
performances is to counter the “textualist” position, or score-centrism, as outlined above, that 
pervades music-academic disciplines.  Yet, Cook’s project contravenes this aim on two levels.  On 
one level, records arguably transform the sound phenomena they capture into texts; they turn what 
is inherently ephemeral into something permanent, something that can then be commodified and 
fetishized.  Placing such analytic weight on recordings threatens to hypostatize performance even 
more.  On another level, Cook’s computer-generated analyses are texts in their own right—and 
abstruse ones at that—ones that can be, and are perhaps supposed to be, perused independently of 
the original sound source.12  Cook’s methodology simply replaces one kind of textualist paradigm 
                                                
11 This entails essentially an accelerando and crescendo to the climax, a ritardando and decrescendo away from it. 
See Cook (2009b). 
12 By contrast, Leikin’s graphic technique (as used in Leikin [1996], shown below) is much simpler, more 
intuitive, and more transparent—in part because he superimposes the graph onto the score itself, which 
Cook does not, so that the graph never becomes an inscrutable end in itself.  Incidentally, from Adorno’s 
three essays on records (1927, 1934, and 1969b), one suspects he might have sympathized with Cook’s 
project.  In the middle essay, in particular, “The Form of the Phonograph Record,” Adorno valorizes the 
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with another.  He concedes as much, stating, “there is a suspicion that recordings have opened up 
a whole new territory in which analysts can ply their trade without rethinking their long 
established scriptist assumptions: audio texts are still texts” (2010, 14).  Yet Cook’s proposed 
solution is not to rethink—much less jettison—his own paradigm as merely to counterbalance it 
with studies of the social context of performance, gesture, teaching practices, and so on—in short, 
all the topics taken up by CHARM’s successor, CMPCP.  This, in my view, is a half measure; it 
does not neutralize the ideological implications and self-contradictions of the original project.  
Once again, I think studying performances is in itself a beneficial countermeasure to the 
work- and score-centrism of traditional music scholarship; it is specifically the mechanical way 
Cook and others do so that I object to.  That said, I cannot claim to have devised a completely 
satisfying conceptual paradigm and practical method for studying recordings either.  For that 
reason, and also because recordings, and their role within the ontological and methodological 
framework I erect in this dissertation, would warrant a separate study, I will invoke them only 
sporadically and without reference to the theoretical problems they raise.  
                                                
materiality, as opposed to mimetic transparency, of the record.  For Adorno, the phonograph has value 
insofar as it is a material entity in its own right, rather than a photograph, as it were, of preexistent music.  
Moreover, he claims that the grooves of a record are indexical with respect to the sounds they encode—that 
is, related to those sounds in a necessary rather than arbitrary way—but also that they possess a 
“hieroglyphic” or enigmatic quality, which precludes overly facile comprehension.  Music, rather than being 
signified by writing, now itself becomes a kind of writing.  Hence, if Adorno were around to behold Cook’s 
spectral graphs, I suspect he might have endorsed them since they enhance the textual and hieroglyphic 
dimensions of the records themselves.   
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Finally, performance has received increased attention in the last couple of decades not only 
due to ethnomusicology and recording analysis but also to a crop of studies dealing with musical 
gesture, embodiment, and the semiotics of performance generally.13  These studies range from 
considering musical gesture as an abstract phenomenon, a result of rhythmic grouping (Graybill 
[1994]) to considering it in its most literal sense, in terms of the physical actions of the performer 
(Pierce [see previous footnote]).  Between these poles lies the semiotics of gesture.  Larson (2007), 
for example, treats gestures neither as solely notational nor as actually physical, but rather as an 
emergent property of notations, one understood by analogy to actual, physical forces.  In this 
sense, Larson, and also Hatten (2010), as we will see, view gesture as bridging the gap between the 
abstraction of the score and the concreteness of performance.   
 
Interpret ive Particularity 
Collectively, these three bodies of work—ethnomusicology, recording analysis, and semiotics of 
gesture and embodiment14—help redress the bias by which music is conceived more in terms of 
                                                
13 See in particular Cumming (2000), Dogantan-Dack (2006), Graybill (1994), Hatten (1993, 1999, and 
2004), Larson (2007), Le Guin (2006), Lidov (1987 and 2006), McCreless (2006), and Pierce (1983 and 
1994).  I find Hatten (1993) particularly interesting.  Here, he claims that physical gesture in Schubert is a 
veritable secondary parameter, alongside timbre, dynamics, and the like.  On this view, the performer’s 
physicality is a bona fide component of the work, not merely ancillary to it. 
14 I omit studies in performance practice and in the psychology of performance here, since the former, at 
least in my view, is primarily a species of historical, empirical musicology, the latter one of cognitive science.  
I find performance psychology especially problematic in that it does not often treat the performer as a 
volitional agent and does not seem concerned with the qualitative aspects of interpretative choices.  
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abstract universals than of sonic, experienced particulars, and by which performance is basically 
assumed to decorate a self-complete piece.  Still, each must decide for herself what basic 
ontological stance to adopt (and there are certainly many other stances that reside between these 
two poles, as I will outline in Chapter 1).  Which stance one chooses to adopt will inevitably be 
influenced by, and will in turn influence, the kinds of things one values and wants to hear in 
performances.  In my view, a score-centered approach arises from and yields relative interpretive 
homogeneity, a performance-centered approach relative interpretive heterogeneity—to put the 
matter somewhat coarsely.15   
I make no bones about being partial to the latter approach.  Notwithstanding the increased 
import recently granted by music-academic disciplines to performance, our current performing 
                                                
Moreover, though obviously centered more on performance than on the work, it nonetheless perpetuates 
the hegemony of abstraction, as Dogantan-Dack explains:  
there is a need to include the performer’s authentic voice and discourse within [music performance 
studies].  To be sure, various studies in music psychology represent this discourse, which the 
researcher documents through questionnaires . . . , case studies, etc.  However, the context within 
which the words of the performer are . . . interpreted is embedded within the researcher’s 
discourse. . . .  The performer as the owner of knowledge and insights . . . i.e., the performer as 
agent, disappears altogether. . . .  This kind of research . . . does not represent the performer as an 
equal partner in the production of knowledge (2012, 38–39).  
 
15 A notable counterexample to the former principle is Glenn Gould, who justified his interpretive 
“liberties” not on the basis of the work being open but on that of the work being fixed.  In other words, 
since he viewed the work as defined by the score—by its pitches and rhythms—he saw his subjective (some 
might say, idiosyncratic) choices as licensed precisely because they had no ability to affect or corrupt the 
identity of the work.  See Bazzana (1995, 36–84).   
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culture still seems predominately score-centric, as evident in the interpretive inhibition by which, 
in my view, that culture is characterized.  This trend is borne out by the recordings made within 
the last sixty or so years (what I will refer to as “modern” recordings), as compared with the ones 
made early in the twentieth century (“historical”).  One must be careful not to overgeneralize, and, 
in particular, I am sensitive to Cook’s (2010) cautionary note about building grand historical 
narratives regarding performance styles.  Still, I think it is safe to say that the Romantic tradition of 
interpretation—characterized by extreme detail-orientation, by ubiquitous alterations in sound, 
touch, and time in order to convey musical rhetoric—is largely defunct, carried on only by fringe 
performers.16  Even a cursory comparison of modern with historical recordings of a particular 
piece—say, of a Beethoven sonata performed by Alfred Brendel, Richard Goode, Murray Perahia, 
and Maurizio Pollini on the one hand, by Alfred Cortot, Samson François, Clara Haskil, and 
Joseph Lhevinne on the other—would no doubt reveal stark differences even to the naked and 
                                                
16 The last world-renown practitioner of the Romantic style is generally considered to be Vladimir Horowitz, 
who died in 1989.  Vestiges of it can be found in fringe pianists such as Andrew Rangell, a Boston-based 
freelancer whose recordings of Beethoven, for example, are often revelatory, and Kumaran Arul, a lecturer 
at Stanford, by whom I have been considerably influenced.  I should clarify that “Romantic,” overtly 
rhetorical playing, characterized above all by continual alterations of tempo, has precedents in the canonical 
composers themselves—in their own statements as well as in statements by others about their playing.  Both 
Mozart and Chopin, for instance, explicitly advocated asynchrony between the pianist’s hands (see 
Eigeldinger [1986, esp. 49–57]) and both Czerny and Schindler attest to frequent changes of tempo in 
Beethoven’s own performances of his sonatas (see Barth [1992, passim]).  In this respect, the Romantic 
school does not merely practice interpretive excess and superimpose onto works subjective sentiment, as it 
is often accused of doing.     
29 
untrained ear.  One can predict with a high degree of certainty that the latter group will display 
much greater dynamic and temporal breadth, both within any one performance and between 
them, than will the former group.   
Robert Philip (1992) has provided statistical support for this intuition.  Examining a wide 
range of recordings, he has documented a general decrease in dynamic and tempo range in 
recorded performances dating from roughly the 1930s to the present day.  According to Philip, 
recorded performances at this time began to evince tendencies toward continuous vibrato, lack of 
portamento, stricter control and lesser extremes of tempo, avoidance of certain types of rubato, 
and so on.  These tendencies in turn betray a more general proclivity for greater “power, firmness, 
clarity, control, literalness, and evenness of expression, and [an aversion to] informality, looseness, 
and unpredictability” (1992, 229).   
Consider, for instance, his findings in the related arenas of tempo flexibility and tempo 
rubato.  In surveying recordings of Elgar’s First Symphony, for example, he notes that Elgar, who 
himself conducted and recorded the work (Web Ex. 2), fluctuates the tempo throughout the 












Table I-1: Elgar Symphony No. 1, fourth movement: tempo comparisons (after Philip [1992, 26]) 
(tempo markings refer to half-note beat; original = 84) 
 
rehearsal number 118 120 130 134 
London Symphony Orch. 
cond. Elgar (1963) 
108 100 180 96 
Philharmonia 
cond. Barbirolli (1963) 
76 84 76 80 
London Phil.  
cond. Boult (1967) 
80 88 80 84 
London Phil.  
cond. Solti (1972) 
96 100 76 108 
London Phil. 
cond. Barenboim (1974) 
88 88 68 88 
 
The more modern performances he surveys, dating from 1963–1974, “do not take the movement 
at a constant speed, but the changes of tempo are almost invariably less extreme” (1992, 27).  He 
also notes here, as elsewhere, that more recent performers, when they do alter tempo, are for some 
reason more inclined to ritard than to accelerando.  After revealing similar trends in numerous 
other works—solo, chamber, and orchestral—he soundly concludes, “a greater range of tempo 
within movements was generally used in the 1920s and 1930s than in modern performances” 
(1992, 35).  The range was also greater between the movements of a multi-movement work: “in pre-
war performances, fast movements were often very fast, so that the contrast between fast and slow 
movements was very great.  In modern performance, fast movements are usually more moderate in 
pace, so that the difference between fast and slow movements is less clearly defined” (ibid.).17 
                                                
17 He does acknowledge that, in some cases, pre-war performers might have chosen faster tempi in order to 
fit the music onto one side of a 78 r.p.m. record.  Still, he notes, there are many examples from this period 
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Tempo rubato—basically, a more localized and continuous application of Philip’s “tempo 
flexibility”—is likewise employed to a much greater extent in recorded pre-war performances than 
in recorded post-war performances.  This is true both of “wholesale rubato” (my term), in which all 
parts shift the tempo in sync, and of “contrametric rubato” (Rosenblum’s term [1988, 362–92]), in 
which various parts (normally the two hands of a pianist) are out of sync—one proceeds in a 
continuous tempo, the other pushes or pulls against it.18  While wholesale rubato is commonly 
used by modern performers (if to a lesser degree than historical performers), contrametric rubato is 
not.  But the latter is ubiquitous among early twentieth-century pianists, and used ubiquitously by 
them within particular pieces, as we will see below.  Philip says, “like the early twentieth-century 
tendency to accelerate, [contrametric rubato] has been firmly discouraged in the late twentieth 
century, and failure to play the left and right hands together is now generally regarded as 
carelessness.19  But until the 1920s, many pianists, particularly those of the older generation 
(Paderewski, Pachmann, Rosenthal, et al.) made a habit of this non-synchronisation” (1992, 47).  
As one example, Philip notes Paderewski’s performance of the theme of Schubert’s B@ Impromptu, 
                                                
of records containing very fast performances that leave room at the end of a side, in which cases “there is no 
reason to doubt that the performers were close to their normal tempos,” the ones at which they would 
perform off record (1992, 36).   
18 Hudson (1994) aligns contrametric rubato with “earlier” rubato, wholesale rubato with “later” rubato.  Of 
course, the two types may be used in conjunction. 
19 I would add that modern pianists largely abstain from accelerando because they are taught from the earliest 
stage that “rushing” is bad.    
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in which he frequently staggers his hands.  Edwin Fischer and Arthur Schnabel, by comparison, 
play the theme in a much more straightforward manner, neither noticeably dislocating the hands.   
Scriabin’s performance of his own Op. 11, no. 13 (Web Ex. 3), which I analyzed above, 
provides a vivid example of the radical temporal differentiation characteristic of the earliest 
recorded performers.20  Leikin’s Example 3.6 (2011), reproduced as my Ex. I-8, features a tempo  
                                                
20 Some view these rhythmic “distortions” as stemming from the vagaries of the Welte-Mignon piano roll, 
on which Scriabin recorded this prelude.  While this issue is beyond the scope of my discussion, suffice to 
say that, while the Welte is somewhat deficient in capturing a wide dynamic range and touch (a deficiency 
to which Leikin attributes the diminished impact of Scriabin’s performances on the modern listener), it is 
fairly accurate in capturing temporal nuances.  (Incidentally, for a fascinating cultural analysis of the player 
piano, see Taylor [2007], who traces its evolution from a gimmicky gadget, a physical commodity; to a do-it-
yourself tool, a vehicle of democratization; to a medium for abstract music, for promoting art music as a 
cultural commodity; to a medium for extolling and fetishizing great performers.)  It is thus preferable to 
regard Scriabin’s rhythmic nuances as redressing what William Rothstein grandiosely terms “the Great 
Nineteenth-Century Rhythm Problem” (1989, 184).  Rothstein argues that the popularity in that period of 
short piano pieces for the amateur musician, usually based on popular folk or dance styles, entailed a 
tendency toward "too duple a hypermeter,” and toward four-square phrase rhythm, in contrast to the more 
fluid phrase rhythm of the Classical era.  Dodson (2012), following Krebs (1999), suggests that composers 
like Schumann and Chopin mitigate this problem compositionally by using metric dissonance, among 
other techniques, and Romantic-style pianists, such as Horowitz, do so by foregrounding such metric 
dissonance by means of desynchronization and rubato.  With respect to Scriabin’s compositional style, 
Leikin states that he “has often been chided for dryness of musical expression caused by the literal or 
sequential repeats of two- and four-measure symmetries” (2011, 27).  But this is countered by Scriabin’s 
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Example I-8: Scriabin’s tempo fluctuations in his performance of Prelude, Op. 11, no. 13 (Leikin’s Figure 




                                                
rubato, which is “unquestionably the most striking feature of his performance. . . .  Scriabin’s tempos are 




graph as well as a transcription that clearly reveal the “liberties” Scriabin took with his own score.  
Leikin notes in particular:  
• Scriabin’s dramatic accelerando into m. 17; 
• the waxing and waning of tempo mirroring the rising and falling of the melodic contour 
(which are also mirrored by crescendi and diminuendi); 
• the many rolled chords and desynchronization of parts, both of which highlight the 
polyphonic layers of the texture; 
• the localized articulation, despite the overarching slur in the score: “Scriabin’s 
performing slurs divide the treble and bass lines into much shorter motifs” (2011, 60);  
35 
• the alteration and addition of pitches.  
 
A quantitative comparison of this performance with more modern ones is hardly needed.  
Clearly, the rhythmic style that Scriabin’s performance typifies is now largely extinct.  I think this is 
a real loss.21  Of course, some might argue that we should no more regret the loss of an archaic 
performance style than we should the fact that modern-day composers no longer compose like J. S. 
Bach.  Fair enough, but I have two concerns.  The first is ideological.  As Philip suggests above, 
musicians and teachers do not merely abstain from this style, which is of course their perogative, 
                                                
21 This is no place for an extensive analysis of the cultural conditions that might account for the narrowing 
of interpretive scope in the modern era, but one obvious reason is the perfectionistic ideal that digitally 
edited recordings arguably instill.  Adorno diagnosed this tendency early on: he deems Arturo Toscanini’s 
performance of Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony as suffering “from an absence of internal tension—as if 
with the first note everything had been decided in advance, as with a gramophone record, instead of 
gradually coming into being.  It was as if the interpretation had already turned into its mechanical transmission” 
(1999b, 43, my italics).  The stamp of technology upon live performances is clearly visible when performers 
treat pieces as foregone conclusions, as today they so often do.  Philip echoes Adorno in saying, “the 
changes in recording and the recording studio have in turn fed back into the concert-hall.  If pre-war 
recordings are remarkably like live performances, many late twentieth-century live performances are 
remarkably like recordings” (1992, 231).  Similarly, with respect to modern Chopin performance, James 
Methuen-Campbell bemoans   
a uniformity of interpretation that perhaps results from the influence of the recording industry.  
With the ever-improving technology of sound reproduction there is a consequent demand for 
playing of the highest technical finish.  In attaining this, the pianist generally sacrifices spontaneity, 
which is a very important factor in conveying the concentrated poetry of the mazurkas and the 
improvisatory mood found in many of the late works (1992, 204–205).  
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but they generally dismiss it as eccentric or manneristic, as a mere historical curiosity.  In other 
words, this style is implicitly framed as a deviation from, as other to, what is held to be a 
normative, universally intelligible style of interpretation.  The problem, therefore, is not the 
preference for a modernist, structuralist aesthetic per se, but rather that this aesthetic is falsely held 
to be non-contingent and non-ideological.  The second problem, in my view, is that a relative lack 
of moment-to-moment rhetorical differentiation drastically compromises the ability of the 
performer to educe and express the various structural and narrative possibilities that inhere in any 
musical work.  That is, if we equate the work not with the most obvious notational properties of 
the score but rather with a broad realm of potentialities as to structure and sense, and if 
interpretation is charged with telling a story of how the musical structure unfolds, then freedom 
and heterogeneity will be integral to the interpretive act.  Just as one can hardly convey the sense of 
a story without continual inflections of vocal intonation and pacing, neither can the performer 
without continual inflections of dynamics, tempo, and touch.22    
  
The Hegemony of Analysis  
These last thoughts point to the role of analysis.  If we view the work as a repository more of 
potentialities than of fixed properties, analysis cannot be reduced to a fact-finding endeavor.  
Rather, it would have to be considered a mode of interpretation and actualization, coequal with, 
rather than conceptually prior to, performance.  This assertion flies in the face of early essays in 
                                                
22 Schoenberg suggests that changes of musical emotion dictate those of tempo, just as changes of human 
emotion inevitably entail those of a person’s inner tempo: “Who is able to say convincingly ‘I love you’, or 
‘I hate you’, without his pulse registering?” (1975, 321). 
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the subfield of performance/analysis.  Two such studies, Narmour (1988) and Berry (1989), place 
the two domains in an asymmetrical relationship.  Presuppositions informing their work might be 
syllogized as follows:  
(i) Rational endeavors are epistemologically prior to, more important than sensuous and 
intuitive endeavors, and thus licensed to constrain them in some sense.23 
(ii) Analysis is a rational endeavor, performance a sensuous and intuitive one.   
_______ 
(iii) Analysis is epistemologically prior to, more important than performance and thus 
licensed to constrain it in some sense.  
 
That is, both writers presuppose that performance must somehow rely upon or defer to a 
preexistent analysis in order to be interpretively valid.  The prime imperative of performance, on 
this view, is to express structural relationships.  Since the latter, according to these writers, can be 
objectively derived, performances can be objectively assessed.  Hence, Narmour speaks outright of 
performances being “correct” or “incorrect” based on their conformity or lack thereof to a correct 
analysis.  Cone (1968), though less draconian in his approach and rhetoric, likewise believes the 
primary duty of interpretation is to express pre-decided structure, in particular the rhythmic 
structure (“rhythmic life”) as derived from analysis. 
If these analysts insist the performer play the piece in a particular way, others insist she do 
nothing but execute the score faithfully and neutrally, under the assumption that structural ideas 
inhere the notes, such that one need only play the correct notes in order to transmit a structural 
idea.  Consider, for example, Leonard Meyer’s analysis of the opening of the D-minor Fugue from 
                                                
23 Recall Parmer’s critique of this position above.   
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the Well-Tempered Clavier, Book 2 (Ex. I-9).  In it, he locates several possible melodic patterns.  As 
shown in the upper staves of the example, these are primarily (a) an arpeggiation of a D-minor 
triad with intervening passing tones and (b) a sequence of fourth-leaps followed by a scalar passage 
descending from D5 that fills the gap created by those leaps.  He then admonishes, “If the richness 
and complexity of these intertwining implicative structures is to be preserved, the fugue should be 
performed as ‘neutrally’ as possible. . . .  Because none of the subpatterns should be thought of as 
being dominant, no special articulation or phrasing is called for” (1973, 149–50).  
I would counter this statement on at least two grounds.  First, how is it possible to play 
“neutrally”?  Even if the keyboardist were to play the passage at a single dynamic and tempo, surely 
his choice of dynamic and tempo would evince some stance toward, and affect our perception of, 
the musical relationships.  But second and more importantly, why would Meyer think that playing 
neutrally—taken here to denote a relative lack of differentiation—would guarantee the 
“preservation” or perception of the relationships he posits?  He clearly presupposes that these 
relationships are objectively present in the music, built into the notes.  As such, the performer 
need only play the notes, with minimal interpretive “intervention,” and these relationships will 
automatically be apparent.  Yet, I would object, the melodic patterns Meyer discerns are less 
objective facts than potentialities, possible melodic shapes that would have to be projected by the 
performer—by means of the subtle yet distinctive use of dynamics, tempo, and articulation—to be 
actualized.  (I will develop this point extensively in the next chapter.)  Moreover, given the multiple 
melodic trajectories Meyer notes, it would seem sensible to choose one in order to orientate the 
listener.  To refrain from interpretation is not to afford the listener a richer experience but a 
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vaguer one.  Meyer’s subtext is well-taken—“don’t play this passage in an overly fussy way”—but 
that is a far cry from avoiding interpretation altogether.   
 
 
Example I-9: J. S. Bach, subject of the Fugue in D minor, Well-Tempered Clavier, Book II (analysis after 




*  *  * 
In the past two decades or so, theorists have grown increasingly resistant to this hegemonic 
scheme.  Some, while still charging performance with expressing structure, will deny that this 
structure is a priori, the sole property of the music analyst.  Rather, they believe that a performer 
can intuitively arrive at a compelling reading of the structure of a piece, and thus that performance 
can influence analytical understanding as much as the reverse.  On this view, performance and 
analysis stand in a symmetrical relationship relative to the work, each capable of realizing its 
potentialities and of offering equally valid interpretations.  I have already cited Lester (1995) as 
evincing this view.  Here are some others, surveyed chronologically: 
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•Both Howell (1992) and Nolan (1994) offer evenhanded expositions on the ineluctable 
tension between analysis and performance, even as the two domains share common 
ground.  
• Fisk (1996 and 1997) posits that strict analysis is not a requisite for performance.  
Rather, the experience of interpreting and physically rendering a piece can entail implicit 
analytical decisions, and may subsequently lead performers more consciously to formulate 
analytical insights.  He also posits the category of the “performer’s analysis,” which is less 
formal and systematic than a strict analysis, will arise in conjunction with a 
“characterological” analysis of the piece, and will conduce more than strict analysis to 
physically rendering the piece—it will arise from and cater to the particular needs of the 
performer.   
• Rothstein (1995) guards against excessively conforming to an analysis, such as bringing 
out all instances of a motive (in an inner voice, say), fugal entries, Urlinie tones,24 and the 
like.  In his view, if one wants to convey a musical narrative, one must not give away too 
much too soon.  
• Cook advocates “the mutuality of the analyst/performer, as against the hegemonic 
relationship assumed by Berry and Narmour” (1999a, 245).  
• Schachter (2001) asserts that analytical and performance-based perspectives complement 
each other: analysts must possess a performative disposition to guard against excessive 
                                                
24 Schenker himself—whose views on performance Rothstein elsewhere explains (1984)—bids the 
performer not to follow “the Urlinie slavishly and pluck it out of the diminution, just to communicate it to 
the listener” (1927, 109).  
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abstraction, while performers must go beyond the surface and grapple with higher-level 
complexities. 
• Other, more practical studies that, to my mind, evince a sensible, equitable approach to 
performance and analysis are Schmalfeldt (1985 and 2011), Larson (1993), and 
McClelland (2004). 
 
Several studies, naturally, fall in between these poles of the hegemonic and balanced.  Hatten 
(2010), for example, wants to propose “theoretical approaches to musical interpretation [that] do 
not neglect issues of immediate concern to performers, or direct engagement with the moment of 
real-time performance” (50).  To this end, he focuses on musical tropes, topics, and gestures, all of 
which “can help close the gap between analysis and performance, by highlighting those expressively 
motivated syntheses of greatest relevance to performers” (53).  Yet, in his subsequent analysis of 
Chopin’s Fourth Ballade, he strictly polices the performer’s tempo choices, thus limiting, in my 
view, the performer’s capacity for gestural and topical expression.  Of the barcarolle-like second 
theme, for example, he asserts that, “again, minimizing any interior rubato in the performance of 
the barcarolle’s metric gesture will allow the expressivity of melodic line and phrase structure to 
prevail over subjective dynamic bulges” (62, my italics).  “Minimizing any,” in my reading, equates 
with “no rubato,” and rubato, in turn, apparently equates with self-indulgently subjective 
intrusions.  
 More generally, other writers, such as Parmer, as discussed, and also Carolyn Abbate, desire 
to counterbalance abstract musical knowledge of any kind, not just theoretical knowledge per se, 
with the real experience of the performer; they extol performance-based rather than intellectual 
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knowledge.  Though an admirable aim, in discussing the need to lend credence to performance 
knowledge without really specifying what such knowledge would look like, they ultimately mystify 
it.  That is, they render it an abstraction, which is precisely contrary to their aim.  Parmer (2007) 
says what performance knowledge is not, or not exclusively—namely, “how-to” knowledge—but 
does not say what it actually is.  Abbate (2004) implicitly builds on Susan Sontag’s (1967) rejection 
of the notion that artworks mean something other than what they are—that, in other words, 
artistic meaning is primarily symbolic or mimetic.  Abbate calls this hermeneutic mentality 
“gnostic,” over against the “drastic,” which is the irreducibly, ineffably carnal experience of live 
performance.25  She, like Parmer, bemoans the bias in musicology toward the gnostic to the virtual 
exclusion of the drastic.  Musicology, she admits, has dealt with performance practice and recorded 
performance, but not “one-off” live performances.  The irony is, her protracted, rather abstruse 
defense of performance against institutionally sanctioned knowledge ultimately reproduces the 
very musicological abstraction of which she claims to be skeptical.  Moreover, we walk away 
                                                
25 This formulation echoes Edward Said’s celebrated formulation of “performance as an extreme occasion,” 
in his eponymous essay (1991).  The crucial difference is that whereas Abbate celebrates the drastic nature 
of the concert experience, of the performer’s corporeality in particular, Said sees in it a possible vehicle of 
domination.  The virtuoso in his view does not so much beneficently connect with his audience as 
overwhelms it: “Whether we focus on the repeatable mechanically reproduced performance available on 
disc . . . or on the alienating social ritual of the concert itself, with the scarcity of tickets and the staggeringly 
brilliant technique of the performer achieving roughly the same distancing effect, the listener is in a 
relatively weak and not entirely admirable position” (1991, 3).  Said proceeds to portray “the listener’s 
poignant speechlessness as he/she faces an onslaught of such refinement, articulation, and technique as 
almost to constitute a sadomasochistic experience” (ibid.).   
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without a clear picture of what performing knowledge is, or worse, we worry it might turn out to 
be something rather trivial.  As Hatten says, “but what does Abbate offer to displace the ‘cryptic 
truths’ of every form of analysis?  Only her own testimony as the accompanist for a singer, in which 
she reports such personal reactions as ‘doing this really fast is fun’” (2010, 50).      
Abbate’s perhaps unconscious ambivalence toward the performer also comes through in 
her stance toward recording technology.  A possible drawback of digitized music, I believe, is that it 
has a disembodied quality; it creates the impression that the music has no performer, that the 
music is just there, ready-made.26  Naomi Cumming states, “It is obvious that musical sounds are 
not, in origin, an impersonal or accidental event, that they do not come to exist in the 
disembodied medium of a CD without the action of a performer’s body, but technological 
intervention can induce [us to forget] this fact” (2000, 21).  She proceeds to note that such 
“complicity in technical illusion” (ibid.) is evident in people’s surprise upon hearing a well-known 
artist in person, having previously only heard her on recordings.  Cumming recounts one such 
response to Midori, who came across to a particular critic as having a rather weak sound live 
compared to her stronger recorded, presumably digitally enhanced sound.  Yet, as Cumming 
notes, Midori, like any well-known performer, is a persona, one constructed precisely through such 
doctored sound:  
                                                
26 Recall Adorno’s view, which is that the record, though it potentially reifies music, is justified by 
possessing its own modicum of materiality—it is not transparent to the music it records.  From an 
Adornian perspective, then, the CD, and even more so the MP3 file, are suspect due to a patent lack of 
materiality—neither has the grooves that for Adorno made the record an admirable kind of musical text in 
its own right.       
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the engineers have effectively created for her a musical ‘body’ and identity. . . .  They are able to 
effect this illusion because the characteristics of sounds are the aural ‘marks’ of bodily action. . . .  
Although a listener’s attention, when playing a CD, may not be directed to bodily actions . . . the 
impression of a ‘personality’ can be gained subliminally through the markers in sound of what 
seem to be the performer’s characteristic physical responses.  Sonic illusion is not, then, the 
innocent cleaning up of a musical surface, but the construction of a personality (ibid., 22).27     
 
Hence, if the digital medium potentially anonymizes and disembodies the actual performer, it also 
potentially creates for her a virtual presence, it paints a picture of bodily action that the listener 
attributes to an imagined persona.  
Cumming thus shows two sides of digital technology, but Abbate seems to acknowledge 
only one.  She maintains that digitized music “hardly shatters the subject except in the most literal 
way.  Masking or suppressing perception of individual performers serves, in fact, to enhance a 
sense of the figural subject. . . .  Subjectivity is dispersed, relocated, and made mysterious . . . but it 
is by no means dissolved” (1991, 14).28  She thus agrees with Cumming’s point that a persona can 
be sonically constructed, but she does not seem bothered by the possibility that media potentially 
efface the actual performer.  In other words, in 1991 she seems comfortable with the lack (or 
illusory lack) of precisely that element—a real body—she so extols in 2004.  Perhaps her views on 
                                                
27 The idea of performing oneself, over and beyond performing the piece or work one is playing, is, of course, 
a central topos in performance studies, as discussed in Auslander (2001, 2004, 2006a and b).  I will return 
to this idea momentarily.   
28 This statement must be understood in light of Abbate’s broader contention that pieces are populated “by 
multiple, decentered voices localized in several invisible bodies” (1991, 13). 
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performance changed in the interim.  In any case, I think we should never be complacent about 
the very real people behind classical performance, the very real labor such performance requires.  
While I agree that pieces commonly intimate several virtual personae, I also think that, in 
performed (as opposed to electronic) music, the performer, her presence, is very real—it does not 
fold under the weight of the virtual personae the music projects.  
Another, somewhat contradictory stance is found in Cook (2001 and elsewhere), where he 
asserts that the score is nothing but a script, a working tool for the performer, one that coordinates 
his activities and his social interactions with other performers and the audience.  “Whereas to 
think of a Mozart quartet as a ‘text’ is to construe it as a half-sonic, half-ideal object reproduced in 
performance, to think of it as a ‘script’ is to see it as choreographing a series of real-time, social 
interactions between players” (2001, parag. 15).  In this model, performances relate to the work 
not in the “vertical,” veridical sense of realizing it more or less truthfully or accurately, but in a 
“horizontal” sense: the work comprises merely a series of performances, each of which derives 
significance from its relation to other performances.29   
Auslander (2006a) is rightly skeptical of this stance:  
Describing a musical work as a set of parameters for a social interaction among musicians, rather 
than an ideal object to be reproduced through performance, Cook goes against the grain of the 
musicological tradition.  But his positing of the musical work as that which is performed ultimately 
leads to a privileging of the work, now renamed as a script, which remains consonant with that 
tradition (2006a, 101).   
                                                
29 This view is to be distinguished from Goodman’s (1976), which is that a work is nothing other than the 
collection of performances in perfect compliance with a score.   
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Auslander proposes an alternative view—that we perform not a script-cum-work but rather an 
identity, a persona.  “The direct object of the verb to perform need not be something—it can also 
be someone, an identity rather than a text” (2006a, 101, his italics).  
While I agree with his critique of Cook, I do not view Auslander’s solution as entirely 
satisfactory.  For I believe we do indeed perform something, not just someone, when we interpret a 
score and lend it sonoric form.  That something is neither a metaphysical work that transcends 
performance nor merely a script, instructions for the performer.  For, on the one hand, we do not 
perform a work as something external, because performance is in some sense part of that work.  
On the other hand, the score does not merely serve performance (as according to Small and, at 
least ostensibly, Cook).  To think so is to practice a reverse-discourse that preserves the underlying 
hegemonic binarism of work/performance while inverting the terms.  Rather, as I have stated, 
performers help create a work in performing a score and realizing its multiple connotations and 
potentialities.  Performers do many things in relation to a score—educe, unpack, crystallize, 
elucidate, actualize, exemplify, concretize—in the process co-creating along with it the musical 
work of which the score is a trace. 
Moreover, unraveling the complexities and ambiguities that musical scores by their very 
nature entail requires some form of analytical insight or awareness.  In my view, analysis and 
performance are distinct yet coequal and analogous attempts to elucidate the score, to present one 
or some of its many possible structural and narrative meanings.  Analysis and performance are 
coequal and analogous in that they ultimately aim, or should aim, toward the same goal: 
interpretive insight, a compelling way to hear and understand the piece on a particular occasion (a 
particular recital, lecture, or lecture-recital).  In this endeavor, good analysis draws upon what I 
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believe to be its innately artistic dimension in addition to the intellectual one with which it is more 
readily associated.  Good performers, conversely, draw upon some analytical awareness, formalized 
or not, in addition to the more experiential and artistic dimension with which they are more 
readily associated.  In this approach, I strive to circumvent the pitfalls of both the “gnostic” model, 
where performance is deemed subservient to theory, and the “drastic” model, where theory or any 
other intellectual pursuit is deemed wholly irrelevant to performance.  The ideal, I feel, is that 
analysis inform performance in a non-dictatorial way, in a way that opens up fresh, creative 
possibilities.  To this end, I advocate a more flexible and imaginative use of analysis, an approach 
that renders analytical insights more amenable to the kinds of things that a performer can 
express—namely, bodily states and emotional and psychological processes.  How can established 
analytical models be employed so as to expand rather than constrict the range of cogent 
interpretive possibilities?  My dissertation attempts to answer this question both theoretically and 
by analyzing various works from the tonal canon.   
 
3. AN OVERVIEW 
Here I offer a sense of how the above ideas will be mobilized, organized, and fleshed out in three 
of my four main chapters.  I will not synopsize Chapter 3, since it is an extended analysis of a 
single work—Beethoven’s String Quartet in C minor, Op. 18, no. 4, first movement—an analysis 
that will serve to flesh out the ontological and methodological claims of the first two chapters.30 
                                                
30 For that matter, Chapter 4 offers a large-scale analysis of a single work as well, Schumann’s Frauenliebe 
und- leben—“Du Ring an Meinem Finger,” in particular.  In this respect, the dissertation divides somewhat 




To reiterate, structural and emotive properties do not inhere in notation and are not self-evident; 
notation necessarily harbors multiple possible meanings.  In this sense, interpretation is intrinsic 
to the musical work.  Chapter 1 places this view against the backdrop of opposing ideologies, ones 
that view interpretation as extrinsic to the work, as having to defer to truths that supposedly inhere 
in a self-complete work or in historical circumstances surrounding the work.      
The authentic-performance movement is an outgrowth of this view.  I view this movement 
as an extension of the positivistic musicology criticized, most famously, by Tomlinson (1984), 
Kerman (1985), and Subotnik (1991).  This movement has become something of an easy target, 
but I would be remiss not to touch on it, invoking in particular Taruskin’s (1995) celebrated 
critique.  I supplement Taruskin by offering an alternative to the modernist mentality with which, 
according to Taruskin, authentic-performance practitioners approach music history.  Namely, I 
discuss five composers, ranging from J. S. Bach to Lou Harrison, who evidently conceived of their 
compositional products not as fixed but as intertwined with performance—more so than is 
commonly assumed, especially of iconic, canonical composers.  The potentially self-contradictory 
aspect of my critique, which I might as well acknowledge upfront, is that, in countering what I see 
as provincial historicism, I myself seek recourse to historical evidence.  Nonetheless, I feel that, so 
long as one cannot and should not entirely ignore the historical context surrounding 
compositions, one does well to recognize that such context is weighted much more heavily on the 
                                                
Nonetheless, the first two feature several analyses, the fourth devotes large sections to theoretical 
meditation.     
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side of interpretive liberty than on that of interpretive constraint.  
As problematic as the authentic-performance movement—if less well known—are the 
music ontologies posited by Kivy (1993) and Walton (1988), among others, who view a work as a 
kind of Platonic ideal, complete in all essential respects prior to its materialization in performance.  
In this sense, they implicitly frame performance—to offer my own metaphor—as a kind of 
embellishing variation on a theme (read: work).  In response to these models, I propose what I see 
as a more fruitful application of the theme/variation metaphor to the musical work/performance: 
I will suggest a theory of retroactive thematicity for which I have argued elsewhere (Swinkin [2012]).  
Here, the theme—particularly in the variation sets of Beethoven and Brahms—is less a concrete 
melodic-harmonic scaffold than an abstract repository of motivic potentialities that variations 
actualize to greater or lesser degrees, thus retroactively determining what the (non-obvious) 
thematic properties actually are.  By analogy, a musical work is a repository of structural and 
corresponding emotive/narrative potentialities, as implied by the score’s notations, that 
performances actualize.  Performances on this view are not supplemental to a work that is always 
already complete, but are integral to it.  Performances continuously define, or redefine, what a 
work in fact is—which is to say, what a work can become.31     
          This alternate ontology has a strong counterpart in the phenomenological reader-response 
theory of Iser (1978) and, to a lesser degree, the hermeneutic theory of Gadamer (1960).  Iser 
frames the literary work as precisely such a repository of potentialities and, insofar as the reader 
actualizes these, he deems the reader and act of reading necessary rather than ancillary components 
                                                
31 Thom (2007) also draws certain parallels between variations of a theme and performances of a work.  
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of the work.  Gadamer argues that the text or work we seek to interpret is not frozen in a particular 
historical moment but rather continues to evolve into the present, such that we not only can but 
indeed must utilize our present perspectives in order to parse the work.  For Iser, the gap between 
text and reader is no impediment to interpretation but rather a precondition of it; ditto for 
Gadamer, regarding the gap between past and present.  Finally, Adorno’s Towards a Theory of 
Musical Reproduction (2006), at least in my reading, provides a musical counterpart to both of these 
models.  In it I find a liberating model of the musical work, one that includes interpretation as an 
essential component and that fosters the kind of interpretive breadth and flexibility for which I am 
arguing. 
I conclude the chapter by considering some concrete interpretive corollaries of these views. 
The performer, I suggest, needs to employ his three primary domains—tempo, articulation, and 
dynamics—to the extent necessary to convey structural sense and emotive-narrative meaning.  
Adorno (2006) himself recommends opting for dynamic extremes, rather than mezzo forte, as the 
“default,” in order to express human sentience.  Inevitably, Adorno’s musical preferences are 
inseparable from his broader ethical and ideological concerns, and so I enumerate some of these, 
as I think they are relevant to our current musical culture.  These concerns bear on musical 
commodification and subjective autonomy.  As to the latter, I posit, in an Adornian spirit, a model 
of interpretive autonomy, in which the performer/performance is, or should be, autonomous in 
relation to the score in some respects.  This means, somewhat paradoxically, that the more freely 
the performer approaches the score, the more easily he will be able to illuminate structural-emotive 
facets of the score.  
Such interpretive freedom, however, as I have been implying, is musical efficacious only if 
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wed with musical intelligence, with a keen cognizance of the score’s various structural potentials.  
Hence, music analysis plays an integral role in the interpretive process.  It is to this role that I turn 
in Chapter 2.   
 
Chapter 2 
Here I propose that analysis is best understood not as a truth-seeking endeavor but rather as a 
means by which to expose various structural possibilities, ambiguities, and aporias that necessitate 
the interpreter’s participation.  Yet, Schenkerian analysis in particular is often used with objectivist 
pretensions, with respect to both score and performance.  Regarding the latter, both Burkhart 
(1983) and Folio (1992), for example, beseech the performer to “bring out” the underlying features 
exposed by their voice-leading analyses.  In doing so, they presuppose that their analyses disinter 
the truth of the composition, which the performer must somehow project.  The approach these 
writers represent (at least in these instances) impoverishes both Schenkerian analysis and 
performance—it reduces the former to a fact-finding endeavor, the latter to a fact-expressing one.  
I argue, by contrast, that higher structural levels are not truths to be expressed, perhaps not even 
actual pitches in the piece (much less ones that need be brought out), but constructs that imbue 
the foreground with particular dynamic qualities and thus elicit particular interpret shadings.  In 
other words, I advocate that the performer sensuously shape foreground details in accordance with 
their relationship to higher structural levels.   
This approach finds support in the rich philosophical tradition in which Schenkerian 
theory is ensconced.  I suggest three models from German philosophy with which Schenkerian 
theory has been, or could be, aligned: Goethean organicism (Neff [2006] and Pastille [1990]), 
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Kantian transcendental apperception (Korsyn [1988]), and the Freudian dreamwork.  The last of 
these entails a hidden meaning that must be excavated by the analyst: for Freud, the latent 
dream/unconscious is the truth; for Schenker, the Ursatz, he sometimes declares, is the truth.  Yet, 
the Ursatz can be viewed more generously, as analogous to, or indicative of, the aforementioned 
Kantian faculty, by which the listener unifies a manifold.  The Ursatz, on this view, is less a static 
truth underlying appearances than the unifying force of consciousness infusing appearances, 
rendering them coherent.  In this way, the Ursatz is happily compatible with the diversity and 
particularity of musical surfaces, its generality is but “a foil for the sensed particular” (Van Den 
Toorn [1995, 55]).  This stance, I argue, is in turn more compatible with the (coherent) 
differentiation and particularity that, in my view, is the aim of interpretation to exploit.  
As for Schenker’s own views on performance, these resist easy summation, and may not 
even amount to a single, coherent stance.  For, on the one hand, these views are dispersed 
throughout his entire analytical oeuvre; on the other, the one treatise he devoted exclusively to 
performance (Schenker [1911, pub. 2000]) was never completed.  Nevertheless, as gleaned from his 
various and sundry remarks, and from his editorial piano fingerings (as parsed in Schachter [1975], 
Rothstein [1984] and Swinkin [2007]), his stance seems to be quite detail-oriented and bottom-
up—quite at odds with the top-down, structuralist approach with which he is associated, and by 
which pedagogues sometimes rationalize imposing a “long line” upon pieces.   
 This incongruity prompts Cook to declare, “the relationship between analytical theory and 
performance practice is far from the unproblematical mapping assumed by the page-to-stage 
approach” (2010, 7).  Indeed, as both Maus (1999b) and myself (2008) have previously argued, it is 
dubious whether performances can in fact convey propositional content—or even if they could, 
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whether they should.  Of course, it is possible that a performance subliminally conveys to the 
listener something of the analytical insight by which it is informed and influenced, but that is not 
its primary function—analyses serve performances, not the other way around.  Performances may 
derive a measure of cogency and coherence from the analytical viewpoint they adopt (wittingly or 
not), but their job is not to communicate such a viewpoint as a piece of abstract information.  
Rather than communicate or instantiate analysis, the role of performance, Maus and I separately 
contend, is to respond to analysis.  Of course, this ensures no consistency from one performance to 
another, and that, in my view, is a good thing.  The variability with which performances respond 
to any one analytical insight actualizes and enriches the work, which always allows for divergent 
realizations. 
Hence, rather than regard an analysis as a factual assertion, I prefer to view it as an implicit 
recommendation for how to hear, and by extension, perform a piece.  In this model, analytical 
observations do not describe how we actually hear a piece, nor prescribe how we should, but rather 
suggest a way we could.  Analysis thus becomes a performative rather than factual enterprise, a 
point Cook (1989a and 1989b) makes nicely.  And one way to allow this (following Swinkin 
[2008]) is to recover the physical and emotive states for which Schenkerian and other analytical 
constructs are arguably metaphorical, as such states can be readily embodied in performance.  
Moreover, interrelating such states as the expression of a single persona (or perhaps of several) can 
engender a musical narrative that, in turn, motivates a compelling interpretation, a universe of 
interrelated particulars that is a hallmark of narrative generally.  Another facet of this approach is 
using analysis to disinter various structural problems or ambiguities the performer resolves, or, in 
some cases, retains or even exacerbates.  In both these ways, analysis implicates and necessitates the 
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interpreter.  Analysis both offers opportunities for sensuous embodiment and crystallizes the 
structural problems the pitches and rhythms of a score potentiate. 
Here, in summary, are the three main points regarding the role of analysis in performative 
interpretation that Chapter 2 pursues:  
1. Higher structural levels can be seen to highlight and particularize rather than reduce away 
the foreground phenomena that comprise the performer’s primary vehicle of expression. 
2. The contentual or putatively factual element of an analytical insight is far less valuable for 
the performer than the somatic or emotive schema underlying such an insight.  For 
performance cannot convey propositions but can convey, in fluctuations of sound and 
time, the somatic and expressive states connoted by such propositions.  
3. A performative analysis will be less concerned to expose static features or properties than  
to expose dynamic structural-cum-narrative problems, lacunae, and ambiguities to which 
the performer can (or even must) respond in some fashion.    
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 2 conceives of performative analysis as speaking directly to the performer’s need to express 
emotive and narrative meaning.  Chapter 4 demonstrates that performative analysis can also 
critique, or allow the performer to critique, the ostensible meaning of a work, a particular meaning 
assigned by the presence of a text, as in vocal music.  I use Schumann’s Frauenliebe und –leben—
“Du Ring an meinem Finger” in particular—as a case study.  Due to its evident misogyny, I set out 
to analyze this work in a deliberately polemical or provocative way so as to elicit performances that 
resist its apparent ideology.  
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A precedent for such a resisting performance is the New Coon Creek Girls’ cover of “Pretty 
Polly,” an Appalachian Murder Ballad, a genre that depicts the merciless killing of a woman, and 
that is usually performed with apparent indifference to the woman’s plight.  Lydia Hamessley 
(2005) cites the New Coon Creek Girls, by contrast, as giving the woman a voice through their 
arrangement—specifically, in supplying a solo violin whose expressive gestures can be seen to 
represent the woman’s sentience.  In this song, since the words are mainly those of the man (a 
composite of an apathetic third-person narrator and the homicidal character), resistance must 
occur on a non-verbal level.  In Frauenliebe, the woman would seem to speak her own words, but 
they arguably articulate a masculine ideal of female passivity within the scheme of nineteenth-
century bourgeois domesticity.  Hence, it is not surprising that the instrumental postlude, as 
analyzed by Kristina Muxfeldt (2001), is a primary site of resistance.  However, I am not content to 
relegate resistance solely to the postlude; I want it to percolate throughout the cycle, and I believe 
it does so, potentially, in the cracks and crevices of Schumann’s musical structures.  These musical 
potentialities, conjoined with a performative-analytical scheme, can generate subtexts through 
which the performer conveys resistance on a largely non-discursive level.  These inner monologues 
will yield interpretive and physical choices that telegraph resistance, on levels both large and small, 
both obvious and subtle.   
My process will be to read the musical structure as consisting of parametric crosscurrents 
that cannot be fully integrated, thus educing a potential source of unease and resistance.  In 
particular, I counterpose hierarchical and horizontal domains, the latter both motivic and melodic-
implicative.  I draw here upon a long-standing music-theoretical polemic between Schenkerians on 
the one hand and the implication-realization school of Leonard Meyer and Eugene Narmour on 
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the other.  I tap into this polemic not to unpack or arbitrate among the arguments, but solely to 
avail myself of a heuristic vehicle by which to generate resisting performances.  That is, I harness 
disciplinary tension to create interpretive tension.  More precisely, the parametric tension derived 
from this theoretical dispute will serve both to symbolize the heroine’s resistance to her 
predicament and also to induce such tension between the performers and the cycle.  The resistance 
will thus be both metaphorical and causal, iconic and indexical.  
My critique relies in no small part on an irreducible plurality of interpretations, a standard 
feminist tack: different forms of analysis and different metaphorical readings of analytical scenarios 
will yield different strains of resistance, different resistant emotions, ranging from mere 
ambivalence to outright anger and defiance.  I worked with soprano Jennifer Goltz on this project, 
and she and I offer four different interpretations along this continuum.    
The final part of this chapter meditates on the implications of this interpretive exercise for 
issues taken up in the first two, theoretical chapters, in particular regarding the hegemonic models 
of work/performance and analysis/performance.  What, if any, are the gendered dimensions of 
these models?  I will pursue the idea, somewhat cautiously, that the work, conventionally 
conceived, assumes a male-dominating stance toward the performer-as-female.  This view is 
empirically bolstered, of course, by the fact that most, if not all, canonical composers of the 
common-practice period are men and that most amateur performers, especially pianists, in the 
nineteenth century were women.  I will inevitably draw upon much feminist musicology here, by 
McClary (1990), Citron (1993), Cusick (1994a and b), Leppert (1992), and Maus (1993), among 
others.  I conclude that to catalyze performer-resistance by exploiting potential structural conflicts 
is not merely to do the aesthetic work of claiming a place for the performer in the very structure of 
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the work, but is also (as Cusick argues) to do the cultural work of countering male hegemony.  In 
this model, the performer (read: female) refuses to “disappear” in deference to—or be rendered 
wholly transparent to—the supposedly fixed ideas of the composer (read: male).   
  
4. CONCLUSION 
Here, in summary, are the principal questions with which my dissertation will grapple.  The first, 
most general one, is one I have already stated verbatim:  
1. How do a particular piece, analytically-informed or –intuitive performer(s), and engaged, 
empathic listener(s) collectively generate structural and emotional/narrative meaning?   
2. How might we model the musical work so as to include interpretation as an integral 
component?  More specifically, how might we schematize the relationship among score, 
analysis, interpretation, performance, and perception?  
3. How can music analysis be conceived or employed so as to allow for ample interpretive 
freedom, to open up numerous interpretive possibilities?   
4. What constitutes performative (illocutionary) analysis?   
5. What conception of Schenkerian theory allows for interpretive heterogeneity and 
particularity, embodiment, and musical narrative? 
6. What constitutes a resisting performance, and how might analysis be used in its service? 
7. In what respects is the work/performance hegemonic model gendered? 
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I will assay answers to these questions drawing on not just music theory and analysis 
(especially Schenkerian, formal, and motivic analysis32) but also philosophy of music, music 
sociology, historical musicology, literary theory (reader-response theory in particular), continental 
philosophy, ethnomusicology, performance and theater studies, popular music studies, and 
feminist and queer theory.  In addition to the written document, I have set up a companion 
website33 featuring audio and video recordings of, or links to, many of the performances I discuss, 
some of which are my own.  Still, since some readers may not have access to this website for 
whatever reason, I will notate the interpretive choices derived from my analyses on the scores 
themselves.   
To whom, precisely, am I speaking?  Primarily, to music theorists and musicologists who, in 
light of the recent trends in the field surveyed above, are probably already sympathetic to 
performance and interpretation, and who view it as worthy of intellectual contemplation and 
possibly even of inclusion in the domain of the musical work.  To this contingent, I endeavor to 
offer some specific strategies of performative analysis, as regards Schenkerian inquiry in particular.  
I also implicitly address musicians who consider themselves primarily performers but who are 
seeking ways to become more analytically informed and want not rigid analytical prescription but 
                                                
32 The three principal models of motivic analysis are: (a) traditional: motives are surface configurations that 
are variously permuted; (b) Schoenbergian: motives are drawn from a Grundgestalt and subject to developing 
variation; and (c) Schenkerian: motives are higher-level entities (often comprised of triadic intervals and 
linear progressions) that tend to recur from level to level (in the form of motivic parallelisms).  I shall 




rather creative collaboration.  Finally, I hope to connect with scholars in related disciplines—
ethnomusicology, performance and theater studies, feminist and critical theory—for whom 
performance, or the idea of the performative, is a central concern.  My work draws generously on 
all these disciplines and so, it is only reasonable to hope that my work gives back to them in some 
small way.  Those who are not professional music analysts will probably want to skip over the 
particularly technical parts, including the penultimate section of Chapter 2, most or all of Chapter 
3, and the middle section of Chapter 4.  That still leaves plenty of theoretical food for thought.     
 
*  *  * 
Just as I began this Introduction with a concession or caveat, so must I end with one.  My 
overarching assumption is that the performer’s job is to interpret: to find meaning in a text (or 
more precisely, in the interstice of a text and particular interpretive methodologies) and embody or 
respond to it in sound and time.  Enfolded in this assumption is another: that interpretation is a 
higher station than mere execution.  This may seem a somewhat self-evident, inevitable 
contention, but it is not.  Laurence Dreyfus (2007) reminds us that this valuation is historically 
contingent and needs to be contextualized: “When we use a word as an unthinking badge of 
identification, unaware of its history, we ignore the repertoire of meanings and nuances which 
govern its contemporary usage” (2007, 255).  C.P.E. Bach, for one, charged the performer with 
rendering notation in accordance with good taste and propriety.  In this conception, performance 
is not unthinking physical labor but neither is it a high-minded endeavor.  Others, such as Mozart, 
emphasized the need not to construe the composer’s notations but to become the composer, as it 
were—to adopt the persona of the rhetorician whose main task is to elicit particular emotional 
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responses from his audience.  The notion of interpreter as exegete emerged only later, with the rise 
of instrumental music: Beethoven’s music in particular, listeners suspected, harbored secret, 
mystical, and transcendental meanings whose decipherment called for an insightful interpreter.  
(To be clear, my stance, on which I elaborate in Chapter 2, is not that the interpreter decodes 
hidden meanings but rather than he in a sense creates or constructs meanings from notational 
potentials conjoined with an analytical apparatus.  However, the “gnostic” or hermeneutic stance is 
undeniably a precedent for the model of interpretation I avow.)   
I won’t retrace the rest of Dreyfus’s fascinating historical unfolding of the concept of 
interpretation, but suffice to say, the notion of interpretation as a meaning-finding or -making 
endeavor is contrary to the ways people used to think about performance.  I acknowledge, 
therefore, that my valorizing of interpretation is historically contingent and also potentially 
harbors elitist overtones (“conception trumps execution”) that I will endeavor to guard against.  
For I do not see interpretation and execution as fundamentally divergent enterprises, and certainly 
not as mutually exclusive.  In fact, in Chapter 1, I fondly recall Adorno’s idea that execution, 
viewed as an end in itself, paradoxically fosters interpretive insight.  Also, in Chapter 2, I argue 
that interpretive concepts, like concepts generally, are built on experiential substrata, and are thus 
naturally disposed toward physical embodiment.  In this scheme, interpretive intellection and 






CURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON INTERPRETATION AND SOME PROPOSED REMEDIES 
 
The ultimate aim of this dissertation is to demonstrate how music analysis can help the performer 
discover interesting interpretive options and ideas.  While a simple and modest aim in itself, it 
relies upon a complex network of ideological and theoretical assumptions that this opening 
chapter (along with the Introduction) makes explicit.  My dissertation is a response to aspects of 
performance, musicology, music theory, and music philosophy that I find to be questionable or 
objectionable.  I outlined three such trends (all interrelated) in the Introduction: work-centrism, 
interpretive restraint, and music-analytic hegemony.  All have roots too numerous and complex to 
exhaustively dig up here.1  I will, however, consider and critique two academic ideologies relating 
to the first two trends, saving a discussion of music analysis for Chapter 2.  These two ideologies, 
in a word, are Authenticity, as evidenced by the authentic-performance movement, and Platonism, 
as evidenced by various statements and essays on music ontology.  The former locates the “truth” 
of the work in an idealized past, the latter in some idealized, Platonic realm.   
                                                
1 I believe many of these roots are economic, political, cultural, and sociological.  Though some of these will 
arise, as inevitably they must, in parsing Adorno’s theory of musical interpretation (later in this chapter), by 
and large I will save a more thoroughgoing critique along these lines for future projects.    
 
62 
My opening discussion will thus be somewhat critical and reactive, but toward the end of it 
I transition to a more constructive mode.  Here I pose a music-ontological model that, more than 
Platonic models, fosters interpretive experimentation and specificity.  This leads me to consider, in 
Part II, theories of interpretation, both literary and musical, that buttress this ontology.  These 
works count interpretation generally as well as the interpreter’s particular perspective among the 
integral components of the artwork.  In this, they encourage the interpreter to play an active role 
in shaping the work in highly individual ways.  Part III, finally, spells out some concrete 
interpretive ramifications of all this theoretical exposition.  
 
PART I: CRITIQUE 
1.1. AUTHENTICITY 
The most famous, effective, and trenchant critique of the authentic-performance movement 
(hereafter, “authenticity movement”) is still that of Richard Taruskin (1995).  He levels the charge 
that this movement ironically arises from and evinces modernist rather than historicist precepts.  
That is, this movement shares with modernism a predilection for the impersonal, the timeless, the 
geometric, sound for its own sake, and the novel.  The last of these, I noticed, is borne out in a 
small but striking way in Nicholas Kenyon’s description of Nikolaus Harnoncourt’s 1968 
recording of Bach’s B minor Mass, which helped kick-start the authenticity movement: “it was the 
Harnoncourt Mass that made the most controversial impact, for it used not only ‘original’ 
instruments, but boys’ voices in the choir and new approaches to phrasing, balance, and 
articulation” (1988, 4, my italics).  By “new,” Kenyon presumably means “old”—he means 
putatively authentic styles of phrasing and articulation.  The infelicitous word choice (parapraxis?), 
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however, is telling: it implies that that the authenticity movement revives old, historical techniques 
exactly because they are in a sense “new”—new, that is, to modern ears.2  This is precisely 
Taruskin’s point: the sensibility that informs this movement is a modernist one, one preoccupied 
with novelty, not a historicist one.3  
This irony can play in reverse as well: not only do apparently conservative values often 
betray more progressive ones, but apparently progressive values often betray more conservative 
ones, as Taruskin himself observes in his Stanford Presidential Lecture (2009).  Here, he muses 
that applicants to the composition faculty at U.C. Berkeley (where Taruskin teaches) uniformly 
and proudly avow their music to be “transgressive.”  In doing so, they are oblivious to two ironies: 
first, transgression is the new conformity—to “transgress” in the current music-compositional 
climate is precisely to conform to what is expected of the composer (especially the academic one).  
                                                
2 Incidentally, Kenyon displays some sense of this incongruity in his very next, parenthetical statement: “It is 
of course ironic, and a comment on the whole ‘authenticity’ business, that most of its artefacts are in the 
extremely inauthentic form of recordings without audience which sound the same every time one plays 
them” (1988, 4).  
3 In a similar vein, Fredric Jameson diagnoses postmodern artistic genres, such as the pastiche in general 
and nostalgia films in particular, as representing not so much our historical past as “our ideas or cultural 
stereotypes about that past” (1983, 118).  He continues,  
Cultural production has been driven back inside the mind . . . it can no longer look directly . . . at 
the real world for the referent but must, as in Plato’s cave, trace its mental images of the world on 
its confining walls. . . .  we seem condemned to seek the historical past through our own pop 
images and stereotypes about that past, which itself remains forever out of reach (ibid.) 
To this extent, the authenticity movement is as much a postmodern phenomenon as, on Taruskin’s view, a 
modernist one.   
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Paradoxically, the transgressive artist works within well-defined constraints.4  Second, transgression 
itself is not even a new, radical value.  Taruskin reminds us that it stems from the nineteenth-
century aesthetics of autonomy.  As he explains, aesthetic autonomy had a more benign moment, 
in which art was thought merely to be hermetically sealed from the external world.  But then it had 
a more pernicious moment, in which the artist-as-hero—epitomized by Beethoven—was thought 
to rise above common humanity and effect social revolution.5  The first moment is problematic 
both in being widely assumed a self-evident, ahistorical principle and in establishing a basis for the 
second moment, for the artist’s “right” to transgress.  Taruskin laments that the romantic ideal of 
the autonomous artist, operative to this day, fosters the presumption that artists are immune to 
codes of moral conduct.  This notion has often produced “spectacular collisions” between artist 
and audience.  Artists have used their supposedly inalienable right to self-expression to justify 
unsound ethical judgments—even a disregard of public safety, as in the case of a controversial 
                                                
4 Kevin Korsyn similarly claims that (seeming) radical individualism is not incompatible with false 
uniformity or consensus—both, in fact, characterize modern society.  Taking academia as representative, he 
claims it establishes professionalized discourses that prescribe the ways in which one may be individual.  
That is, institutions at once allow for individual expression yet also carefully circumscribe the type and 
extent of it: “The type of originality that tends to be valued . . . must be classifiable according to norms” 
(2003, 26). 
5 Taruskin traces these dual ethoi of autonomy and transgression back to “esthetic” and “historical” 
narratives, respectively.  The latter “celebrates progressive (or ‘revolutionary’) emancipation and values 
artworks according to their contribution to that project.  Both are shopworn heirlooms of German 
romanticism” (2010, xv).  He denigrates Adorno and Dahlhaus, in particular, for subscribing to and 
perpetuating these values.  On the latter figure, also see Hepokoski (1991).    
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2006 production of Idomeneo in Berlin, which proceeded under a bomb threat, to cite just one of 
Taruskin’s examples (Taruskin [2009]).   
I juxtapose Taruskin’s pet peeves of authenticity and of transgression in order to note their 
converse relationship: the former is a modernist sentiment tricked out as a historicist one, the 
latter a historical (Romantic) sentiment tricked out as a modernist (or postmodernist) one.  I 
should clarify that I do not think there is anything intrinsically wrong with, for example, 
Renaissance performance values per se, or Romantic aesthetic values per se.  The problems arise 
when musicians (a) universalize contingent values, as is especially the case with Romantic 
aesthetics, or (b) peddle oppressive precepts on the basis of specious historical support, as is often 
the case with practitioners of “authenticity.”  The latter spout the necessity of historical veracity 
and validation under the false supposition that their practices are historically pure.   
Why, again, aren’t these practices “historically pure?”  Not just for the most general reason 
we have been discussing, that the impulse to fetishize historical practices emanates from modernist 
values.  More specifically, because the authenticity movement aspires to an ideal sound product 
and aims to produce it by closely adhering to an Urtext.  However, in following the letter rather 
than spirit of the score, Taruskin observes, the authenticity movement undermines its own 
enterprise.  A performer can approximate (though never precisely replicate) the practices of a 
particular era only by investing the performance with his own subjective inclinations—thus 
achieving insight, firsthand, into the subjective impulses that have become reified by notation (a 
claim Adorno will later help us fill out).  This requires no submission or strict adherence to 
scholarly evidence.  Taruskin avers, “To limit oneself to positive data is nothing but literalism, 
leading at best to an impersonation . . . of the past. . . .  And impersonation of anything, after all, 
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is the opposite of authentic” (1995, 79).6  What we need, then, for authentic authenticity is an 
honest appropriation of the past from our present perspective—an active rather than passive 
inheritance of tradition (a claim Iser and Gadamer will later help us fill out).  Perhaps Taruskin’s 
stance toward performance can be encapsulated thus: in seeking “authenticity”—not in any literal, 
historicist sense but in the sense simply of wanting to bring music to life—we ought not to be 
surreptitiously modernist but rather ought to embrace our inevitable modernity, the necessity of our 
present and subjective perspective.  
 
Precedents for a Flexible Work Concept 
Yet, this is not to recommend we abandon all historical awareness.  If capturing the spirit rather 
than letter of the composition requires us to embrace our ineluctable presentness, it may also 
require us to acknowledge historical circumstances devoid of modernist-ideological blinders.  To 
be clear, I do not mean to imply that one can ever be entirely free of ideological prejudices or that 
there is some pure historical condition that is simply waiting to be retrieved.  I only mean to say 
that to uncover the circumstances and practices surrounding pieces or works—those of virtually 
any period, in fact—is to recognize their malleability, their fluid identity, and thus the high degree 
                                                
6 Relatedly, Peter Rabinowitz suggests that historical reconstruction, ideally, should less determine the 
practices that governed an original performance than discover “the attributive screens through which 
[musical sounds] were processed by their intended listeners.”  That is, “part of ‘the music,’ as the composer 
originally intended it, lies in the commonplaces and metaphors listeners were likely to use to organize their 
aesthetic experiences” (1992, 55).   
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of interpretive freedom they support.  I will survey a handful of telling examples, proceeding 
chronologically. 
 
1) Bach’s musical culture was one of shared performance conventions—as are, in some sense, most 
musical cultures—such that he left many elements unnotated, such as embellishments upon 
repeats (a notable and beautiful exception is the Sarabande from the English Suite in A minor).  
Likewise, Bach only rarely notated articulation and dynamics in his keyboard works; typically he 
provides only short, sporadic slurs.  These elements might have been regulated by practice to some 
extent, but Bach no doubt wanted to grant the performer a generous degree of interpretive 
freedom.  Bach’s lack of sanctimony toward his own texts is also evident in his having transcribed 
many of his own pieces for alternate instrumentations—and, in The Art of Fugue and The Musical 
Offering, having left the instrumentation mostly unspecified to begin with.   
 
2) We witness similar circumstances with Beethoven, who, for example, allowed the 
“Hammerklavier” Sonata to be published in a version that excised the titanic fugal finale.  Also, as 
is well known, he composed an alternate finale to the String Quartet, op. 130, relegating the 
original finale, the Grosse Fuge, to an independent opus.  Maynard Solomon raises the possibility 
that these cases betray an aesthetic sensibility that musicologists are often reluctant to assign 
Beethoven, or composers generally—one that embraces the openness of the musical work, the 
presence of alternate solutions to compositional problems.  Solomon asks whether Beethoven 
conceived for his works “a plurality of potential, dormant alternatives, dependent for their 
emergence on intuition, contingency, and whim” and concludes that “the real point, of course, 
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may be that in late-period Beethoven no work was necessarily final, nor was any form ineluctably 
the only one capable of expressing his central ideas” (1991, 292).7  In short, Solomon implies that 
Beethoven was not as wedded to the ideal of the sacrosanct, indivisible artwork as we are. 
 
3) Jeffrey Kallberg points out that discrepancies among different versions of a single passage or 
piece by Chopin is today viewed as a problem (what he dubs the “Chopin problem”).  However, 
the musical work in Chopin’s day, he claims, was more of a social process, a byproduct of the 
interaction among Chopin, his publishers, and the public.  Hence, the work was conceived as a 
broader phenomenon, not inextricably linked with any one score or version but rather comprised 
of multiple versions.  Hence, “the sources preserving Chopin’s music reveal clearly the problematic 
nature of the notion of ‘composer’s intentions’ in general, and ‘final intentions’ in particular” 
(1996, 218).  Similarly, John Rink (2003), referring to the three different versions Chopin 
composed of the Nocturne, op. 9, no. 2, contends that to be “authentic” in this case is precisely not 
                                                
7 Barbara Barry (1995) also devotes much thought to this idea in relation to op. 130, suggesting that the 
original finale (the Grosse Fuge) functions as an oppositional agent with respect to the previous five 
movements, thus creating a bipartite framework for the piece as a whole.  The alternate finale, by contrast, 
conforms to an overarching pattern by which the more serious and somewhat contrapuntal movements (1 
and 3) alternate with the more playful, dance-like, homophonic ones (2, 4, and 6).  Like Solomon but to a 
greater extent, Barry frames this issue in terms of potentiality: the beginning of this work, as perhaps those of 
all works, intimates a plurality of continuations.  Normally, of course, the composer settles upon one 
actualization but Beethoven, in the rare cases we have been considering, offered two possible actualizations, 
each of which retrospectively affects the structural balance and dynamic of the previous movements and 
thus the piece as a whole. 
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to conform to any one edition necessarily, or at least not grant any one edition authoritative status.  
Rather, the performer may take the plurality of editions and of variances among them to be 
emblematic of the wide range of interpretive possibilities open to her. 
  
4) The flexibility or broadness of intentionality is particularly patent in composers from whom we 
have both verbal statements and recordings.  Robert Fink recounts, for example, how Stravinsky, 
for his 1929 “first revised edition” of The Rite of Spring, felt compelled to rebar certain passages in 
order to clarify rhythmic grouping and accentuation.  Specifically, he split measures in 5/16 meter 
into two shorter measures of 2/16 + 3/16.  Crucially, he did so based on Pierre Monteux’s 
interpretation, on the latter’s rhythmic “analysis” of the “Danse sacrale” (Fink [1999, 319]).8  In 
other words, Monteux’s interpretation was subsequently incorporated into the completed work as 
one of its permanent properties.  On the other hand, Stravinsky also felt compelled to re-beam a 
passage in order to clarify the grouping of some measures in 5/16 as 3+2 rather than, as Monteux 
had done, 2+3.  Even here, Monteux’s “mistake” became integral to the work in inciting a 
notation Stravinsky had not previously conceived.  In short, Monteux’s interpretation had become 
part of the revised work in both positive and negative senses. 
Fink considers these events in light of Stravinsky’s aesthetic stance toward interpretation 
generally, as articulated in his Poetics of Music (1947).  Here, the composer distinguishes between 
“potential music,” the composer’s intentions as notated in the score, and “actual music,” the 
sounding music by which those intentions are realized.  Ideally, for Stravinsky, the latter will 
involve minimal interpretive “intervention,” minimal subjective response on the part of the 
                                                
8 Monteux conducted the notoriously ill-received premiere of the work in 1913. 
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performer.  Stravinsky holds that potential music is logically prior to, and more desirable than, 
actual music, which always threatens to corrupt the supposed purity of the composer’s conception.  
Yet, Stravinsky’s revisions of The Rite demonstrate just how dialectically interwoven the work and 
performance are: as much as Stravinsky may have felt that his revisions in response to Monteux’s 
interpretation represent the way he had always wanted the music to sound, clearly that 
interpretation served to educe many of Stravinsky’s intentions, ones of which he was not conscious 
until having heard a performance.  In Fink’s words, “Monteux’s incorrect interpretation of the text 
was not a betrayal of the composer’s prescriptions but the catalyst for them.  Actual music, in this 
case at least, precedes and determines potential—if only dialectically, by contradiction” (1999, 
323, my italics).9   
This story, I would suggest, dramatizes the normative condition of the musical work.  It 
reveals the extent to which interpretation continually expands the identity of the work, even when 
the composer happens no longer to be around in order to institute changes and inscribe them into 
the score.  The story illustrates that the work is necessarily always evolving, and that the “real” 
music is not Platonic or conceptual in essence—the composer’s intentions comprise no pristine 
realm, one fully crystallized prior to performance.  The score in this view is merely a moment 
within the ongoing exchange, actual or possible, between composer and performer.  No single text 
can truly be definitive of a musical work. 
 
                                                
9 Kevin Korsyn cautioned me, in a personal communication, that Fink overlooks the possibility that 
Stravinsky made editorial changes merely in order to renew copyright.   
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5) Less well known, finally, is the case of Lou Harrison’s Grand Duo (1988).  In preparing the 
critical edition of this piece, Mark Clague recalls, Harrison asked the editor to include the 
articulation and bowing that Romuald Tecco, the violinist for whom the work was composed, 
wrote into his part.  Clague muses:  
if Harrison was still living, would he have continued to tinker with the musical text in future 
performances as he had done so often in the past?  . . .  All of this raises questions about the 
absolute certainty of any edition and cautions against editorial hubris.  An edition may capture a 
particular version of a work at a particular moment, but the vital creative contribution of 
performance as underscored by [this] example reminds us that a musical work is likely to be a 
moving, mutating target.  At least for certain composers, the work itself is a process of becoming 
reconceived at each juncture of the publishing or performance (2005, 59–60, my italics). 
 
To summarize, to approach a work with a relatively unclouded rather than ideologically 
distorted historical perspective is to encounter strong evidence in favor of interpretive necessity 
and freedom.  It is only in the twentieth century that interpretive confinement and standardization 
became a distinct trend, as I discussed in the Introduction.  And I base this claim not only on the 
genetic circumstances I just outlined but also on the various treatises (by Quantz and C.P.E. Bach), 
comments on Beethoven’s playing (by Czerny and Schindler), and various and sundry remarks 
made by Mozart and Chopin, among others, that paint a picture of much freer interpretive 
practices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than most musicians currently assume.  





1.2. THE HERMENEUTIC IMPULSE  
We have seen that for the authenticity movement, historical context is less something that informs 
performance than something to which performance is reduced or indebted—performance serves 
history, not the other way around.  Put differently, historical circumstance serves as a separable 
criterion, one supposedly guaranteeing the correctness of a performance.  This tactic lends a 
falseness to and reifies both cultural context and performance in one fell swoop.  On the one 
hand, it reduces the former to a repository of discrete elements—the right instrument, tuning, 
number of players, acoustical setting, performance techniques, and so on.  On the other hand, it 
implicitly frames music as something neutral and prediscursive that is modified by certain cultural 
constraints.  Yet, as Gary Tomlinson (1984) maintains, music is not something separate from 
culture and then conditioned by it.  Rather, music informs the very culture it is informed by—the 
two domains are inseparable.  Music, like the human subject according to Judith Butler (1990), has 
always already been inscribed by culture and is simultaneously a cultural force that inscribes other 
domains. 
 This specious historicism might be related to a hermeneutic impulse—hermeneutic in the 
sense of assuming truths to be buried behind sensuous appearances, truths that can or should be 
excavated by the canny interpreter.  In the next chapter, I will critique this view in relation to 
music theory (Schenkerian theory in particular) and show how it does not foster perspicacious 
performance.  Here, in preparation for that, I will consider the hermeneutic impulse in historical 
musicology (aside from the authenticity movement, which, in my view, is an extension of empirical 
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musicology), in performance culture, and in musical performance itself.10  In considering the last, I 
counter a commonly held view that the gestures and sound structures a performer creates in 
realizing a score express primarily his private, emotional and psychological states (if also those of 
the composer, for whom the performer is often considered a proxy).  This discussion will provide 
an opportunity to sketch my basic beliefs about musical meaning and how it is generated in 
performance, beliefs that will inform the remainder of this dissertation.    
 
Historical  Musicology 
What is the value of knowing a piece is in sonata form?  Such a generic designation tells you little 
indeed unless you understand how the form is particularized in any given instance.  What is more, 
Charles Rosen reminds us that sonata form as originally conceived by A. B. Marx was largely a 
codification of Beethoven’s practices prior to 1812—a highly circumscribed domain:  
those aspects of Beethoven (and of Mozart—not of Haydn) which had the greatest interest for the 
nineteenth-century composer were isolated; these were, principally, the order and the character of 
                                                
10 The hermeneutic impulse in music can arguably be traced back to Beethoven.  (In fact, as Cook says more 
generally, “many of the ideas most deeply embedded in our thinking about music today can be traced back 
to the ferment of ideas that surrounded the reception of Beethoven’s music” [1998, 24]).  Dahlhaus affirms 
that Beethoven’s music was basically the first to convey the sense that music contained clandestine 
meanings.  Beethoven’s first audiences, Dahlhaus recounts, “felt basically that the acoustic phenomenon 
whose sense they were unable to grasp nevertheless harbored a meaning, which, with sufficient effort, could 
be made intelligible.”  Beethoven’s music challenged audiences “to decipher, in patient exertion, the 
meaning of what had taken place in the music” (1989, 10–11).  
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themes.  Harmonic and textual matters were consequently pushed into the background, as 
subsidiary to the thematic structure. . . .  The method of defining a form by taking the works of a 
famous composer as models is rightfully discredited today (1988, 4). 
On this view, sonata form, at least as formulated by Marx, is regrettably synecdochal: a limited 
number of traits, those of Beethoven’s music, speciously stands in for the whole of a form.   
A dangerous consequence of this sort of generalizing procedure is that we are likely to view 
particular techniques as aberrant with respect to supposed norms.  As an example, Rosen asks us 
to consider Haydn’s “monothematicism.”11  By the late 1780s, it was standard practice to use a 
different theme for the second tonal area, in relation to which, admittedly, “Haydn’s procedure 
was markedly eccentric” (1988, 5).  Yet, though the typical listener in this period would initially 
have been surprised by Haydn’s use of the same theme, he would have quickly grown accustomed 
to it and taken it as normative for Haydn’s practice:   
In short, the average music lover in the 1780s—as today—listened to Haydn not against a 
background of general practice but in the context of Haydn’s own style.  He did not expect Haydn 
to sound like anybody else; by the 1780s his music was accepted on its own terms.  We might, in 
fact, claim that the more Haydn was heard against general practice, the less he was understood” 
(ibid., 6).  
 
Rosen’s is a cautionary tale, the moral of which is that the seemingly benign act of placing a 
work in a formal category is far from unproblematic, especially if that form, as with sonata form, 
was postulated ex post facto and falsely generalizes primarily the practice of a single composer 
                                                
11 Rosen deems this a misnomer, since even movements that use a variant of the opening theme to 
articulate the expository dominant invariably contain different themes elsewhere in the movement. 
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(Beethoven), or falsely objectifies the aesthetic preference of a given age (that of the nineteenth 
century toward thematic rather than tonal paradigms).  Nor is it fruitful to label practices 
idiosyncratic or aberrant with respect to norms, since these so-called aberrant practices quickly 
constitute their own norms.  Simply put, lurking behind sonata practices is not some 
Beethovenian truth or essence.     
On a broader level, Adorno (1999a) argues that stylistic categories and distinctions are 
often erroneous or misleading.  He claims that Classical music requires the critical subjectivity 
normally associated with Romanticism, Romanticism the objective grounding normally associated 
with Classicism.  Similarly, DeNora (1994) reminds us that supposedly inviolable historical 
categories such as “Classical” and “Romantic” are social constructions.  We might view substylistic 
distinctions with equal skepticism.  For example, Solomon, in discussing the traditional 
tripartition of Beethoven’s oeuvre into early, middle, and late, proclaims that his “oeuvre is a single 
oeuvre, which we segment out of a penchant for classification, a need to clarify—and at our peril” 
(1988, 125).12  James Webster, finally, avers, “The concept ‘Classical style’ (I must use quotation-
marks) is an anachronism.  Haydn was understood in his own time as modern, a bold pioneer;13 
his progressive form and destabilizing rhetoric are incompatible with the shibboleths of balance, 
                                                
12 I problematize the conventional periodization of Beethoven’s music generally, Adorno’s distinctions 
between the middle and late styles in particular, in Swinkin (forthcoming B).      
13 Note that, on this point, he and Rosen take issue—as we just discussed, Rosen does not see Haydn as a 
musical iconoclast.  They also obviously disagree regarding the validity of the moniker, “Classical style.”  I 
am concerned here, however, with their point of contact: sonata form is a false generalization for Rosen just 
as the Classical style is for Webster.   
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symmetry, architectonic form, and the rest.  He and Mozart were not thought of as ‘classics’ until 
early in the nineteenth century” (1991, 9). 
 Hence, the question Rosen, Adorno, DeNora, Solomon, and Webster raise is, what do we 
really gain when we apply to a piece the general designations—such as “sonata” or “Classical”—
that are the bread and butter of musicological practice?14  I would suggest that they are fine if used 
as a springboard for a more “particularist” analysis,15 an engagement with the irreducibly unique 
details of a particular composition—just as the Ursatz and other high-level constructs are valuable 
mainly insofar as they lead to this sort of engagement (or so I will argue in the next chapter).  
 
Concert  Culture 
The hermeneutic impulse is also evident in our modern concert culture, where the musical 
factoids that populate program notes and pre-concert lectures (Beethoven’s deafness, Schubert’s 
syphilis, Tchaikovsky’s homosexuality, and so forth) pose as bona fide musical knowledge.  
Program annotators and pre-concert lecturers “sell” these nuggets of information to concert-goers 
hungry for them, in part because audiences think, are led to believe, that such information will 
help them understand something about the pieces being performed.  The audience, moreover, 
enters the concert hall predisposed to such a hermeneutic sensibility.  This predisposition derives 
                                                
14 Braunschweig (2012) valiantly endeavors to reconnect musicological knowledge (music-theoretical 
knowledge in particular) to the concrete historical particulars from which, in his view, it has been 
progressively dissociated in favor of abstractions.   
15 Brown/Dempster (1989).  The opposite, “positivistic” approach employs pieces to exemplify general 
principles.    
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from broader cultural trends, among the most influential of which, Abbate contends, is film (and 
technology in general): 
Consuming a diet rich in cinema with musical accompaniment . . . continues to nourish a deep 
conviction that musical configurations convey information. . . .  Contemporary sensoria have been 
re-formed by modern technological multimedia, and this leads to amplified convictions about 
correspondences.  The original sensorial transformation . . . is projected onto pretechnological high 
art objects (like symphonies), with correspondence becoming those works’ raison d’être. . . .  
Perhaps hermeneutics was reborn of cinematic kitsch and manipulation (2004, 523).   
 
Abbate does not univocally disparage this filmic predilection, nor shall I.  After all, I 
endorse the view of Adorno and Gadamer, among others (to be discussed later) that a musical 
work—due in part to its indeterminate and polysemous character—is a continually “moving, 
mutating target” (to recall Mark Clague’s felicitous phrase), and that the various cultural paradigms 
through which it passes can possibly illuminate its various potentialities.  Indeed, perhaps it is 
simply in the technological nature of our era that music is, as Abbate says, “sticky”—that images 
and associations readily adhere to it, and perhaps these cast a different and valuable light upon 
aspects of a composition.  Yet, Abbate’s main thrust is that performing and the performing body—
a sheer, irreducibly physical presence—are recalcitrant toward abstract, hermeneutic intellection, 
and I would affirm that the emphasis on bodily thought and on pure sensuality equally characterize 
the spirit of our age.  Indeed, the hermeneutic and the somatic constitute polarized yet coexisting 
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epistemological frameworks in our society (musical and otherwise)—just as, similarly, metaphysics 
and materiality were competing aesthetic currents in nineteenth-century musical culture.16   
We need not choose between these antithetical terms.  On the contrary, a meritorious 
model of performance/analysis will, I believe, synthesize them—it will bring conceptual reflection 
and sensuous materiality into proximity.  While it remains to be seen how this will work, for now 
it suffices to recognize that this project is not served by a hermeneutic drive to treat music as a 
symbol for something else or to reduce it to facts (especially facts that are mere biographical 
curiosities).  
 
Musical Express ion 
Our propensity to seek categories into which we can fit sounds or to seek meanings behind sounds 
likely leads to, and also results from, a propensity to assume that a performance is transparent to 
                                                
16 The work concept and the cult of virtuosity arose roughly around the same time—the latter, of course, 
due in large measure to the efforts of Liszt.  He, according to Lawrence Kramer, helped “establish music as a 
popular entertainment medium . . . [even as] many musicians . . . were simultaneously trying to establish 
music as a fine art” (2002, 69).  In contrast to the Romantic ideal of pure, structural listening, Liszt’s 
performances lent veracity, even a spiritual dimension, to musical expression.  His showmanship flouted the 
post-Enlightenment ideal of music as universal, as transcending particularity (especially that of the 
performer).  A signal musical paradox of Liszt’s period, therefore, was that music “is supposed to possess 
independent symbolic value . . . but it can be transmitted . . . only by means of public spectacles that 
threaten to subordinate music to the histrionics of performance” (2002, 81).  This was an era, then, in 
which the sensuous medium of sound competed with the artwork for ontological primacy, an era in which 
music was bifurcated into the extremes of metaphysical transcendence and sensuous immediacy. 
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the performer’s interiority, that it directly reflects her emotional state.  We often conceive 
performance, in other words, as unmediated self-expression and often reduce it to emotional states 
that can be easily captured in words.  Yet, the solo musician likely adopts a persona when she 
performs, and this in two senses:17 that of a protagonist—a narrator of, or character within, the 
musical plot—and, at least in the case of stars, of a public personage that has been more or less 
deliberately constructed so as to render the musician a brand-name product with readily 
identifiable characteristics.  In neither case, necessarily, would the performer feel the emotions she 
portrays: as a narrator or character, she might empathize with them to the degree necessary to 
convey emotion in sound; as a persona, she might not even empathize with them but merely 
project their appearance to an audience using both sonic and visual cues.   
Cumming (2000) expertly explains the means by which a musician conveys emotion in 
sound.  To begin, she affirms that, in music, feeling is mediated by the sounds a performer creates, 
in all its nuances.  Musical feeling is not a direct expression of the performer’s sentience but rather 
derives from certain interpretive strategies, sound profiles, to which we have granted 
intersubjectively stable meanings.  To say a violin “sings,” to use her example, is, first of all, not to 
suggest that it represents someone actually singing; “when you hear ‘singing’ in a violin’s sound, the 
singing is in the sound, not somewhere else. . . .  ‘Singing’ is not, then, an object to which you 
imagine [sounds] refer” (ibid., 73).18  To expand upon her example, the emotional quality such 
                                                
17 Auslander (2006a and b) is a strong proponent of this view; I will return to his argument later.   
18 Put in Nelson Goodman’s (1976) terms, the violinist in this scenario exemplifies rather than denotes 
vocality; simply put, vocality is not separable from the sound in which it is manifest.  As Treitler (1997) 
explains, while the phrase “sad person” refers to (denotes) the person over there who is crying, a sad piece is 
80 
violinistic singing exudes—pleading, soulfulness, dejection, or whatever—is one we listeners can 
recognize due to preestablished, intersubjective agreement as to what basic emotions correlate with 
what performative nuances.  Consider Joshua Bell’s performance of the opening cadenza from 
Beethoven’s Violin Concerto, for example (Web Ex. 4).  His interpretive choices, as roughly 
outlined in Ex. 1-1, create gestures that, in my hearing, wax and wane in degrees of confidence.  
Overall, he conjures a narrative by which one attempts to find a voice, to find a way into a 
discussion or, more broadly, a community.  Of course, an introductory cadenza, by its very nature, 
will usually convey something along these lines, but Bell exploits this sentiment in his various 
hesitations, dynamics, phrasing, and points of arrival.19  I think it is fairly intuitive that each of 
these gestures are on some level analogous or isomorphic with non-musical motions and emotions.  
 
*  *  * 
                                                
itself a tangible instance of (it exemplifies) sadness.  Hence, in listening to the piece, we are not led away 
from it, as with the phrase, but our attention is bound to each musical detail exuding that quality.  (A 
possible consequence of this is that the referent is ultimately inextricable with and redefined by the artwork 
in which it is evident.)  As Treitler aptly summarizes (in referring to a passage from Berg’s Lulu, but which 
he invokes to convey this general point), “The music signifies, unquestionably, but it is not absorbed in 
signifying.  Reference flows from this complex signified back to the music, which, rather than vanishing 
once it has done its job of signifying, is richer as a result of the reference from the signified to it” (1997, 35).   
19 Another good example of an introductory, written-out cadenza that somewhat cautiously introduces the 
soloist, brings her into the discussion, is the piano’s exordium of Mozart’s Piano Concerto in C, K. 467, 
first movement.   
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I will briefly expand on this principle of isomorphism, without pretending to offer a full-fledged 
theory of musical meaning or emotion.20  Kivy’s “contour” theory “explains the expressiveness of 
music by the congruence of musical ‘contour’ with the structure of [human] expressive features 
and behavior” (1989,77).  Here Kivy draws a distinction between expressing emotion and being 
expressive of emotion (1989, 12–13).  To cite his paradigmatic example, a Saint Bernard is not 
necessarily sad, but to a human observer his countenance is nonetheless expressive of sadness 
because it resembles the countenance of a person when he or she is sad.  By contrast, the dour 
countenance of a person who is in fact sad expresses sadness—his countenance directly reflects 
how he is feeling.  Music, Kivy submits, is more like the Saint Bernard than the sad person: a piece 
is expressive of sadness not because it is sad in any literal sense—nor because it expresses the sad 
feelings of the composer or evokes them in the listener—but because its contour closely resembles 
the physical forms we associate with sadness.  A drooping façade or posture, whether of a Saint 
Bernard, flower, or melody—say, one in a minor key and replete with descending leaps, as in the 
first two measures of Mozart’s Mass in C minor, K. 427—is likely to convey a negative emotional 
quality, a dejected state; the opposite holds for an uplifted façade.  In short, music is expressive 
partially due to its isomorphic relation to animate features.21 
                                                
20 I do so in Swinkin (forthcoming A), on which the following few paragraphs are based.  
21 Davies (1994, 201–278) similarly submits that music presents not felt emotion but “emotion 
characteristics in appearances”; that is, music utilizes the same primary expressions of feeling as operate in 
people.  Small (1998, passim) expresses a related view: that music expresses emotions not directly but rather 
through the physical gestures with which emotions are associated.  Incidentally, Kivy (1989) also locates a 
source of musical expression in musical convention, expressive codes with widely recognized denotations.  
82 
 
                                                
One type of these that he does not really discuss are the topics (topoi) of the Classical style, such as horn 
calls (horn fifths), which commonly express aggressiveness; Sturm und Drang angst; the lament bass (held 
over from the Baroque) ceremonious grief; the Mannheim rocket intense expectancy; the sigh (Seufzer) motif 
plaintive longing, and so forth.  For a general introduction to classical topics, see Allanbrook (1983, 31–70) 
and Ratner (1980, 9–29).  Of course, the expressive import of these and other musical conventions has in 
part to do with their contours.  That is, the line separating contours and conventions is rather permeable, as 
Kivy himself recognizes.   
Example 1-1: Beethoven, Violin Concerto in D, op. 61, opening violin cadenza: Joshua Bell’s nuances and gestural meanings  
      p then cresc. 
      lopsided to more even rhythm 
      straight tone to more vibrato 
correlates  
with (respectively) 
                gradually emerges 
                gradually stabilizes 
                gradually finds voice 
pinched sound 
no sooner finds voice than 
loses confidence to use it 
i.e., increasingly 
comfortable 
audibly retakes bow 
redoubles effort to gain confidence 
dim. into and lingers on C  , purposely hedges 
knows that continually striving 
(to arrive on G) will not work; bemoans his own weakness,  
complete dynamic stasis 
floating in indecision, weak, or biding time 
cresc.         gaining confidence 
# 
arrives            dim.--- - - - - - -                                 Luftpausen                  
more detached, off string 
long, sweet tone sweet triumph (now we can proceed. . .) 
!"
more buoyant,  
optimistic 
cautiously finding way back, 
summoning courage 
reached goal . . . but retreats 
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Emotional contour is not confined to melodic physiognomy.  We also detect emotion in 
musical behaviors that are analogous to human behaviors—in particular, to physical gesture and 
vocal utterance.  As to the former, just as we might infer an emotion from a person’s gait, so might 
we from a musical gait, as conjured by tempo and rhythm.  To take an obvious example, a slow 
tempo commonly intimates a sluggish gait, from which we infer sadness (especially if conjoined 
with the minor mode).  On a more local level, much music is replete with gestures that can be 
understood as analogous to human ones; this is particularly true of the mature classical style, with 
its heterogeneous phrase rhythms and detailed articulations.  Regarding vocality, Kivy states that 
we hear sadness in music when we “hear musical sounds as appropriate to the expression of 
sadness . . . when we hear them as human utterances, and perceive the features of these utterances 
as structurally similar to our own voices when we express our own sadness in speech” (1989, 51).22 
Kivy attributes musical contours, gestures, and behaviors to notational patterns, but they 
can also arise from patterns of sound, from the various inflections by which a musician lifts the 
notes off a page.  Sometimes performance gestures will merely replicate those more or less built 
into notations; other times they will amplify or diminish them; other times they will be entirely 
novel and have little to do with the implications of notation.  In any case, Kivy’s theory of contour-
                                                
22 Although Kivy’s theory serves us well to a point, it is patently deficient in accounting for the wealth of 
music-emotional nuance that we associate with the music we know and love.  To account for such nuance 
more completely, we need to incorporate considerations of structure, to examine in particular the 
interrelations between foreground contours and conventions on the one hand, high-level structural 
processes (Schenkerian and motivic) on the other (which Agawu [1991] does brilliantly).  While I cannot 
fully theorize this process here, I will draw upon such an amalgam somewhat intuitively in the chapters and 
analyses that follow.  
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isomorphism can be readily applied to performance and help explain how a performer conveys 
expressive meanings to an audience.  For example, perceiving music as evocative of speech depends 
in no small measure upon performance, especially regarding articulation.  Interestingly, the 
eighteenth century witnessed a significant shift in the manner by which performers conveyed a 
linguistic sensibility.  Barth (1992, 38 ff.) recounts how the “syllabic nonlegato” of C.P.E. Bach 
and Mozart gave way to Beethoven’s predominately legato touch.  While the latter would seem far 
less conducive to a declamatory style than the localized articulation and pianistic punctuation of 
earlier composers, in fact, Beethoven’s “cherished innovations—the legato style, the slurs that 
more frequently crossed bar lines to subsume points of arrival, the lengthy passages of 
unarticulated figuration” (47)—became means of conveying larger dramatic arcs.  Beethoven 
sublated the periodicity of eighteenth century rhetoric, preserving it but on a higher level, one 
compatible with his grander structural proportions.  His use of legato less often conveyed long-
lined lyricism than “dramatic breadth” (45).   
The foregoing substantiates my basic point: while performers may feel the emotions they 
musically portray to various degrees, musical expression does not depend on it, because we hear 
expressive qualities in sounds as shaped interpretively, due to their analogous relations to extra-
musical phenomena.  Thus, we err in supposing that a composition is a mechanism by which to 
convey or transport the inner state of a performer (or composer) to the listener, as along an 
assembly line.  Rather, music, as written and performed, works with an intersubjectively 
established community of gestures and tropes, such that we all participate in the generation of 
musical meaning.  
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In conclusion, hermeneutic-musical knowledge, ideas about a piece that are separable from 
it—whether historical, biographical, or having to do with performance—are just that: knowledge 
about a piece rather than knowledge of a piece.  This notion applies to music-theoretical ideas as 
well and will serve as the foundation for the theory of Schenkerian embodiment I propose in the 
next chapter.   
 
2.1. ONTOLOGIES OF THE MUSICAL WORK 
Schoenberg and Stravinsky are two of the more famous figures who have outright degraded the 
interpretive act: Schoenberg deems it a gratuitous sonic realization of a self-complete work that one 
might as well audiate (aurally imagine) directly from the score.23  Stravinsky, as we have seen, 
deems it not only gratuitous but even potentially disruptive.  In his scheme, Fink states, “the move 
from potential to actual [music] is always a fall from grace, especially if the performers have known 
Sin, letting their own musical ideas ‘contaminate’ the purity of the composer’s original 
conception” (1999, 323).  But, as we already know, the genesis of The Rite gives the lie to 
Stravinsky’s own distinction, for (this quote bears repeating) “Monteux’s incorrect interpretation 
of the text was not a betrayal of the composer’s prescriptions but the catalyst for them.  Actual 
music, in this case at least, precedes and determines potential [music]. . . ”   
                                                
23 Note, however—as evident in his comments I peppered throughout the footnotes to this chapter—that 
Schoenberg often adopts quite a liberal, charitable stance toward performance, appearing to regard it as 
essential to the expression of human sentience in music.  As I mentioned in connection with Glenn Gould 
(see Introduction), these two ideals of the abstract, non-material work and of interpretive license, though 
seemingly antithetical, can in fact be seen as compatible. 
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These stances on the part of Schoenberg and Stravinsky anticipate the Platonic ontologies 
more explicitly formulated by later twentieth-century analytic philosophers.  Such ontologies, by 
their very nature, peripheralize performance.  Let us survey various ontological positions, 
progressing from the most strictly Platonic on one pole to the most performance-oriented on the 
other.  Peter Kivy (1993) defends, if not wholly advocates, the theory that a musical work is a 
Platonic entity that the composer discovers rather than creates, such that even if it never 
materialized in a score—or once it had been, all the scores were destroyed—it would still exist.  
Performances in this scheme are tokens of a type, mere instances of an entity that is essentially 
complete in its abstract form.  Performance here is thus extrinsic to the work itself.  
This view is closely related to, and perhaps derives from, a Romantic-period conception of 
music as ideal or as in essence a mental conception (of the composer and/or listener) and to a 
concomitant distrust of musical materiality.  A statement by Hugo Riemann (although written in 
1915) epitomizes this view: 
The alpha and omega of music are not to be found in actual musical performance, but are to be  
found in the newly arising tonal relationships in the musical phantasy of the composer before they  
are notated, and again in the musical phantasy of the listener.  The notation of a musical  
composition and even the actual performance are only expedients for transplanting the musical  
experiences from the mind of the composer into that of the listener.  (“Ideen zu einer ‘Lehre von 
 den Tonvorstellungen” [“Ideas for a Theory of Tonal Concepts”] in Mickelsen [1977, 86]). 
Schumann expresses this same view more poetically, exclaiming, “if only I had no fingers and 
could play with my heart on other hearts!”24   
                                                
24 “ . . .hätt ich nur keine Finger and könnte mit meinen Herzen spielen auf anderen!” Tagebücher 1, 361, 
translated by MacDonald (2002, 539).  MacDonald also notes that Schumann generally embodied the 
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Kendall Walton (1988), similarly, advances a quasi-Platonic theory: he claims a musical 
work is defined by the sound patterns represented in the score.  That is, the score specifies the 
sonic properties a performance must possess to be an instance of the work.  These specifications 
comprising the work are basically pitches and rhythms.  Other parameters, such as phrasing and 
dynamics, are recommendations as to how to perform the work well—how to interpret the 
essential elements—but do not affect the identity of the work.  In Walton’s terminology, a 
performance both “presents” the sound pattern of a work, manifesting its defining features, and 
“portrays” that pattern, parsing it in particular ways.  Performance in this theory, though more 
highly valued than in the full-fledged Platonic theory, is nonetheless peripheral to the work proper.   
Jerrold Levinson (1980) refutes both of these views, arguing that musical works cannot be 
pure sound patterns since (a) works are composed; (b) the musico-historical (stylistic) context yields 
essential aesthetic attributes of the work; and (c) the performance medium is essential to the 
identity of the work.  Musical works must encompass creation, historical context, and 
performance.  The result is an “indicated” (rather than “implicit”) structure, one that arises from 
an act of human determination performed upon pure structure.  In short, Levinson defines the 
musical work as a sound and performance structure as indicated by a composer at a particular 
moment in music history.  For example, “Brahms’s Piano Trio in C, Op. 101, is not simply a 
sequence of sounds performed on a piano, violin, and cello, but rather that sequence-as-indicated-
                                                
aforementioned duality of nineteenth-century thought, the paradox by which music’s technical, material 
medium came to the fore just as music also came to be regarded as embodying spiritual essence.  
Schumann’s ambivalence in this regard, as documented by MacDonald, thus reflects not just his own 
artistic and psychological dilemmas but also an essential conflict of his age.  
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by-Brahms-in-the-summer-of-1880. . . .  the aesthetic and artistic attributes of a work are not fixed 
solely by the relevant sound/performance means structure.  This precludes identifying such works 
with the pure structures comprised in them” (1980, 64–65).25  Performance in this theory, then, is 
an essential constituent of the work. 
Finally, Nelson Goodman, in his characteristically nominalist vein, claims that a musical 
work has no essential, defining properties and is nothing more than the collection of performances 
in perfect compliance with the score.26  Goodman’s requisite of “perfect compliance” is infamously 
draconian and runs counter to common experience, in which we have no trouble identifying a 
work even when its performance is technically imperfect.  Hence, we benefit from José Bowen’s 
related but more nuanced, Wittgensteinian view: a work is nothing other than a series of 
performances related to each other by virtue of “family resemblance” rather than of conforming to 
essential properties.  Performances mediate between the generic aspects indicative of a fixed work 
and the particularity and individuality of a specific musical utterance.  They exist within a 
historical tradition of performances, both alluding to previous performances—displaying the 
qualities they take to constitute the work—and introducing changes, leading to a new conception 
of what constitutes the work.  Performances, not the score, define the work (Bowen [1993]).  
 
                                                
25 Jean-Jacques Nattiez articulates this same notion but less technically: “the musical work is not merely . . . 
‘structures’. . . .  Rather, the work is also constituted by the procedures that have engendered it (acts of 
composition), and the procedures to which it gives rise: acts of interpretation and perception” (1990, ix). 
26 Goodman (1976, 179–92).  Joseph Margolis, comparing the views of Levinson and Goodman, describes 
the former as intensional, the latter as extensional (1993, 145–47).   
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*  *  * 
In this cursory survey, the two polar extremes I mentioned are evident: on one pole, the work is 
entirely separate from its materialization in performance; on the other, the work is inextricable 
from its performances.  The first, Platonic view, represented by Kivy, is patently untenable since, as 
Levinson suggests, it runs counter to the commonsense intuition that works are created, not 
merely discovered.  Platonic musical universals are, if anything, melodic, contrapuntal, and 
harmonic schemata (of the Schenkerian sort, for example), which require substantial elaboration 
and embellishment to form a complete work.  It makes little sense to posit that works in their 
finished detail and specificity are somehow predestined and inevitable (even taken as a metaphor, 
the value of the Platonic paradigm is far from clear).  Moreover, if, as few would deny, music is a 
sonic art—just as painting is a visual art, literature a linguistic art, and so forth—then surely we 
would want to question a conception of the musical work that grants sound and its interpretive 
sculpting such low status.   
The second, nominalist view, represented by Goodman, is equally problematic, for it 
reduces a work to mere notation and its realization, failing to include the meanings and 
relationships that notation might entail.  Moreover, it adopts a stridently mechanistic view of 
performance, reducing its function to mere instantiation.  This model, like its Platonic antithesis, 
has a precedent in nineteenth-century thought.  Its precedent is located in the increased value 
granted to performance as a sensuous phenomenon over and above any transcendental ideas the 
work might communicate.  Although my aim is to liberate performance from excessive abstraction, 
I still want to keep performance tethered to the larger work of which it is a necessary component.  
I want to demonstrate how performers parse notations in order to crystallize their structural-cum-
90 
emotional potentials.  For, the “all about performance” model evinces the same hegemonic 
dynamic but merely with the terms and valuations reversed: instead of the work on some level 
effacing performance, the performance effaces the work.   
Walton and Levinson mediate these unpalatable extremes with some success.  Walton’s 
theory, however, is less than ideal as it deems interpretation a merely decorative domain, as 
peripheral to the work itself.  Levinson’s comes closest to my own in including performance 
among the work’s essential dimensions.  Still, we need to specify further the relation between 
performance and the notational elements of the work.  This I pursue in the next section. 
 
2.2. A THEME-AND-VARIATIONS MODEL 
I propose that a musical work is comprised of the configurations of pitch and rhythm denoted by a 
score, a range of expressive and structural potentials connoted by these configurations, and the 
interpretations/performances27 that both present the score’s denotative properties and actualize its 
                                                
27 I share Paul Thom’s distinction between interpretation and performance: an interpretation is a type, an 
abstract conception of how one wants to play the piece (which might arise, however, from physical 
exploration); actual performances are tokens of that type, actualizing it to varying degrees of accuracy and 
efficacy (Thom [1993, 43]).  In my view, the variabilities that arise in performing a work over a period of 
time may ultimately lead to a new conception, a new interpretive type (even if largely implicit or 
unconscious).  Parmer recognizes this reciprocity between conception and realization when he states, 
“material realizations do not flow from preexisting sound images in a unidirectional circuit: each produces 
the other so that the realization of an idea into material form alters or conditions the idea that 
simultaneously gives rise to the realization” (2007, 35).  This reciprocity does not, however, in my view 
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connotative possibilities.28  In triangulating these domains of work, score, and performance, I find 
the theme-and-variations model a useful analogy.  Briefly put, a performance is like a variation of a 
score-as-theme in that it will both present its invariant, denotative properties, at least to a high 
degree, and also generate new properties, many of which will ultimately serve to actualize various 
of the score/theme’s potentialities.29  
This operation of actualization, however, is not common to all variations.  Some variations, 
we all know, are solely or primarily decorative or embellishmental.  It is variations of the 
nineteenth century—particularly those of Beethoven and Brahms—that possess especially potent 
actualizing capacity.  In my article devoted to this topic (Swinkin [2012]), I have provided 
numerous instances of variations within variation sets (mostly Brahms’s opus 9) that realize myriad 
structural potentials with respect to tonal structure, voice leading, motive, rhythm, form, and so  
on.  
However, this variational procedure is by no means limited to variation form per se.  To 
offer just one example: in Brahms’s “Sommerabend” (the first of Six Songs, Op. 85), the opening 
gambit (Ex. 1-2) intimates a I–IV–vii–I progression—the middle two chords are merely “intimated” 
because they occur over a tonic pedal point.  After a contrasting middle section 
                                                
obviate the need to distinguish between interpretive conception and performative realization—on the 
contrary, such reciprocity depends on this distinction.    
28 I will elaborate on this idea of structural potentiality, or music-structural imaginings, in the next chapter.   
29 Markand Thakar holds precisely the opposite view: that the work is what remains after all the 
performance-variations are reduced away.  “We are after the object that is the continuity across those 
infinite variations.  We are after the essence of the piece itself” (2011, 11).  Needless to say, I am highly 





centered (at least initially) on D minor, the opening refrain returns (m. 25) but now fully realizing 
the initially latent chord progression, in the process producing an effect (or affect) of sensuous 
release.  But this is not all: the roots of the first three chords implicit in the first refrain—B@–E@–
A—suggest a descending-fifth sequence.  This latency is also realized in the second refrain, where 
the B@–E@–A continues onto D–G–C–F–B@–E.  Indeed, the sequential possibility is so fully 
realized—Brahms gets so caught up in it—that he “overshoots” the ostensible tonal goal (B@, I, in 
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m. 31), passing on to E that forms the root of a viiĳ/V (we initially expect this V to be the 
structural dominant of the entire song, but this expectation is thwarted when the V discharges into 
another I7).30  One might say that the sequential element of mm. 2–6—anticipated, incidentally, by 
the slight piano introduction, which traverses C–F–B@—would scarcely be apparent if not for its 
actualization by the variational second refrain.  In other words, standing on its own, I–IV–vii–I, 
although featuring a descending-fifth root-progression across the first three chords, is likely to be 
construed simply as a functional T–PD–D–T progression over a tonic pedal (a typical opening 
gambit).  It is not until the second refrain that we realize, in retrospect, the latent sequential, in 
contrast to functional, potential of this initial progression.  The second refrain thus helps comprise 
the “theme’s” identity.  The variation is not innocuous and purely coloristic but rather plays a 
decisive role in exposing what the theme in fact is by showing what it is able to become—that is, by 
showing what features it potentially possesses. 
The next song in the set, “Mondenschein” (Ex. 1-3) forms a pair with “Sommerabend.”31  
This is evident not just in the obvious repetition of the refrain material but in at least three 
                                                
30 Notice that the first chord to extend the harmonic sequence—that is, the first chord to deviate from the 
harmonic model of the first refrain—is D minor in m. 28.  This is perhaps not coincidental given that the 
middle section, as mentioned, was centered on D minor.  Moreover, it is quite conventional for nineteenth-
century ternary forms to effect some sort of synthesis, whereby the A2 section incorporates elements from 
both A1 and B.  Put metaphorically, Brahms’s second refrain finds in the middle section its inspiration to 
make the most of its potential.   
31 For an extended discussion of the relationships between these songs, see Stevens (2008, 178–200). 
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processes that span the two songs.32  First, Brahms, over the course of the repeated refrains, states 
the countermelody an octave higher each time, culminating, in “Mondenschein,” with the florid 
tune in the above-middle-C range, seen in the full light of day.  Second, the upper-third relation in 
“Sommerabend” between the tonic (B@) and the key of the middle section (d) is countered in 
“Mondenschein” with a lower-third relation between the tonic B@ and G@, a key touched on in 
mm. 4 (a G@ chord also kicks off the descending-fifth sequence, mm. 21 ff.).33  Third, the second 
song provides greater tonal closure than the first does, due in part to the middle section standing 
on the dominant, such that the discharge upon the tonic (m. 20) has considerable impact.34  The 
tonal ambiguity of the first song is thus alleviated in the second.   
 
                                                
32 I owe the following three points to Kevin Korsyn (personal communication).   
33 Given the emphasis on G@ at the beginning and end, with B@ being relegated largely to the middle, this 
song has a kind of inversional relationship to the previous one: there the primary key occupied the outer 
sections, the secondary key occupied the middle one; here the opposite holds.  This inversion with respect 
to the formal placement of the primary and secondary keys perhaps reflects the inversional relationship of 
the keys themselves (B@–D versus B@–G@).    
34 The pedal point gives way, at least at the foreground, in the second half of m 16.  However, the dominant 
continues to be composed out until the very end of m. 19, especially as the B@ chord to which the F passes 
in m. 16 is a B@7.  Attaching the 7th here and continuing the chain of fifths undermines the potential tonic 





Yet, if this last-mentioned passage enables the second song to surpass the first in terms of 
tonal closure, it also balks at the realization of the descending-fifth sequence.  For here, in striking 
contrast to the sequence in Song 1, mm. 23 ff., it restores latency to the sequence by placing it 
above a pedal point, as did the very opening of Song 1.  Hence, whereas this section in Song 2 
shows a progressive tendency regarding the registral culmination of the countermelody, it shows a 
regressive one regarding the realization of the sequence.   








opening of Song 1 extended:  
now clear fifth-sequence 
fifth-sequence returned to quasi-latent 
form, since now over pedal point 
emphatic dominant resolution 
(dominant still being prolonged) 
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If, however, this fifth-sequence is inhibited, another is freed: in Song 1, the auxiliary 
cadence with which the song begins is in fact part of a descending-fifth sequence but is likely not 
perceived as such, since the sequence in mm. 3 ff. is inhibited by the pedal point.  Also, the abrupt 
change of texture in m. 3 dissociates those ideas—it makes it difficult to hear mm. 1–2 as 
belonging to the same progression as mm. 3 ff. (or, put differently, makes it difficult to hear the 
progression in mm. 3 ff. as a continuation of that begun in mm. 1–2).  However, in mm. 23–24 (of 
Song 1), the two-measure introduction to A2, that auxiliary progression is more fully assimilated to 
the sequence in that the sequence is now more fully apparent.  Still, the change in texture—
comparable to that of the opening—makes it difficult to hear those two chords as a bona fide part 
of the sequence.  However, in Song 2, that two-bar module is extended to four (mm. 6–9) and 
houses a full-fledged descending-fifth sequence—so much, in fact, as to trump the subsequent 
sequence, now over a dominant-pedal.  Hence, the initially latent sequential potential of the 
auxiliary progression in Song 1 is realized in Song 2.  The end of the piece reaffirms the stability of 
that progression, now using it for cadential closure.   
 
*  *  * 
Like Brahms’s variational refrains, and like countless other similar examples in the nineteenth 
century, performances both manifest the notational properties of their “theme” (that is, the score) 
and actualize particular potentialities of that notation.  As with variations, “deviations”—
interpretive nuances not indicated by the score and that vary among performances—are neither 
necessarily incorrect nor merely decorative but frequently serve to illuminate otherwise latent 
features of the work.  In short, as Joseph Dubiel suggests, an interpreter construes notation guided 
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by a conception “not of what the passage automatically is . . . but of what it can be.  It is 
constrained, but not fully determined, by what is in the score” (1990, 331, his italics).  Likewise, 
Lawrence Kramer affirms that “what is objectively ‘present’ in the work . . . is not a specific 
meaning but the availability or potentiality of meanings” (2002, 118).  An interpretation has the 
illocutionary function of directing us to hear the work in a particular way, just as a variation directs 
us to hear the theme in a particular way.35  
This model thus holds performance and interpretation to be essential to the identity and 
constitution of the work.  The performance is not a mere token of the work, for the work is not 
fully formed or defined prior to its performances—as new performances occur, the work 
continually evolves, latencies emerge of which we were previously unaware.  Performances, then, 
are not of a work, since they are part of the work.  If anything, performances are of a score, in the 
special sense I have indicated.  I think we would want to preserve the notion, one to which most 
people intuitively subscribe, that a performance, in the Western art-music tradition at least, is of 
something else, an Other it engages, something that transcends any one performance and is a 
                                                
35 This theme-and-variations model or metaphor for the musical work obviously requires greater 
substantiation in the form of a separate study.  Nicholas Cook (1999b, 204–206) only briefly develops this 
idea.  He argues that a theme is to its variations what Corelli’s score (of Op. 5) is to its ornamented 
versions—which, in turn, he likens to performance in general.  What is varied in each case, he claims, is 
less the concrete entity (the theme/score) itself than its underlying properties.  Both variations and 
elaborations (performances) implicitly reduce or analyze the music they vary, disassembling its structure in 
order to reconfigure it anew.  Performances, then, like variations on a theme, are not supererogatory with 
respect to a work but extensions of it, serving to actualize its structural potentialities.  (Paul Thom [2007] 
also considers the similarities as well as differences between interpretations and variations.) 
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common bond among its various performances.  Our appreciation of interpretive nuances derives 
in part from the implicit conception or assumption of a work with certain invariant properties that 
an interpreter manifests in a particular way.  Yet, this Other is merely one component of a work, 
the score, not the work entire.  The score-theme is conceptually prior to the performance-variation 
in the sense that it defines certain key features that identify the piece as such.  However, just as 
variations are as much as part of the piece as is the theme, so performances are as much a part of 
the work as is the score. 
 
*  *  * 
My ontological model holds certain elements in common with the phenomenological reader-
response theory of Wolfgang Iser (1978).  Iser frames the literary work as a repository of 
potentialities and consequently deems the reader—insofar as she actualizes various of these 
potentialities—a necessary rather than an ancillary component of the work.  For Iser, the gap 
between text and reader is no impediment to, but rather a precondition of interpretation.  The same 
goes for Gadamer, on whom I will also remark, regarding the gap between past and present.  
Finally, Adorno’s Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction—an incomplete work existing only in 
draft and note form—has some affinities with myself and Iser.  In it I find a liberating model of 
the musical work, one in which interpretation is indispensable and granted ample freedom.  
Curiously, Adorno’s treatise has received scant scholarly attention since its 2006 English 
translation.  Hence, I provide here a lengthy précis in order not only to elaborate upon the view of 
the musical work and performance I have proposed but also to introduce many readers to this 
important philosopher’s provocative thoughts on musical interpretation.  I summarize Iser at 
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length as well, since his theory of reading is perhaps the most apt non-musical model I have found 
for what I am trying to say about music.36   
 
II. AMELIORATIONS 
Her autobiography, if such a thing were imaginable, would be, if such a thing were ever to be 
written, an assemblage of dark voids and unbridgable gaps. . . .  She understood that if she was 
going to hold on to her life at all, she would have to rescue it by a primary act of imagination, 
supplementing, summoning up the necessary connections . . .   
–Carol Shields, The Stone Diaries 
 
 3. ISER’S READER-RESPONSE THEORY 
What actually happens when we read a work of fiction, what transpires in the reader’s mind?  How 
is the text transformed during the reading process?  How is the text designed to elicit, even 
necessitate, the reader’s active involvement?  “Where is,” or what constitutes, the aesthetic object 
(as opposed to the book per se)?  How does literature lead the reader to new experiences and 
worldviews that are no less coherent for being novel?  These are some of the main, and rather 
enticing questions that Iser’s masterful The Act of Reading attempts to answer.  
His principal points are as follows.  The literary work lies in the interstice between text and 
reader.  The text is a network of potentialities; it falls to the reader to actualize these potentialities.  
Such actualization is subjective but not arbitrary: the reader draws upon her own experiences in 
grappling with the text, but the text itself conditions and delimits this subjective understanding to 
a high degree.  The elements of a text are intersubjective instructions for making meaning.  Responses 
                                                
36 I have not often seen Iser invoked in a musical context; Bonds (1991) is a notable exception. 
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to a text are elicited by the objectively present elements in a text but not reducible to them.  “It is, 
then, an integral quality of literary texts that they produce something which they themselves are 
not” (1978, 27).  Thus, the aesthetic object that is the literary work is neither text nor reader’s 
response but rather a felicitous marriage of the two.    
As a reader, Iser argues, I do not merely identify with textual elements that already mirror 
my psyche.  Rather, I seek out new perspectives; this quest is catalyzed by the dissonance between 
textual elements and my preexistent beliefs.  These new beliefs are “prestructured” by the text but 
certainly not predetermined by it—the text merely allows for their possibility.  The text impels me 
to construct meaning because it presents unfamiliar conditions, or frames otherwise familiar 
conventions within new contexts.  In the process of forming new meanings and having new 
experiences, layers of my personality surface of which I had been previously unaware.  Thus, when 
I read, I not only realize latencies in the text, I also realize them in myself; as I help constitute the 
literary work, I also constitute myself.  
Although Iser is speaking of fiction, I think his ideas apply to reading generally, and, even 
more broadly, to aesthetic experience in any form.  The following traces his main argument, or at 
least the points most relevant to my musical purposes.  I will not spell out their musical relevance 
in this section but will draw upon them liberally in the sections and chapters that follow.  Just as 
Iser divides his work into three main parts, enumerating traits of the reader, text, and intersection 






Utterances in literary texts are performative.  In J. L. Austin’s (1962) theory on which Iser draws, 
performative utterances can be either illocutionary, ones that inform, or perlocutionary, ones that 
induce a certain state of affairs.  The signal trait of performative utterances generally is that they 
are not primarily denotative but rather pragmatic.  If, to use my own example, I tell you, “It’s hot 
in here,” I say it not primarily to denote a factual state of affairs (the temperature), but rather to 
inform you that I am hot, and even more so, to get you to do something—that is, to open a 
window, or to come outside with me to get some fresh air.  In other words, a performative 
utterance will harbor a subtext, one that often elicits a particular action or response.   
Performative utterances in literature, Iser explains, are similar in structure though different 
in function from those in the real world.  Literary statements do not produce what is meant, they 
do not result in the action they describe.  Yet they are no less potent for that.  For, in laying bare 
and reconfiguring traditional assumptions and standard conventions, they thus “enable us to see 
precisely what it is that guides us when we do act” (1978, 61).  In this way, we are released from 
“the tyranny of unconscious concepts,” to borrow a felicitous phrase from Kevin Korsyn (1983, 2), 
and are freer to explore new ways of being in the world.  Performative statements in literature, 
then, are not propositions regarding preexistent states of affairs, they are not mimetic.  They 
invoke such states in order to bring them to the reader’s consciousness, and to incite her to form 
new beliefs about them, new attitudes toward them.  Thus, as Daniel Purdy states, when Sophie 
Mereau “writes about female figures in her novels and her historical essays, she posits them as 
possible configurations of female identity rather than as mimetic representations of her own true 
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self. . . .  [Her] literary figures . . . in their irrationality cast a critical gaze upon existing historical 
conditions” (quoted in Muxfeldt [2001, 32]).  
To restate and offer a more extended example: literature does not so much depict reality—
it is not primarily mimetic—as offer a conceptualization of reality, which it then stands on its head.  
That is, any episteme will foreground certain beliefs while pushing others to the background.  The 
literary work points up the latter, that which the conceptual model has demoted.  The work is thus 
able to dismantle that model—or rather, it compels the reader to do so.  Any belief system 
contains the seed of its own undoing; the function of literature and reading is to bring this seed to 
fruition.37  For example, in The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy,38 Lawrence Sterne explicitly 
invokes Locke and fashions the novel in a Lockean vein, by which the characters thrive on 
freewheeling associations and sense impressions.  This is especially true of Uncle Toby.  Yet this 
character does not perform the meager service of confirming Lockean philosophy.  Rather, in his 
desultory ramblings, he points up the problem lurking beneath Locke’s philosophy: namely, 
knowledge based on subjectivism and associationism is precarious knowledge indeed and can easily 
unravel.  Sterne exposes and exploits the potential deficiency of Locke’s philosophy, in the process 
                                                
37 Deleuze and Guattari express a very similar sentiment in their notion of territoriality/deterritoriality: 
“But these territorialized functions and forces can suddenly take on an autonomy that makes them swing 
over into other assemblages, compose other deterritorialized assemblages” (1987, 325).  Of course, this is a 
central conceit of deconstruction.  
38 This along with Tom Jones are the two works that Iser primarily draws upon.  His emphasis on eighteenth-
century literature is unsurprising, since it was in this period that authors were particularly cognizant of the 
reader and sought to engage her directly.  This is especially true of Tristram Shandy, as I discuss presently. 
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compelling the reader to question that system and to redress its deficiency.  In this—not in 
denotation, representation, or confirmation—lies the value of literature, according to Iser.   
The literary work invokes not only preexistent conceptual models but also literary 
conventions and previous works.  Intertextual allusions dig up old solutions to philosophical and 
artistic problems, and these solutions become problematized in turn.  The familiar forms that are 
summoned “lose their validity when transplanted into the literary text.  And it is precisely this loss 
of validity which leads to the communication of something new” (1978, 83, his italics).  We 
deform convention to arrive at something novel and revelatory.  At the same time, the old is not 
merely discarded, for the new is comprehensible only in its definable relation to the old.  In short, 
the literary text is performative in that, far from codifying existing knowledge and conditions, it 
leads the reader to new insights and experiences.    
 
The Reader 
Writing has to implicate reading in order to yield the intentional object that is the artwork.  A text 
implicates reading, in part, by referring to objects incompletely, thus placing the onus on the 
reader to fill in and synthesize these objects.  Moreover, the text piques expectations on the part of 
the reader, the realizations of which instantaneously yield new expectations.  The past event both 
informs and is transformed by subsequent events.  Gaps in this implication-realization flow, 
however, are essential to the reading process.  Otherwise, there would be few signals by which to 
indicate the changes in perspective the reader must synthesize or negotiate.  (These various 
perspectives are those of the narrator, protagonist, secondary characters, plot, and “fictional 
reader”—the hypothetical reader situated within the text who casts attitudes toward the various 
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goings on and the cast of characters).  These incongruities beg the reader’s attention and 
involvement; they incite her to form some sort of gestalt, to aim for consistency in her 
interpretation.39  Yet, the reader is constantly forming new gestalten as the text unravels: the latent 
gaps within one gestalt compel the reader to form another gestalt, which does not displace the old 
but rather modifies it.  Our entanglement in the text is “never total, because the gestalten remain 
at least potentially under attack from those possibilities which they have excluded but dragged 
along in their wake. . . .  The result is a dialectic . . . between illusion-forming and illusion-
breaking” (1978, 127).  
Since Iser apparently considers Tristram Shandy paradigmatic of reader-oriented literature, I 
offer more examples from that work, here and in the next subsection.  Blocks to the narrative flow 
of implications and realizations, as mentioned above, would normally occur covertly; they would 
simply be part of the plot.  Sterne, by contrast, renders these occlusions glaring.  Tristram 
mischievously inserts so many digressions—for example, during the first few volumes in which he 
recounts the story of his conception—as to call into question the primacy of that story.  In this, 
Sterne shows his work resistant to mimetic realism and draws attention instead to the very act of 
reading.  In fact, Tristram frequently stops the story in order to address the reader directly.  For 
example, in Chapter XX, in the middle of his birth story, he calls out to the reader: 
                                                
39 Charles Keil poses a musical counterpart to this idea, suggesting that people are led to musical 
participation—to movement, in particular—by a certain out-of-syncness in performance.  Such 
“participatory discrepancies” can involve time, tone, or both: “music, to be personally involving and socially 
valuable, must be ‘out of time’ and ‘out of tune’” (Keil [1987, 275]).   
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————How could you, Madam, be so inattentive in reading the last chapter?  I told you in it, That 
my mother was not a papist. ————Papist!  You told me no such thing, Sir.  Madam, I beg leave to 
repeat it over again, That I told you as plain, at least, as words, by direct inference, could tell you 
such a thing.——Then, Sir, I must have miss’d a page.- -No, Madam,——you have not miss’d a 
word.———Then I was asleep, Sir.——My pride, Madam, cannot allow you that refuge.———Then, I 
declare, I know nothing at all about the matter.——That, Madam, is the very fault I lay to your 
charge; and as a punishment for it, I do insist upon it, that you immediately turn back, that is, as 
soon as you get to the next full stop, and read the whole chapter over again (51–52). 
Sterne/Tristram here calls attention to the contingency of reading and to how reading is not an 
unimpeded linear process.    
 
Text -Reader Interaction 
The literary text is pockmarked.  It is replete with gaps the reader must fill in with acts of 
imagination (hence the epigraph to this section).  Again, such acts are not mere personal 
associations but flights of fantasy within the parameters established by the text.  These gaps 
account for why the literary work is less a document to be decoded for hidden meanings than a 
vehicle for communication—the literary work is thoroughly heteronomous, implicating and 
beckoning the reader.40  “Whenever the reader bridges the gaps, communication begins. . . .  
                                                
40 Iser critiques Ingarden’s notion of “indeterminacy” on the basis that, for Ingarden, actualization is not 
communication.  This is because Ingarden deems actualization dependent upon external criteria.  Hence, 
he cannot accept that a work may be concretized in different, equally valid ways.  Moreover, for many works 
of art, Iser states, their reception “would be simply blocked if they could only be concretized according to 
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Hence the structured blanks of the text stimulate the process of ideation to be performed by the 
reader on terms set by the text” (1978, 169).   
In his concluding chapter, Iser enumerates two “structures of indeterminacy”—blanks and 
negations.  For our purposes, it will suffice to outline the former.  In contrast to Ingarden’s “places 
of indeterminacy,” which are gaps within a schema, Iser’s “blanks” are gaps between schemata.  
Blanks are junctures where meaning must be created.  They continually allow for new ways of 
combining and negotiating the text’s various perspectives.  Importantly, such combination 
contravenes the classic perceptual principle of good continuation: in the literary work, we seek not to 
fill out an existing image but to replace that image.  Literature demands not the protracted 
perception of a single object; rather, it deliberately impedes the construction of a given image so as 
to juxtapose various objects.  In literature we seek out various combinations, the “repeatable 
diversifications of innovative gestalten of meaning” (1978, 188).  Iser emphasizes,  
the vividness of the meaning will be proportional to the number of blanks that break up the good 
continuation and so stimulate a sequence of discarded images of the first degree and their 
replacement by those of the second degree. . . .  We develop an impression of comparative poverty 
in the ‘continuously’ patterned text, as opposed to the vivid complexity of the ‘impeded’ text” 
(1978, 189).   
In short, the reader is not supposed to merely internalize the various positions presented by the 
text but to juxtapose them so they will transform each other.  As a result of this strategy, the 
aesthetic object begins to dawn. 
                                                
the norms of classical aesthetics” (Iser [1978, 178]).  While Iser applauds Ingarden’s break with the mimetic 
conception of art, he ultimately deems Ingarden’s completions of indeterminacies “undynamic.”   
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Turning again to Tristram Shandy, its blanks, as with its inhibitions of gestalt-formation, are 
glaringly obvious, and in some cases, quite literal.  For example, in volume 6, chapter 38, Tristram 
is about to describe a woman whom Uncle Toby fancies—Widow Wadman.  He halts and states, 
“To conceive this right,——call for pen and ink——here’s paper ready to your hand.——Sit down, Sir, 
paint her to your own mind———as like your mistress as you can——as unlike your wife as your 
conscience will let you. . . .” (422).  He then inserts a blank page (423), after which, “————Was 
ever any thing in Nature so sweet!——so exquisite!” (424).  Tristram/Sterne reckons that the reader 
will create an image to suit his ideal of a beautiful woman.  Likewise, in place of expletives Sterne 
supplies asterisks, leaving it to the reader to fill in the actual words—the onus of indecency is 
placed on the reader.   
In summary, the act of filling in, of forming gestalten, of making meaning, which the 
reader does normatively, is in Tristram Shandy foregrounded, deliberate, and self-conscious.   
 
A Note on Gadamer 
Iser’s work resonates with that of both Gadamer and Bakhtin in more ways than I can enumerate 
here.  It will suffice to cite a few salient connections. 
If for Iser the gaps within the text, and that between text and reader, are no impediment to 
communication but actually a precondition of it, so for Gadamer the gap between past and present 
is no impediment to interpretation but a precondition of it.  
Briefly, Gadamer (1960 and 1976) insists that we can—indeed, must—understand 
historical phenomena in terms of the present because those phenomena are not fixed in the past 
but continue into the present by means of traditions of reception, of which our present interpretive 
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stance is a part.  To understand the past is not to project ourselves onto an uncorrupted historical 
moment; nor do we merely capitulate to our modern biases.  Rather, we embrace both temporal 
realms, or more precisely, we dissolve the binarism of past/present altogether, realizing that the 
past bleeds into the present, conditioning our current modes of understanding.  The document we 
seek to interpret is not ossified in historical stone such that we need to excavate it but is rather 
something alive that evolves over time.  Gadamer, in short, posits the fusion of temporal horizons as a 
prerequisite for any act of true understanding.   
If for Gadamer “horizon” is a temporal frame, for Iser it is more a conceptual one.  Recall 
that, on Iser’s view, a text is composed of various perspectives that the reader slides in and out of.  
The reader cannot hold multiple perspectives simultaneously—at any given point, he will hold a 
single one, the “theme.”  Yet this theme, Iser states explicitly invoking Gadamer, “always stands 
before the ‘horizon’ of the other [perspectives] in which [the reader] had previously been situated” 
(Iser [1978, 97]).  If, for instance, the reader is currently concerned with the protagonist, his 
attitude toward her will be conditioned by the horizon of other characters, the plot, the narrator, 
and so forth.   
In brief, I see Gadamer’s hermeneutics as essentially a diachronic counterpart to Iser’s 
synchronic theory.  By this I do not mean to imply that Iser posits a static model of reading—on 
the contrary, he places great emphasis on the temporality of reading—but that Iser is not primarily 
concerned with historicity.  That said, Iser does offer one particularly revealing comment 
concerning temporality that perhaps shows his Gadamerian colors most clearly: in reiterating that 
the discrepancies and negations of the text ensure the reader’s “entanglement” in it, he states that 
such entanglement “is what places us in the ‘presentness of the text” (1978, 131, my italics).  To the 
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extent that we strive to navigate the text’s manifold crevasses and chasms, the literary text is a 
contemporary, relevant document. 
 
A Note on Bakhtin 
To consider only Bakhtin’s “Discourse in the Novel,” I see three loci of intersection with Iser.  
First, both deplore the idea that novelistic notation is simply to be decoded, that nothing new is to 
be gained for the reader in the act of reading.  “A passive understanding of linguistic meaning is 
no understanding at all. . . .  [It] contributes nothing new to the word under consideration, only 
mirroring it, seeking . . . merely the full reproduction of that which is already given in the word” 
(Bakhtin [1938, 281]).  For both scholars, the meaning of a literary utterance derives not from 
what it denotes, but from a web of contextual factors: for Iser, from the way a particular reader 
bridges gaps, negotiates the incongruity between her assumptions and those presented in the text; 
for Bakhtin, from the way a reader engages the various meanings a word has accrued, the various 
socio-ideological prisms through which it has been refracted.  The common link between the two 
thinkers is that this meaning-endowing context is replete with incongruous and incommensurate 
elements—for Iser these are the various perspectives of a text, for Bakhtin the “contradictory 
opinions, points of view and value judgments” that stand between any given word and its 
ostensible denotation.  Neither writer allows for facile, unmediated meaning.  
Second, Bakhtin makes explicit the rhetorical impetus to Iser’s theory.  Iser, as we have 
seen, maintains that literature is directed toward the reader and necessarily elicits his response and 
active involvement.  Rhetoric, oratory, would seem to be paradigmatic of this notion, but Iser 
seldom acknowledges it.  Perhaps this is no accident, for although oratory patently engages the 
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perceiver, it does not purport to be semantically ambiguous—on the contrary, the orator harbors a 
singular, clear, often propagandist message beneath his layers of tropical and topical flourish.41  
Bakhtin, for his part, likewise recognizes the monologism of rhetoric per se.  Yet he also recognizes 
that rhetoric informs every kind of discourse that is oriented toward a “responsive”—that is, active 
rather than passive—understanding.  Literature is paradigmatic of such discourse—its language is 
dialogically charged.  Even the single word “is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the 
profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates” (1938, 280, his italics).  
Finally, and most significantly, if for Iser a literary text is populated by a multitude of 
partially incongruous perspectives and schemata, for Bakhtin it is populated by a multitude of 
partially incongruous languages.  Yet, in both cases, the reader forms a gestalt, a unity that for Iser 
is continually transforming over the course of reading, a unity that for Bakhtin is irreducibly 
“heteroglot.”  A novel is replete with various languages and their concomitant socio-ideological 
registers.  Yet for Bakhtin it is less the reader who carves out of these various registers a unique 
unity (as it is for Iser) than the author.  She, knowing that the words she uses are always already 
shot through with alterity—with various possible meanings deriving from the plethora of contexts 
in which the words have been used (“Each word tastes of the . . . contexts in which it has lived its 
                                                
41 I am being somewhat reductive here.  Within a more progressive, empiricist philosophy of language, as 
espoused by several eighteenth-century philsophers—Herder, Condillac, and Rousseau, among others—
rhetorical tropes and poetic language generally do not serve to materialize a priori, abstract ideas but are 
rather the very stuff of which ideas are made.  That is, language for these writers was initially poetic (and 
musical and gestural) and only subsequently more abstractly symbolic.  This view of rhetoric, then, is 
arguably compatible with Iser’s theory.    
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socially charged life” [1938, 293])—consciously expropriates words from these contexts and imbues 
them with her own intention.  Crucially, however, these alien meanings can never be fully 
eradicated—they continue to infuse and color the writer’s linguistic use, just as, for Iser, the 
previous perspectival horizons continue to inform the reader’s current one, and just as the 
conceptual paradigm the novel critiques is not entirely jettisoned but rather remains an 
indispensable backdrop against which the new paradigm is all the more visible.   
 
4. ADORNO’S THEORY OF “MUSICAL REPRODUCTION” 
Although Adorno’s titular “reproduction” would seem to betray a view of the musical work as 
inflexible and self-defining, Adorno’s stance is actually much more nuanced and complex than this 
term implies.  Barbara Barry construes Adorno’s term as having two different senses: “one is 
objective reproduction of the work from its notation; the other is active reproduction as interpretation, 
with all its dangers of human fallibility and its potential for the miraculous” (2009, 93, her italics).  
It is this second sense that I feel better captures Adorno’s overall attitude toward performance, and 
obviously the one with which my own stance has greater affinity. 
According to Adorno, a score is not a set of performance directives, a mere script for the 
performer (as it is for Thom and Cook, for example), but is rather indicative of a complete, self-
contained work, which, however, entails an image of sound.  The work, although in a sense 
autonomous in relation to performance, possesses an element of indeterminacy as part of its 
autonomous structure that performance must rectify.  Thus, the work by its very nature implicates 
performance.   
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The primary function of interpretation is to recover and revitalize the sounds and the 
expressive elements they embody that have been reified by notation.  To elaborate, musical 
notation has both a “mensural,” or linguistic, denotative aspect and a “neumic,” or mimetic,42 
gestural aspect.  The performer’s job is to translate the former into the latter—to translate discrete, 
static symbols into a fluid image of human gesture.  (Interestingly, he notes at one point that 
sometimes the mimetic is, in a sense, inscribed directly onto the mensural.  The way notes are 
beamed, for example, can indicate something of their gestural quality.  The composer’s actual 
handwriting, due to its distinctive character and fluid contours, can also intimate the gestural—
more so than static printed symbols, which foster musical reification.43)  That is, the interpreter is 
concerned less with notation per se than with the sound and sentience it represents: “the task of 
interpretation is not, of course, fidelity to the text in itself, but rather the representation of ‘the 
work’, that is, the music for which the text stands” (2006, 67).  Yet, performance does not merely 
reverse such reification, but, as the latter permeates the musical substance itself, the performer 
must somehow express this ineluctable tension between the idea and its notation.  “This 
                                                
42 At one point, Adorno indicates that the term “mimetic” should be replaced by another, but, regrettably, 
he does not specify which.  However, from his remarks elsewhere on aesthetic meaning, one might infer 
that he does not mean this term to suggest that musical sounds have a primarily imitative relation to the 
world.  Rather, Adorno generally believes that music relates to the world by virtue of structural homology, 
not by overt resemblance.  
43 Relatedly, Schenker often testifies to the fact that great composers’ original notations often render 
musical relationships visible.  For example, in reference to a passage in op. 101, fourth movement, 
Schenker remarks, “the Master’s notation, as my score shows, is again a paragon of visual presentation; what 
belongs together is united [with beams], and what comes as a consequence is separated” (1921, 171).   
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reification through notation . . . is not merely external to the composition . . . but rather seeps into 
it as an aspect in itself. . . .  And interpreting therefore means not simply allowing the idea to 
crystallize, but rather making this force field visible” (2006, 140, his italics).  
Also in a state of tension within musical works are the universal and particular, which the 
work attempts to reconcile; performance, Adorno says, should also attempt this reconciliation.  
“The idea . . . that the great music of tradition, in particular Beethoven, brings the general and the 
particular into a paradoxical state of unity, would be applied to the theory of reproduction. . . .  
interpretation is the imitation of that process which takes place in the composition itself” (2006, 
70).  Interpretation should expose the various problems and antagonisms inherent in the structure 
of the work, the points at which particulars resist subsumption by the whole.  At one point, 
Adorno likens this process of structural exposure to taking an “x-ray” of the work, revealing its 
“subcutaneous” elements.  Elsewhere, however, Adorno questions the use of this metaphor, since 
it falsely implies that the work can simply be decoded.  Yet, he does maintain that all aspects of 
interpretation should be constrained by the structure of the composition.  This seemingly 
contradictory stance that notation both is indeterminate and objectively prescribes its mode of 
interpretation equates, in my reading, with the view that the work entails a range of possible 
realizations—polysemy, paradoxically, is one of its immanent properties.  Performance is thus no 
gratuitous sonic manifestation of a self-complete structure, but rather a means to recapitulate, work 






The Historicity of  the Work 
Because the work is not a fixed, monolithic entity, it is not susceptible to different performance 
“styles” or trends.  Relativism, Adorno astutely suggests, is the complement to absolutism—to 
claim that the work can be interpreted in any number of equally valid ways is to presuppose that 
the work is a singular, self-defined entity to begin with.  Rather, the work itself changes throughout 
history—its notational indeterminacy necessitates its historical evolution, its potential meanings 
are gradually revealed in historical stages.  Indeed, a work is susceptible to modes of musical 
understanding that derive from subsequent compositional trends and aesthetic paradigms.  In 
particular, the Classical-era paradigm of unity-in-diversity—in which the notion of unity is 
expanded to accommodate increasingly diverse and contrasting elements—can be retroactively and 
fruitfully applied to the music of the high Baroque (Bach and Händel), even though the implicit 
conception of unity in this music was oriented more toward uniformity than toward diversity (or 
so Adorno claims, presumably in reference to that music’s relative rhythmic homogeneity).  The 
Classical model can illuminate Baroque music, highlighting unintended and otherwise 
unsuspected elements of contrast: “the multifarious formal structure of music since Haydn and 
Mozart unlocks a cognitive dimension in all music, whether earlier or later, that necessarily 
determines interpretation” (2006, 191–92).  This is no dubious anachronism, for, again, the work 
is not absolute in the first place and is not fixed to the particular historical period in which it 
arose.  Simply put, music of the past must be construed in terms of the present; “if themes are 
gestures, then these gestures . . . can only be imitated as present ones” (2006, 188).  The affinities 
with Gadamer are quite apparent here.   
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Indeed, shifts in interpretive perspective are a necessary consequence of the work’s 
historical unfolding.  Regarding the fast tempi prevalent in the early twentieth-century, for example, 
Adorno contends they resulted from the (re-)functionalization of music, by which meaning was 
divorced from the surface shape.  The work was played faster because its parts were thought not to 
be imprinted with meaning but rather to convey separable meaning.  (This trend is evident in 
composition itself, with the emphasis upon quicker note-values—whole notes have all but 
disappeared.)  Yet, this is not necessarily a regrettable trend.  Händel, for instance, was writing at a 
time when the “harmonic principle” came into being, and this in turn necessitated comparatively 
slower tempi in order to express this greater harmonic weight and harmonic awareness.  Our 
modern harmonic sensibilities, in contrast, are more advanced and thus today we need not play 
Händel as slowly.  These faster tempi may not evince the highest musical values, but they are an 
honest reflection of the historical state in which Händel’s music finds itself (Adorno [1930]).   
 
*  *  * 
Regrettably, Adorno rarely substantiates his musical speculations with concrete analytical 
examples.  It is left to us to do so.  For this, I turn to Glenn Gould’s 1962 rendition of Bach’s C 
minor Prelude from the Well-Tempered Clavier, Book 1 (Ex. 1-4, Web Ex. 5).44  I choose this piece 
because it is quintessentially Baroque in its relentless rhythmic uniformity (at least on a foreground 
level), and, concomitantly, in its wholesale devotion to a single basic affect.  Gould, however, 
arguably brings a Classical mentality to the piece, educing otherwise unsuspected elements of 
                                                
44 The following analysis of Gould’s performance is indebted to Barolsky and Martens (2012), but from 
their analysis I draw more or less my own conclusions.   
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contrast.  To start, the softer dynamic, less forceful accentuation, and more varied, nuanced 
articulation he applies to the section beginning in mm. 5 ff. renders it, we might imagine, a more 
delicate, plaintive “secondary” theme (or perhaps “transitional” theme, since it modulates to the 
relative major), over against the “primary” theme of the first four measures, which he plays more 
aggressively.  The relative autonomy and thematic identity of mm. 5–14, the latent Classicism, is 
supported by Barolsky and Martens’ perception that Gould fashions out of those otherwise 
Fortspinnung-oriented measures a quasi-period (antecedent, mm. 5–9; consequent, mm. 10–14) 
(2012, parag. 14).  That is, Gould differentiates the two phrases by subjecting each to a different 
type of process: the antecedent alternates between two types of articulation, and concomitantly, 
between strong and weak bars, creating two-bar hypermeasures; the consequent, by contrast, charts 
a single course in its progressive shortening of soprano tones, a course that leads to a crucial 
harmonic arrival—the relative major (m. 14).45  Extrapolating from Barolksy and Martens, these 
two processes intimate an antecedent-consequent relationship not merely in being contrastive, but 
also in being complementary, just as the thematic content and cadences of an antecedent and 
consequent must be.  That is, the oscillating dynamic of the “antecedent” is complemented by the 
linear dynamic of the “consequent.”  Or, in Barolksy and Martens’ reading, “Gould’s oscillating 
articulations in measures 5–9 reinforce Bach’s harmonic sequence in its movement away from a 
stable key area.  His gradual shortening of the soprano notes in measures 10–13 convey instead the 
sense of a single expansive teleological gesture leading into the more stable E@ major in measure 
                                                
45 M. 9 is a transitional bar in that Gould repeats the weak-bar articulation of the previous bar (see Ex. 1-4).  
Within the continuous linear-intervalic pattern, then, Gould inserts a conspicuous contrast; this moment 
thus particularly evinces a Classical disposition.   
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14” (2012, parag. 14).  Hence, if this section is not literally thematic and periodic, Gould infuses 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Example 1-4: Bach, Prelude in C minor, WTC Book I, mm. 1–15: Gould’s nuances (after Barolsky and Martens [2012])!
10                                                         9–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– LIP: 
Hypermeter:   1                                                           2 
10                                                         9––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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If Gould evinces a penchant for Classical diversity, he also evinces a Romantic penchant 
for motivic processuality.  In fact, Bazzana avers that Gould’s interpretations were influenced by 
the concept of developing variation, as practiced by Brahms and codified by Schoenberg (Bazzana 
[1997, 91–94], discussed in Barolksy and Martens [2012, parag. 23]).  Barolsky and Martens note 
Gould’s slurring of the E@–D–E@ figure in m. 1, which protrudes because all other notes in that 
measure are played staccato.  The authors then note that Gould demarcates an augmented variant 
of that figure in m. 15 (F–E@–F of the bass)—indeed, it seems to me that Gould really goes out of 
his way to not emphasize the first E@ in the bass of that measure, to play it staccato, precisely in 
order to foreground the neighbor figure.46  These instances are motivically significant in 
anticipating the lower-neighbor figure that initiates the fugal subject (C–B&–C).  I would add that 
Gould’s slurring in m. 1 seems haphazard in this context and is likely unintentional.  No matter: 
one could easily chalk it up to a parapraxis, one showing unwitting sensitivity to motivic import.47 
Gould thus draws out structural subtleties from Bach’s seemingly prosaic prelude by 
employing post-Baroque techniques and aesthetic sensibilities.  I should clarify that, in pitting 
                                                
46 The authors note another significant facet of this demarcation: it marks the moment where the gradual 
descent of the line departing from E@5 in the soprano of m. 5, is transferred to the bass, which continues 
onward to the G (the structural dominant) in m. 21–25.  In this respect, incidentally, Gould marks off a 
midway point in the larger section comprising mm. 1–25, thus creating a kind of antecedent-consequent 
relation on the level of the entire section.   
47 Barolsky (2008) hints that Benno Moiseiwitsch, in his recording of Chopin’s E minor Prelude, commits 
an equally illuminating parapraxis. 
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“Baroque” against “Classical” and “Romantic” in the above discussion, I do not mean to 
essentialize those styles in the manner I was criticizing above.  Rather, I use those labels 
heuristically, as a means to support Adorno’s contention that the traits we associate with 
Classicism and Romanticism are in fact potentially present in Baroque music as well (and vice 
versa), and that these traits can be spotlit by the savvy performer. 
 
*  *  * 
A musical work, then, is not fixed to the historical period in which it was created.  In fact, Adorno 
views the “historicity” of the artwork as not external but immanent—historicity is one of the 
intrinsic properties of the musical work and of its interpretation.  He states, “the truth of 
interpretation does not lie within history as something that is alien to it . . . it is rather history that 
lies within the truth of interpretation as something that unfolds according to the latter’s laws” 
(2006, 166).  Let us pause on this enigmatic notion, one on which Adorno does not really 
elaborate.  He does suggest that one of the imperatives of interpretation, as alluded to above, is to 
grapple with the notational reification of musical ideas, which means not simply to negate such 
reification—to penetrate the putative content underlying notation—but rather to render the 
tension between the idea and its notation palpable in the interpretation itself.  The historical 
dimension of this idea can be construed as follows: notation, due to its relative opacity, will not 
readily yield the gestural content for which it stands, but will by necessity require layers of 
interpretation, which unfold over a protracted period of time.  Put a bit differently, notation has 
different possible meanings whose elucidation requires multiple and various aesthetic paradigms 
or schools of musical thought and interpretation (as distinct from more narrow fashionable 
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performance trends) and these, in turn, arise not simultaneously but in the course of history.48  In 
this sense, the musical work, by its very nature, encompasses its own historical unfolding.  The 
different meanings it acquires throughout history are not superimposed onto it but rather derive 
from the content and nature of the composition itself.  “This would mean that the changes 
undergone by works through interpretation are no mere matter of taste, but rather obey some 
objective law. . . .  they are predetermined by the works themselves, not dependent on preference 
or even on the dominant manner among performers” (2006, 194). 
Interpretation and historicity, then, no less than any other facet of the artwork, is 
immanent in the musical work itself.  Consequently, Adorno is skeptical of appealing to historical 
conditions surrounding the work as a basis for interpretive validity.  He deems such historicism 
specious: our sense of what constitutes the past reflects more our present biases and reified notions 
than historical truth.  Anticipating Taruskin, he avers, “the connoisseurship nurtured 
educationally on the past in truth never gains access to those past works, but only to their false 
present, their conventionalized expression” (2006, 194, my italics).  In alluding to a “false present,” 
                                                
48 This is not to claim, however (at least I do not claim), that the successive interpretations of a work over 
the course of history progress ever closer to the “truth” of a work—I do not construe Adorno’s stance 
teleologically.  Nietzsche, speaking more generally, claims, “the whole history of a thing . . . becomes a 
continuous chain of reinterpretations . . . which need not be causally connected among themselves. . . .  The 
‘evolution’ of a thing . . . is not its progressus toward a goal. . . .  Rather, it is a sequence of more or less 
profound, more or less independent processes of appropriation” (1887, 210).  (Forthwith, however, he 
proceeds to espouse precisely the opposite view, one favoring the “atrophy and degeneration . . . in short, 
death” of weaker beings precisely for the sake of “progressus,” for the good of the stronger and more powerful 
[ibid.]) 
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Adorno brings an added dimension to Taruskin’s critique of the authenticity movement.  
Taruskin (1995) accuses that movement of distorting the past in its vain attempt (“vain” in both 
senses) to uncover historical truth—an attempt that derives from a modernist ethos.  Adorno takes 
a step further, implying that those who adopt a didactic (hermeneutic) approach to works of the 
past not only distort that past by filtering it through the prism of the present, but distort the present 
as well.   
Mozart’s first compositional foray into Bach’s style can perhaps serve as an allegory of this 
idea.  After encountering Bach’s music for the first time, in 1782, Mozart penned the Fugue in C 
major, K. 394, about which Edward Lowinsky quips, “What a paradox this fugue presents: it has 
all of Bach’s technique and none of his style!” (1956, 162).  That is, it adroitly uses Bach’s fugal 
techniques yet, contrary to Bach’s fluid and asymmetrical phrase rhythm, exhibits phrase rhythm 
that is rather four-square.  Yet, I would add, by 1783 Mozart had himself already achieved a 
remarkably fluid and plastic phrase-rhythmic style (the opening of the Menuetto from the Piano 
Sonata in A, K. 331, composed that year, is an apt example).  Hence, in dutifully and earnestly 
attempting to recover Bach’s style, Mozart unwittingly falsified not only an element of that style 









Subject ivity in Interpretation 
The above suggests that attempting to recover the work in its supposed historically pure state is a 
fool’s errand.  Adorno affirms the necessity of appraising the score from a subjective standpoint.  
For, insofar as the interpreter’s task is to translate mensural symbols into mimetic gestures—to 
translate the reified into the sentient—she must tap into her own subjective impulses in order to 
relate empathetically to the living spirit behind the notation.  Fidelity to the notation per se as a 
primary objective entails suppressing one’s subjective impulses and thus the ability to capture the 
subjective impulses of which the notation is a manifestation.  In other words, a fundamental 
paradox of interpretation is that one is able to realize the (or better, an) objective meaning of the 
work only by relating to it subjectively, since the objective elements of the work are themselves reified 
subjective elements.  “Where subjectivity [and] sense . . . are essential to the matter itself, yet at the 
same time congealed, ‘encoded’ within it, that aspect [sic] requires an equal, namely the subject, in 
order to be salvaged—precisely for the sake of factual content” (2006, 142).  More succinctly, “in 
musical reproduction, objectivity of approach can come about only through the efforts of the 
subjective fantasy” (2006, 118).49  Nietzsche likewise holds that the “objective” is accessible not 
                                                
49 Of course, subjectivity is not a fixed thing—people and their identities constantly evolve.  Yet, the work, 
due to its polysemous character, can accommodate such fluctuating subjectivity.  As Stephen 
Nachmanovitch states, “there is some largeness or manyness in the art that can resonate with the changing 
versions of myself”  (1990, 172).  In other words, the artwork is fluid enough to be able, potentially, to 
resonate not only with different historical perspectives, as discussed above, but also with the different 
perspectives of a single, evolving subject.  
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through disinterested contemplation but only through “the most diverse perspectives and 
psychological interpretations” and that “the more emotions we allow to speak in a given matter, 
the more different eyes we can put on in order to view a given spectacle, the more complete will be 
our conception of it, the greater our ‘objectivity’” (1887, 255).  
From this perspective, interpretation replicates an essential facet of “authentic” art itself, 
which, on Adorno’s view, captures universal truth by means of its unique, particular details.  To 
elaborate, Adorno suggests that every particular must resonate with a universal in order to be a 
valid component of an artwork.  Yet, paradoxically, one cannot apprehend the true character or 
nature of the particular unless one views it as autonomous in relation to universals—as irrespective 
of a subsuming concept (note the Kantian inflection).  For it is precisely in the specificity and 
irreducibility of the particular that something universal is to be found.  I, for one, routinely sense 
the truth of this assertion in listening to music.  I sense how an exquisitely nuanced musical 
emotion seems to convey something universal precisely in its specificity.  Conversely, when 
composers or other artists, in an attempt to convey something universal, employ generic or 
commonplace techniques or expressive tropes without significant qualification or reimagination, 
they fail to access such universality because such art is not grounded in real experience.  Adorno 
implies that the deeper an artist delves into her own personal, subjective experience, the more 
universal it is—the more broadly it will resonate.  As simply stated by Nachmanovitch, 
“Paradoxically, the more you are yourself, the more universal your message” (1990, 179).  Adorno, 
in short, suggests that the path to the universal is through the particular: “no particular in the 
artwork is legitimate without also becoming universal through its particularization” (1997, 180, my 
italics).   
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Interpretation, then, requires highly subjective involvement in order to recover the 
objective elements of the work, just as art itself has to be grounded in very particular experience to 
enjoy universal resonance.  
 
*  *  * 
Adorno works very hard to corral all aspects of music into the work; even history and 
interpretation, on his view, count among its objective properties.  I do not necessarily accept 
Adorno’s view of the work in this sense, for, as will become increasingly clear, I am reluctant to 
assign a work immanent properties beyond the most obvious, denotative ones.  Yet, one might 
wonder precisely to what extent, or in what sense, Adorno regards these dimensions as objective, 
because with Adorno, one must take into account his penchant for dialectics and to remember 
that his language is often more performative than propositional.  I think by “objective” 
interpretation he means something closer to Iser—that the text in its conspicuous chasms 
implicates the reader—than to the view Schenker, for one, sometimes adopted—that the text 
harbors a particular structural meaning that must be conveyed in performance.  His rhetoric of 
immanence notwithstanding, he clearly embraces interpretive flexibility and variability, the 
imperative to bring a score to life.  I now turn to more concrete interpretive consequences of these 






III. INTERPRETIVE COROLLARIES 
5. CRITIQUE 
The common ontological assumption, discussed in the Introduction and earlier in this chapter, 
that the musical work is prior to and transcends performances, and is essentially inextricable from 
the score, entails, to some degree, the effacement of the performer.  It relegates him to a mere 
pieceworker within a patronizing division of labor in which he who generates ideas stands above 
him who executes them.  What are the interpretive ramifications of this pervasive view?  I will 
consider this question first in the abstract, then more empirically. 
Those holding this view will likely define (explicitly or not) interpretation more negatively 
than affirmatively—by what the performer avoids doing rather than by what she does.  They 
assume musical sense to be “built into” the composer’s notations (both mensural and expressive), 
such that realizing those notations unobtrusively, not “interfering” with them, will guarantee 
musical sense.  This stance conflates not only the work and score but also, more specifically, the 
notational symbol and its referent, thus encouraging performers to play “the notes as if they by 
themselves were [the] disclosed word,” in A. B. Marx’s biblical phrasing.50  That is, notation is 
solely denotative and thus fully determined rather than also connotative and thus 
underdetermined, requiring considerable interpretive input.  Indeed, this approach exhibits a 
distinct strain of formalism in prioritizing the mensural over the mimetic; it conceives the work as 
self-referential.  A corollary of this view is a formalistic approach to the tools of musicianship: 
technique takes priority over interpretation and even the latter is employed with scant regard for 
the meaning it potentially serves to convey—variances in dynamics, tempo, and articulation exist 
                                                
50 Quoted in Schindler (1860, 396); I have been unable to locate the original source.   
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largely for their own sake.  In short, within a score-centric model, the performer’s imperative is to 
execute rather than interpret, and to be fully transparent to the work, which is considered 
complete in its essential aspects prior to interpretation.  
Such an ideology, like all ideologies, inevitably trickles down to, and also rises up from, the 
level of praxis.  My Introduction has already documented the discernible trend toward relative 
interpretive homogeneity.  Dynamics are relatively constrained, with mezzo forte the implicit 
default.  Barely audible pianissimos are rarely employed, since the imperative is to “project”— to 
reach out to listeners rather than to draw them in (to relate to them, one might say, efferently 
rather than afferently).  Modern performers are more likely to take risks on the louder side of the 
dynamic spectrum.  Even fortissimos, however, are tempered by the ideal of a pervasively “beautiful 
tone.”51  This emphasis upon the material or sensuous qualities of sound—sound for sound’s sake 
(what Adorno derisively terms a “culinary” approach)—rather than upon sound as a vehicle for 
musical sense evinces a formalist mentality. 
Tempo is thought to be the interpretive element most responsible for achieving unity, and 
is thought to achieve this through relative uniformity.  Indeed, such uniformity is framed as the 
backdrop against which temporal relations as supposedly inherent in the notation emerge.  
Edward Cone typifies this stance: “Paradoxical though it sounds, absolute tempo governs our 
perception of the relative importance of each musical event, and thus our comprehension of form” 
                                                
51 Chapter 4 will sound other, more troubling ideological overtones of the seemingly unproblematic trope 
of musical beauty. 
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(1995, 246).52  Edwin Stein likewise states, “The tempo is one of the performer’s most important 
means for holding the form together. . . .  The same tempo, l’istesso tempo, should therefore be 
maintained. . . .  If there are several themes of different characters, a tempo has to be found that is 
apt to all” (1962, 48–49).  On this view, playing the two contrasting (primary and secondary) 
themes of a sonata at the same, “absolute” tempo illuminates rather than obfuscates their different 
characters—a curiously skewed logic.  Rubato is an aberration of sorts, pejoratively framed in 
terms of the “stealing time” metaphor, in which taking time (ritarding) in one place requires giving 
it back (accelerating) in another.  (Stein stipulates such compensation as requisite for employing 
tempo rubato.)  In other words, tempo variances are valid only insofar as they result in overall 
evenness.  Relatedly, legato is the default articulation and is applied on a broad scale in order to 
render “long lines,” out of an assumption, as with tempo, that uniformity will ensure unity and 
coherence.  
A simple example demonstrates that, contrary to the above stance, tempo changes 
potentially illuminate rather than obscure changes of character, even when these changes are quite 
slight.  Horowitz, in his live performance of Mozart, Sonata in C, K. 330, first movement (Ex. 1-5, 
Web Ex. 6), plays the first theme at a fast clip, approximately 76 to the quarter note.  He ritards 
substantially at the bifocal close, into m. 18, but then appears to resume tempo for the more 
lyrical, appoggiatura-laden first secondary theme (ST1).  However, he actually plays the theme 
approximately one metronome mark slower, as befits its vocal quality.  Finally, he plays the march-
                                                
52 Cone’s apparent assumption that unity equates with uniformity is also evident in his analysis of Chopin’s 
A major Prelude (1968, 40–42), which he ultimately reduces to a single “ball-throwing” gesture.  (See Cook 
[2011, 293] for a discussion of Cone’s analysis.)  
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like second secondary theme (ST2) one metronome mark slower still, as befits its sterner, lockstep 
quality.  To be sure, he pushes and pulls within each of these sections and their corresponding 
tempi, but the overall tempo distinctions are clear even to the naked ear and reinforce the clear 
changes of topic, from ebullient Musette and Fanfare to Aria to March.  By contrast, Glenn Gould 
(Web Ex. 7) maintains his initial slow, stately tempo through all three themes.  This backdrop, pace 
Cone, does not, at least to my ears, somehow magically illuminate the very distinct topical profiles 
of Mozart’s thematic tapestry, but it does foreground Gould’s Bachian disposition: he evidently 
brings to the Mozart a sensibility oriented toward moto perpetuo, Fortspinnung, Affektenlehre, and the 





music whose stylistic trademark, in contradistinction to the Baroque, is thematic and topical 
diversity.  I submit that Gould’s interpretation communicates his particular aesthetic 
predisposition and preference more than it does the thematic narrative of K. 330.   
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To be clear, I am not averse to employing an aesthetic arsenal that is historically removed 
from the piece at hand.  If I had no problem in principle with Gould applying a Mozartian 
sensibility to Bach (as we saw earlier), nor should I with him applying a Bachian one to Mozart.53  
If in some cases the Classical value of (unified) diversity might illuminate potentially differentiated 
elements in Baroque pieces, so in other cases might a Baroque sensibility illuminate Classical 
pieces.  The question, really, is what does or does not work in any particular case, what 
“anachronistic” strategy best serves the potentials of any given score.  Such interpretive open-
mindedness, however, has no ally in the draconian stance apparently held by Cone and Stein, 
among many others, that “absolute” tempo uniformity is a prerequisite for illuminating thematic 
differences. 
 
Ideological  Implications  
One might attribute the insistence upon dynamic moderation to psychological discomfort, on the 
part of the performer and audience alike, with conflictive or antagonistic elements (as often 
embodied by extreme loudness) or with feelings of intimacy or vulnerability (as often embodied by 
extreme softness).  Taking a step further, one might view such dynamic-cum-emotional moderation 
as a means by which metaphorically to contain or control the musical experience so as to render it 
more susceptible to commodification.  To elaborate, interpretive variances, as we have seen, serve 
to express gestural and emotive meanings, the mimetic aspect of notation.  The more numerous, 
                                                
53 To clarify, I do not actually equate a Baroque sensibility with temporal uniformity, nor, for that matter, 
do I subscribe to a singular “Baroque sensibility” as regards performance.  I am being somewhat reductive 
here for the sake of argument. 
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salient, and structurally strategic these variances, the greater their capacity to convey such 
meanings.  Hence, to quell dynamic range is potentially to silence the meanings music can express, 
to diminish its capacity to reflect subjective and sentient experience.  Furthermore, the less 
“human” the music, the more easily we can conceive it as an object, treat it as a mere commodity.  
As Adorno puts it, the “taboo” of dynamic extremes serves to “ward off expressions of pain and to 
attune music to a moderation that belongs to the sphere of cheerful and refreshing subjects, to the 
sphere of bourgeois vulgar materialism” (2006, 143).  Interpretive containment, then, indicates 
and yields emotional containment, which in turn more readily yields a musical commodity.  
This consumerist mentality is fostered not only by a lack of interpretive audacity, but also, 
and concomitantly, by a mechanistic, perfectionistic approach—by the desideratum of a seamless, 
glossy surface.  Writing in 1938, Adorno bemoans the performance style emerging at that time:  
All the cogwheels mesh so perfectly that not the slightest hole remains open for the meaning of the 
whole.  Perfect, immaculate performance in the latest style preserves the work at the price of its 
definitive reification.  It presents it as already complete from the very first note.  The performance 
sounds like its own phonograph record.  The dynamic is so predetermined that there are no longer 
any tensions at all.  The contradictions of the musical material are so inexorably resolved in the 
moment of sound that it never arrives at the synthesis . . . which reveals the meaning of every 
Beethoven symphony (1938, 301). 
Performing a work as a foregone conclusion, without foregrounding its inner tension or 
developing its unity from the bottom up—playing it, in other words, with neither conflict nor 
synthesis—is at once a cause and consequence of objectifying the musical work, the better for it to 
be expropriated by the consumer industry.  Put another way, modern performers standardly avoid 
the arduous task of reconstructing the work’s structure—with all of its problems as well as 
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affirmations—opting instead to transmit attractive, palatable particulars.  These can then, like the 
work as a whole, be easily reified and commodified.  (The consumer in this scenario, Adorno’s 
“regressive listener,” clings to musical bits and pieces, tuneful fragments, appreciating them apart 
from the larger structural context from which they derive something more than mere material 
value.)  Without such extemporaneous meaning-making—by which the musical structure is 
(re)built in unpredictable ways in a temporal present from which it cannot be extracted—music is 
especially vulnerable to commodification.  “A Beethoven symphony as a whole, spontaneously 
experienced, can never be appropriated” (Adorno [1938, 298]).  Whether the cardinal sin is 
commercialism or interpretive homogeneity each must decide for himself.  But neither is the cause 
of the other; rather, they feed off each other in a vicious cycle.   
 
*  *  * 
Interpretive confinement serves not only emotional containment and commodification, but also, 
and relatedly, conformity.  Adorno is suspicious of any artwork that presents a “false totality,” that 
portrays particulars as being subsumed by universals too facilely and fully.  Such art is ideological 
in fostering the false belief that the members of a society coexist with greater concordance and 
contentment than they really do.  On the same basis, we might also question an interpretation that 
portrays a false totality—that fails to highlight and grapple with the incongruities and antagonisms 
of a work, which reproduce those of external reality.54  Indeed, the ideal of seamless execution 
(technical perfection, dynamic containment, uniform tempo, long line, and so forth) that typifies 
                                                
54 Schoenberg refers to encountering “problems” in studying a work that conductors who perform that work 
would “erase” by “playing whole movements in one stiff, inflexible tempo” (1975, 322).   
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this approach is not only aesthetically but also ethically dubious, insofar as it conduces to “false 
consciousness”—the impression than things are better than they really are—and thus, in a way, 
discourages dissent and promotes conformity.  Stated more concretely, when one plays (or teaches 
another to play) in a way such that no detail dynamically protrudes from its surroundings, that 
rubato is not directly perceived but is instead subject to the requisite of overall uniformity, that 
articulation bridges together disparate ideas, and so forth—by all these, one upholds and 
encourages, if unwittingly, a model of conformity.  To skirt this pitfall, one must foreground the 
tensions between part and whole, to maintain a sense of the counterforces and antinomies within 
the work.   
Such a conformist agenda is even more blatant in the insistence that the performer need 
defer to the composer’s “intentions”—what Michael Klein facetiously derides as “an impulse to 
defer to the dead as a means of discovering univocal meaning” (2004, 29).  This, in my view, is a 
patent model of political hegemony, a tool by which to engender unquestioning compliance.  As 
Nicholas Cook puts it, “the idea that the performer’s role is to reproduce what the composer has 
created builds an authoritarian power structure into musical culture” (1998, 26).  Indeed, the 
pecking order of composer first, interpreter second compulsively rehearses a hoary hierarchy-based 
ideology.   
 
6. A PREFERRED INTERPRETIVE MODEL 
In General :  Ambiguity 
So much for reactive critique; time to put forward the interpretive stance I embrace, and one all 
interpretations in this dissertation will betoken.  This stance emanates from my beliefs that, first, 
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the musical work, properly construed, not only allows for but necessitates active interpretive 
involvement; and second, the performer, as emblematic of the societal subject—indeed, solo artists 
are widely taken to epitomize self-expression—ought to enjoy maximal expressive liberty.  If the 
interpreter views the work as a broad, if finite, realm of structural and expressive potentialities that 
entails and implicates interpretation, at no point, or rarely, will she deem the score self-evident or 
self-explanatory.  She will not assume its coherence to be guaranteed by a literal rendering of the 
composer’s indications.  In fact, often the more apparently self-evident the music is, the more 
interpretive questions it raises.  Consider that the opening theme of Mozart’s Piano Sonata in A 
major, K. 331, for example, is perhaps one of the most picked over passages in the music-
theoretical literature.55  This is evidence of the fact that seemingly simple music typically conceals, 
and arises from, a host of structural questions and ambiguities.  
Adorno correctly observes that sometimes ambiguity (or, more generally, obfuscation) is 
itself a structural property of the work to which the interpreter need adhere—in Jerrold Levinson’s 
words, “a duality that is internal to, and arguably intended in, the work” (1993, 39).  For example, 
a composer might offer an ambiguity as a crux in the musical narrative and might subsequently 
disambiguate or resolve it as part of that narrative.  Yet, I contend that such cases of narrative 
ambiguity are the exception rather than the rule.  Normatively, structural ambiguity and expressive 
polysemy are less properties warranting direct expression than corollaries of indeterminate 
notation that therefore warrant resolution.56  In my view, the fundamental task of the interpreter, 
                                                
55 Allanbrook (2008, 273–75) lists the myriad writings devoted to this theme. 
56 I realize that an ambiguity is by definition an undecidable multivalency, so when I speak of a performer 
“resolving” an ambiguity, I do not mean to suggest he resolves it in any definitive sense, but rather that, for 
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in formulating a conception of a particular piece, is to choose from among its several inherent 
structural and expressive possibilities and present a single, definitive way to hear the piece in any 
given performance.57  It is the performer’s role to guide the listener through the work’s relations as 
she conceives them rather than to present a “neutral” version onto which the listener imposes his 
own interpretation—that would be more a conceptual exercise than a sensuous, aesthetic 
experience.  As we have seen, to aspire toward neutrality or objectivity is necessarily to miss the 
mark, insofar as musical objectivity is, if anything, encoded subjectivity and thus requires a 
subjective response.  The “neutral” performance—in which one attempts to allow the music to 
“speak for itself”58—will ineluctably betray subjective biases at any rate, but, crucially, will not do 
so with the consistency and purposiveness needed for a compelling, cohesive interpretation.  
                                                
the sake of clarity, he chooses and projects one out of its several possible (structural-cum-emotive) meanings 
in a particular performance.  In other words, he implicitly asks his listeners to imagine that this meaning is 
the only possible one (more on such imaginings in the next chapter). 
57 This selectivity and specificity, on Levinson’s view, is what distinguishes a performative interpretation 
from a scholarly (“critical”) one: the former, he states, is “typically selective, individualizing,” the latter 
“ideally synthetic, overarching” (1993, 39).   
58 To this “authenticist” notion Taruskin sagely retorts: let us accumulate as much knowledge (including 
historical knowledge) as possible about a piece, but not “in a spirit of dutiful self-denial or with illusions 
that the more knowledge one garners, the fewer decisions one will have to make” (1995, 62).  We cannot 
remove ourselves from the process of bringing a piece to life—music steadfastly refuses to “speak for 
itself”—and indeed “the suspension of personality in a modernist performance immediately stamps the 
performance as such, as is therefore paradoxically tantamount to an assertion of personality” (ibid).    
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I offer examples of each type of ambiguity: the normative case where a passage simply offers 
multiple possible meanings, and the special case, where the ambiguity is evidently a distinct 
element of the musical discourse since it is later resolved.  Both cases, as I will demonstrate, call for 
the performer to assume an active rather than neutral role.  We have already seen an example of 
the former in the Introduction (Ex. I-9): recall that Meyer (1973) detects in the subject of Bach’s D 
minor Fugue multiple implicative strands.  Although he does not explicitly call the passage 
ambiguous, he clearly regards it as such, as structurally multivalent.  Recall, he contends that the 
listener will perceive such multivalence provided the performer does not intervene, provided the 
performer merely execute the notes and not group or accentuate them in any particular way.  I will 
repeat what I said before: such a neutral rendering, if even that were possible, will not convey 
anything in particular.  The performer who wishes to concretize Meyer’s analysis on some level will 
choose one implicative strand and devise a strategy by which to convey or imply it.  Of course, the 
performer may also choose to play different subject-entries in different ways, according to different 
implicative strands (as shown in Ex. 1-6), and thus convey a sense of ambiguity or polysemy on a 
large scale.  
 
An example of the second type is Mozart’s Symphony in G Minor, K. 550, whose opening 
theme is famously ambiguous from a metric standpoint.  As shown in Ex. 1-7, the ambiguity 






(cf. Intro, Ex. 9, middle system) 




(cf. Ex. 9, top system) 
— — 
Example 1-6: Bach, D minor Fugue, WTC, Book 2, mm. 1–5: some performance strategies for conveying Meyer’s various implicative strands 
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in the bass, with the lower note intimating the stronger hyperbeat.  On the other hand, the 
thematic content basically begins in m. 2, with the anacruses to that measure serving to reinforce 
its thematic and hypermetric stability (if, alternatively, the first measure were hypermetrically more 
stable, m. 2, along with its anacrusis, would serve as an extended anacrusis to m. 3).  Mozart 
disambiguates this theme when it returns in the recapitulation: as shown in the example, the 
retransitory passage, which as a whole has a decidedly anacrusic quality, encompasses the opening 
measures of the theme, such that they are now clearly anacrusic as well—they are now 
unequivocally weak hypermetrically, preparatory to the structural downbeat that is m. 166.59  
 
 
                                                
59 Incidentally, this retransitory passage typifies the special blend of eloquence and contrapuntal artifice that 
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Example 1-7: Mozart, Symphony in G Minor, K. 550, first movt.: primary theme at beginning of exposition and recapitulation: hypermetric reinterpretation 
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The question for the conductor, in light of this subsequent hypermetric clarification, is, 
how should she interpret the opening measures?  To somehow play it neutrally would not, I think, 
ultimately convey the presence of conflicting meanings.  Rather, by making a clear choice from the 
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m. 160 (tail of retransition) 
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reinterpretation in the recapitulation will make the astute listener realize, in retrospect, that in the 
theme always inhered the possibility of multiple metrical interpretations.  In other words, the 
ambiguity emerges progressively, over the course of the piece; it is not something that need be, or 
even can be evident in one particular moment.  That said, some cases might exist where structural 
ambiguity can be conveyed instantaneously, in an emotionally palpable way—by creating, for 
instance, a murky, hazy quality.  Schoenberg offers a hypothetical example in which a pianist 
“blurs” motives rather than clearly delineates them in order to illuminate a piece’s 
multidimensionality and its representation of “life on several levels” (1975, 348).60 
Hence, whether the ambiguity arises simply from the normal, indeterminate condition of 
musical notation or whether it is evidently planted by the composer in order later to be resolved, 
the performer can and should treat the ambiguity decisively.  It is naïve, I think, to assume that 
interpretive abstinence will somehow guarantee the expression of such a complex state as 
ambiguity.  I suspect that some musicians covertly and perhaps unconsciously use ambiguity to 
justify the interpretive neutrality to which they are predisposed, to justify restricting a performer’s 
                                                
60 Tanner (2000), discussing Liszt’s Sonata in particular, notes that its formal ambiguities are not merely 
analytical problems to be solved; rather, they open up opportunities for particular kinds of expression.  Also 
see Krebs (1999).  In his chapter devoted to the performance of metric conflict and ambiguity in 
Schumann, he initially appears too heavily invested in the binary choice of bringing out such conflict or 
not.  Eventually, however, he softens his stance, discussing the need to parse the meaning or explore the 
emotional intonations of such ambiguity: “It is not enough to convey the letter of metrical conflicts; you 
must also attempt to penetrate and to communicate their spirit, that is, their meaning” (spoken through his 
fictionalized Clara) (1999, 184).  
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freedom.  Janet Levy (1995), for example, surveys several examples of “beginning-ending 
ambiguity” and considers the ways in which performers might respond to these.  In every single 
case, she concludes that any tempo fluctuation will detract from the ambiguity, and therefore that 
the performer serves such cases only by being as unobtrusive as possible.  Performance is, in her 
view, evidently more about what not to do than what to do.  
 
In Particular:  The Interpret ive Parameters  
Now I offer a basic approach to the fundamental interpretive elements of dynamics, tempo, and 
articulation.  Most generally, the interpreter employs all three elements to manifest the structural 
and expressive meanings on which she has settled, to express musical sense and mimetic gesture.  
In other words, rarely does the interpreter call attention to these elements in and for themselves—
for example, rubato for rubato’s sake.  Adorno (2006) emphasizes in particular the need to express 
through these variances the formal function of an event, its temporal relation to previous and 
subsequent events.  He claims that, in fact, there is no pure identity in music.  Even two phrases 
consisting of the selfsame notes cannot be strictly identical, for they occur at different times and 
thus in different contexts and thus assume distinct formal functions that the performer need 
project.   
To convey this range of emotional meaning and formal function, the performer requires 
the fullest possible range of dynamic color.  Dynamic extremes, rather than mezzo forte, are 
themselves the norm, for only they are capable of “articulating and liberating the subcutaneous.  
Not varying a medium sound, but rather drawing strength from the characters [of the work] and 
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their proportions.  The requirement of much greater dynamic differentiation: it must extend as far 
as the differentiation manifest in the composition” (Adorno [2006, 105]). 
 Tempo fluctuation (rubato) in this approach is an indispensable component of 
interpretation, a primary means of expressing musical sense.  Insofar as every musical group is 
viewed as having the potential to create a semblance of human gesture, ubiquitous variances in 
tempo are needed to realize this mimetic potential, to allow notes to coalesce into physical images 
and emotional tapestries.  On a higher formal level, different themes require different tempi in 
order to manifest their different characters (these differences might be slight, but still clearly 
perceptible).  This approach eschews the notion of a single, uniform tempo since that would 
essentially nullify a primary element of interpretation, an essential means by which to convey 
meaning.   
Parenthetically, Adorno’s remarks on tempo variance are frustratingly contradictory rather 
than genuinely dialectical (of course, one cannot know if he would have arrived at a more 
consistent stance had he completed his theory of performance).  In one place, he claims that to 
interpret at all is necessarily to employ rubato.  In another, he claims that tempo variance is a 
“more superficial means of articulation” than dynamic variance (2006, 99).  He also claims that the 
tempo expresses the totality of the composition, dynamics the individual element (the two of 
which interact dialectically), and that a unified tempo is required in order to express the unity of 
the composition (2006, 102).61  Yet, leaving aside the question of whether a uniform tempo can 
                                                
61 To be precise, Adorno views such unity of tempo not as a material actuality—that is, as involving literally 
equidistant beats—but as an underlying, overall uniformity, an abstract idea: “no 2 [actual] beats will ever 
be chronometrically equal” (2006, 102).  
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create unity in any meaningful sense, there is no reason why tempo need be confined to this 
purportedly unifying role, reserving localized differentiation and characterization for dynamic 
variance.  For tempo variances can be as subtle and minute as dynamic ones, and are as necessary 
for “humanizing” the music—for transforming the quantitative and mensural into the qualitative 
and neumic.   Ultimately, I read Adorno’s overall ambivalence toward temporal manipulation as 
amounting to an allowance of moderate variance but also to a distaste for any rubato that appears 
superimposed onto the music, that results from the performer’s mannerisms rather than from 
structural necessity.  This is evident in his statement that Chopin used rubato for a specific 
purpose, namely for “gliding over harsh modulations. . . .  [It was thus] applied in a purely 
functional way, so unlike the abuse of it by many modern executants with whom it degenerates 
from slight variation into a disregard of time” (2006, 20–21).   
In short, I believe, evidently in contrast to Adorno, that tempo variance is at least as 
important a tool for expressing musical structure (on all levels) as is dynamic variance.  In fact, 
arguably any alteration in sound in bound to entail at least a slight alteration in time and vice 
versa.  The fundamental point on which Adorno and I agree is that one should generally not 
employ rubato for its own sake, but mostly for the purpose of conveying musical sense.62   
Finally, this approach requires considerable differentiation in articulation, both globally 
and locally.  Globally, the piece is be conceived as a series of discrete yet functionally related formal 
                                                
62 Of course, minute gradations of sound and time are sometimes purely decorative or coloristic, devoid of 
any demonstrable meaning.  Alternatively, one might hold that the most minute interpretive variances do 
in fact convey meaning, but meaning that is ineffable.  For a probing investigation into the precise nature of 
musical ineffability, see Raffman (1993).   
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units and rhetorical moments, many of which require demarcation by means of separation.  
Locally, smaller-scale gestures likewise require such demarcation.  The interpreter carefully 
considers how events should be grouped on various levels, not assuming such grouping to be self-
evident—that is, he does not abstain from grouping events decisively (presenting a “neutral” 
version whose grouping would need to be imposed by the listener).  Nor does he assume legato the 
default articulation, especially for music prior to Beethoven, where, in point of fact, non legato was 
the norm.63  Thus, the absence of articulation marks in the music of Bach, for example, is assumed 
to indicate neither the absence of distinctive grouping nor pervasively legato treatment but rather 
to warrant varied articulations whose function is to group the musical events in one of the several 
possible ways connoted by the notation.  
In short, the greater the range of variance—with respect to dynamics, tempo, and 
articulation—the performer has at his disposal, potentially the more capable he is of conveying 
structural relationships and expressing gesture and emotional meaning.  My stance valorizes extreme 
interpretation—not, per Said (1991), in order to dominate and dehumanize the audience but, on 
the contrary, to create a more human, more deeply felt experience for all involved.  Such 
extremity, affirms Jonathan Culler, is “a quality to be cultivated rather than shunned. . . .  Like 
most intellectual activities, interpretation is interesting only when it is extreme.  Moderate 
interpretation, which articulates a consensus, though it may have value in some circumstances, is 
of little interest” (1992, 122).  An interpretation, he admits, is not guaranteed to succeed on 
account of its extremity, but it will stand “a better chance . . . of bringing to light connections or 
                                                
63 To recall, Barth (1992) documents that Beethoven was the first composer to cultivate a pervasively legato 
touch. 
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implications not previously noticed . . . than if [it strives] to remain ‘sound’ or moderate” (ibid., 
110).         
 
7. CONCLUSION: THE AUTONOMOUS INTERPRETER 
A corollary of the foregoing is that a performance/interpretation, though part of the work, is, or 
should be, an autonomous part of that work in some sense—just as, by analogy, some works 
comprise quasi-independent formal sections or fragments.64  Put more precisely, an interpretation 
is autonomous with respect to the score while still being part of the work.  In fact, it is this very 
autonomy in relation to the score that allows the performance to be a bona fide part of the work as 
opposed to a mere instantiator of it.  Like the romantic variation (of the “actualizing” variety I have 
described), the interpretation sets itself apart from the score but precisely in order to illuminate it 
more fully and in non-obvious ways—in order to seize upon its connotative possibilities.   
On a heuristic level, the principle of interpretive autonomy means, somewhat obviously, 
that the more fully developed and versatile the performer’s technical and interpretive capacities in 
general—that is, apart from any concrete application—the greater her potential to illuminate 
particular works.  Less obviously, it means that a particular piece is often best served by 
                                                
64 Rose Subotnik notes, for example, how certain pieces by Chopin are “internally fragmentary”: 
And precisely because this is music in which style is of greater importance to intelligibility than is 
form, much of the same value can be obtained from the fragments . . . as from the whole.  Thus the 
opening of the well-known Etude in E Major (Op. 10, No. 3) is not a statement of a harmonic 
premise that will unfold itself but a self-contained section that leads nowhere and could well stand, 
with just a few rhetorical changes, as an independent piece. . . .  What we have here is a sensuous 
fragment. . . .  It would not ravage the sense of the piece to end it here as it would to end at the 
corresponding point in a Mozart structure (1991, 153).  
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approaching it as a catalyst for the exploration of interpretive possibilities irrespective of what the 
piece seems to warrant.65  In this scenario, one employs the piece to generate interesting and 
imaginative dynamic colors to be appreciated for their own sake.  Here, the piece initially serves 
interpretation rather than the reverse.  Yet ultimately, this free exploration of sensuous nuance 
(hopefully) provides the performer with vivid and various interpretive particulars that she can 
gradually match up with the score and modify in accordance with the exigencies of a particular 
music-structural reading.  Such freedom from the supposed stringencies of the score conduces to a 
leap of imagination by which the performer can intuit a felicitous interpretive choice or overall 
conception that he likely would not if approaching the score more deferentially.  Conversely, a 
performer whose primary objective is to be “true” to the work unwittingly constricts the range of 
interpretive possibilities and variances by which meaningful dimensions of the musical structure 
can be revealed.  The interpreter who is unduly concerned with adhering to the work’s objective 
elements, despite his best intentions, will often miss the true import of those elements.  In a 
nutshell, a subjective, autonomous stance toward objective musical features paradoxically serves 
them, whereas an outright (supposed) allegiance to them does not.  “Just as composition in fact 
increases its demands on interpretation the more it grows apart from it [that is, the more abstract 
or esoteric the music is], so also will the performer, the more perfect and differentiated his 
performance becomes, and the better he controls his natural material, become increasingly able to 
do justice to the composition” (Adorno [2006, 113]).  
                                                
65 “A method that compels people to puzzle over . . . [elements] about which there might initially seem to be 
nothing to say has a better chance of producing discoveries . . . than one which seeks only to answer those 
questions that a text asks its model reader” (Culler [1992, 122]).   
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This paradoxical relation of interpretation to the score is analogous to that between the 
composer and the musical material she is obliged to employ in some fashion.  Adorno states that, 
as such material accumulates generic meanings or associations over time, and as musical forms 
become more standardized, the composer starts to lose his freedom; it is less society that limits his 
creativity than the musical matter itself.  For the modern composer in particular, the material 
presents challenges at every turn, and the composer has no choice but to grapple with “what his 
music objectively demands of him.  But such obedience demands of the composer all possible 
disobedience, independence, and spontaneity.”66  The composer can be true to the objectivity of his 
material—which, to reiterate, congeals subjective and social impulses—only by utilizing such 
material freely and unconventionally.  The score is to the interpreter what musical material is to 
the modern composer: both score and material are easily reified, such that to do them justice, to 
vivify them, performer and composer must resist their reification—they must be “disobedient” to 
them.   
                                                
66 (1973, 37, my italics).  In this work (Philosophy of Modern Music), Adorno expounds the thesis that 
Schoenberg’s more progressive, atonal and 12-tone language is truer to the (then) current state of music and 
society than Stravinsky’s regressive, neo-tonal language.  The latter’s music is a falsity in supposing that 
tonality is still appropriate to then current social conditions.  In fact, such ostensible allegiance to tonality 
actually does it a disservice: “[the] arbitrary preservation of tonality endangers that it wishes to maintain” 
(1973, 3).  This stance toward musical style in general parallels that toward musical works in particular: 
presenting the latter as supposedly they once were reifies and distorts them and also fails to bring the work 
into concordance with current social and political realities.  In this sense, Stravinsky’s neo-tonal style as well 
as authenticist performance trends belie the nature of both the past and the present.  
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I would extend this notion even to one’s own interpretive conception: to have such a basic 
conception is crucial, yet to “be true” to that conception by attempting to replicate it exactly each 
and every time is inevitably to desiccate and distort it.  Here too, paradoxically, the performer must 
always go beyond his basic conception, must always be trying new things, precisely to invest that 
conception with the subtleties needed to keep it afloat—to render it compelling and to realize its 
embodied potential.  The ideal of autonomy (in Adorno’s paradoxical sense), then, applies to the 
relation between the interpreter and the work, the composer and his material, and the interpreter 
and his own interpretive conception.  
 
*  *  * 
The above recalls the authenticist notions the opening of this chapter put on trial.  Was I a bit 
unfair?  After all, it seems that all performers want more or less the same thing: to connect to the 
motions and emotions underlying notation in order to bring music to life for an audience.  The 
question is, what attitude best serves that goal?  Pious deference to the putative intentions of the 
composer, the letter of the score?  Or rather, entering into the spirit of the score, by empathizing 
with the human qualities by which it is animated?  Leopold Auer weighs in: “The musical spirit of 
Bach transcends all narrow limitations of period, and the artist of to-day who truly enters into this 
spirit will play Bach as he should be played, and will play Bach better because he will play him in 
the interpretive spirit of our own generation, not that of 1720.”67  As Dreyfus comments, it does 
not even occur to Auer that one could capture the spirit of the piece by unearthing how it might 
                                                
67 Leopold Auer, Violin Playing as I Teach It (London: Duckworth and Co, 1921, 143–44). Quoted in 
Dreyfus (2007, 267).   
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have been played centuries ago.  On the contrary, “historical reconstruction may well 
countermand the musician’s most important task, to move listeners in the here and now” (2007, 
268).  It is freedom and autonomy in relation to such veridical notions that enable the present-day 
musician to reanimate the human qualities underlying a score.  No two performers will express 
these in quite the same way.  Interpretive standardization and relative uniformity can only arise 
when the letter of the score becomes the object of interpretation.  If that object, rather, are feelings 
to which we can relate or with which we can empathize, their expressions in tone and time will be 









Interpretation is not the art of construing but the art of constructing.  Interpreters do not decode poems; 
they make them. 
– Stanley Fish (1980, 327) 
 
The analysis and interpretation of music are, for better or worse, also performances. . . .  Performers 
inevitably hope that they have reached, moved, and inspired their listeners.  Music analysts can only hope 
for the same. 
–Janet Schmalfeldt (2011, 21) 
 
 
My aim here is to argue for music analysis as a mode of interpretation rather than as a revelation of 
objectively present musical structures.  Analysis is interpretive especially when used in a way as to 
implicate performance.  In this chapter, I explore two ways analysis can do this.  One, in an Iserian 
vein, is to pose—or, more precisely, educe from the score—questions, irregularities, and 
ambiguities with which the performer must grapple.  Another is to elicit embodiment: as I will 
argue, many analytical constructs are metaphorical for physical and emotive states and thus 
eminently amenable to realization in performance.  Put another way, when one chooses to view 
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analytical constructs as vehicles for sentience rather than as assertions of fact, one opens the door 
to using them performatively.  I will emphasize the first performative feature in my analysis of 
Schumann’s “Von fremden Ländern und Menchen,” the second in my analysis of Chopin’s 
Nocturne in C minor, op. 48, no. 1.  The chapter divides into two parts, the first considering the 
performativity of music analysis generally, the second of Schenkerian analysis in particular.  
 
I. MUSIC ANALYSIS IN GENERAL 
1. ANALYSIS IN THE WORK 
Music theorists regularly evince the ontological bias I oppose, as a rule attributing features they 
derive analytically to an abstract work, rarely considering the possibility that they might belong to 
performance or perception.1  This ontological stance was especially explicit in 
performance/analysis studies of the 1980s—I have already cited Narmour (1988) and Berry (1989) 
in this regard.  Since these authors, among others, viewed structural features as immanent 
properties of works and viewed analysis as uniquely capable of unearthing such properties, they 
placed performance in the role of having to conform to and communicate an analysis (whatever 
“communicate an analysis” might mean, more on which below)—at least if the performance 
desired to be cogent.  Again, Narmour, for one, unapologetically speaks of “correct” or “incorrect” 
performances based on their conformity, or lack thereof, to a correct analysis.  In this way, analysis 
occupied an authoritative role vis-à-vis performance; the relationship between the two domains was 
                                                
1 Fred Maus (1999a) is an exception in arguing that the property of unity, in particular, should be attributed 
to one’s experience of the musical work rather than to the work itself. 
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asymmetrical and hegemonic.2  I speak in the past tense because, as I discussed in the 
Introduction, this power structure is beginning to loosen.  Still, more often than not, music theory 
speaks of works, not of performances—or more precisely, it speaks of works in a way that does not 
recognize performance as an indispensable component.  The defining properties of a work are 
what they are, irrespective of performance.3   
 What role, in this scheme, does analysis play in relation to the musical work?  It is instructive 
to consider and compare Schenker and Adorno in this regard.  Adorno, while not terribly 
                                                
2 Parmer criticizes musicology for adopting a similarly hegemonic stance toward performance: “Although 
manufactured apart from . . . actual practice, [musicological] knowledge nevertheless exerts an authoritative 
force to which practice remains subservient: in this hierarchy, practice becomes professional, becomes 
authoritative and rigorous, only when it implements or applies such knowledge” (2007, 13).  If, for Parmer, 
musicology derives its authority from other liberal-arts disciplines (recall my allusion to “derivative 
disciplinarity” in Chapter 1), performance derives its authority from musicology.  The chain of command 
thus runs, from top to bottom: humanities/social sciences, etc.—musicology/theory—performance.   
3 Lucy Green savors a paradox in this regard: the standard practice by which music theory frames the 
musical work (within the Western art music tradition) as an object of structural analysis—as an object 
whose meanings derive from its supposedly immanent properties—itself holds an extra-musical, ideological 
(in Green’s terminology, “delineated”) meaning.  Namely, such music is of high value and thus worthy of 
such probing investigation (more so than, say, popular music, which putatively derives its value from social 
associations rather than from intrinsic content).  The very act of analysis, which assumes the musical work 
to be an autonomous object replete with inherent meanings, conveys a decidedly non-immanent, 
ideological meaning, contrary to its objectivist pretensions—or, in different terms, a paramusical meaning, 
contrary to its formalist pretensions (see Green [1988, 53, passim]). 
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sympathetic to Schenker,4 agrees with him on two crucial points.  First, analysis is part of the work 
in some sense.  Second, following from the first, structural comprehension, in some form, is a 
requisite for successful performance.  For Schenker, the mode of analysis integral to the work was, 
of course, his own: “The musical examples which accompany this volume are not merely practical 
aids; they have the same power and conviction as the visual aspect of the printed composition itself 
(the foreground).  That is, the graphic representation is part of the actual composition, not merely 
an educational means” (1935, xxiii, my italics).  Schenker does not explain the precise sense in 
which his graphic analyses are part of the musical work.  One can speculate.  In depicting 
structural levels in a dynamic, quasi-narrative manner, he clearly grants them a modicum of artistry 
in their own right.  That is, in progressing through the levels, Schenker essentially tells a story (in 
his view, I think, the story) of how the piece came to be as it is—a story replete with conflict, 
tension, resolution, and transformation.5  In other words, while the structural levels are in actuality 
synchronic, Schenker depicts them in his running commentary as metaphorically diachronic, as if 
the background were the beginning, the middleground the middle, and the foreground (or the 
piece itself) the end of a narrative sequence of events.  In this, he implicitly ascribes to them a 
tangible quality, he implicitly directs the reader-listener to imagine that the levels are themselves 
                                                
4 “For, in reducing music to its most generalized structures, what seems to him . . . merely casual and 
fortuitous is, in a certain sense, precisely that which is really the essence . . . of the music” (Adorno [1969, 
174]). 
5 His story is not an empirical description of the actual, chronological process of composing, but rather an 
account of the conceptual layers or logical stages that lead from an abstract universal—the Ursatz—to a 
concrete particular—the actual piece. 
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sensate phenomena, not merely an abstract structure underlying phenomena.  Scott Burnham 
affirms,  
Schenker describes the theoretical motion from background to foreground in terms usually 
reserved for the compositional motion from beginning to end (left to right).  Such a conflation 
should not come as a surprise in a theory that holds that music is about itself—theoretical 
abstraction thus becomes another form of music composition and indeed, Schenker liked to 
consider his way of thinking to be more an art than a theory (1995, 90).  
 
Yet, ultimately I construe Schenker to mean not that the higher structural levels are 
literally material and perceptible in themselves, but that they affect what is directly perceptible.  
That is, hearing the musical surface against the backdrop of higher levels yields qualities—of 
tension and deferral, for example—that would not otherwise arise.  Put another way, a 
Schenkerian analysis is an attributive grid, a mode of explanation or interpretation that one 
invokes in order to make sense of a musical work on a given occasion (more on which later).  
Consequently, even if such a system, in the terms of Peter Rabinowitz (1992), is not properly in the 
work, it is nonetheless, in a sense, part of the work.  I take Rabinowitz’s phraseology as a clever way 
of saying that one can construe the work in a narrow sense—as consisting mainly of authorial 
notations—or in a broader sense—as encompassing modes of interpretation that are revelatory of 
the work in some way.  It is in this latter sense, I think, that Schenker touts his theory as being 
artistic in its own right. 
 For Adorno, analysis is a constituent particularly of those works that are patently esoteric—
serial ones, for example.  Such works unfold partially in the analytic medium.  Put another way, 
works whose substance resides more in inner content—in a dense motivic argument, for 
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example—than in outer form depend upon some brand of analysis for their realization.  (Yet, with 
characteristic dialectical slippage, Adorno goes on to claim that it is precisely such subcutaneous 
elements that are the most untranslatable—the most irreducibly particular to the piece at hand and 
therefore the least amenable to the general tools on which analysis relies.  Insofar as analysis must 
make the unknowable knowable, it is a “squaring of the circle.”)  Thus, for Adorno, the musical 
work, at least in particularly recondite cases, encompasses not only the composer’s notations but 
also the modes of interpretation that are indispensable for parsing those notations.   
Adopting the stances of Schenker and Adorno, then, one might extend the purview of the 
musical work to include analysis.  While I relish this prospect, I find with Schenker it comes at too 
high a cost, since he insists that one particular mode of analysis—namely, his—merits musical 
status (and is thus a prerequisite for compelling performance).  For, on the one hand, I think there 
is some truth to Cone’s celebrated declaration (one also found in Adorno) that “the good 
composition will always reveal, on close study, the methods of analysis needed for its own 
comprehension” (1960, 54).  A particular piece—by the nature of its particular form, genre, or 
style—may be more susceptible of one type of analysis than of another.  For example, a piece that 
exploits and extends the possibilities of sonata form (such as many by Beethoven and Schubert) 
would warrant a formal analysis; a scherzo, whose effect depends largely upon rhythmic and 
(hyper)metric rhetoric and ambiguity, a rhythmic analysis; almost any work by Brahms, which 
thrives on the technique of developing variation, a motivic analysis, and so forth.  On the other 
hand, even within a single piece, at one point one parameter might come to the fore, at another 
point some other.  One might envision a scenario, for instance, in which now harmony is most 
prominent, now rhythm (with harmony receding), now form (with rhythm receding), and so on.  
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Indeed, Dahlhaus admonishes against assuming that all musical parameters will be equally 
emphasized for the duration of a piece, claiming “components which make up a musical structure 
can advance and retreat to different degrees during the formal process” (1975, 11).  James Webster 
more forcefully asserts, “The belief that a complex work can be understood on the basis of a single 
musical parameter is reductive. . . .  The more theoretically self-conscious the method, the greater 
its pretensions to global explanation, the more it actually excludes.  The only sane course is to 
pursue . . . ‘multivalent’ analysis: to study each principal domain . . . without regard for ‘unity’” 
(1991, 4)—without regard, that is, for how the parameters might ultimately converge, which they 
often do not.  Finally, there might be some merit to analyzing a piece against the grain—to analyzing 
an overtly rhythmic piece in terms of voice leading, a lyrical one in terms of rhythm, and so on—
especially if the aim of interpretation, as Adorno holds, is to uncover potentially incongruous, 
conflictive dimensions.  In summary, (1) different types of pieces conduce to different modes of 
analysis—Schenkerian analysis should not be the analytical “default”; (2) different parts of a single 
piece may conduce to different modes of analysis—voice leading often takes a back seat to other 
parameters; and (3) pace Cone, one should not necessarily restrict one’s analytical approach to the 
method the piece is most obviously amenable to—even patently linear pieces might be better read 
by methods that go against the Schenkerian grain (as we will see in Chapter 4). 
My more substantive concern, however, with Schenker’s conception of analysis as 
belonging to the work is that he apparently takes his analytical method to be a truth-seeking 
enterprise.  I prefer to see analysis as an indispensable component of the work not because it 
disinters the truth of the work but, on the contrary, because it disinters multiple structural 
potentials.  The Ursatz—or, more generally, long-range connection and progression—is apparently 
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for Schenker (at least as evidenced by some of his remarks, documented below) precisely such a 
singular truth.  Now, this does not mean Schenker’s theory must be viewed in this way—we need 
no more defer to authorial intentions with music theories than we need do so with musical works.  
In fact, Part II of this chapter will pose an alternate Schenkerian perspective, drawing on the rich 
philosophical tradition in which Schenker’s ideas are embedded.  But it does appear that Schenker 
viewed his own theory in apodictic, hermeneutic terms.6  This is most evident in how he upheld 
the Ursatz as a guarantor of musical profundity and value.  As much as within any given analysis 
Schenker reveals the Ursatz to be tightly wed to the lower-level diminutions and motivic details it 
generates, it is nonetheless for him a separable, metaphysical ideal, one that transcends particular 
compositions.   
 
2. Performance as Truth-Telling  
In Chapter 1, I argued that hermeneutic musical knowledge is ersatz knowledge, or that, at the 
very least, we need to be cautious about reducing pieces to generalizations, which are useful, if at 
all, only as points of departure.  I just pointed to Schenker’s affinity for such knowledge, for 
viewing deep structures in a reified way.  They need not be, and I will pose alternatives below.  For 
                                                
6 Here I speak of hermeneutics neither in Gadamer’s sense nor in the sense of programmatic, narrative 
interpretations of the Kretzschmar variety.  (Incidentally, Schenker, his formalist reputation 
notwithstanding, was not immune to such interpretations.  For example, he reads Beethoven’s Piano 
Sonata, op. 110 as indicative of an enervated persona striving for greater vitality.  See Snarrenberg’s 
discussion of this reading [1997, 108–20].  My own reading of Chopin’s C Minor Nocturne will rest upon a 
similar narrative premise.)  Rather, I am speaking of hermeneutics in the sense I used in Chapter 1, relating 
to hidden meanings (here, primarily ones of a structural nature). 
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now, however, I want to suggest that we ought to be equally reluctant to assign performance the 
task of communicating putative music-analytic fact.  
Maus (1999b) has offered perhaps the most compelling argument along these lines, and so 
I summarize and gloss his article at length.  He defines the “standard conception” of analysis-
performance relations thus: analysis uncovers a truth or the truth about the piece and performance 
can and should reveal it somehow.  For Schenker, for instance, “something is true of the work,” 
Maus states, “and the performer’s task is to find a means of communicating it” (1999b, 133).  For 
Cone, to take another instance, the performer’s duty is to reveal the “rhythmic life” of a 
composition, as derived from analysis.  The problem with the standard conception, Maus cleverly 
deduces, is that if the listener already knows the analytical precept, she does not need the 
performer to project it (however he might do that); if, on the other hand, the listener is not privy 
to the precept, nothing the performer does will unequivocally communicate that precept.  
Performance under the standard conception is either superfluous or hopelessly ineffectual.  
Maus elaborates on each pole.  Regarding superfluity, he notes that in most 
performance/analysis discourse, one proceeds from analysis to performance: one first formulates 
an analysis of a piece and then takes the compliant performance to be a self-evident token of that 
analysis (failing to consider what the listener not privy to that analysis would hear).  We tend to 
forget, or blissfully ignore, the constructed nature of the enterprise.  Maus thus implies that such 
studies typically exercise circular reasoning—the performance merely confirms the meaning that 
we have decided in advance it would hold.  On the other hand, performance obviously cannot 
unequivocally communicate an analytical precept because it is semantically indeterminate.  A 
particular interpretive tactic might be understood in light of different, even diametrically opposed 
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analyses.  To offer my own hypothetical: dynamic emphasis might express either structural weight 
or, conversely, extra-structural significance—either phenomenon could easily inspire dynamic 
intensity.  The converse, I would add, is equally true: a particular analytical determination might 
be conveyed by opposing interpretive tactics.  A cadential arrival, for instance, can be delineated 
equally well by both a dynamic increase and a decrease.  
Maus concludes, “I do not think that theorists know very much about the extent to which 
performance details can actually communicate analytical information” (1999b, 141).  Better to 
think of an analysis-influenced performance as responding to that analysis rather than somehow 
instantiating it.  To expand on this key point, when a performer follows an analytical 
interpretation, either his own or someone else’s, the performance outcomes do not—indeed, by 
nature of the musical language, cannot—discursively communicate that prior interpretation.  
Rather, the interpretation contains fluctuations of phrasing, dynamic, articulation, tempo, 
pedaling, vibrato, portamento, and so on, that—in some, not all cases—arise in response to that 
analysis, but which subsequently take on a life of their own; they become autonomous in relation 
to the analytical information by which they were incited.  These performance outcomes may well 
possess structural qualities such as cohesiveness and differentiated unity in part as a result of 
following an analytical reading.  But, crucially, these qualities become wedded to the sounding 
experience and do not convey the analytical data by which they may have been catalyzed.7  The 
analysis eventuates in sounding music, not the other way around. 
                                                
7 Put another way, performance can help us understand structural elements not in the sense of calling our 
attention to those elements per se, but in helping us hear the music as coherent.  This distinction relies 
upon a more basic philosophical one, as explained by Jane O’Dey, between understanding what sentence s 
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Another problem with the standard conception, Maus contends, is that it falsely 
presupposes a work outside or prior to interpretive discourse, a work on which the performer then 
comments.  Maus conjectures, however, that most listeners do not hold a work- or score-based view 
and thus do not perceive a distinct boundary separating a piece from its performance.  “In an 
actual performance the composer’s decisions blend with those of the performer, and often there is 
no way to tell, from listening, where the composer’s creativity leaves off and that of the performer 
begins” (1999b, 148).  In other words, the typical listener does not hear the performance as 
communicating something about something else—she does not hear the performance as pointing 
to or commenting on an abstract work and its invariant properties, and certainly not pointing to 
an analytical conception of that work. 
 Maus then takes a step further and concludes that performance is indeed part of a 
composition, not a commentary on it.  A composition, meanwhile, is itself performative.  He 
contends, along with Small, that “one might regard composition as an activity that has as its goal 
the production of performances” (199b, 149).  Both assertions grant performance “the centrality, 
in our theorizing, that it already holds in our musical practices, our musical pleasures” (1999b, 
150).    
The performance is part of the work; the work is part of the performance.  I agree, but I 
                                                
is and understanding s.  The former requires that we possess the vocabulary to parse the grammatical 
structure of s, the latter merely that we intuitively grasp the sense of s.  The latter, “understanding 
simpliciter,” is the more common way of understanding music.  “Like language, music has an 
‘understanding simplicter’ that is linked neither to explicit explanation nor to the ability to read musical 
notation and that operates independently of both” (O’Dey [2000, 9]).   
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also wonder: where does this leave analysis?  In my view, it can also be performative.  It is 
concerned, to invoke a Goethean precept, not with truth but rather with meaning.  The next 
section develops this premise. 
 
3. ANALYSIS AS PERFORMATIVE  
Making Meaning 
To review, fiction for Iser is not opposed to reality but is somewhat opaque to it precisely in order 
to expose something rarified about it.8  Since literature is not content to present a mimetically 
transparent, uncontested view of the extra-literary world, it is only logical that it should deliberately 
elicit the reader’s involvement.  For, the reader, drawing on his store of experience, will inevitably 
bring something new to the text, will construct a more intricate and uncommon meaning than the 
text alone could do.  Literature, on Iser’s view, is less about what it means and more about what it 
does to the reader (and what the reader does to it).  Indeed, Iser is forthrightly opposed to the idea, 
often assumed, that artworks stow hidden meanings.  If anything, artworks educe new realizations 
and insights from the reader’s own depths. “The significance of the work, then, does not lie in the 
meaning sealed within the text, but in the fact that that meaning brings out what had previously 
been sealed within us” (1978, 157, my italics).  However, I do not take Iser to mean that the reader, 
like the notional Freudian analysand, harbors an unconscious truth about himself that simply 
                                                
8 Novalis lent this idea pretty, poetic form in his “Monolog” of 1798: words, he said, “create a world unto 
themselves—they play with themselves, express nothing more than their wondrous nature, and for just that 
reason are they so expressive—for just that reason do they mirror the strange play of relations among 
things” (quoted in Rumph [2005, 135]). 
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awaits discovery.  Rather, the literary work along with its participatory reader create new meanings 
that retrospectively expose, if anything, only latent potentialities—those of both the reader and the 
text. 
Turning to music, I offer an analogy between literature and extra-literary meaning on the 
one hand, music analysis and music-structural meaning on the other.  Just as literature generates 
new ideas about the world rather than merely reflects preexistent ideas, so might it be more fruitful 
to conceive of music analysis as constructing rather than reflecting the attributes it ascribes to a 
piece.  Nicholas Cook has been the chief ambassador for this idea (especially in 1989a/b and 
2002).  An analysis, he postulates, is an implicit plea to hear a piece in a particular way.  He cites 
Schoenberg in this regard: though subscribing to a natural foundation for music theory, 
Schoenberg contends that such a foundation has yet to be fully discovered.  Until then, we must 
view theory as a mode of “good comparison.”  In this model, analysis makes metaphors, ones 
whose efficacy derives less from illuminating “the ultimate nature of the things presented” 
(Schoenberg [1911, 10]) than from their own heuristic and music-pedagogical utility.  Schenker’s 
theory too, despite its essentializing tendencies, is arguably more a recommendation for how we 
could hear—more an impetus for revised perception—than a reflection of how we actually do 
hear.9  Whether or not a theory purports to be factual, we can employ it in a pragmatic, 
performative way.  
                                                
9 Marion Guck (1998) seconds this view, arguing that analysts write not about structural truths but about 
their own particular mode of engagement with the work.  The latter, as well as analysts’ more general 
assumptions regarding the nature of the work and the role of the perceiver, can be gleaned from their 
linguistic style and diction. 
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How does performance fit into this model?  To the extent that analysis recommends 
particular perceptions, it recommends particular interpretive tactics that will enable those 
perceptions.  From Cook’s vantage, in fact, structural analysis is not external to performance—it is 
no abstract dimension—but is rather a way of conceiving and formulating the expressive 
possibilities of performance.  More broadly, the very notion of a musical work might be 
understood “as a means of representing or conceptualizing performances” (1999a, 244).  The 
result (to reiterate this key quote) is an “emphasis on the mutuality of the analyst/performer, as 
against the hegemonic relationship assumed by Berry and Narmour” (ibid., 245).  Within Cook’s 
model, analysis is itself performative, infused with a performance-like sensibility.  Analysis is not 
antecedent to performance as concepts in general have often been deemed antecedent to 
experience, because analysis on this view is not factual but rather experiential through and 
through.  The possibility of performance and perception conditions the very process of structural 
attribution, and such attributes, while perhaps posing as abstractions, are implicitly conceived as 








                                                
10 Tim Howell (1992) adopts a similar stance regarding the role of analysis in relation to performance. 
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Musical Imaginings 
Kendall Walton’s theory of artistic representation (1990) is a useful supplement to Cook’s ideas.  
Walton proposes that when we participate in a representational work, we implicitly agree to follow 
certain “rules of the game”—both the ones established by the medium generally as well as those 
established by the artwork in particular.  In viewing a painting, for example, the most general tacit 
rule is: view this two-dimensional matrix as if it were three-dimensional.  In viewing a play: pretend that 
these actors are the characters they portray—that the person onstage is really experiencing the feelings he 
portrays and that the events his character undergoes are really happening.  A literary work is replete with 
“fictional truths”—propositions that are true within the fictional world created by the work.  Each 
mimetic genre has its own rules to which we must adhere if we are to experience the object as an 
artwork, with neither undue formalism—say, seeing the painting as mere splotches of color on a 
canvas—nor undue realism—say, in viewing the play, thinking the murder being depicted is a real 
one.11   
                                                
11 Suzanne Langer (1953 and 1957) would frame such imaginings as “illusions” or “apparitions.”  Her thesis 
is that each artform poses its own central image (imagining), one peculiar to it, and without which it would 
not be perceived as art.  This image transcends the particular materials used to create that it—it is an 
emergent property.  For instance, music creates an illusion of “audible time” that transcends the harmony, 
melody, form, and rhythm forming the basis of that illusion.  In other words, the property of temporal 
unfolding is an emergent one, one supervenient upon various music-structural parameters.  This effect is 
integral to perceiving music qua music.  Thus, the moment we perceive harmonic progression instead of the 
illusion of temporal progression that harmonic progression helps engender, we no longer listen to music as 
such.  Likewise, the moment we perceive paint and brush strokes instead of virtual space, we no longer view 
a painting, merely marks on a canvas.  While each kind of art creates its own particular illusion, all such 
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Walton’s theory is apropos of our discussion in that, while he does not assign the 
percipient as great a role as Iser does in constituting the meaning of a work, he does render the 
percipient an integral part of the mimetic act.  The percipient does not just passively take in a 
depiction, merely suspending disbelief, but actively participates in creating it, triggering fictional 
beliefs, implicitly agreeing to imagine particular things.  (To be precise, Walton claims that 
fictional truths exist whether or not they are actually imagined as true, but they are nonetheless 
designed to be imagined as true, just as the work of fiction, in Iser’s account, is designed to elicit the 
reader’s response.)  
Walton (1994) applies this model to music with an aim to explain musical expression.  
Music, he claims, prescribes that we imagine certain behaviors.  Building upon Guck’s (1993) 
analysis of the opening piano solo from the Adagio of Mozart’s Piano Concerto in A, K. 488, 
Walton adduces a provisional plot centered around the qualities of lateness and fortuitousness that 
pervade this passage.  He eventually dismisses the specifics of the plot as “silly,” a mere crutch by 
which better to connect the various instances of lateness and render them more tangible.  
Nonetheless, that the music does not entail this, or any one particular plot does not mean it fails 
to prescribe imaginings.  The music, Walton maintains, does in fact create a fictional world, albeit 
an incomplete one: this world is replete with qualities and attributions, but unlike literature, it 
lacks agents and narrative continuity.  The denizens of this world are so many “jumbled” fictional 
truths (1994, 67).   
                                                
illusions basically serve to express human feelings—not the feelings of the artist, nor those evoked from the 
audience, but those of the “lifeworld,” feelings in general. 
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Indeed, Walton draws a clear line between musical and literary/pictorial fictionality.  For 
one, in viewing a painting, I imagine myself viewing its object from a certain perspective.  In music 
I have no such perspective, for the spaces of the music and of the listener are entirely separate (or 
possibly, I would counter, entirely merged, but in neither case would the listener occupy a distinct 
position in virtual space in relation to the music).  For another, in viewing a painting, I imagine 
seeing what is represented.  In music—excepting music depicting birdcalls, thunderstorms, flowing 
water, and the like—I do not imagine hearing what is represented: “a rising melody portraying the 
ascension of a saint into heaven doesn’t portray the sound of the ascension; I have no idea what a 
saint’s ascent to heaven sounds like.  Music probably does not portray sounds when it portrays 
nonvocal behavioral expressions of emotion” (1997, 70–71).  Both cases suggest that one has less 
perceptual access to the fictional world in music than one does to the fictional world in painting.  
Yet, Walton says, this is counterintuitive, for “my impression is the opposite of being distanced 
from the world of the music. . . .  I feel intimate with the music—more intimate, even, than I feel 
with the world of a painting” (1997, 71).  Indeed, the feelings music represents are feelings we 
imagine ourselves as having, and we imagine of a particular auditory occasion that it is an 
experience of that feeling.  “Music that induces me actually to feel exuberant thereby induces me 
to imagine feeling thus, and music might induce me merely to imagine feeling anguish when I 
don’t really” (1997, 75); and I imagine not just that I feel exuberant, but also that my experience of 
the sounds is an experience of exuberance.  From this Walton concludes that, at least with respect 
to emotional expression, music offers no “work world”—at least not in the same sense as those of 
literature and painting—only a “game world,” the world of the perceiver.  “The only fictional 
truths there are may be ones generated by the listener’s experience with the music, ones that 
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belong only to the game world” (1997, 81).  In short, “It is the auditory experiences, not the music 
itself, that generate fictional truths”  (1997, 82). 
 
*  *  * 
Walton’s theory holds fascinating implications for the aesthetics of musical representation and 
expression.  But my main concern at present are the performative dimensions of his theory, and 
how we might relate it to music analysis.  Judging from his account, music is perhaps even more 
performative and perceiver-oriented than are the mimetic arts because the experiences the work 
mandates us to imagine are solely our own, not those of characters.  Though precipitated by 
structural features of the work, these experiences belong to our world, not that of the work.  Yet, 
we need not even go this far to argue for the performativity of Walton’s theory.  In fact, I see no 
reason why a sad piece cannot engender a fictional world, a work world, in which a persona is sad, 
even if it is also the case that the perceiver and/or performer are (imaginatively) sad.  Such a music-
fictional world would still be incomplete and indeterminate enough to serve performative aims, to 
elicit the listener’s participation in organizing the world in one of several possible ways that would 
make sense (Walton’s narrative about K. 488 is one of the ways those otherwise “jumbled” 
ascriptions of lateness could cohere).  
But let us set aside specific emotions for the moment, as the musical work, Walton accedes, 
prescribes imaginings about more general sensations as well: lateness or delay (as in K. 488), 
tension-resolution, suspense, surprise, fulfillment, and so on.  And these in turn, I would add, 
derive from structural elements.  For example, from a form-functional standpoint, we imagine that 
12 measures standing on the dominant augur a tonal-thematic return, an imagining that triggers a 
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sense of tension or expectancy; from a rhythmic/structural standpoint, we imagine that this return 
is a “structural downbeat,” thus an emphatic, even triumphant arrival; from a Schenkerian 
standpoint, we imagine that a  melodically embellished is consequently omnipresent in some 
sense, and that in relation to it the embellishing tones are circuitous, desultory, tense, or whatever.  
In each case, a material trace, a music-notational fact (such as several bars reiterating a dominant 
chord), filtered through some structural/stylistic model (form theory/sonata convention), induces 
both a music-structural imagining (the V augurs a thematic/tonal return) and a correlative 
experiential or quasi-emotive imagining (tension, suspense).  The imaginings are not randomly 
imposed onto the music—they have a material basis—and yet they definitely transcend this basis, 
congealing in the listener’s mind, thus forming an intentional object.  In Nattiez’s (1990) 
semiological terms, the neutral level, subjected to music-analytical imaginings, ascends to the esthesic 
level.  
This material trace is thus in itself merely a potentiality as regards both its structural and 
emotive meaning.  One might say it is rhematic in Peirce’s [1955] sense.  In Peirce’s system 
(helpfully schematized by Turino [1999, 226]), a rheme is a sign that represents its object as a 
possibility.  The word “dog,” for example, is a rheme because it points to the possibility of a dog 
without necessarily signifying an actual dog.  A painting of a fictional person is also a rheme.  (A 
rheme corresponds to the levels of icon and qualisign within Peirce’s other trichotomies.)  As 
Turino summarizes, “As signs interpreted as representing possible . . . objects, rhemes are crucial to 
the semiotic functions of art because they allow for the play of imagination and creativity.  Rhemes 





into existence by imagining and representing the possibility materially in art objects or 
performances” (ibid., 238, my italics).   
The rheme is a sign in its nascent, inchoate stage, one at which we can only imagine the 
various phenomena it might ultimately signify.  Importantly, rhemes are not restricted to words 
and pictures; in fact, Turino relates them to “certain ineffable sonic qualities of performance” 
(ibid).  I would add that score-traces—harmonic, melodic, rhythmic, and simple formal 
configurations (basically, musical phenomena not rising above the purely “descriptive” level of 
analysis)—can also be rhematic, insofar as they, in conjunction with a music-analytical impetus, 
can elicit musical imaginings regarding the structural and expressive relationships among tones.     
Here we begin to see the role of music analysis in “as-if” performativity.  Analysis 
consolidates the score’s performative inclinations: if material traces allow for multiple potential 
relationships, particular music-analytical models circumscribe this set, indicating what in particular 
the performer-listener is to imagine.  Different analytical modalities apply to music different sets of 
metaphors in terms of which we imagine hearing the music, different attributive hats that we 
listeners try on.12  The listener also imagines the aesthetic and emotive qualities that invariably 
                                                
12 If my stance seems a bit ironic, I believe it is—not flippantly so, but in the Romantic sense.  As René 
Rusch declares (in the context of discussing irony in Schubert), “With regard to a musical work, it seems 
plausible that multiple contextual frames can bring meaning to a single musical statement” (2011, 78).  If 
this is so, I propose that the analyst is justified in adopting a degree of ironic distance from the music she 
analyzes and methods she uses, realizing that music is by nature susceptible of various modes of 
explanation, such that using any one is bound to entail an act of imagination, a suspension of disbelief.  
One imagines, for instance, that a voice-leading analysis, in a particular case, is indispensable for 
illuminating the music.  Braunschweig adopts a similar stance, claiming that “when one encounters a 
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accompany such structural metaphors.  Music-analytical imaginings are thus by nature double 
imaginings.  
The entire package—the material potentiality as exposed and actualized by analysis and (in 
some situations) responded to by a performer—is then delivered to the listener for his delectation.  
The listener’s experience, the final link in the interpretive chain, is perhaps the least amenable to 
codification.  Suffice to say, although the performer, as we discussed, typically projects the 
expressive connotations of analysis by tactics that have preestablished expressive functions, thus 
ensuring some degree of intersubjective consistency among listeners, the listener will ineluctably 
filter the interpretive product through her own realm of experience, thus introducing additional 
variables.  For that matter, the performer, as we have seen, cannot be expected to manifest the 
meaning actualized by analysis but only respond to it, to filter it through the exigencies of her 
instrument.  (Sadness, for example, is typically conveyed one way on the violin, another on the 
piano, another in the voice, and so on.)  Hence, meaning is not simply passed along a conveyor 
belt from the neutral to esthesic levels—it is fundamentally altered in each stage of the process.  
The chain from material trace to analytical interpretation to performance interpretation to 
perception is by no means a closed loop.13   
                                                
phrase that exhibits conflicting criteria, the problem is not analytic but theoretical, a problem of . . . 
historically sedimented definition[s] that is masked by our disciplinary tendency to pursue timeless 
theoretical models and types” (2012, 77).  Braunschweig’s statement points up both the non-immanence of 
structural features and the fictionality of supposing only one theoretical model applicable in a given case.   
13 Nor is the chain unidirectional, insofar as the performer is obviously a perceiver as well.  As such, she will 
continually alter her previous sound-conception or sound-image based on what she hears coming from the 
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*  *  * 
In brief, analysis is integral to the music work in illuminating not its immanent properties but its 
potentialities—ones only intimated by rhematic musical notation—thus drawing the 
performer/perceiver directly into the meaning-making process.  Analysis is, or at least can be, a 
portal through which the performer/perceiver finds a way into the work, a way to make the work 
what it is in a particular instance.  Analysis, then, induces new meanings and experiences rather 
than codifies what is already present in the score, simply waiting to be sonically manifested.  But, 
as Walton sagely remarks, even if analysis were simply the process of making conscious what we 
already hear, it would still lead to new perceptions:  
The objective of analysis is not always or only to explicate how listeners in fact hear pieces, however. 
Many analyses are designed to explain and encourage new ways of hearing.  The obvious way of doing 
this is by specifying the intensional content of the new hearing. . . .  But the distinction between 
explicating a current way of hearing and pointing to a new one is not clearcut.  Even an analysis 
consisting entirely in specifications of what a listener already hears in a piece is likely to change the 
way she hears it. . . .  So an analysis . . . by specifying what I hear in a piece . . . changes my experience 
at the same time that it enhances my understanding of it (1992, 42–43). 
 
The Need for Analysis  
                                                
instrument (alter, that is, in real-time performance and/or from one performance to another).  The 
component of perception, therefore, is not merely an “output” with respect to performance, but also an 
“input,” resulting in a kind of feedback loop.  On these points, see Parmer (2007, 30–37).  
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Do I go too far in including analysis as a component of the work?  I don’t think so.  Music by itself 
has a limited capacity to direct its readers to imagine—simply because its harmonic and melodic 
configurations do not, like sentences in a novel, denote particular assertions the truth of which we 
are then implicitly directed to imagine.  Music analysis thus serves as a crucial interlocutor between 
the score and the performer/perceiver, drawing out potential structural relations, narratives, and 
anomalies, rendering them more explicit, guiding the willing analyst-listener to imagine their 
certainty, their reality, and their concomitant emotional qualities.   
Let me restate the situation in Iser’s terms.  For Iser, a signal difference between reading and 
social interaction is that “the partners in dyadic interaction can ask each other questions in order 
to ascertain how far their views have controlled contingency, or their images have bridged the gap 
of inexperienceability of one another’s experiences.  The reader, however, can never learn from the 
text how accurate or inaccurate are his views of it” (1978, 166).  Moreover, dialogic partners 
presumably converse within some sort of pragmatic context, which serves as a tertium comparationis 
that regulates their interpretations.  The reader-text dyad lacks this as well.  Thus the reader, Iser 
concludes, must infer the codes that regulate interaction from the text in which they are dispersed 
or implied.  The music-auditor also lacks a dialogic partner.  A regulative context, on the other 
hand, inheres, I would argue, in musical form and genre (perhaps more so than in literary genres).  
The experienced listener intuitively grasps the principles and practices underlying these forms and 
genres and reflexively grapples with the discrepancies that invariably arise between generic norms 
and particular pieces.  A music-analytic context will serve both to highlight and reinforce these 
normative procedures and also posit additional regulative principles in relation to which we 
perceive the piece.  Sonata-form theory, for example (that of Caplin, Hepokoski/Darcy, Rosen, 
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Schmalfeldt, and others) both codifies well-established sonata-form practices and offers a theoretical 
surplus—additional codes or imaginative prisms through which we view particular pieces.  In short, 
most music—and not just, pace Adorno, abstruse twentieth-century music—is complex and 
indeterminate enough as to require, or at least benefit greatly from, an explicit interpretive matrix.  
Some will no doubt be skeptical of my radically constructivist stance toward musical 
structure and analysis.  In particular, some might wonder how I distinguish between an analytical 
method or analytical application that poses questions relevant to the piece at hand and one that 
imposes its own preoccupations onto a piece willy-nilly.  In response, I would say, first, that models 
that are themselves musical (or rather, meta-musical)—that utilize musical notation and are 
homologous in some sense with the music being analyzed—are more likely to seize upon musical 
relevancies.  This is arguably one of the signal advantages of Schenkerian theory14 (though, again, it 
should not grant that theory precedence over all others nor preclude us from extending and 
amalgamating it with others, if fruitful for understanding a particular piece).  Second, like any 
other mode of interpretation, music analysis, to be compelling, must convince the reader that it 
responds to something objectively present in the score, even while creating something new from 
that neutral trace.15  That said, both analysis-based and performance-based interpretation inevitably 
                                                
14 Also see in this regard Keiler (1981). 
15 Paul Ricoeur (1978) posits a similar point in an important article on metaphor.  He essentially claims that 
metaphor posits a deviance that results in a new congruence on the level of an entire sentence (rather than 
on that of the individual word), such that we see similarity in the difference.  Yet the similarity is not 
arbitrary or associational but one entirely appropriate to the new juxtaposition.  He asserts, moreover, that 
it is precisely in this interstice between difference and an emerging novel congruence where imagination 
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walk a fine line between immanence and contingency.  Such a precarious balancing act is, in my 
view, precisely what renders the interpretative act so tantalizing and potentially powerful. 
 
4. SUMMARY 
This chapter thus far has provided the crux of my theory of music-analytical interpretation.  
Hence, it will be useful to reiterate its main principles before proceeding to an extended analysis.  
1. Both Adorno and Schenker consider analysis part of the work in certain circumstances: 
with Adorno in the case of abstruse repertoire, with Schenker in the case of his own 
theory.  The problem with Schenker’s model, in my view, is that, even though he views his 
own theory as artistic, he at the same time evidently views it as apodictic and thus as 
indispensable for successful performance.   
2. I take inspiration from Adorno and Schenker in posing a model of the musical work by 
which it encompasses music analysis in its various forms, alongside performance, as an 
integral mode of interpretation and explanation, as part of what makes the music what it is 
on a given occasion.  But, unlike Schenker, I deem analysis integral not because it unearths 
objective properties but rather because it crystallizes various potentialities.   
3. As a consequence, analysis, in whatever form, is not something to which performance 
must adhere.  Analysis and performance run parallel, not perpendicular, as it were—they 
are coequal interpretive enterprises.  A performance that takes inspiration from an analysis 
responds to it—engages in a dialogue with it—rather than somehow exemplifies it.  
                                                
and feeling play a key role.  In its emphasis on imagination as part of metaphor, Ricoeur’s theory resonates 
with Walton’s; in its emphasis on imagination as creating new meaning, it resonates with Iser’s. 
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Regardless of whether analysis can expose objective properties, sounding music, due to its 
semantically indefinite nature, is not able to make assertions about such properties—
performance is not a propositional medium.  Performance that is reduced to such a fact-
conveying role is either superfluous or ineffective.   
4. In responding to an analysis, a performance exemplifies not analytic propositions but 
rather the more general qualities, both structural and emotional, that underlie such 
propositions (I expand on this idea later in this chapter).  An analytically-informed 
rendering may consequently exude a structural quality such as differentiated unity without 
communicating the particulars of the analysis that in part gave rise to that quality.  Such 
qualities, in other words, are emergent, supervenient upon analytical phenomena—
dependent upon them materially but ultimately autonomous with respect to them.  The 
perceptual corollary of this notion is that the listener knows differentiated unity when he 
hears it—she knows it intuitively, unconsciously, non-verbally—but does not necessarily 
know about it.  Her understanding is “simpliciter.” 
5. Two scholars who have significantly contributed to our understanding of how music 
theory is performative are Cook and Walton.  Cook amplifies Schoenberg’s notion that 
music theory is a mode of “good comparison.”  That is, unable to get at “ultimate nature” 
of music—unable to recover the noumena behind the phenomena—it must be content to 
make metaphors by which we can grasp various aspects of music in a partial, perspectival 
way.  The efficacy of such metaphors is thus heuristic rather than factual.  Moreover, 
analysis, and indeed, the work itself, Cook insists, is simply a way of crystallizing the 
expressive capacities of performance.  Music theory, in short, is artistic both in being 
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metaphorical and in being performative—performative in that those metaphors both arise 
and evoke responses from performers and perceivers. 
6. Walton’s theory of fictional imagining is suggestive for performative analysis.  Although 
he claims that the musical work world is virtually non-existent—that the listener’s musical 
imaginings involve herself rather than a virtual musical persona doing something—I 
contend musical work-worlds do exist and do contain fictional personae, various 
attributions, actions, and so forth, yet are nonetheless incomplete and thus need to be 
filled in by the interpreter.  I also extend Walton’s theory to structural imaginings, since 
even the most basic structural attributions we might take for granted—such as a thematic 
return being a structural arrival or a prolonged scale degree persisting through its 
embellishments—are in fact acts of imagination, even if automatic or unconscious, elicited 
by particular theoretical models.  Almost any structural imagining will also be an emotive 
imagining, since the very ways theoretical propositions are framed betray assumptions of 
sentient qualities and effects.  
7. The incompleteness of the work world is a corollary of the rhematic aspect of notation.  
That is, musical notations, while objective material traces, harbor inchoate, nascent 
structural meanings, whose realization requires the interpreter’s imagination (as 
conditioned by particular theoretical predispositions).   
8. The interpretive chain in one sense goes from score to performer/analyst to listener, but 
two crucial caveats apply: first, there is no unproblematic continuity from one link in the 
chain to the next.  The performer, analyst, and listener are all constrained by the particular 
tools of their respective media and also by their particular experiences.  Second, the flow of 
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meaning can go “backward” as well as “forward,” given that, for example, perception is not 
merely the output of but also an input to performance, just as performance, in turn, can be 
an input to composition.   
9. Iser says that literary interpretation lacks explicit means of verification other than the 
codes that one must infer from the text itself.  These codes in music, I submit, are stronger 
than in literature, since music places greater weight on form and genre as vehicles of 
meaning.  On the other hand, music does not enjoy the semantic definition literature 
does.  Hence, analytical contexts can help pose particular imaginings that music is unable 
to on its own.  They can render explicit imaginings that are otherwise obscurely present in 
particular forms and genres, and also pose new imaginings.   
10. Music-analytical interpretation presumes neither musical immanence nor subjective 
contingency and relativism.  Rather, it mediates between these two extremes.  Its degree of 
interpretive efficacy, as with metaphor, depends on the degree to which it is able to say 
something new that is still ultimately congruent (if unexpectedly so) with exigencies of the 
form/genre and the particularities of the piece at hand.   
 
5. SCHUMANN, “VON FREMDEN LÄNDERN UND MENSCHEN” 
I should proceed no further without offering a concrete example of a self-consciously performative 
analysis.  For this purpose, I will look at Schumann’s “Von fremden Ländern und Menschen” (“Of 
Foreign Lands and People”) from Kinderszenen (Scenes from Childhood), op. 15 (Example 2-1).  In its 
simplicity, the piece will provide an amicable vehicle by which to put forth a rather complex mode 
of analysis.  It will also illustrate that even such seemingly simple music, conjoined with analysis, 
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can offer numerous structural-expressive issues and ambiguities that performance can address, and 
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Example 2-1: Schumann, “Von fremden Ländern und Menschen”: analysis 
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Analysis  
Even at first glance, several questions arise regarding the form.  On the highest level, the piece 
clearly has three main sections (A1, mm. 1–8; B, mm. 9–14; A2, mm. 15–22).  But, first, how are 
we to understand the relation between the B section and the A sections by which it is framed?  
That is, to what degree is the former independent of the latter?  One factor suggesting that B is 
relatively independent is that it is tonally closed, concluding on I in the home key.  If it had 
cadenced on V, as middle sections often do, one would be more likely to group it with A2.  On the 
other hand, B possesses neither its own tonality (it never really leaves the home key) nor its own 
theme—its melody (initially in the bass) is a variant of the opening theme.  Hence, the overall 
form is somewhat ambiguous: the middle section is autonomous with respect to the outer sections 
by virtue of its tonal enclosure (suggesting ternary form), parasitic upon them by virtue of 
developing the main theme (suggesting rounded binary form, which, of course, is also implied by 
the repeat signs).  Second, how are we to understand the relation of A2
 to A1?  For, on the one 
hand, the two sections are nearly note-identical; on the other, A2, occurring after B, is therefore 
perceived in a different context than A1 and surely has a different function or expressive 
connotation, if subtle.  The notation itself, which contains but slight variants at the very beginning 
and end of the section, offers scant clues as to what this difference might be. 
On a lower level, the phrase that is the A section comprises three subphrases grouped as 
2+2+4 measures, suggesting a sentence.  However, it deviates from a prototypical sentence (as 
defined by Caplin [1998, 35–48]) in that the third subphrase does not possess the characteristic 
features of a continuation—harmonic acceleration and fragmentation (at least not to a significant 
degree).  Another issue concerns subphrasal connections: the discreteness of the two subphrases 
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within the presentation phrase, and of the presentation and continuation phrases as a whole, is 
problematized, though not necessarily obliterated, by the bass motion of leading tone to tonic 
(mm. 2–3 and 4–5), which seems to transcend these formal boundaries.  (Indeed, in the A section, 
every measure is approached by a semitone motion in the bass until the penultimate measure.)  
While the bass motion implies a connection between mm. 2–3, the slurs and thematic parallelism 
in the right hand imply a lack of connection—a new beginning in m. 3.  Hence, the juncture 
between mm. 2 and 3, and analogous measures, is ambiguous.  A consequence of the parallelism 
just mentioned is that the right-hand pitches, D5–B4, mm. 2–3, have no direct syntactical or 
perceptual connection (in Riemann’s terminology, the interval formed between them is “dead,” 
inactive).16  As for the B section, it also has a sentential character, but where we would expect a 4-
bar continuation phrase, we receive merely another two-bar phrase, such that the B section seems 
somewhat truncated.  In short, both the A and B sections seem to aspire to a more fully formed 
internal, sentential structure, yet neither is able fully to manifest it: in each case the continuation 
phrase is in some sense problematized.  Even a cursory formal analysis of this piece, then, reveals 
some problematics and ambiguities regarding the overall form, the form of individual sections, and 
the degree of connectivity between subphrases—all fodder for the canny interpreter.   
Turning to a motivic overview of the right hand, the theme in mm. 1–2 consists of an 
ascending sixth followed by descending steps (demonstrating the melodic convention by which a 
leap in one direction is countered by steps in the opposite direction).  The thematic statement in 
                                                
16 One might characterize such a dead interval as an Iserian blank, not merely a separation but also “a tacit 
invitation to find the missing link” (Iser [1978, 196]).  Adorno, incidentally, is unsympathetic to this 
Riemannian notion: “it is unlikely that there would be any dead intervals in true interpretation” (2006, 72). 
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mm. 5–6 is modified in following the ascending sixth with a descending skip (G5–E5) rather than 
with a step as before.  The section concludes (mm. 7–8) with a sequential variant of mm. 5–6 
(beginning a step lower, on A), in which the ascending sixth motive is compressed to a fourth but 
the third—now D5–B4—is preserved.  This continuation group, mm. 5–8, has significant motivic 
and formal implications: due to the long slur, there is now a direct, syntactical connection between 
the notes (C5–A4) at the formal juncture between mm. 6 and 7 (a juncture comparable to those 
between mm. 2–3 and 4–5).  In other words, this juncture can be seen to activate the previously 
inactive interval of a third.17  This event is prepared by the motivic deviation in mm. 5–6, in which 
the third G2–E2 is perceptually marked by occurring where one expects a step.  It is also reinforced 
by the final two melodic notes of this section, which restate the original pitches of the third—the 
D5–B4 of mm. 2–3—and posing a clear connection between them, given the slur and the 
parallelism with the previous, C–A figure.  The question for interpretation, then, in light of the 
continuation group, is: do we still view the thirds D5–B4 in mm. 2–3 and 4–5 as inactive, or do we 
regard the activation of the third in the continuation group as suggesting they were active to begin 
with, as retroactively clarifying their true relation?  This question is of formal, not just motivic, 
consequence, for if the performer decides that, in retrospect, D5 and B4 were always related and 
thus chooses to connect them in some fashion, they will transcend the ostensible subphrase 
boundary, mm. 2–3.  In this scenario, because both bass line and melody travel over the bar, the 
                                                
17 For a similar case, see Leonard Meyer’s analysis of the theme of Mozart’s Sonata in A major, K. 331, 
whose interval of a fourth between mm. 1 and 2 is in his view inactive—or, as he says, “unrealized”—due to 
the rhythmic factors he discusses, but is then subsequently realized in variation 1 (1973, 37–38). 
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juncture is no longer ambiguous.  If, on the other hand, the performer disunifies them—in spite, 
or perhaps because, of their eventual activation—he will uphold the ambiguity. 
When the soprano regains the melody in m. 13, it traverses a line: is it a fifth, E4–B4, on 
account of the fermata over B4; a sixth, E4–C5, on account of the formal division (A2 arrives on the 
next note); or a seventh, E4–D5, since the stepwise line continues unbroken to that point?  Each 
scenario has its own interesting implication.  The first seems to reflect and reinforce the 
predominance of the bass in the B section, whose melodic variant replaces the sixth motive with a 
fifth (more on which in a moment).  The second hints at the original motive, filling in the initial 
open sixth more completely than the A section was able—the D5–B4 gap in mm. 2–3 precludes the 
open sixth of m. 1 from being filled in entirely.  Both of these scenarios maintain a clear juncture 
between the B and A2 sections, and thus indicate ternary form (or at least reinforce its sectional 
boundaries).  By contrast, the third scenario entails a complete connection between the B and A2 
sections in implying a connection between C5–D4, mm. 14–15, and hence subsuming the first note 
of the A2 section by a line initiated in the B section.  This scenario is thus more indicative of 
rounded binary form, by which B and A2 form a larger group.  As we can see, motivic 
interpretation here, as in the A section, bears directly upon formal grouping.   
Regardless of which line the analyst/performer deems motivically significant (a fifth, sixth, 
or seventh), the fermata over the B4 points up the fact that the B section has reached that note 
prematurely, as it were—prior to the thematic restatement at the beginning of A2.  As a 
consequence, that restatement begins on D instead of B, and thus the sixth motive is transmuted 
to a fourth (recalling m. 7); this moment is thus characterized by intervalic compression or 
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inhibition.  The question is, to what extent, if any, does this slight alteration infiltrate the reprise 
as a whole—to what extent does it distinguish A2 from A1? 
The bass voice follows an interesting path: it begins as an approximate inversion of the 
melody: where the melody ascends a minor sixth in m. 1, the bass descends a diminished fifth; 
where the melody descends a third in m. 2 (linearly), the bass ascends a third (as an open interval).  
The bass more closely approximates the soprano in m. 5, where its G–B precisely inverts the B4–G5 
of the melody (the resultant voice exchange, as indicated in Ex. 2-1, reinforces this 
complementarity).  After a brief thematic hiatus in mm. 7–8, where the motivic content of the bass 
is liquidated so that the bass may serve the conventional role of articulating the cadential   
€ 
ˆ 5 –  
€ 
ˆ 1 ,  the 
bass states a variation of the theme in mm. 9–10.  True to its quasi-inversional character, it begins 
with a descending perfect fifth rather than an ascending sixth (and rather than a diminished fifth 
as in m . 1).  Thus far, the bass has traversed a linear path: it began as an approximate inversion of 
the melody, then stated a more precise inversion of the melody, and then became the melody, albeit 
in varied form.  In this last instance, however, the thematicism of the bass is less than certain, 
given that its use of a descending fifth in place of a sixth recalls its previous inversional and 
accompanimental function, and also delineates a descending fifth sequence, whose generic and 
homogeneous quality attenuates the bass’s thematic distinctiveness.  Consequently, it is not 
surprising that the bass quickly reverts back to its mirroring role (mm. 13–14), in preparation for 
the thematic return upon the arrival of A2.  In short, the bass spins a motivic tale, in which it 
aspires to be thematic but is ultimately unable to fully realize this aspiration.18 
                                                
18 Similarly, notice how the inner part comes to the fore for a brief instant in m. 8, recalling the B–G 
ascending sixth of the theme (thus bringing A1 full circle).  At the end of A2, the final motivic recurrence in 
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Finally, a window into the voice-leading structure is the   
€ 
ˆ 3 and resultant imperfect 
authentic cadence on which the piece ends.  Indeed, the entire piece prolongs   
€ 
ˆ 3 —there is no 
linear descent to   
€ 
ˆ 1 19 (such lack of melodic resolution is not surprising given that the piece is, after 
all, merely the first in a cycle of interconnected pieces20).  Although the piece is inherently 
inconclusive, the question remains as to just how inconclusively the ending should be rendered.  
This might depend, in part, upon whether “Von fremden” is played as a free-standing piece or as 
part of the larger set; the former case would probably merit slightly greater conclusiveness than the 
latter.  Also, as the graph in Ex. 2-2 reveals, the melody is of a polyphonic nature, which perhaps 
suggests that the pianist should somehow differentiate the two melodic strata.  Incidentally, notice 
how the G–F# in the upper tier of this compound melody is countered by its inversion, F#–G, in 
the bass, at once revealing another dimension of the inversional relation of the bass to the soprano 
and lending further support to the possibility of a connection between mm. 2 and 3 and analogous 
locations.   
                                                
the inner voice is incrementally more exposed than it was at the end of A1 since it is offset by the preceding 
tie.  The inner voice thus seems to intimate its own, albeit minute, thematic quest.  
19 John Ellis has a different interpretation: he reads the final   
€ 
ˆ 3 as a cover tone concealing the   
€ 
ˆ 1 of a   
€ 
ˆ 3 –  
€ 
ˆ 2 –  
€ 
ˆ 1 
descent (2003, 313).   




In summary, this brief analysis has exposed numerous structural occurrences and their 
narrative implications to which the performer might respond, ambiguities and questions he might 
resolve or decline to resolve—potentialities he might actualize—and a motivic narrative that is 
highly suggestive for non-musical meanings, which in turn hold implications for interpretation.  I 
now consider how the performer might grapple interpretively with these aspects of structure.  
 
Interpretation  
In my reading, the tonal-structural dimensions of the piece are rather restricted: recall that it 
prolongs a single scale degree and thus does not substantively progress melodically; neither does it 
significantly digress from the home key.  A dynamic interpretation following this reading would 
likewise be relatively constricted.  That is, the piece would have an intimate quality, with all 
variances relative to a piano context (although this range would perhaps be slightly greater if the 
piece were played in isolation).  On a lower level, Schumann marks each of the main formal 
sections piano, yet clearly not all pianos will be equivalent given the distinct function of each 
section.  The B section, which is more dynamic—more harmonically (sequentially) active—than 
the A sections, would probably warrant a slightly stronger dynamic, a wider dynamic range (even in 
Example 2-2: Schumann, “Von Fremden”: melodic reduction (verticalization) 
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the music prior to the notated crescendo in mm. 13–14).  A2 would perhaps be more piano overall 
than both A1 and B, given the more confined, reticent way in which it begins—with a fourth 
instead of a sixth—and the irresolute way in which it ends the entire piece. 
On a lower level still, in m. 5, the motion from G to B in the bass can be distinguished 
from the previous G–C# motions in order to highlight the transformation from dissonant tritone 
to consonant minor sixth (the latter as both a melodic interval within the bass and a harmonic 
interval between the bass and soprano) and the fact that the bass has begun to realize its thematic 
potential.  The skip into m. 6, since it deviates from the previous two statements of the theme, 
warrants dynamic inflection.  Most likely, since it is a decisive event, anticipating and perhaps 
motivating the conversion of the inactive third into an active one, it will warrant a strong dynamic.  
It is indeed the most likely candidate for the climax of the phrase, its point of arrival; the other 
candidate is the A on the downbeat of m. 7, since that is the precise moment at which the third is 
activated.  The remainder of that section is no doubt a dynamic denouement, not only due to the 
notated decrescendo, but to the motivic liquidation and rhythmic relaxation to which that dynamic 
responds.  That decrescendo, and possibly an accompanying ritardando, would thus be infused with 
the qualities of smoothing out and winding down.  In the B section, one might respond 
dynamically to the sequential repetition in mm. 9–12, although it is not to be assumed that 
because the sequence descends one must diminuendo.  The notated crescendo in m. 14 can be seen as 
responding to the gap-filling progression in the right hand, but precisely what quality this 
progression and crescendo have awaits a narrative interpretation.  Whether one would continue the 
crescendo through C2 (the last note of m. 14) or subtly taper it depends upon whether one views the 
progression as essentially terminating at the fermata B or reaching beyond it.  Finally, one should 
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listen to the inner-voice pitches B–G1 in the last measure of each A section for their thematic 
character, although to demarcate them deliberately would surely result in overstatement.  In 
particular, the very last time they are played, at the end of the repeat of A2, one would want to 
ensure that they do not overshadow the B of the soprano, upon which the irresolute quality of the 
ending depends.   
Next, consider the temporal implications and questions that arise from the above analysis.  
Most generally, the tempo range and degree of rubato would certainly be relatively constrained, 
given the structural constraints mentioned above.21  The tempo of the B section might be slightly 
slower than the outer sections given the thematic import of the bass and the deliberate right-hand 
progression starting in m. 13, both of which connote weightiness.  On the other hand, its 
harmonically active quality relative to A might warrant a quicker tempo.  More locally, most 
dynamic variances will imply corresponding temporal ones.  In particular, the B in the bass in m. 5 
will require an agogic accent for its import to be realized.  An interesting choice here would be to 
roll the left hand on the second beat, so that the sixth the bass forms with the tenor (B–G) will 
sound melodically as well as harmonically (assuming B is caught in the pedal), thus highlighting 
the melodic and motivic import of those pitches and foreshadowing the fuller thematic emergence 
of the bass in the B section.  As mentioned, a slight ritardando at the end of A1 will serve the 
denouement.  The quality and precise pacing of the ritardando in mm. 13–14 will derive from the 
                                                
21 Ellis (2003, 307–8) suggests that a relative lack of rubato in this piece will intimate “child-like innocence” 
while one with rubato will intimate “the adult, nostalgic aspect of this cycle.”  He cites Horowitz’s 
performance as an instance of the former approach, Alfred Cortot’s of the latter.   
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narrative meaning one ascribes to this progression.  A final question concerning tempo is whether 
the effect of irresolution at the end would be better served with or without a slight ritardando.  
 In terms of articulation, one might place a slight break between mm. 2 and 3 in order to 
avoid the implication of a direct, syntactical connection between D2 and B1, for the reason already 
mentioned.  On the other hand, since the connection between F# and G in the bass is so strong, 
tonally and motivically, one would probably “connect” them, if not literally, then by the subtle use 
of dynamics and tempo.  By not connecting the right-hand pitches but connecting in some fashion 
the left-hand ones—that is, by having each hand suggest a different formal grouping—one would 
preserve the formal ambiguity at this point.  Indeed, I think this is a case where it is important to 
preserve the ambiguity since a resolution is suggested within the notational domain itself (in the 
continuation phrase); to eliminate the ambiguity would be to eclipse a compelling musical process.  
Another crucial question is whether to connect C5–D5 into the A2 section; this depends upon what 
progression one posits here, and to what degree one wishes to highlight the point of thematic 
return.  The latter would require a distinct slur break or caesura since A2 begins on D rather than 
B and so without a cue from the performer, one may not realize A2 had begun.   
 
Express ion 
The analysis exposed particular events that merit particular interpretive attention, and in working 
through the principal interpretive parameters of dynamics, tempo, and articulation, we cited 
variances that seem to be the clear choice given my particular structural reading.  However, we 
have also encountered further questions, where, of the choices that apply, we do not yet seem to 
have a concrete basis on which to choose one over the other.  For this we require a concrete 
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expressive scenario.  The motivic analysis of the piece—which emphasized a dormant interval 
progressing toward an active one, and a bass line progressing toward greater thematicity—was 
highly suggestive of a narrative thread, which we might now consolidate with a more explicit 
hermeneutic (in the sense of programmatic) reading.  Schumann’s descriptive title, as with all such 
titles, is of course only a clue to, or perhaps an example of, the generalized experiential processes 
encoded within the piece—merely a point of departure for a more thoroughgoing construal of 
musical meaning.22  My own reading that follows is itself but a single—albeit more elaborate and 
explicit—indication or example of those processes, and of course many other fictional scenarios 
might capture the expressive potential of the musical structure equally well.   
 On the largest level, the most basic emotional quality implied by my analysis is longing.  
One instance of longing is fulfilled—namely, the initially latent third that is later actualized.  Most 
instances, however, are ultimately unfulfilled: the sentential aspirations of each section, the quest 
of the bass (and to some extent the inner voices) for greater thematicity, the gap of a sixth that is 
never completely bridged (in the descending direction at least), and, more broadly, the structural 
gap between the melodic scale degree on which we end ( ) and the more stable one on which 
pieces normally resolve ( ).  Experiencing such longing is arguably a single character or persona, 
who I infer from the development of a single theme—and also, more specifically, from the 
overarching thematic process of the bass.  Schumann’s protagonist is a mature adult reflecting 
upon the lost innocence of childhood, as suggested by the title of the cycle, wistfully recalling 
youthful fantasies of exotic places and people, as suggested by the title of the piece.   
                                                
22 Edward Lippman (1999) discusses Schumann’s ambivalence with respect to the use and meaning of the 





On the next narrative level, the opening ascending sixth is the motive of longing, perhaps 
for exposure to things foreign, for some experiential confirmation that distant lands and people 
are as ideal as the inner child conceives them to be.  The child has clearly not yet explored these 
remote regions—she is self-enclosed.  The latter is connoted by the voice exchange in m. 2; also 
witness the repetitive harmonic cycles and also how the remoteness of the C# diminished-seventh 
chord and its consequent tonicization of V in m. 2 and analogous places are immediately curbed 
by a return to the tonic.  Both of these seem to express a quality of confinement.  The A1 section, 
in short, might be read as a naïve idealization of Otherness which is tinged with sadness because it 
appears inaccessible.   
The B section, by contrast, might express disillusionment—the adult persona overtaking 
the child persona—considering the earthbound emphasis upon the bass, which converts the 
ascending sixth of naïve longing to the descending fifth of sober realization.  The adult, unlike his 
inner child, his younger self, has been to these foreign regions and knows enough not to idealize 
them.  The melodic transformation in mm. 13–14 is the most decisive proclamation against 
misguided hope, concretizing the vague, ethereal sixth of longing with the practical steps of 
wisdom and experience.  In this process, the adult co-opts the crucial B (under the fermata) in 
order to preclude the child from restating the longing motive of the sixth at the beginning of A2.  
Indeed, the child is now compelled to begin on D instead of B, to state a fourth instead of a sixth, 
and hence to proceed more reticently, soberly, within a more constrained imaginative space.  The 
child is not quite the same as he was before—he has assimilated the adult perspective, at least to 
some degree.  In this sense, this piece is a microcosm of the entire set, which traverses a journey 
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from childhood to adulthood, the latter most strongly represented by the final piece, “Der Dichter 
Spricht.”    
Hence, this piece, while expressing the agency of a single persona, nonetheless represents 
two sides of that persona: one the credulous child, the other the disenchanted adult, as represented 
by the A and B sections respectively.23  Alternatively, we might infer the child and adult personae 
from the right and left hands, respectively.  The C# bass, in forming a tritone with the G soprano, 
forces the latter to resolve to F#—the adult curbs the child’s flights of fancy, bringing him down to 
earth (even more so in the B section).  This interpretation warrants a speaking style of playing, in 
which the two hands—in particular, the G–F# motive and its inversion—partake of a dialogue.  In 
this scenario, the right hand progression in mm. 13–14 signifies the child voluntarily taking the 
adult’s cue rather than the adult forcing his point.  These two readings are not necessarily 
incompatible.  Indeed, within an amalgam of the two, the A section foregrounds the child 
persona, with the bass serving to frame that persona by the perspective of the adult narrator, while 
the B section foregrounds the adult perspective, which had been subtly present in A1.  In other 
words, in this scenario, the gradual thematic emergence of the bass is a musical analogue for the 
gradual emergence of adult consciousness. 
                                                
23 These sections and perspectives are associated with different temporal modes: A is arguably in lyric time 
(arrested time, comparable to Marx’s Satz), B in narrative time (passing time, comparable to Marx’s Gang).  
That is, the A sections evoke the past, but as stored in memory, and thus rendered static; the B section 
evokes the present, where states are shifting, feelings evolving.  Michael Klein (2004) demonstrates the 
interaction of these two modes in Chopin’s First and Fourth Ballades and argues that such interaction 
lends plausibility to the notion of musical narrative generally. 
192 
*  *  * 
What does this expressive scenario suggest for the interpretive questions posed above?  First, I 
presented evidence in support of both a slower and a faster B section: slower on account of its 
weighty bass-orientation, faster on account of its increased harmonic activity.  Which does my 
narrative entail?  In it, the A section belongs primarily to the child persona, which, situated within 
the context of an adult perspective, implies the past—or rather, the past as stored in the adult’s 
memory, and thus statically present.  The B section, by contrast, belongs primarily to the adult 
persona and is thus actively present.  Hence, in pragmatic terms, A is generally slower and softer, B 
quicker and louder.  Second, regarding the dynamic treatment of the bass’s B in m. 5, it would 
most likely have a strong, earthly quality, since here the adult’s perspective begins to be actualized.  
Third, where does the narrative place the point of arrival within the A section?  This is still not 
entirely certain, but I would suggest that E in m. 6 would be the likeliest candidate, since it marks 
the point at which the child breaks free of his repetitive, hermetically-sealed imaginings and asserts 
something less fanciful—perhaps in direct response to the emergence of the adult’s voice in the B 
of the bass, one beat before.  Fourth, how do we dynamically render the sequence in mm. 11–12?  
It would probably be weaker, in that the strength of the perfect fifth of the previous two measures 
yields to the instability of the tritone, which might be seen as initiating the bass’s regression to its 
initial subsidiary role as a mere accompaniment; in other words, at this point, the adult begins to 
lose his voice, albeit slightly.  Fifth, if one played the right-hand progression, mm. 13–14, as a fifth 
progression, arriving decisively on the B, it would indicate that the child has resolutely adopted the 
adult’s perspective.  Finally, the entire A2 might realize the emotive implication of the initial 
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ascending fourth, that the child has been irreversibly affected by the adult perspective.  It would 
thus be rendered more soberly than A1—with even less rubato and dynamic fluctuation.24   
Ex. 2-3 summarizes the interpretive choices for this piece given my particular structural and 
expressive reading, and Web Ex. 8 features my performance of it.    
 
Concluding Thoughts 
Performative analysis reveals elements that only infrequently necessitate a particular interpretation.  
Much more often, it admits of a range of possible interpretations, in particular ambiguities that the 
                                                
24 Very commonly in late Classical and Romantic ternary forms, A2 in some sense synthesizes A1 and B, 
typically amalgamating the theme of A1 and a rhythmic or textural element of B.  In this piece, A2 does not 
overtly synthesize the two sections.  But if the performer manifests the emotive suggestion of that opening 
fourth—that is, imaginative constraint and earthly realism—rendering the initial section from the 
perspective derived from B, A2 would indeed be a synthesis, an emotive one, of the previous two sections.  
This example reveals the capacity of the interpreter to create form, or, more precisely, to actualize extremely 
subtle formal implications or potentialities.  
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performer will resolve or, less commonly, preserve—that is, when, as in the Schumann, the 
ambiguity is resolved in the course of the music-structural process.  Alternately, it suggests 
particular structural-affective states, but which can be realized in any number of ways.  The 
structural and affective are thoroughly intertwined.  Indeed, the very way in which an analyst 
frames his observations regarding structural occurrences betrays his assumptions regarding the 
anthropomorphic dimensions of such occurrences.  In this way, an analysis will often provide a 
foundation onto which the performer may project a more explicit narrative conception.   
Extrapolating from the above scenario, how in general does the performer grapple with the 
various possible meanings exposed to her by analysis?  She experiments with the range of 
interpretive options that seem appropriate for a particular musical event, whether a local detail or 
significant structural occurrence.  Where no one choice within this range intuitively strikes her as 
the most convincing, she must defer to a more concrete expressive scenario, which will hopefully 
motivate a particular interpretive choice.  In other words, while multiple choices may be valid in 
relation to a structural reading, the performer must ultimately choose one; yet, this choice must 
not be random but rather compelled by an emotional connection to the piece.  
Two caveats warrant reiteration.  First, the analysis, although fruitful and in some cases 
even necessary for interpretation, will not necessarily precede interpretation.  The latter can induce 
intuitive realizations regarding musical structure and its narrative implications as much as the 
reverse.  In other words, I conceive of the two modes as partaking of a bidirectional, dialogic 
exchange, where in one case analysis might lead to interpretation, in another case the reverse.  But 
again, even when analysis precedes performance, it will not dictate to it assuming it is framed more 
in terms of questions than putatively factual answers.  Second, when a structural or emotive 
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realization does happen to come first, the performer need not necessarily devise an interpretive 
application deliberately.  Very often, such a realization will affect him naturally, unconsciously, 
and physically, infusing his playing with interpretive nuances that he would not necessarily arrive 
at through conscious deliberation, and which are often so subtle as to be impervious to conscious 
control.   
 
PART II. SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS25 
6. SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS AS TRUTH-FINDING 
To begin, let me restate the basic issue with which we have grappling in the terms of Susanne 
Langer.  She identifies two basic kinds of symbols.  Discursive, or linguistic, symbols capture the 
rational order of experience due to their linear syntax and denotative capacity.  Presentational 
symbols such as artworks, on the other hand, can capture extremely subtle and complex mental 
and emotional states that language cannot; this is due to their multidimensionality and ability to 
present simultaneities (Langer [1957, 53–78]).  Music, in her view, is a presentational symbol.  In 
                                                
25 Some of the material in this part is drawn from my College Music Symposium article (Swinkin [2008]) but 
has been substantially revised.  In what follows, I will not be considering Schenker’s own personal views on 
analysis and performance, save for a few scattered quotations.  The reason is that this topic is quite large 
and complex and requires separate space (for a condensed but invaluable discussion, see Rothstein [1984]).  
For, there are not only his own explicit theoretical statements on the topic to consider (as gathered in 1911 
[pub. 2000]) but also assumptions to be gleaned from his editorial activities, especially his fingerings (on 
which, see Swinkin [2007] and also Terrigno [2009]).  Moreover, one could also parse his critical 
commentary on performers of his own day, the first extended study of which is only now being written (by 
Kumaran Arul, working under Nicholas Cook at Cambridge).   
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its rhythmic motion, patterns of tension and release, hierarchical complexity, and so forth, music 
is a logical analogy for feelings and other inner states (Langer [1953, 104–48]).  In other words, 
music and other art forms do not refer to dimensions of internal experience but present or embody 
them (hence “presentational” symbol). 
Is Schenkerian theory more discursive or presentational—or, roughly rephrased, more 
science or art?26  This very question leads us astray, for the “is” suggests an essentializing tendency I 
do not subscribe to.  Better, then, to ask how the theory has been or can be used in particular 
circumstances.  Since my main concern is performance/analysis, I will reframe the question thus: 
which of the various applications of Schenkerian theory to performance betray implicit but clear 
biases regarding the discursive versus presentational character of Schenkerian theory?  Or, more 
broadly: when Schenkerian theory is situated within the context of performance, what 
epistemological assumptions about it come to light?  
Rather than attempt a comprehensive survey of the literature, I will offer a representative 
example of a Schenkerian performance/analysis study that, to my mind at least, clearly evinces a 
discursive bias.  Cynthia Folio (1992) aims to offer a practical account of how analysis can be 
                                                
26 The most rigorous defense of Schenkerian theory as a scientific system, as meeting the strict standards of 
scientific validity, has been mounted by Matthew Brown (2005).  A key component of his argument 
(building on an earlier article he co-authored with Dempster and Headlam [1997]) is that Schenkerian 
theory conforms to “The Hypothetico-Deductive Method,” wherein, as stipulated by Popper, an 
explanation, to be valid, must be falsifiable (Brown affirms that for Popper, “even our best knowledge is 
fallible or conjectural” [2005, 16]).  On Brown’s view, the fact that some Schenkerian principles can be 
logically refuted protects Schenkerian theory from the charges of circularity that have been leveled against it 
(most famously by Narmour [1977]).   
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applied to performance, using the first movement of Bach’s Sonata in E Major for flute and 
harpsichord as her central example.  Some of the pervasive features of this piece she uncovers 
using Schenkerian techniques are parallel tenths governing relatively long stretches of music, 
embedded double-neighbor motives, and motivic connections between flute and harpsichord.  Her 
main advice to performers is to emphasize or “bring out,” dynamically or agogically, the notes 
comprising these underlying lines and motives, and to highlight long-range structural and registral 
connections by dynamically “matching” the notes that comprise such connections (see her Figures 
4 and 5, 142–43).  In this account, the analysis itself, while not overtly reductive, ultimately betrays 
such an orientation by using performance to cut through foreground phenomena in order to 
project structural lines.  This reductive methodology, in turn, equates with a discursive, or 
propositional one; it is tantamount to stating a supposed fact—that a structural entity exists.  Folio 
thus employs the conjunction of analysis and performance discursively: the foreground, via 
performance, is reduced to (supposed) structural fact.  
 The “bringing out” technique is hardly unique to Folio; it is widely endorsed.  Another 
widely endorsed discursive or literalist application of Schenkerian principles to performance 
involves rendering “long lines,” as supposedly implied by the Urlinie (and perhaps by 
middleground linear progressions as well).  The Urlinie and Züge relate mostly non-contiguous 
pitches, exposing a musical logic operative over long time-spans.  Yet, proponents of this approach 
misconstrue this metaphorical notion of aural or conceptual connection as implying or entailing 
literal, physical connection—that is, as a mandate to create a “long line.”27  A rigidly discursive 
                                                
 27 Needless to say, the long line phenomenon does not at root derive from a literalist construal of 
Schenkerian theory, as is evident by its ubiquity among performers and studio teachers, few of whom are 
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approach to Schenkerian theory and performance, then, will view high-level structures as factual in 
two senses: first, they exist, and the analyst/performer must excavate and emphasize them; second, 
the connection among these structural tones is real, hence the performer must actually connect 
long strands of tones, employing overarching legato as the default articulation.  
 Certainly, it is sometimes appropriate and desirable to project structural tones or create 
long, legato lines.  Yet, the fundamental shortcoming of this literalist approach is twofold.  For one, 
it may adhere to the letter of Schenkerian thought but does not adhere to its spirit.  That is, it does 
not conduce to the organic coherence that Schenkerian constructs were designed to expose or 
elicit.  Simply demarcating or connecting structural pitches by itself does nothing to ensure or 
                                                
directly influenced by Schenkerian analysis.  If anything, the converse holds: performers-turned-theorists 
come to Schenkerian analysis with a predilection for playing with a long line and construe the implications 
of the Urlinie in such a way as to validate that stance (Murray Perahia is perhaps the most notable case in 
point).  This predilection, in turn, stems from modernist ideology.  As Nicholas Cook points out, current 
Schenkerian performance-pedagogy 
interprets principles derived from Schenker’s writings in terms of the performance style of post-
1945 modernism, a style that remains broadly current today [as I discussed in the Introduction].  
And here there is another and sharper paradox, for this style is utterly unlike that of . . . 1890s 
Vienna, where Schenker seems to have formed the basic musical sensibilities that he retained 
through his life (2011, 294). 
Furthermore, in his closing paragraph, Cook writes, “Schenker’s theory has . . . been invoked to support a 
style of performance quite different from, even opposed to, the ‘rhetorical’ style to which Schenker 
subscribed” (ibid., 307).  Schenker made himself vulnerable to such distortion and modernization, Cook 
submits, because he did not closely connect his theoretical views with those on performance. 
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create meaningful relationships among these pitches.28  In other words, the musical unity that 
Schenkerian constructs potentially foster is often misconstrued by performers as implying 
uniformity of articulation (and frequently of tempo as well).29  Such unity—or more precisely, unity-
in-variety—can only be achieved through the strategic and varied use of articulation, dynamics, 
and tempo, the performer’s essential resources.  Second, and more crucially, the particular pitches 
that comprise the Urlinie and Züge are hardly the point.  Rather, their significance derives from 
their interaction with the surface, from their function as a backdrop in relation to which 
foreground particulars achieve expressive salience.30  In brief, the discursive/literalist approach 
                                                
28 Schenker himself admonished the performer not to follow “the Urlinie slavishly and pluck it out of the 
diminution, just to communicate it to the listener” (1927, 109). 
29 See Schenker’s diatribe against the substitution of uniformity for true unity in Schenker (1925a).  In this 
essay, as Schachter aptly summarizes, “he was urging performers . . . to discard the featureless continuous 
legato suggested by ‘phrasing slurs’ of corrupt editions in favour of the varied and lively articulation shown 
in the composers’ autograph” (1991, 620).  Indeed, Schenkerian performance-pedagogy can truly benefit 
from taking into account Schenker’s early and middle works, not just the Ursatz-oriented late work.  Even 
though the latter, charitably construed, fosters particularity in its own way, as I will discuss presently, the 
concern for particularity is more evident in the earlier work.  
30 Gregory Proctor goes so far as to assert that “structural levels [are] ideas of reasonable musical processes  
. . . not . . . some of the notes in a piece”; quoted in Smith (1996, 278–79), which goes on to claim that the 
structural pitch itself is not nearly as important as “the formal-contrapuntal-harmonic process in which that 
pitch participates.”  Likewise, Schachter states, “identifying structural elements should never become a goal 
in itself; the goal is to discover how those elements participate in what Schenker called ‘das Drama des 
Ursatzes’—the drama of the fundamental structure” (2001, 168). 
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simply does not go far enough.  By focusing on the supposed fact of structural progressions, it 
limits the creative uses to which such progressions can be put. 
 I will offer a performative alternative to this strategy below.  First, however, I would like to 
lay some philosophical groundwork for this project.  In the next section, I sketch three German-
philosophical models to which Schenker’s theory has an affinity in some sense.  
 
7. SCHENKER AND THE PHILOSOPHERS 
. . . Schenker was no philosopher . . . 
–Victor Zuckerkandl (1973, 206) 
 
Perhaps not.  Indeed, Schenker was impatient with those who placed music-philosophical concepts 
before music-theoretical ones.  Yet, as Kevin Korsyn affirms, “Schenker’s rejection of the musical 
opinions of philosophers was by no means a rejection of philosophy. . . .  He simply believed that 
an understanding of musical language is a precondition for any aesthetic generalizations about it” 
(1988, 3).  The culture of fin-de-siècle Vienna in which Schenker lived was a heady one indeed, and 
there is little doubt that Schenker was steeped in German intellectual history, as Korsyn affirms: 
“Schenker was a typical Viennese intellectual in terms of the breadth of his knowledge” (1988, 5).  
We know he read Schopenhauer and Goethe, both of whom he quotes, and Kant’s name and his 
various terms, such as “synthesis,” are peppered throughout his oeuvre; though he does not refer to 
Freud explicitly, scholars have long suspected a connection between the Ursatz and the 
unconscious and new research tells us that Schenker did in fact read Freud.31 
                                                
31 The first extended study of Schenker’s relation to Freudian ideas is hot off the press (Fleshner, 2012).  
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Granted, given Schenker’s concerns about putting the philosophical cart before the 
musical horse, we should not expect to see in his work overt use of these philosophers’ concepts.  
Rather, as Korsyn suggests, we are more likely to encounter displacements (in the Freudian sense) of 
these concepts.  Our task here is to detect resonances between Schenker’s analytical edifice—the 
Schichten of background–middleground–foreground—and certain strands of German thought.  So 
as not to lose the main thrust of my argument, I offer rather condensed remarks on Schenker’s 
intellectual affinity with Goethe, Kant, and Freud—three philosophical snapshots.  
 
Goethe 
Goethe’s Urphänomen strives, through the process of Steigerung, toward ever higher levels of 
organization, continually generating new forms.  Yet all such forms are holistically related: the 
centrifugal tendency of development is held in check by the centripetal, unifying power of the 
organic whole.  
William Pastille (1990, 34) reminds us that Schenker, in the second volume of Der 
Tonwille, quotes Goethe’s poem “Typus,” the incipit of which reads: “Es ist nichts in der Haut, 
/Was nicht im Knochen ist.” [“There is nothing on the skin, /that is not in the bones.”]  Though 
the poem describes organic life, Schenker’s invocation suggests it can extend metaphorically to the 
artwork.  In both, an inner model governs external characteristics.32   
                                                
32 Schenker’s appropriation of Goethian thought is, of the three philosophers being considered here, by far 
the most discussed.  See Kassler (1983), Neff (2006), Pastille (1990), and Solie (1980).  Incidentally, for a 
brief yet informative account of Goethe’s own involvement with music, see Heller (1949). 
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Schenker’s inner model is strict counterpoint, which, in his view, underlies and ensures the 
coherence of the various phenomena of free composition.  More specifically, Schenker’s 
counterpart to Goethe’s Urphänomen is of course the Ursatz—a contrapuntal-harmonic formula 
that eventuates in a plethora of foregrounds.  Hence Schenker’s motto: “Always the same, but not 
in the same way.”  Far from being static and architectonic, the Schichten evince a teleology, or 
entelechy: just as Goethe’s plant strives to realize the potential of its inner form in outer 
appearance, so Schenker’s Ursatz strives to realize its potential in the foreground, where it remains 
in order to ensure the interconnection of all phenomena, no matter how diverse.  Musical form, in 
his words, is “an energy transformation—a transformation of the forces which flow from the 
background to the foreground” (1935, 162).33  Music, on Schenker’s view, thus evinces a 
teleological impulse by which it actively strives to manifest its latencies, its aesthetic DNA as 
encoded in the Ursatz. 
To offer a more specific parallel, which I find especially interesting: Goethe’s “proliferous 
rose” (Durchgewachsene Rose) is “a partially defined flower, as it were, with a stem growing again 
from its center, and new leaves developing on this stem” (1790, 94).  That is, it is an entire plant in 
microcosm, as it were, in the place where one would expect reproductive organs (see Figure 2-1).34  
We witness an almost exact musical parallel in Schenker’s technique of the “transference of the 
Ursatz.”35  Here, the fundamental structure that governs the whole is replicated in its entirety at a 
                                                
33 For a further discussion of this passage, see Rothfarb (2002, 939). 
34 In the section immediately following, Goethe proceeds to describe the “proliferous carnation,” which he 
deems “still more remarkable” (1790, 93).   
35 See Schenker (1935, 87–90 and Figs. 109–111). 
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lower structural level (Schenker discusses abbreviated or “incomplete” forms of the transferred 
structure as well).  For example, in Schenker’s analysis of Beethoven’s “Freude” theme from the 
Finale of the Ninth Symphony (reproduced in my Example 2-4), he posits a – –  
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is replicated verbatim at the foreground (see the circled notes in the example).  Moreover, the 
interrupted form of this structure, occurring at the deep middleground (bottom system), is 
replicated at the shallow middleground (middle system), rendering the first half of the piece a 
precise microcosm of the whole.36  
For both Goethe and Schenker, the whole is ever present in an ideal sense.  For Schenker, 
to hear music organically is to hear each event as uniquely colored by its position within the whole.  
But with the proliferous rose and transferred Ursatz, the whole is present in a quite real sense as 
well: the whole is literally one of the parts.  It is not difficult to see, then, why these two entities 
would have held special meaning for their respective authors: both illustrate organicism in the 
                                                
36 Zuckerkandl’s analysis of this passage (1973, 174) demonstrates its recursivity even more rigorously than 
Schenker’s.  
Example 2-4: Schenker’s Figure 109e/3 (analysis of Beethoven’s “Freude” Theme)  
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most vivid possible way.  In Goethe’s words, “the proliferous rose . . . offers a very clear example of 
everything we sought earlier through our power of imagination and understanding” (1790, 93).37  
 
Kant 
For Kant, the synthesis of diverse phenomena must come from the apprehending subject.  
Synthetic unity would seem a contradictory concept: how can a manifold be unified?  It can 
because diverse phenomena are united as my thoughts—as belonging to “transcendental 
apperception.”  Likewise, Korsyn (1988) notes, the Ursatz, far from being a formula to which a 
piece is reduced, is a vehicle for transcendental apperception.  It is the “I” of the piece, the 
metaphorical subject who renders the various foreground events coherent.  
Crucially, it is through time that the transcendental subject binds phenomena; “time-
determination,” Paul Guyer asserts, is “the real basis of Kant’s epistemology” (cited by Korsyn 
[1988, 28]).  For Schenker, the Ursatz (along with other high-level linear progressions) is precisely 
such a vehicle of time-consciousness—it binds a series of disparate tones unfolding in time.  Time-
consciousness is the mental tension by which we carry over the initial tone of a linear progression 
to the end: Schenker states, “the conceptual unity of a linear progression signifies a conceptual 
tension between the beginning and the end of the progression: the primary note is to be retained 
                                                
37 A notable distinction between the two formations, however, is that whereas the transferred Ursatz is a 
relatively standard technique, the proliferous rose is an anomaly, an anatomical aberration.  In this respect, 
one might note a connection between Goethe’s rose and Freud’s neurotic symptom: in both, a pathology 
serves as a precious window into a much more significant phenomenon—in the former the organic life-
force, in the latter the substance of a repression, the etiology of mental illness. 
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until the point at which the concluding note appears.  The tension alone engenders musical 
coherence” (1926, 1, my italics).  What ensures unity in multiplicity is holding onto a single entity 
over a period of time—a single tone that passes through the others or through which the others 
pass.  This tension ensures that a string of events comprise not a mere succession but a 
grammatically coherent statement.  So, contrary to the common criticism that Schenker ignores 
musical time, we see that the Ursatz represents first and foremost a temporal faculty. 
To summarize, “the organic composition, then, is a correlate of Kant’s cognitive subject; 
the Ursatz is the transcendental consciousness of the piece, its ‘I think’” (Korsyn [1988, 35]).  This 
model, Korsyn muses, explains why an encounter with a piece often feels like an encounter with 
another person, or even with a version of our own deeper self: music sensuously embodies a crucial 
element of how we think.38   
                                                
38 Cook (2006), I think, gets at this same basic Kantian idea but in non-Kantian terms.  He argues that the 
composer-oriented values that originated with Beethoven’s heroic style “ran underground, so to speak, in 
the twentieth-century analytical commentaries that eliminated the composer but retained the traces of 
creative intentionality” (2006, 18).  He cites Schenker in this regard, claiming his is a theory not of music 
generally but of masterpieces in particular, and of how they are created in a “lightning flash” (Cook’s 
phrase).  Schenker’s move was to retain composer-like intentionality while taking the actual composer and 
the feelings ascribed to him out of the equation.  Indeed, music theories are often pseudo-theories of 
creativity in a formalistic guise.  The values of coherence and unity are seeming formalisms that bear 
vestiges of creativity and intentionality.  Hence, to return to Schenker’s Kantian predilection, compositional 
unity and organicism implicitly symbolize and valorize the transcendental mind that gave rise to them and 
that governs musical unfolding from behind the curtain, as it were.  In this sense, everything in a piece, 




Both Freud’s and Schenker’s theories seek to expose the motivations underlying complex and 
often apparently disintegrated phenomena.  Freud and Schenker did not inhabit the same social 
circles, but they were almost exact contemporaries; both lived in Vienna and in fact attended the 
University of Vienna only ten or so years apart; both were Jewish but not very religious; and both 
were born of Galician parents.  Nicholas Cook (2007) stresses the affinity between these figures, 
claiming that their respective theories were not just theories in the modern sense but “programmes 
for action,” movements with political and religious overtones.  Cook notes that both theories have 
a strong mystical component, perhaps a trace of Talmudic philosophy: in both, the truth is 
concealed, not readily apparent to the eye or ear, and requires analytical intervention to be 
exposed.  The truth for Freud lies in the unconscious, for Schenker in the Ursatz.  “Whether in 
religion, psychoanalysis, or musical analysis, then, truth takes the form of revelation, being 
accessible . . . only to the adept” (Cook [2007, 213]).  
Rather than attempt to consider Freud’s theory of mind generally, I will focus on his dream 
theory in particular, since here the affinities to Schenker, in my view, are most tangible.   
 
The Dreamwork 
To briefly rehearse Freud’s dream theory (1900): events on the day preceding the dream trigger 
unconscious associations, thoughts of past experiences, and a wish, which the dream fulfills in one 
way or another.  The dream distorts these “dream thoughts” by transposing psychical intensity 
onto otherwise indifferent dream-day material; the dreamwork appropriates that material to 
209 
express repressed memories and desires.  Such distortion satisfies the agency of censorship.  This 
agency is very strong in waking life, which is why unconscious thoughts often reach quasi-
consciousness only in dreams, where that agency is less strong.  To slip by the censor, dream-
thoughts disguise themselves; in particular, several are often condensed into a single image, which 
is thereby “overdetermined.”  Sleeping dreams differ from daydreams in having a strong 
hallucinatory component, for which Freud offers an ingenious explanation: normally, we first 
receive sense perceptions, which then leave traces in memory; in dreams, this normal path is 
reversed.  Due to censorship and to the absence of fresh stimuli, the process runs backward, from 
mnemonic traces back to sensory perceptions.  The dreamwork is in this sense “regressive” (1900, 
581–82).   
The psychoanalyst and analysand recover the latent thoughts underlying the dream 
content; they disentangle from a single image the various thoughts that catalyzed it.  The patient 
forgetting part of the dream or doubting her memory of it is no impediment to analysis, for these 
are but a continuation of the dreamwork and its censorship.  The point is not to reconstitute the 
dream perfectly but to disinter the unconscious thoughts it manifests.   
 
Schenkerian Structure 
Schenker’s Schichten can be readily described in Freudian terms.  If ultimately all dreams, as Freud 
insists, fulfill a wish, ultimately all music, on Schenker’s view, expresses the Naturklang, the “chord 
of nature”—the major or minor triad as derived from the first five partials of the overtone series.  
The background, the first presentation of the Naturklang in linear form, is the unconscious of the 
piece.  The middleground (of which there might be several) is the pre-conscious agency of 
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censorship, guarding the gates to the conscious, the foreground.  It provides the initial set of 
transformations by which the background will enter the foreground in distorted or disguised form.  
Finally, the foreground is both the conscious mind and the sensory faculty—it is where we hear 
the piece.  It is a dream of tones that variously conceals and exposes the latencies from which it 
arose.   
Both models, therefore, adduce purposive thoughts underlying often apparently random or 
incoherent phenomena.  The key difference, however, is that whereas in Freud the latent dream is 
much more intricate than the manifest dream, in Schenker, conversely, the background is much 
simpler than the foreground.39   
 
Examples 
I offer two examples, framing the Freudian one in Schenkerian terms, the Schenkerian one in 
Freudian terms.  The former (Figure 2-2) graphs a rather intricate dream and its analysis (Freud 
[1900, 232–34]) along four Schenkerian strata.  The arrows indicate a derivational relationship—
they trace the various components of the manifest dream back to recent events (both inside and 
outside therapy) and those in turn back to the latent dream thoughts.  Turning to Appendix A, the 
background posits an octave Urlinie,40 which is divided into a fourth and a fifth (the two 
progressions overlap on ) based on the fact that, as the bass line shows, D5–A4 compose-out a i 
                                                
39 I thank Professor Frederick Amrine for pointing this out to me. 
40 Octave Urlinien are quite rare.  As David Beach (1988) points out, a full-octave descent is often merely 
apparent, as in cases where the initial three tones are harmonically unsupported and thus actually embellish 
the true Kopfton   
€ 





chord while A4–D4 unfold over a cadential progression.  The first middleground begins the process 
of transformation: most notably, it changes the melodic tone C5 of the background from a 
dissonance into a consonance; also, it changes the melodic tone G4 of the background from a 
perfect into an imperfect consonance.  We might regard this process of inverting consonance and 
dissonance as analogous to inverting psychical intensities, as occurs in dreams.  Then, the 
penultimate bass note is shifted back to coincide with the F; entities that were separate become 
conjoined or condensed, as in the dreamwork.  The second middleground continues the 
transformational process, mutating B@ into a different object altogether: B&.  Thus, the 
middlegrounds perform the operations of inverting psychical intensities, condensation, and 





The foreground introduces its own motive, that of a fourth, which takes on its own 
internal logic, one irrespective of the foreground’s relationship to higher levels.  Such motives and 
their repetitions, at least for later Schenker, are ontologically obscure, secondary to higher level 
!"
Figure 2-2: A Schenkerian-Type Graph of a “woman patient’s” dream, Freud (1900, 232–34). 
One of six children, didn’t get enough attention.   She dirtied the bed and is made to 
          stand in corner; her father threatens to 
                    love her no longer.   
Woman: “if Dr. Freud gives me twice as much time, will I have 
        to pay him twice as much?  If so, that is filthy!”  
Dr. F compares psychoanalytic treatment       Dr. F: “I haven’t enough time to 
to an orthopedic treatment                         see you an hour daily.” 
Woman: “If the tailor’s apprentice loses the money I gave him, will I have to  
pay him again?” 
Husband (teasing): “Yes.” 
Woman waits for him to tell her that isn’t true.   
Niece’s arithmetic game: 
arranging digits in  
nine  squares 
Orthopedic institute
She stands in a corner and waits 
for Dr. F to say it wasn’t true. 
Other patients laugh at her. 
She is making small squares. 
Dr. F has no time to treat her separately; 
she must be treated alongside five others. 
She refuses to lie in her 
assigned bed. 
1. 2. 3. 
4. 5. 
213 
motives, which recur from one structural level to another.41  By analogy, Freud submits that 
apparent logical relations within a dream are part of the manifest rather than latent dream—the 
connections among events within the dream itself are in a sense illusory in that they represent 
separate, latent content.  
There are dreams in which the most complicated intellectual operations [seem to] take place, 
statements are contradicted or confirmed . . . just as they are in waking thought.  But here again 
appearances are deceitful.  If we go into the interpretation of dreams such as these, we find that 
 . . . what is reproduced by the ostensible thinking in the dream is the subject-matter of the dream-
thoughts and not the mutual relations between them (1900, 348, his italics).42 
 
                                                
41 Cohn (1992) argues for the emancipation of foreground motives from this rigidly hierarchical scheme 
and locates the seed of such emancipation in Schenker’s work itself. 
42 Generally speaking, musical applications of Freudian theory have scarcely been explored.  I have 
suggested elsewhere (Swinkin [2012]) that variation form, especially of the nineteenth-century type to which 
I alluded in Chapter 1, can be usefully viewed from a Freudian perspective: the theme bears material traces 
with “repressed” (that is, latent or potential) meanings which come to light only as a consequence of 
musical “memories” (that is, variations).  Maynard Solomon expresses this analogy in similar terms, likening 
the theme to a manifest dream, “a simple, condensed sequence of images masking an infinity of latent 
dream thoughts” (1977, 303) and variations to analyses of the dream, which educe certain of those latent 
thoughts.  William Echard states, more generally, that “Musical personas do not follow the same rules as do 
actors in the mundane world.  They are dream-like, and just as with dreams, their distinctiveness comes into 
focus when we notice that they include figures which are the same as those in waking awareness, yet not the 
same” (2006, 86) 
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Assessment  
To summarize, the Ursatz can be likened to Goethe’s Urphänomen, Kant’s synthetic apperception, 
and Freud’s latent dream, and by extension, the unconscious.  This is not to say, of course, that 
the Ursatz is identical with any of these, but that, though Schenker may not have been a 
philosopher in his own right, he was clearly engaging, if unconsciously, several important strands 
of German philosophical thought.  
At root, all four models valorize depth, forces operating beneath the sensuous surface.  We 
should recognize a key distinction, however.  Freud, on one pole, seems primarily interested in 
“foreground” phenomena—symptoms, parapraxes, and so on—for the window they open onto 
unconscious forces.  Kant’s innate apperceptive faculty, on the other pole, is about organizing and 
unifying external phenomena in all their diversity.  Is Schenker’s Ursatz closer to the Freudian or 
the Kantian paradigm?  Is it more a deep truth to be recovered from phenomena or rather a faculty 
that penetrates phenomena?  Judging from Schenker’s own words, the former: he often adopts a 
kind of zealous rhetoric by which the Ursatz, like Freud’s unconscious, is the truth; “the 
fundamental structure amounts to a sort of secret . . . which, incidentally, provides music with a 
kind of natural preservation from destruction by the masses” (1935, 9).  Likewise for motivic 
parallelisms, of the sort we witnessed in the “Freude” theme.  Here Schenker speaks of “the 
mysterious concealment of such repetitions [as] an almost biological means of protection: 
repetitions thrive better in secret than in the full light of consciousness” (1935, 18).  Schenker 
invokes organicism here not to revel in the resplendence of deeper structures at the foreground 
but to posit a kind of protective layer against disintegrated hearing—against what he views as 
musical mediocrity. 
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Such devaluing of sensuous appearances might be seen as retreating from organicism in the 
truest sense, by which the whole infuses the parts and deep structure is apparent in surface 
phenomena (as with Goethe’s proliferous rose), and as advancing toward a geological or 
archaeological paradigm, by which deep structure is buried and in need of excavation.  Cook 
affirms that, “like Freud’s use of the [archaeological metaphor], Schenker’s entails digging through 
the surface to recover what lies beneath, removing the layers of accretion or misrepresentation that 
have built up over the years” (2007, 213).  Indeed, Schenker’s stance evidences what Holly 
Watkins (2004) contends is a broader trend during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by 
which artists and writers gradually relinquish organicist metaphors and increasingly embrace 
geological ones.  If at the beginning of the eighteenth century, depth was thought visible in the 
surface, later it was thought hidden and needing to be exhumed.  I, for one, find this trend 
dubious—better, in Schenker’s case, to regard the lower levels of middleground and foreground as 
transparent layers through which the background is visible rather than as opaque, sedimented rock 
under which the Ursatz is buried. 
 
*  *  * 
Fortunately, Schenker lends some support to this stance, for his archaeological protestations are 
belied by the generative methodology he generally practices.  As we have discussed, his typical 
analytical narrative takes us on a journey leading from background to foreground.  That is, he 
presents a particular level as an elaborated and, in some respects, transformed version of the 
previous, more abstract level rather than a more normative version of the next, more concrete 
216 
level.43  But Schenker does not quite put his mouth where his money is; or at least, his remarks on 
his own methodology are somewhat equivocal and muddled: 
The question of why my representation of voice-leading strata moves in all cases from the 
background . . . to foreground, and not . . . vice versa may be answered as follows: actually, it makes 
no difference.  Nevertheless, the opposite direction of presentation [from foreground to 
background] . . . would give more consideration to the needs of teacher and student, but would not 
so accurately represent the true process (1925c, 107).44 
In one breath he states both that it does matter which direction one takes and that the “true 
process” is top-down.  I will try to disambiguate his stance with three propositions: (1) the 
compositional process is essentially top-down.  Again, this “process” is conceptual rather than 
temporal: the composer may conceive of all levels simultaneously, with different structural levels 
perhaps occupying different levels of consciousness; (2) once the levels are generated, the analyst can 
                                                
43 Of course, that he presents the background first does not mean he produced it ex nihilo, for, in analyzing 
a piece, he must have already parsed the lower levels to some degree in order to arrive at a plausible Ursatz 
for that piece.  Thus even an ostensibly generative approach must entail a heuristic by which one examines 
salient details of the actual piece that are suggestive of an Ursatz, which one then turns back on the 
composition as an explanatory mechanism.  This process thus traverses the so-called hermeneutic circle, in 
which both the meaning of the whole is derived from the parts and that of the parts from the whole.  Cook 
affirms, “the process of Schenkerian analysis is . . . one of oscillating between the notated surface and the 
emerging underlying structure, between a bottom-up approach and a top-down one” (2002, 94). 
44 Felix Salzer holds that, even if the top-down approach is not the “true process,” it is nonetheless the more 
revealing of the “meaning and impact of the prolongations which create the color, interest, and tension of 
the music” (1952, 207.)  Also see Keiler (1983–84). 
217 
proceed in either direction, or shuttle back and forth between the two.  That is, music-structural 
relations are symmetrical—generation and reduction are two sides of the same coin; (3) the 
difference in direction is procedural rather than logical: analytically, it is more efficacious to 
proceed from the top down, pedagogically from the bottom up.  
Schenker’s verbal ambiguity aside, his generative methodology would suggest that the 
Ursatz is merely the point of departure from which the lower levels and musical composition arise.  
That the Ursatz is meant to generate and unify musical content does not mean that the content is 
reducible to its structural or conceptual origins.  In fact, the Ursatz can be viewed as a universal 
backdrop against which the particularities of a piece are all the more apparent, “the general as a 
foil for the sensed particular,” in Pieter Van Den Toorn’s pithy formulation (1995, 55).  For 
example, as we have seen, the Ursatz establishes tonal and melodic goals that the foreground resists 
or delays.  It is often precisely the details that exceed or evade the structural plan that possess the 
greatest expressivity and urgency—qualities that would not arise, or would not be as salient, if not 
for the backdrop of the Ursatz.  Indeed, the point is not to hear through foreground phenomena to 
the background, but rather to hear them in relation to the background.  In short, that Schenker 
departs from the background does not mean that he prioritizes it.  Quite the opposite: the point of 
the Ursatz is to eventuate in the foreground and illuminate its particularities.  In Schenker’s 
theory, the Ursatz serves the actual music, not the other way around. 
Thus, Schenker’s rhetoric notwithstanding, I think it is completely justifiable to view the 
Ursatz not as buried treasure but rather as indicative of synthetic apperception, of an organizing 
mode of consciousness and perception.  From this Kantian perspective, the Ursatz is not merely 
readily visible through the surface but is actually a constituent of the surface, in the sense of being 
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crucial to how foreground events are perceived.  A remaining question, however, is whether the 
Ursatz (and other high-level entities) is merely symbolic of this faculty or is an empirical apparatus by 
which actually to exercise this faculty.  In other words, does the Ursatz merely signify a 
transcendental subject or do we actually hear in terms of it?  Does the Ursatz symbolize the 
notional “I” that is the piece’s central persona or does it indicate the empirical “I”—I the listener 
and how I actually make sense of the piece? 
 
A Phenomenological  View of the Ursatz  
Recall Schenker’s assertion, cited above, that what unifies a sequence of tones is the mental 
retention of the primary tone (“the primary tone of the progression is to be carried forward until 
the goal tone appears”).  This statement is Husserlian in spirit, and can be seen as but the tip of 
the phenomenological iceberg.  This is no place to assay a full-blown theory of Schenkerian 
perception, but I will take a few steps in that direction.  
Markand Thakar (2011) offers a lucid account of music phenomenology, although not 
from a Schenkerian perspective (that will be my contribution).45  I reproduce and gloss one of his 
key diagrams in my Figure 2-3.  Basically, he argues that aesthetic objects or experiences are 
indivisible, such that every “now-point” is infused with both the past and future: elements of the 
past are retained, those of the future protended.  In this sense, even though music flows in time, it 
is a simultaneity nonetheless.  Of course, we don’t literally hear everything at each now-point, but 
each now-point sounds as it does and makes the sense that it does by virtue of its relation to the  
                                                
45 A better-known but less recent account is Lewin (1986). 
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remembered past and anticipated future.  “In any experience of an indivisible . . . temporally 
extended object, our focused consciousness at any now-point includes the corresponding now-
phrase, the retention of ‘just having been’ now-point experiences, and the protention of ‘as-yet-to-
come’ now-point experiences” (Thakar [2011, 134, his italics]).  In this model, even where 
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the whole is not literally replicated as one of its parts, as in the transferred Ursatz, the whole is still 
in some sense refracted through each and every part.     
 Thakar does not musically concretize the dual processes of retention and protention; 




at now-point B, we retain  
A (A1) and protend C (c)  
Figure 2-3: Thakar’s music-phenomenological model 
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phenomenological perception are possible).46  Using a very brief example—the incipit of the 
“Freude” theme—my Fig. 2-4 appropriates Thakar’s model from a Schenkerian perspective. 
Schenkerian hearing, under this model, is truly the phenomenological counterpart to organic 
structure: the entire structure folds in on itself, so to speak, such that every now-point exudes a 
sense of the whole.  
 
                                                
46 I view Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s A Generative Theory of Tonal Music (1983) as essentially a music-
cognitive/perceptual, though not strictly phenomenological, appropriation of Schenkerian thought.  I refer 
primarily to the parts dealing with tonal cognition, although their rhythmic and metric models are 
rigorously hierarchical as well.  (Note, however, that not all actually consider Schenkerian structure 
hierarchical in the strictest sense; see, for example, Rifkin [2000, chapter 1].) 
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?   (See discussion in text) 
Figure 2-4: A Schenkerian appropriation of Thakar’s music-phenomenological model  
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Yet, Thakar’s phenomenological model is, of course, highly idealized, as is my Schenkerian 
version.  It presupposes absolute, unerring immersion in each moment of the music’s unfolding.  
Such immersion, for Thakar, is in fact synonymous with musical beauty and transcendence.  To 
experience musical beauty, he submits, is to be completely “open” to each and every musical 
sound.  The listener does so, he argues, by withholding judgment, not hearing the sounds “as” 
anything.  “A loss-of-self experience can happen only when the act of consciousness does not 
involve judgment” (Thakar [2011, 141]).  The notion that disinterested contemplation is integral 
to aesthetic experience, to a judgment of beauty, is of course a Kantian one (curiously, Thakar does 
not openly acknowledge his debt to Kant).  Yet, if suspending conceptual attribution, as Kant 
claims we must in apprehending beauty, is necessary for organic hearing, it is certainly not 
sufficient.  In other words, merely coming to music unencumbered by concrete thoughts (a near 
impossibility in itself) does not itself ensure one will retain and protend musical events.  One 
could perhaps make a case that retention is somewhat natural, that to hear a tonal melodic and/or 
harmonic progression coherently, we necessarily condense (reduce) previous elements, “chunking” 
them, in order to secure a context in relation to which subsequent sounds make sense.  But the 
notion of protention is much more problematic and enigmatic.  Do we have a natural 
predisposition to hear  as implicating – – , for example?  I would claim we owe such 
expectations not to immanent properties but to a deliberately Schenkerian way of hearing—a kind 
of hearing we need (or most of us need) to learn and to consciously adopt (or not) in each 
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instance.47  It is arguably only within an acknowledged Schenkerian framework that I hear 
emphasis on  in the beginning of a composition as implicating a -line Urlinie (or, more locally, 
a third progression), that I hear in some sense a future promised by .  This way of hearing, I 
believe, is largely theory-dependent.  
To summarize: (1) The Ursatz, at least in the context of perception/performance (as 
opposed to abstract analysis), is optimally viewed not as a structural gem to unearth but rather as a 
vehicle for perceiving foreground events as coherent.  (2) This perceptual model can be viewed 
phenomenologically, as involving both retention (reduction) and protention (anticipation).  (3) 
But this way of hearing is not natural; rather, it is constructed, learned, and theory-dependent.  
To reiterate the question, then, that I posed at the outset: is the Ursatz more symbolic of 
ideal (transcendental) perception or indicative of how one might actually perceive music?  I would 
say the former.  I do not believe Schenkerian hearing is inborn (even to the most gifted musicians) 
but I do think one could learn to hear that way.  Put another way, just as literature and music do 
not merely reproduce epistemes and experiences but modify them and create new ones, neither 
does Schenkerian theory reflect the way we hear.  Rather, it is a system of metaphors in terms of 
which we could hear, hear in a new way.  It is to this metaphorical aspect of Schenkerian theory 
that I now turn.  
 
                                                
47 Which is not to say that, once learned, one cannot listen in a Schenkerian mode spontaneously and 
unconsciously.  It is only to say that Schenkerian hearing (if one can even postulate so reductive a concept) 
is not inborn.  
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8. A PERFORMATIVE APPROACH TO SCHENKERIAN ANALYSIS 
The last section hopefully established a compelling philosophical basis for using Schenkerian 
theory performatively.  Toward this goal, it took the first and most crucial step, which was to argue 
that Schenkerian theory need not be viewed as factual, nor does it represent the way we actually or 
naturally hear—it is rather a construct that guides hearing.  Schenkerian theory represents neither 
immanent properties (only immanent possibilities) nor an inborn perceptual faculty.  Yet, 
acknowledging Schenkerian theory’s metaphorical nature does not lessen its interpretive potency 
in the least.  To the contrary, it enhances such potency, just as the performer, as I argued in 
Chapter 1, is much freer to illuminate the score once liberated from the duty to find truth in the 
work.  My task in this section is to establish a more precise sense in which Schenkerian theory is 
metaphorical and performative, and to delve into metaphors within the system that have distinct 
implications for performance.  
On the most general level, we might regard Schenkerian theory as a directive to imagine 
that a particular composition arose organically or intuitively, and, concomitantly, that it unfolds 
organically (the latter can be seen to symbolize the former—music on Schenker’s view is apparently 
symbolic of mind).  Viewing organicism as metaphorical is arguably consistent with Schenkerian 
thought taken as a whole—that is, considering the early, not just late work.  In an early essay, “Der 
Geist der musikalischen Technik” (1895), Schenker asserts, “the material of musical content never 
arises completely organically, but rather, the composer’s teleological intent is to bring it about that 
the arrangement of proportions and the order of moods . . . should be judged from the perspective of 
the organic” (in Cook [2007, 329, my italics]).  Kevin Karnes weighs in, stating that these moods 
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“must be heard and evaluated, in other words, as if they were the products of an unimpeded 
outpouring of spontaneous invention” (2005, 160, my italics).  He adds, “Schenker considered it 
of the utmost importance that [the] element of deliberate craftsmanship be employed with 
discretion, so that the finished work sounds to the listener as if . . . it were a product of nature rather 
than compositional artifice” (2005, 161, his italics).48  If for later Schenker organicism was a 
metaphysical truth, for early Schenker it was a contingent metaphor, an illusion created for the 
listener.   
More specifically, Cook (1989a) argues that Schenkerian analysis offers a metaphor of 
Fuxian counterpoint in terms of which we are asked to perceive the music.  In other words, 
through a Schenkerian filter, we listen to a piece as if it were a prolongation of the prototypes of 
species counterpoint.  Of course, this is not as arbitrary as it sounds, for there is a reasonably good 
fit between the domains of species counterpoint and free composition; the Schenkerian metaphor 
thus seizes upon what is objectively present in music even as it extends it metaphorically.  (Clearly, 
not every metaphorical model will fit music equally well.)  The point, then, is not to state an 
objective fact about the piece—“it elaborates this contrapuntal configuration”—but rather to ask, 
“what would it be like to hear the piece as an elaboration of this contrapuntal configuration—
what particular details come to light at a result?”  Put more baldly, Schenkerian theory is a 
Waltonesque directive, a rule of the game (the “game” here being a particular hearing or particular 
performance): “hear these configurations as embellishing or prolonging tonal prototypes.”49   
                                                
48 For more on Schenker’s anti-organicist tendencies, see Korsyn (1993) and Pastille (1984). 
49 Cook (1987), a well-known empirical study, concludes that the longer the piece, the less likely university 
music students are to notice the piece was altered to end in a different key from the one in which it 
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But, to reiterate, unlike a typical directive, one implicit in a mimetic art form and that we 
adopt more or less intuitively (“pretend the actors on the stage are real people with real thoughts 
and feelings”), a Schenkerian directive is more consciously adopted.  It directs imaginings that are 
not “built into” a musical genre or style, such as, in sonata form, “hear the second theme in the 
recapitulation as succumbing to the first theme,” or something along these lines.  Schenkerian 
theory, in short, is “an action disguised as fact” (Cook [1999a, 252]), a catalyst for imaginative 
perception.  
 
*  *  * 
Recall, however, that most musical imaginings are dual imaginings: most structural imaginings 
have salient somatic and expressive connotations.  I will address each in turn.  The notion of 
structural levels employs a spatial metaphor, whereby mostly non-contiguous pitches are collected 
into various spaces—conceptual categories and physical spaces on the page—indicating their 
structural significance.50  The concept of voice leading is at once spatial and somatic, involving the 
                                                
began—in other words, the less likely they are to perceive long-range tonal structure.  Extrapolating from 
this study, Leech-Wilkinson states, “long-term structures are theoretical, useful for composers, an invitation 
from analysts to imagine music in a particular way, but apparently not perceptible” (2012, parag. 4.10, my 
italics).   
50 In the more explicit terms of Lawrence Zbikowski (2003) and others, the “source domain” of space is 
mapped onto the “target domain” of time, serving to render it more tangible.  Zbikowski’s work and mine 
in the following relies heavily upon Johnson (1987). 
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motion of an entity through tonal space toward a goal.51  On a lower level, Schenkerian theory is 
replete with more particular metaphors that are perhaps even more saliently somatic in 
orientation: these include unfolding, register transfer, reaching over, and motivic processes such as 
expansion and compression (motivic parallelisms).  All of these rely upon the metaphor of musical 
space and of an agent physically engaging such space in various ways.  
 Generally speaking, the spatial/somatic and emotive are fundamentally intertwined, such 
that one can often start in either domain and easily be led to the other.  We witness this 
connection in Schenkerian analysis no less than in other realms.  For example, the spatial/somatic 
notion of descent, as in the descending Urlinie, connotes other spatial/somatic notions such as 
closure and stability, which in turn have positive and reassuring associations.  Ascent, by contrast, 
often has less comforting connotations of striving, struggle, and tension.  These emotive 
associations derive from our experience of the physical world, in which succumbing to gravity and 
conforming to natural laws affords one a reassuring sense of resolution and comfort (as when an 
airplane lands), while resisting gravity can be unsettling (as when one takes off).  Of course, in 
other contexts, the roles are reversed, but the point remains: physical motions have emotive 
correlates or consequences.   
                                                
51 Schenker (1935, 14) associates the Urlinie with the notion of tone-space.  This voice-leading metaphor is 
also anthropomorphic in nature.  Most music-somatic metaphors will be, since the physicality ascribed to a 
musical process is more easily envisioned as enacted by a musical persona rather than as motion in general.  
Saslaw (1997–98) expounds the somatic-metaphorical dimension of Schenker’s (and Schoenberg’s) theory 
in much greater detail.  
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Tension is perhaps the most crucial physical/affective metaphor in Schenkerian theory 
(affective in a general sense—it is an experiential dynamic that underlies many, more specific 
emotions).  As we have seen, the central notion of prolongation pivots on it, insofar as, according 
to Schenker, one must mentally retain the primary tone of a linear progression in order to bind 
the others into a manifold unity; this produces “conceptual tension.”  In Schenkerian theory, such 
tension derives from imposing higher levels upon lower ones, which renders salient the way 
“motion toward the goal encounters obstacles, reversals, disappointments, and involves great 
distances, detours, expansions, interpolations, and, in short, retardations of all kinds” (1935, 5).  
Schenkerian theory is a meta-musical matrix that, applied to a piece, seizes upon the potential 
tension that any tonal piece will harbor; it furnishes a clear framework in which tension is all the 
more apparent.  The framework may itself be fictional or imaginative, but is no less heuristically 
effective for that.   
A final consideration: how do Schenkerian metaphors compare to standard tonal 
metaphors, the ones common to virtually any tonal theory?  For example, any theory would 
consider a root-position tonic triad stable in some sense.  Does the ubiquity of this metaphor 
render it “dead”?  That is, has “stability,” albeit of non-musical origin, become for all intents and 
purposes literalized in music theory, a “metaphor” in only a nominal sense?  Cumming takes up 
this question, suggesting that a root-position tonic chord in Schenkerian theory might “carry 
further suggestions, whose connotative dimension is more marked.  A background of ‘stability,’ 
contextualizing features deemed ‘disruptive’ at a more local level, is not merely a technical feature 
of a tonal style, but impinges on the potential mood of a phrase or section in which it is 
exemplified” (2000, 85).  For Cumming as well as for myself, metaphors in Schenkerian theory are 
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particularly “live” or salient, expressively marked in relation to the unmarkedness of comparable 
metaphors in other music theories, and expressively suggestive for the pieces to which they apply.  
Such markedness perhaps accounts for the widespread appeal and longevity of Schenkerian theory.    
In closing, if Schenkerian analysis implicitly frames musical processes in terms of our 
physical engagement with the world, it also frames them in terms of our emotional reactions to 
such engagement.52  After arriving at such isolated physical/emotive states, the interpreter’s next 
task is to bridge the gaps among them, to integrate these states into some sort of narrative 
framework.  Such a narrative approach will render these isolated physical and emotive states more 
specific; it will engender a more multidimensional, complex human condition that the performer 
can more readily identify with, physically embody, and musically project through sound, touch, 
and time.  I hope to show this in my reading of Chopin’s great C-minor Nocturne.   
 
9. CHOPIN, NOCTURNE IN C MINOR, OP. 48, NO. 1 
I have argued that viewing Schenkerian theory as a performative and metaphorical, rather than 
explanatory, apparatus adjoined to the music (“hear the music as if . . .”) ensures a continual 
engagement with the musical surface, with the particular ways in which the foreground manifests, 
embellishes, and deviates from contrapuntal prototypes and structural progressions.  I contend 
that the most fruitful ramifications of Schenkerian structure for performance involve precisely 
these particular interactions between foreground and deeper levels.  For it is these interactions, 
rather than structural entities per se, that are laden with the physical and expressive connotations 
                                                
52 As Snarrenberg (1997, 120) points out, Schenker himself posits an inextricable link between musical 
motion and emotion in the movement of Züge. 
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that can be readily actualized in performance.  In other words, what is most applicable to 
performance are not the tones of the Urlinie or linear progressions in themselves, but the somatic 
and emotive details that arise from understanding or hearing the musical surface in relation to 
these structural progressions.    
In the following analysis of Chopin’s Nocturne, op. 48, no. 1 (Ex. 2-5, voice-leading sketch 
in Appendix B, my performance Web Ex. 9), I shall demonstrate that one can readily apply 
analytical insights to performance by actualizing, in sound and time, the spatial/somatic 
metaphors that underlie and are connoted by Schenkerian constructs.  For the first section, I will 
proceed phrase by phrase, working in close detail.  For the subsequent sections, I will proceed a bit 
more quickly, taking more global issues into account, and will focus more on motive and topic 
than on tonal structure per se.  My procedure of starting with analysis and moving to performance 
might smack of the hegemonic stance I have scorned, but, as I have said, this chronology itself is 
not the problem; the problem is the epistemological priority granted to analysis.  In my model, 
however, analysis is not primarily a series of abstract claims that must somehow be manifested in 
performance, but is itself sensuous and emotive.  As such, performance is no longer expected to 
assimilate something foreign to it—namely, abstract concepts—but merely to draw from a well of 
experience common to analysis and performance alike.  Analysis in this model is not prescriptive, 
but rather gives the performer something to respond to (following Maus).  When an analysis is 
devised in this way, proceeding from analysis to interpretation is no longer problematic. 
Moreover, I believe the performer can reap advantages from following an independent 
analysis, especially if he undertakes it himself.  Attaining insights into non-obvious structural 
relationships is often difficult to achieve at the instrument and often requires separate analytical 
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activity.  Schenkerian theory, employed in the manner I have been describing, can make available 
to the performer interpretive subtleties and options of which he might not otherwise  
 
be aware.  In this sense, proceeding from analysis to performance is not only unproblematic 
(because analysis in this model is predisposed toward performance, not alien to it) but decidedly 
Example 2-5: Chopin, Nocturne in C minor, op. 48, no. 1, mm. 1–24 






advantageous, since it renders the performer more amenable to fresh, even radically new insights, 
less susceptible to the status quo.      
 
First  phrase,  mm. 1–4: Analysis 53 
Mm. 1–2 establish an upper neighbor (Nb.) motive consisting of G–A@–G ( – – ), which is 
mirrored by a lower neighbor motive in the bass (C–B&–C).  The Nb. motive embellishes the G 
Kopfton, which is then unfolded by a – –  
€ 
ˆ 1 arpeggiation (mm. 1–31) (see Appendix B).  The 
potential tonic support of the C5 that ends this arpeggiation is undermined by the A@ in the bass.  
In addition, C5 is overshadowed by the emphasis on the Kopfton (and Nb. motive) at the beginning 
and end of the phrase and by the coupling of the Kopfton over the entire phrase.  Hence, the tonic 
pitch on m. 31 is weakened both locally due to its harmonization and more globally due to its 
subsumption by the octave transfer of .  The quality of weakness established by this suggestive 
detail is exemplified in a different way at the end of the phrase: in m. 4, C4 is now harmonized by 
i, but such potential strength and resolution is undermined by C’s own transience, resulting from 
the accelerated and abruptly terminated rhythm.  The C, a mere sixteenth note placed off the beat, 
evaporates into the silence from which the phrase emerged (remarkably, silence in this piece is a 
veritable motive unto itself).  Moreover, neither tonic pitch in the melody is approached via a 
linear descent; the Kopfton G is composed out by arpeggiations rather than by linear progressions.  
                                                
53 I partially owe the following strategy of discerning relationships—congruence as well as disparity—
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Thus, both ^1s in this phrase fail to achieve a sense of stability or closure.  As we shall see, the 
quest for these qualities will provide a narrative arch throughout this piece. 
 The quality of weakness as implied by the voice leading is amply exemplified by foreground 
elements.  The –  motive found in mm. 1–2 is a quintessentially Romantic motif of longing 
and anxiety.  As presented here, with its curious rhythmic setting dominated by strong-beat rests, it 
establishes, along with the minor key, a reticent, anxious, and ambivalent mood at the outset 
(hence contradicting the qualities of stability and clarity conventionally associated with a 
beginning).  This motive shifts to the bass in mm. 3–4.  As a larger-scale entity, it has the capacity 
to permeate more of the phrase with its sullen mood.  Being in the bass also allows the motive to 
affect other, namely melodic, elements—specifically, it is responsible for the weak harmonization 
of C in m. 3.  It is as if this anxious emotion is initially conscious (the melody, mm. 1–2) and 
subsequently descends to a deeper, more unconscious level (the bass, mm. 3–4), creating a more 
unsettling feeling.  Another foreground element is the melody’s descending fifth (G5–C5) into m. 
3,54 which can be construed as a sigh motive, and thus anticipates the more decisive shift toward 
weakness that occurs on the downbeat of m. 3.  What follows is a funeral-march topic, which 
marks the zenith of pathos within the phrase.  Both the sigh and funereal motives exemplify the 
structural qualities of weakness and instability.  The end of the phrase, as mentioned, is a rhythmic 
thrust that contributes to the lack of closure (the stretto indicated in some editions serves to 
exemplify the inbuilt acceleration and consequent tonal irresolution).  In short, the features of 
mode, motive, topos, and rhythm all have affective associations that support and are supported by 
those of the tonal structure. 
                                                
54 This gesture can be seen as an intervalic expansion of the G5–D5 in m. 2.  
  
! 





First  Phrase:  Performance  
The structure and surface signify a constellation of related affects one may variously describe as 
weakness, tentativeness, anxiety, tension, pessimism, and so on.55  On a general level, these 
qualities can be expressed through slightly unsteady timing (a limping gait) and a weak sound.  
More specifically, the absence of a linear dynamic trajectory—that is, a steady crescendo leading to a 
distinct point of arrival—will express the absence of voice-leading linearity and tonal resolution.56  
Moreover, the pianist might also gently accelerate in m. 2, in order to exemplify the acceleration 
from a quarter-note to an eighth-note to a sixteenth-note pulse, and then pull back decisively in m. 
3 in order to consolidate the new, morose feeling (which results in part from the progressive 
animation being curtailed).  Finally, since the silences are motivic and pregnant with suspended 
                                                
55 These words do not all mean the same thing of course, and by bunching them together I mean to convey 
not that the feeling of the passage is unclear, but that words can only approximately describe rather than 
precisely denote a musical affect.   
56 To offer a crucial clarification, however, one to bear in mind throughout this analysis: to “express” in this 
case is not to denote, not to communicate a proposition.  The non-linear dynamic scheme does not 
somehow say: “we lack voice-leading linearity here.”  Rather, it culls from that structural assertion, or 
structural imagining, a more general quality—irresolution—one that permeates or can permeate the 
dynamic scheme.  Once it does so, that sense of irresolution stands on its own.  It acquires significance in 
relation to other abstract qualities—or in relation to an emerging narrative scenario—but not in relation to 
the original structural imagining by which it was incited. 
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emotion, the pianist might slightly extend them.  The best way to do this, as I was taught, is simply 
to listen for them—to try to hear silence.   
   
Second phrase, mm. 5–8: Analysis 
The previous gap between G and E@ (as part of the arpeggiation, mm. 1–3) is now filled by F (m. 
6), which establishes a line that continues to D in m. 7.  This   
€ 
ˆ 5 –  
€ 
ˆ 4 –  
€ 
ˆ 3 –  
€ 
ˆ 2 progression thus supplies 
the linearity that was conspicuously absent from the first phrase, and seems to promise a resolution 
to and proper harmonic support of   
€ 
ˆ 1 , especially when the tonality turns abruptly from the relative 
major back to the home key in m. 63.  This promise, however, is quickly broken: no sooner does   
€ 
ˆ 2 
arrive than we shift toward the key of g (v), and hence are not in a tonal position from which to 
resolve to C.  Instead, D ascends to E@, which reinforces the denial of closure in two ways.  First, it 
is part of an implied   
€ 
ˆ 6 –  
€ 
ˆ 5  motive (within the key of v), whose tension here seems to arise from and 
comment upon the voice-leading predicament.  Second, the E@ (m. 7) is conspicuously isolated in 
terms of register and does not resolve directly to the expected D.  Hence, the promise of even local 
linearity is foiled. 
 Harmonically, this phrase begins in III, which, in conjunction with the increased linearity, 
connotes amelioration and optimism.  By contrast, v (m. 7) coincides with the loss of linearity, and 
consequently of hope.  Yet, on a deeper level, III can be understood as a long-range neighbor to 
the v/v (thus paralleling the neighbor motion in the bass of the opening phrase and, at pitch, the 
E@–D Nb. motive of the second phrase [see motivic analysis]).  III is thus subsumed on a deeper 
level by v.  Analogously, the hope it signifies is subverted by the anxiety signified by the minor 
mode.  For that matter, the initial three Stufen of i–III–v taken together can be seen to compose 
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out the tonic triad, suggesting perhaps that the essentially pessimistic mood of the minor tonic 
underlies the entire section, rendering any change of mood suggested by III illusory.  
 As for foreground features, the tied A@ in mm. 5–6 precludes a recurrence of the rest that 
had occurred in m. 21, and thus directly exemplifies the broader qualities of connectedness and 
directionality associated with the voice-leading linearity.  That is, the more abstract process by 
which a melodic gap is subsequently filled is concretized by a rest being filled with sound.  Second, 
the loss of linearity and hope in m. 7 is immediately presaged by the rhythmically conspicuous B–
C motive in the bass of m. 6, which recalls the initial phrase and its predicament and also allows 
us to pivot back to a minor key (v).  The motive can be seen as representing a psychological shift, 
an intrusion of memory, which recalls an undesirable state and reverts to it.  Finally, following that 
unpropitious motive, all hope of linearity is quashed with the octave drop at the beginning of m. 7.  
The resultant disillusionment is then topically reinforced by a sigh figure (E@5–F#4)—all the more 
potent for occurring on the expressively charged . 
 
Second Phrase:  Performance 
Unlike the initial phrase that expresses basically a single emotional state, this phrase expresses two: 
attainment then loss of hope (of achieving stability and fulfillment).  A performer following this 
reading would thus bifurcate this phrase, playing the first half with a distinct sense of security and 
linearity, the second in a more disoriented, erratic manner.  The emotional shift as represented by 
B–C in the bass of m. 6 can be played abruptly and intrusively.  Transcending this break, however, 
is the – – –  line that arrives on m. 71.  The performer can express this ephemeral linearity 






ˆ 5   
! 
ˆ 4   
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m. 5 to anticipate the imminent over-the-bar connection—and by applying directional dynamics, 
arriving decisively upon D5 m. 7.  It is crucial, I think, to differentiate dynamically between the 
arrival on that note and the one on E@ (m. 73), as the former connotes affirmation, the latter 
anxious deviation.  The E@ is the longest note in the phrase and undoubtedly the climax of the 
piece thus far.  It fully consolidates the initial state and is all the more indignant for having seen a 
glimpse of a solution.  This one note, therefore, played with sufficient intensity, can encapsulate a 
complex mental state.  A subito piano on F# (last note, m. 7) will have a threefold purpose: to 
express the sigh figure, to dynamically isolate the E@5—that is, to express its registral isolation and 
consequent loss of linearity—and to induce a soft dynamic for the end of the phrase, which will 
foreground the lack of closure.57   
 The ambiguity of III presents a considerable challenge to the performer: how might she 
handle its multiple connotations?  On a surface level, as we have seen, it expresses optimism and 
resolution, while on a deeper level, it is subsumed by pathos and instability.  Of course, one could 
simply express the latter on account of the former being in some sense illusory—perhaps by 
resisting the temptation to brighten the color on m. 5 but instead retaining the general sound of 
the previous phrase, exemplifying the subsumption of III by i.  Alternatively, one could fully 
indulge in the glimmer of hope and not express in any way its subsumption by i nor anticipate its 
motion to v.  Yet a third option, which I think preferable, would be somehow to capture the 
                                                
57 This interpretation is reinforced by the fingering Chopin recommended to his student Dubois of 4 on 
E@5 and 3 on F#4, suggesting that the two notes would be detached and isolated from each other, and that 
the second note would be played with a weaker dynamic, since whatever intensity had accumulated by the 
climax on E@ would be dissipated by the detachment.  Eigeldinger (1986, 264). 
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polysemous quality of the moment, perhaps by furnishing a bright color, but at the same time, 
resisting too firm a grounding in that key, instead projecting its inherent instability and mobility as 
an upper neighbor within v.  In this rendition, the performer will not feel or allow the listener to 
feel metrically grounded in the section, but will infuse the passage with a sense of imminent 
slippage or unease.  In short, this moment involving III is a small but revealing example of the 
potential correlation between structural and emotional complexity: to expose structural levels is to 
expose the various affective levels to be conveyed.58 
 
Third phrase,  mm. 9–16: Analysis   
Up to this point, the analysis has yielded qualities that inextricably link the physical and emotive.  
The lack of linear resolution in the first phrase intimated both physical and emotional weakness, 
while the initial presence of linearity in the second phrase intimated both physical and emotional 
security.  The third phrase, however, seems to foreground purely physical qualities—as perhaps 
befits its somewhat developmental function—boasting no fewer than four distinct somatic/spatial 
techniques, some of which have multiple instances.   
1) Motivic Enlargement: The –  (A@–G) motive is enlarged over the span of four measures 
(mm. 9–12).  Mm. 1–12 thus constitute an enlargement of the complete Nb. motive of mm. 1–
2 (G–A@–G) (see deep middleground in Appendix B).   
 
                                                
58 I develop this view of musical emotion in Swinkin (forthcoming A).   
  
! 




2) Octave Displacement and Alternation: Each pitch of the Nb. motive (A@ and G, mm. 9–12) is 
octave-transferred.  This event frames the more extensive registral play of m. 10, where a 
descending third motion of A@–G@–F is played out in two registers.  Chopin apparently wanted 
this registral dialogue to be audible, given his downward stems.   
 
3) Reaching Over: The A@ of the Nb. motive receives its own neighbor (B@5) in m. 9, which is a 
reaching over.  This maneuver creates the space for additional motivic content59 and recaptures 
the obligatory register.  Likewise, C6 on the last eighth of m. 11 reaches over the upper voice 
containing A@5. 
 
4) Motivic Compression: There are at least four instances of motivic compression.  First, the 
octave alternation in m. 10 referred to above can be seen as a compression of the broader 
octave alternation of the tones of the Nb. motive by which it is surrounded.  Second, the 
motion of A@5–G into m. 12 is a slight parallelism and compression of the Nb. motive, an 
audible instance of the larger Nb. motive that governs the four-bar phrase.  Third, the right 
hand of m. 13 constitutes a parallelism of the bass line of the previous two measures (see 
motivic analysis).   However, notice that this figure can also be understood as an augmentation 
of the ascending fourth cell of the theme (m. 24).  This figure is thus a diminution and an 
augmentation simultaneously (Ex. 2-6), creating a sense of ambiguity.  Finally, the melismatic 
                                                
59 The figure in m. 9 can be viewed as an augmentation and intervalic expansion of that in m. 7 (beginning 
on the second note).  The second and third phrases are thus related by Knüpftechnik.   
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ornamentation of m. 15 (leading into beat 4) encapsulates the melodic configuration of the last 




Third Phrase:  Performance 
Generally, this section is marked by expansiveness, in terms of both the exploration of vertical, 
registral space and the linear expansion of the Nb. motive.  The performer can express this quality, 
in general, by employing a broader spectrum of dynamic and tempo fluctuations than he has 
employed to this point in the piece, and by expressing a sense of strain and of resisting gravity 
(with subtle ritardandi) on the octave transfers and reachings over.  (M. 10, by contrast, involves 
considerable compression, and thus might be played with a hurried quality.)  For a more specific 
recommendation, one can highlight the bass line in mm. 11–12 due to its motivic significance, 
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Example 2-6: Chopin, mm. 11–13: a rhythmic double entendre 
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mind that to “highlight” the bass is not merely to bring out the individual pitches, but to shape 
them as a coherent line.  That imitation, in turn, because of its rhythmic ambiguity as explained 
above, can perhaps be played with a sense of push and pull, as if not knowing whether to be fast or 
slow. 
 
Fourth phrase,  mm. 17–24: Analysis  
The opening is quite fluid harmonically; it employs a descending fifth sequence that touches upon 
both initial Stufen (i and III).60  It also recalls the elements of disconnection and connection 
associated with those respective Stufen.  Namely, the downbeat rest of the second measure is 
reinstated, recalling the first phrase associated with i.  On the other hand, the G–E@ gap is filled by 
F, recalling the second phrase associated with III.  In this way, this phrase compresses events or 
elements that previously belonged to separate phrases into a single phrase.  Our narrative is 
reaching a climax.  The conflicting elements of linearity and non-linearity are coming to a head 
within an intensified harmonic motion that seems to signal a more fervent desire and active search 
for a resolution to the predicament.  At long last we arrive upon   
€ 
ˆ 1 via a linear descent (m. 20), but 
it still does not receive definitive, tonic support, as it once again sits atop the upper-neighbor A@.  
As in m. 7, the lack of closure is immediately reinforced by a registral gap, this time an audacious 
melodic leap of an ascending eleventh (m. 21).  A probing musical soliloquy (mm. 21–23) then 
                                                
60 To be precise, the i here is replaced by V7/IV, which, however, serves as a tonic substitute.  An alternate 
harmonic reading might assert that, since the previous phrase cadenced on what is arguably a V/III (m. 
161), and since we return to III in m. 18, the C7 chord here is subsumed by a prolongation of III (mm. 16-
18)—its tonicity thus denied.  I will not pursue the narrative or performative implications of this reading. 
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explores the space opened by that leap, as if searching for something to cling to within this chasm.  
Such intrinsic logic and linearity is actually to be found concealed within the intricate folds of this 
melisma.  As the graph reveals (also see Ex. 2-5), this passage embeds a fragment of the initial 
melody (G–A@–G–F–E@), bringing the fundamental line down to E@.  In its searching, circuitous 
contour, within which is nested a comprehensible melodic line, this passage can thus be read as a 
peroration on the search for closure and the problematics and obstacles involved in such a search.  
It intensely encapsulates the dialectic of resolution and tension, connection and alienation, played 
out since the beginning.  The protagonist finally achieves some semblance of closure, although we 
must imagine the structural , as it is an implied tone (see Appendix B).  The closure is also 
provisional in that  is not in the obligatory register.  That this closure is provisional and does not 
(yet) equate with satisfaction and stability is borne out by the tragic triplets with which the section 
ends.61  
 
Fourth Phrase:  Performance 
The beginning of this phrase, I feel, strongly calls for a sense of forward motion, to indicate both 
the compression of events and the intensified search and yearning for closure.  The figuration in 
mm. 21–231 is the most difficult interpretively, but an awareness of its underlying thematic 
contour should afford the performer some basis on which to shape it.  But again, it is not primarily 
a matter of bringing out the embedded thematic notes but of responding to the emotive and 
                                                
61 Such triplets, in a major-key piece, might convey optimistic heroism.  In a minor-key piece, however, they 
tend to be foreboding, as is the case with the opening of Mahler’s Fifth Symphony, to take another 





narrative significance of their embedding: that is, the fervent desire for a sense of a linear 
orientation and rationality in the midst of a seemingly insoluble predicament.  The dialectic of 
underlying motive and foreground figuration, because of the emotional complexity it embodies, 
will yield far more substantive and numerous interpretive possibilities than the underlying motive 
itself (and the imperative to “project it”).  Overall, this phrase, in its juxtaposition of elements, 
effusive figuration, and equivocal resolution (note that the structural   
€ 
ˆ 2 is implied), encodes the 
most complex mental state in the piece thus far.  Moreover, the more multidimensional the state 
is, the more a sheer recognition of it through structural analysis will naturally affect a performer 
and the less one can prescribe how it will.   
 
B Section 
E@5  was registrally stranded at the end of the A1 section (m. 23).  Since, as a consequence, that tone 
lingers in the listener’s mind, the modal inflection (E&) that begins the B section is especially 
salient.  This E& serves as the local Kopfton, the primary tone of the B section.62  Obviously, the 
switch from minor to the parallel major connotes a more positive mood.   
This emotional shift also occurs on a topical level.  The hymn or chorale topic around 
which this section revolves, generally speaking, has an affirmative, reassuring quality.  This quality, 
however, is modified and specified both by the particular, somewhat unusual way Chopin deploys 
                                                
62 The connection I posit between E@ and E& is consistent with Schenker’s view of modal mixture as form-
generating: that is, in most of his examples where ternary form derives from mixture,   
€ 
ˆ 3 in the initial section 
is altered to @  
€ 
ˆ 3 in the contrasting middle section or vice versa.  See Schenker (1935, 40–41 and 70–71).    
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the chorale topic and by its relation to the topical content surrounding the chorale.63  On the one 
hand, these chords are big, covering a wide ambitus, which, at least for most pianists, would entail 
some stretch and strain, even though they are rolled.  For, several rolls require changing hand 
position and are thus not easy to navigate.  This embodied tension is, to be sure, very subtle, kept 
under wraps by the sotto voce.  Nonetheless, it might be seen as a latent form of the more overt and 
dramatic tension that erupts starting in m. 39 (more on which in a moment).64  On the other 
hand, the chorale signifies a release from the tension of the A1 section.  More specifically, A1, with 
its expressive melodic and rhythmic contours set against a more neutral accompaniment, sketches 
a highly individuated subject—one, moreover, who is quietly desperate, melancholy, full of 
longing, and who gradually finds his or her voice, culminating with the melismatic peroration.  
The opening of the B section, by contrast, soothes the subject, or perhaps even transcends 
subjectivity altogether.  In depicting both a spiritual, transcendent state and a communal, 
reconciliatory realm, it serves as a reprieve from individualistic desire.  
However, this peaceful realm is subsequently shattered by the double-octave passages.  I 
construe them as symbolic of physical strength, of the protagonist desiring and trying to overcome 
her physical weakness as expressed in the A1 section, and to flout the chorale that aims to assuage 
or nullify such desire.  These passages, in my hearing, represent the reemergence of the desiring 
                                                
63 Stephen Rumph (2005) notes that any one topic may harbor several possible meanings.  Which one(s) it 
holds in any given context depends in large part upon the contrasting topic with which it is juxtaposed. 
64 Alternatively, these chords could be rendered as harp-like and ethereal, in which case they obviously 
would not exude tension.  One performance that creates this effect marvelously (largely through “over”-
pedaling) is Martha Argerich (1978–79). 
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subject, whose brute physicality and materiality intrude upon, compete with, and ultimately 
overwhelm the nuanced reassurances of the ecclesiastical voice.  The quality of intrusiveness 
derives not just from bravura content per se but from the way it interrupts, is interpolated into, the 
phrases of the chorale, ultimately overtaking it in m. 47 where the chorale chords must be content 
to coincide with the thunderous, more dominant bass.   
Chopin thus juxtaposes and sets in conflict two antithetical topoi.65  But underlying this 
(seeming) antithesis is a subtle source of synthesis, since, as I previously stated, the chorale chords 
are dispensed in a way that creates understated tension and, moreover, the virtuosity of the octave 
passages emerges gradually—it takes time for the protagonist to recover her voice and strength.  
The challenge I would pose to the pianist, therefore, is not so much to amplify the topical contrast 
but to convey the bourgeoning anxiety of the chorale (perhaps deploying Chopin’s crescendi for 
that effect) and to depict with the initial octave passages the waxing and waning of energy, the 
progressive emergence of the heroic subject.  Just as Chopin semantically extends the traditional 
connotations of the chorale topic, both in its textural treatment and topical juxtaposition, so the 
pianist, in turn, has an opportunity to semantically extend the traditional connotations of such a 
juxtaposition—that is, not merely to employ it for blunt contrast but to seek out a subtle synthesis.   
Another way to frame this unifying effect is in terms of extension.  This quality is evident in 
the interpolations, which stretch out the phrases of the previous chorale (or at least give that 
impression).  This extension may be seen as a corollary of the purely physical extension required by 
the rolled chords.  In other words, the extension that embodies psychical stress is at first quite 
                                                
65 Chopin’s E major Etude, op. 10, no. 3 also features lyrical, Nocturne-like content that is broken up by an 
unexpected bout of almost violent virtuosity within the middle section.   
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literal—the hand is stressed and stretched—then metaphorical, transferred to the domain of 
phraseology.  
 
*  *  * 
The somewhat general moods or qualities I have attributed to the B section will be specified, and 
rendered more amenable to interpretive treatment, by examining motivic content (Ex. 2-7).  In this 
section, a new (or seemingly new) motive comes to light: its first instance is in mm. 283–291, the 
chromatic passing motion D–D#–E, what I will designate the chromatic slide motive (“CS” for 




 This enharmonic and contoural reversal signals an emotional reversal in relation to the A1 
section.  In the next instance of CS, G–G#–A in the inner voice of m. 31, the tendency tone (now 
G#) is given consonant support (by E).  In other words, the E major chord (a chord of secondary 
( 
Example 2-7: Motivic analysis of chorale 
CS consonant support of chr. passing tone 
from 
5––––  5 # 
from 
5––––  5 # 
CS inverted and extended 
Ex. 2-6. Chopin, Nocturne in C minor, op. 48, no. 2, mm. 1–24 












m. 39 restores CS to Nb. from which it was derived 
(opening) 
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mixture), arises, in my estimation, from the need to consonate the G# that, by virtue of its 
correspondence with the D# of m. 28, is essentially an augmented 5th above C (see example).  If the 
D# of the initial instance of CS arguably enharmonicizes E@ of the home key, the G# of this 
instance arguably enharmonicizes A@ of the home key, especially since it comes from G, just as A@ 
in m. 1 does.  In this light, we might derive CS from the Nb. motive of the opening.  In other 
words, CS converts the semitonal upper neighbor of Nb. to a chromatic passing tone, thus 
extending the Nb. motive’s one semitone to two.  This process of extension continues into the 
next two, sequentially related instances of CS, in the bass of mm. 33–34 and 35–36.  In addition, 
the contour is inverted.  The combination of chromatic extension and inversion yields a 
descending chromatic bass line, whose affective connotation of dejection is well supported by 
virtue of both contour and convention.  It is also supported contextually: it recalls the descending 
G–G@–F of mm. 9–10, which introduced us to the darker realm of the Phrygian key.66  Hence, the 
emotional reversal of A1 signified by the enharmonic and contoural reversal of its defining Nb. 
motive is now itself reversed.  CS is restored to the emotional condition to which it was a reaction.    
Interestingly, the motivic and emotional reversal is cemented by the soprano’s G#–G& in m. 
36, which inverts the G–G# of m. 31, thus returning CS to its Nb. origins.  It does so, moreover, 
in the same register as mm. 1–2, thus rendering this motivic connection more audible.  The 
audibility is also enhanced by the analogous mode of continuation, as shown in Ex. 2-7.  This 
                                                
66 The importance of this chromatic bass line for the middle section was foreshadowed by the otherwise 




connection is rendered even more evident in m. 39, where G#–G is restored to A@–G and placed 
within an explicit neighbor-oriented context, one distinctly reminiscent of the opening of the 
piece, with its –  motive.  
 The pervasive spatial/somatic quality of extension and tension, then, which we have seen 
to operate, in different ways, in both the chorale chords and double octaves, also derives from 
extending the previous Nb. motive to include three and then four notes (two then three 
semitones).  More specific emotions, or at least emotional dynamics—reversal in particular—
derive from these motivic permutations.  The emotional reversal in m. 33 ff. supports my previous 
observation that the chorale harbors stress and strain beneath its reconciliatory surface.  The 
pianist following this motivic-emotive narrative will likely infuse mm. 28–29 with energy and 
buoyancy, given the connotation of D–D#–E; exhibit composure on the E chord in m. 31, in light 
of the support it lends to G#; and ratchet up tension in mm. 33 ff., perhaps emphasizing then 
tapering the bass, since it laments.   
 
A2 Section 
The accompaniment part in A2 synthesizes the central opposition of the B section: the 
homophonic texture of the chorale and the rushing triplets of the octave passages.  A2 is also, more 
obviously, a synthesis of the A1 and B sections, since its accompanimental texture is derived from 
B, its melodic and harmonic content from A1.  A2 also acts as a kind of emotional synthesis.  It 
appears to take from B both its (partial) communal equanimity, symbolized by the chorale, and its 
subjective yearning, symbolized by the octaves.  The equanimity comes across in how the melody, 
which in A1 was given a fairly sparse accompaniment and thus suggested an isolated and alienated 
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protagonist, now finds a home, so to speak, as it is ensconced in a plush harmonic fabric.  Also, 
whereas previously the rests by which the melody was perforated were readily audible due to the 
sparse accompaniment, in A2 they are infused with harmonic resonance.  The protagonist, then, is 
no longer alone but is embraced by a community.  Still, the agitato, rushing triplets, and 3-versus-4 
rhythmic dissonance convey residual unease.  If the synthesis shows the protagonist that her 
individuality might be compatible with the intersubjective, communal sphere, she is still somewhat 
skeptical of this idea, anxious about being too thoroughly subsumed (though not nearly as anxious 
as she was in the defiant octave passages).     
This section is thus emotionally ambiguous, and not merely in the unmarked sense—by 
which music is always in some sense emotionally ambiguous, overdetermined, multivalent, and so 
on—but in the marked sense, by which it is irreducibly ambiguous—indicative not simply of an 
array of competing possibilities but of an actual mental state (one that might be better termed 
ambivalence) that can on some level be conveyed.  In other words, marked musical 
ambiguity/ambivalence is a palpable element of the musical narrative.  I believe one can express 
ambivalence here, on the one hand, by exuding anxiety through impulsively timed triplet chords, 
rushing and retreating; on the other hand, by conveying some degree of comfort and resolution by 
relishing the harmonic fullness, by rendering the melody more subservient to the harmonic 
accompaniment (read: community) than the reverse.  This is not to say the melody will be buried; 
on the contrary, the pianist might reinforce the melody by the notes by which it is now doubled (in 
mm. 492, 494, 513, and so on).  Also, the pianist might play the melody with more dynamic 
direction than he did at the beginning (there, to recall, its conspicuous gaps, in terms of both rests 
and voice leading, led us to eschew dynamic linearity).  For, again, the melody/protagonist is no 
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longer isolated and alienated.  This increased directionality is to some extent implied by the slight 
variations in melodic contour: in mm. 69–711, the soprano, now weighed down by thick 
homophony, is not as unfettered as in mm. 21–231, and hence not as registrally erratic.  The 
smaller melodic intervals and more linear contour in the soprano intimate that we might achieve a 
less anxious resolution to   
€ 
ˆ 1 than in A1 and so the oration appears less dismal.  (It is as if the 
spiritual intervention of the B section—whose continued presence is indicated by the homophonic 
texture—has had a positive effect on the protagonist’s state of mind.)  
 However, the resolution turns out to be far from untroubled: for the expected perfect 
authentic cadence in m. 72 is subverted or evaded by a brazen ł chord (Ex. 2-8).  This chord arises 
from the descending chromatic motive in the bass, as occurred in mm. 84–9.  Of limited 
consequence in the A1 section, this descending chromatic bass motion, as I have shown, gained in 
motivic importance throughout B (mm. 33–34 and 35–36) and now rears its head, signaling 
defiant irresolution.  This motive is reinterpreted in m. 73, however, where it is relegated to 
decorative figuration in the right hand and is thus much less able to steer the course of harmonic 
events (Ex. 2-9).  Also, the G@ is respelled as F# , which shows it no longer has a tendency to 
tonicize the Phrygian (and the tendency of F# to tonicize the dominant is instantly quashed by the 
F&).  In other words, the pernicious tendency of G@ has been neutralized, which renders closure 
possible.  As an affirmation of successful closure, the E@–C gap into m. 74, which in the first 
phrase of the piece had posed a state of irresolution (C was an overhang note, subordinate to E@ 
that, in turn, was subordinate to G), is now decisively resolute, with the C appearing on the 
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downbeat and elongated—thus both metrically and agogically accented.67  That E@, however, 
returns in the soprano voice of the final chords, posing something of a question mark.  The 
protagonist, despite having overcome social solitude and physical weakness by dint of the spiritual 
embrace of his community, and despite having found some direction, purpose, and resolution, is 






                                                
67 I thank Kevin Korsyn for this observation. 



































CS  (cf. mm. 9–10) 
V4––––––3                          V                                Np. !  6 "
CS inverted/extended, now  
G   neutralized 
Example 2-9: Chopin, mm. 73–74 
b 
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*  *  * 
The Nocturne, then, as perceived through the filter of my Schenkerian and semiotic reading, is a 
veritable character study.  It portrays a persona who in his essence is feeble and uncertain, perhaps 
afraid, but who more locally undergoes a range of feelings and corresponding physical stances.  
The pianist following this reading would, like an actor, simultaneously embody and convey the 
most deep-seated as well as the more transient emotive states.68  Importantly, the narrative premise 
of weakness and striving for stability, perhaps no more than a potentiality within the piece—at 
times strong, at others somewhat faint—is consolidated by the application of the Urlinie, Zug, and 
other Schenkerian constructs.  Without a Schenkerian reading, such a potentiality might easily 
remain latent.  Indeed, I believe a Schenkerian reading of any piece is at root a mandate to 
imagine precisely such a search for closure, and the many obstacles and deviations encountered 
along the way.  Schenkerian analysis is ideally suited to elicit this particular mode of engagement 




I hope to have shown that performance and Schenkerian analysis are, or can be, deeply 
compatible.  We actualize this potential compatibility when we attend to the physical and emotive 
features of Schenkerian analysis, features in which performance is also patently grounded.  
Somatic and affective states condition the formulation of Schenkerian concepts and constructs, 
                                                
68 On a pedagogical approach to embodying expressive states that derive from Schenkerian analysis, see 
Pierce (1994); see Pierce (1993) for a broader overview of her approach to performance and movement. 
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and these states can be recovered and manifested in performance.  To be unabashedly 
metaphorical, it is as if Schenker’s metaphors freeze real experience and thaw upon contact with 
the warmth of the performed music to which they are applied, becoming actual again.  
Schenkerian theory and music can in this way partake of a mutually beneficial relationship, by 
which Schenkerian theory actualizes potentialities of the piece, the piece potentialities of 
Schenkerian theory. 
The more anthropomorphic our analytical reading of a piece, the more naturally that 
analysis can be applied to performance.  Empathizing with the somatic and affective substratum of 
analysis is key, for this allows the performer, in a somewhat intuitive way, to project the sense of 
sound and movement that typifies such states.  Indeed, a Schenkerian analysis, employed in a 
metaphorical spirit, exposes states that are so fundamentally human and that elicit such empathy 
from the performer that little deliberate “application” from analysis to performance need be done.   
In other words, the ideal use of analysis, in my view, is to arrive at an exegesis of a piece that is 
itself so experiential, so suggestive of a physical and expressive stance, as largely (if not entirely) to 
obviate the need for conscious or rational translation.69 
                                                
69 Schenker himself seems to have advocated this unselfconscious approach to the relation between analysis 
and performance.  Rothstein (1984), for example, suggests that Schenker conveyed many of his 
recommendations for performance based upon analytical insights—regarding dynamics, articulation, 
phrasing, and so on—in the form of fingerings as opposed to more explicit indications.  In this way, the 
pianist relate to these insights on a kinesthetic level, executing them naturally, without cognitive mediation 
or exaggeration.  Bamberger (1976) likewise claims that Beethoven conveyed abstract ideas in the form of 
fingerings.  In this respect, Schenker’s approach to fingering in his edition of the Beethoven Sonatas 
arguably followed the lead of Beethoven himself.   
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 Yet, as I have also suggested, such an approach, as rooted as it is in mutual consonances 
between analysis and performance, paradoxically foregrounds the ineluctable tensions between 
them.70  For the metaphorical qualities that arise from my methodology are general, and thus will 
inevitably receive very different realizations from different performers.  Moreover, a human-
oriented approach to analysis will allow for the subjective inclinations of the performer, for the 
possibility that he will realize a structural quality in an unexpected way, adding nuances that 
modify established meanings and even lead to new ones.  Simply put, while a broad correlation 
exists between Schenkerian analysis and performance in that both thrive on physical and 
expressive qualities, no exact, predictable, and measurable correlation does.  In this lies an 
inexhaustible source of interpretive richness that one would not want, despite its messiness, to 
wish away.   
                                                






BEETHOVEN, STRING QUARTET IN C MINOR, OP. 18, NO. 4, FIRST MOVEMENT 
 
The following scenario, whose setting is a D.M.A. seminar/practicum in performance/analysis, is not 
intended realistically to depict the typical responses of seminarians, nor, for that matter, to serve as a 
pedagogical model or ideal.  I merely employ this quasi-Socratic medium (taking inspiration from Korsyn 
[2003], Krebs [1999], Le Guin [2006], Pierce [1983], Schmalfeldt [1985], and Thakar [2011]) in order to 
transmit my performative analysis of this piece in a manner that is itself somewhat performative.  Since I am 
not a string player, my avatar in this dialogue, the teacher/chamber-music coach, will dispense advice on 
performance that is for the most part general rather than string-idiomatic. 
 
SESSION 1: EXPOSITION, FIRST THEME 
Teacher (T): Welcome to Week 3 of our Performance/Analysis seminar!  Over the next 
several sessions, I will be coaching you string-quartet players on the first movement of Beethoven’s 
magnificent1 C-minor String Quartet, op. 18, no. 4.  I have asked you to learn the notes but to 
                                                
1 Not everyone agrees: Joseph Kerman, for one, is positively scathing in his appraisal: “and the Quartet in C 
minor is the exceptional work in the Op. 18 series; exceptional, by its weakness, in the entire corpus of the 
Beethoven quartets” (1966, 71).  While my aim here is not primarily to defend the aesthetic integrity of the 
work, I do hope my analysis will reveal many interesting features that might at least give some critics pause.  
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hold off settling on particular interpretive nuances, since our goal, remember, is to explore how 
music analysis can awaken us to new possibilities.  We don’t want our physical habits, in which 
status-quo ways of playing are often ingrained, to determine or unduly constrain our 
interpretation.  We are therefore going to adopt a proactive stance, for each section discussing 
analytical points first, which will hopefully generate interesting and even radical interpretive ideas, 
which we will then put into practice.  But first, to orientate our work on this piece, perhaps it 
would be advisable to review some of the general principles regarding analysis and performance 
that we have been discussing over the last two weeks.2  Who can get us started?  
Silence.  
T: Why is it crucial to aim for a performance rich in individuated moments, drawing on a 
wide palette of dynamics, articulations, and tempi? 
First Violinist (V1): Because, as Adorno pointed out, smoothing over a piece’s contrasts and 
complications is sort of like oppressing individuals.  It’s really an ethical issue, not just a musical 
one.   
T: Yes, not to mention that playing in a highly individualized way affirms the freedom of 
the performing individual himself or herself.  It affirms his or her relative autonomy with respect 
to the supposed strictures of the score and intentions of the composer, to academic expectations, 
                                                
2 This initial discussion draws upon the previous two chapters.  Please consult those for fuller explanations 
and citations. 
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and to the limitations imposed by recording-industry values.  We are thus talking about freedom 
not just in a symbolic sense, but in a quite real one as well.3  Anything else?   
Violist (Vla): One might need to use particular dynamics, tempo changes, or whatever in 
order to realize certain potentials of the score.   
T: Indeed.  Can you fill out that idea a bit? 
Cellist (C) (interjecting): Well, a score includes pitches, rhythms, and all kinds of expressive 
markings.  But we all know that music is about so much more than quarter notes and crescendi!  
These symbols may indicate what to play and something about how to play it, but they also imply 
certain things about musical structure.  Isn’t that right?  And to get across ideas about musical 
structure, we need to use lots of variance.   
T: Nicely said.  But I’m concerned about that last sentence: by “get across ideas,” do you 
mean we try to communicate abstract ideas in a performance?  Is that even possible? 
C: Sorry, I didn’t put that quite right: realizing something about musical structure can 
motivate the musician to play in a certain way.  When a piece varies a motive, evades a cadence, 
shifts the hypermeter, or what have you, it suggests a physical or emotional state—at least to the 
imaginative interpreter.  When the performer adopts this state or empathizes with it in some way, 
it can affect how she plays.    
                                                
3 Put in more formal, Peircean terms, freedom is signified not just iconically but also indexically.  Thomas 
Turino makes a related point: “When music makers and dancers are in sync, such signs move beyond felt 
resemblances [the iconic level] to [the] experienced fact of social connections and unity [the indexical level]” (1999, 
241, his italics).   
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T (interrupting): Right, and the variations in dynamic, tempo, and articulation that result 
will yield sonic contours that are analogous to how certain feelings and thought processes feel, or to 
how people comport themselves, gesticulate, and vocalize when feeling particular things.  Listeners 
intuitively pick up on these analogies, they readily infer an emotional state from the performer’s 
interpretive behaviors.   
V1: So you’re saying that we don’t communicate ideas when we play.  Rather, when we 
read structural processes imaginatively, we are led to interpretive nuances that help create the 
semblance of human states to which we can all relate. 
T: Yes.  Being in a particular emotional state (or, as Kendall Walton might prefer, imagining 
ourselves in such a state) will often naturally lead to a physical gesture that directly affects how we 
play.   
C (demurring): But, it isn’t always that straightforward: singing or playing an instrument 
presents its own very particular demands, so we often need to adjust or modify those natural 
physical responses simply to execute notes on our instruments.   
Vla: Yeah, but instrumental technique does not entirely lose touch with the non-musical 
gestures to which they are inevitably related.    
T: Couldn’t have said that better myself.  Now, one more thing: we’ve been saying that 
sometimes an analytical tool or concept will point out a sentient element potentially present in the 
music that the performer can then physically realize or embody.  But won’t an analysis sometimes 
hit a stumbling block?  Or, put in more positive terms, sometimes an analysis will seize not a 
definite state but rather on an ambiguity lurking in the score.  So, we should not always look to 
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analysis to give us answers, but sometimes to pose stimulating questions.  Can anyone think of a 
common example? 
C: When we apply the Urlinie metaphor to a piece, doesn’t that often bring out a conflict 
or ambiguity between possible head-tones—  versus ?   
T (jumping in): Yes.  Now, as we’ve discussed, a musical ambiguity might be “unmarked”—
just part and parcel of musical notation and how it necessarily harbors multiple possible meanings.  
Alternatively, the ambiguity can be “marked,” a palpable part of the musical narrative.  Now, how 
do we handle ambiguity of the unmarked variety? 
Vla: We make a choice!  We play in a distinctive way, not assuming the music will “speak 
for itself!”  
T: Naturally.  And how do we handle ambiguity of the marked variety? 
V2: It depends, doesn’t it?  We can try to create a visceral sense of ambiguity by playing in a 
murky way, as Schoenberg suggested, right?  Or we can approach it more intellectually, say, by 
playing the ambiguous passage, if it is repeated, in two different ways.  That way, we allow the 
ambiguity to unfold gradually, retrospectively.     
C: Or, when the music and analysis subsequently clarify the initial ambiguity, we might 
play that passage in light of how we know it will eventually be resolved.   
T (jumping in): Musical ambiguity, and how it can be treated in performance, is a very 
complex matter, one best handled on a case-by-case basis.  And the Beethoven Quartet will 
certainly give us ample opportunity to think more about this issue.  Okay, that was a productive 








*  *  * 
T: I trust you all understand the basic dimensions and procedures of sonata form, which 
this movement is in.  And you are familiar enough with the piece that we can start analyzing it in 
detail, yes? 
 Quartet members nod.  
 T: Excellent.  So, we will proceed more or less chronologically but jump around where 
appropriate.  We will focus on form, motive, tonal structure, rhythm, and melodic 
expectation/realization.  We will consider how these various parameters interact to yield sentient 
states as well as conflicts and ambiguities.  Sound good?   
Players nod. 
T: To begin, does this piece remind you of any other by Beethoven in the same key, written 
at around the same time? 
V1: The “Pathétique” Sonata? 
T: Precisely, op. 13.  Both were composed around 1800.4  Moreover, their opening tunes 
are remarkably similar, don’t you think?  [See Ex. 3-1.]  Both begin with a firm tonic, outline a 3rd, 
and then enunciate an accented dissonance resolving down by step.  Both then sequence their 
respective opening ideas.  Hey, as long as the opening of the “Pathétique” is basically in a four-part 
                                                
4 Op. 13 dates from 1798–99.  The Quartet’s chronology is a bit more complicated—see Kerman (1966, 
54–55) and Marliave (1925, 3).  In what follows, I draw together several C-minor works, a key to which 
Beethoven was particularly drawn; see Tusa (1993).  I also liberally draw upon Caplin’s (1998) theory of 
Classical form.   
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texture, why don’t you play it as if it were a string quartet?  Read off the photocopies I made for 
you.   
They do so.   
T: Good, now play the opening of the C-minor Quartet in the same slow, grandiose, tragic 




They do so.   
T: Does that do anything for you? 




        3rd     accented diss.    
Example 3-1b: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in C minor, op. 13: opening 
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Vla: I think that’s a good exercise.  Even though the Quartet is marked “Allegro ma non 
tanto” and so is faster than the Sonata’s opening, we might want to err on the side of the “ma non 
tanto” in order to bring out its relation to the “Pathétique.” 
T: Interesting thought.  But more important than the slow tempo in itself, and more 
important than conveying this possible intertextual connection,5 is imbuing the Quartet with 
weight, depth, and darkness (which you can do even within a relatively fast tempo) in order to 
underscore its potentially tragic element.  Practicing the piece as if it were a slow movement, like 
the opening of the “Pathétique,” is merely one way to inculcate these qualities.   
V1: By the way, isn’t there another, earlier C-minor piano sonata by Beethoven? 
T: Yes, op. 10, no. 1. 
T plays Ex. 3-2a. 
T: How would you compare the form of the respective openings of these two C-minor 
piano sonatas? 
Quartet contemplates. 
Vla: Well, both are sentences, in that both have a basic idea, a sequence6 of that idea, and 
then a longer phrase.  But the basic idea of op. 10, no. 1 is much more involved than that of op. 
13.  The former is comprised of two smaller, somewhat independent ideas, right? 
                                                
5 Stefano Mengozzi (unpublished) posits even more striking intertextual connections between the 
“Pathétique” and the previous piano sonata, op. 10, no. 3.   
6 The sequences here are melodic, not harmonic.  In op. 10, no. 1, the bass line weaves a stepwise ascending 
line, C–D–E@, through the basic idea and sequence.  In op. 13, the bass is sequential—in the first measure 
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T: Yes, what Caplin calls a “compound basic idea.”  And how would you compare the  
longer phrases, what he calls “continuation phrases”? 
V1: They are similar in that both present a kind of microcosmic sentence.  That is, each  
presents a module, a repetition of that module, and then a longer continuation.  But these 
continuation phrases are also quite different. 
                                                
it outlines C–G, in the second A@–E@—but the harmonic progression itself is not.  Both passages compose 




T: How so? 
V1: The one in op. 10 is followed by a separate cadential phrase, starting in m. 17.  The 
one in op. 13 is not.    
 T: What else? 
!"#$
Example 3-2a: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in C minor, op. 10, no. 1: opening 
Example 3-2b: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in C minor, op. 13: opening 
!$
compound basic idea sequence 
continuation 
basic idea sequence 




 C: The continuation in op. 10 almost has a new thematic idea, one much more lyrical than 
the basic idea.   
 Vla (jumping in): But they do share that two-note sigh figure. 
 C: True.  The continuation provides more of a “home” for that Seufzer motive, ensconcing 
it in a longer stepwise line.   
T: So, let me rephrase the similarities and differences between these two continuations.  
Both continuations are sentences in microcosm, which is very common.7  Continuations also 
always fragment their basic ideas, which both of these do: op. 10 shortens the 4-bar module of the 
basic idea to 2 bars; op. 13 shortens the basic module by about a beat, by repeating the jagged-
rhythm motive prematurely.  But we see a key difference as well: since the continuation in op. 10 
presents a (partially) new idea, its fragmentation is mainly temporal, while in op. 13 the 
fragmentation is more obviously of the motivic variety.   
 V2: My roommate, Shaun, who is a pianist, is working on Beethoven’s C-minor Piano 
Concerto, whose opening is structured in a very similar way. 
 T: Indeed.  The theme of the first movement, just like that of op. 10, no. 1, features a 
compound basic idea whose first module is an arpeggiation.  And in each, the basic idea is 
                                                
7 The first theme of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 2, no. 1 is perhaps the paradigmatic instance of this 
technique (and of sentences in general).  However, as Janet Schmalfeldt pointed out to me (in a personal 
communication), sentential continuations are perhaps more common among 16-bar sentences.     
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followed by a more expansive, lyrical continuation that reduces the thematic module from 4 to 2 
bars.8  (Casually) I know Shaun, by the way.  What else is he playing these days? 
 V2: Let’s see, I think a Brahms Rhapsody, some etude by Liszt, and . . . oh yeah!— 
Beethoven’s op. 7 piano sonata.   
 T: Ah, I love that sonata.  In fact, its opening (Ex. 3-3) is relevant to our discussion.  Here 
Beethoven brilliantly foils our expectations: he sets up what seems like a clear-cut sentence, and 
then, come time for the continuation, he uses entirely different melodic material.  Granted, like a 
continuation, it does create a sense of fragmentation and acceleration, increasing the harmonic 
rhythm considerably.  Still, its melody is so unlike the opening that it is hard to hear it as part of 
the same sentence.  So, it is very similar to op. 10 in its heroic, arpeggiated basic idea followed by 
more passive, lyrical material for the continuation.  But in op. 10, as we saw, the seemingly new 
idea in the continuation was really linked to the opening by means of that sigh figure.  In Op. 7, 
by contrast, I think we would be hard pressed to find any motivic connection to the opening.9 
                                                
8 Mozart’s C minor Piano Sonata, K. 457, opens with a theme redolent of both Beethoven’s Op. 10, no. 1 
and C-minor Piano Concerto.  However one might describe the mood that C minor evoked in Classical 
composers, that mood clearly compelled them to devise similar sounding themes and to structure them in 
similar ways.  Again, see Tusa (1993).      
9 If the passage beginning in m. 5 is indeed a new sentence, what we had initially thought to be the 
presentation phrase (mm. 1–4) turns out to be, becomes, a kind of introductory fanfare.  Following 
Schmalfeldt (2011), I use a block arrow (as shown in the example) to indicate the relationship of becoming, 
of one formal function transforming into another on the basis of what follows.  I should clarify that, 
although the “Beethoven-Hegelian dialectic,” as Schmalfeldt calls it, is most closely associated with middle-
period Beethoven (its paradigmatic instance is the first movement of the “Tempest” Sonata), it is by no 
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 C: So, I’m seeing a kind of continuum regarding sentences with sentential continuations: 
we lead from the “Pathétique,” whose continuation phrase is motivically consistent with the 
presentation phrase; to op. 10, no. 1, whose continuation is motivically (only vaguely) similar to  
 
 
the presentation; to op. 7, whose continuation is entirely distinct from the presentation and thus 
possibly indicative of a new sentence [see Table 3-1].  So, where does our Quartet fall along this 
continuum [see Ex. 3-4]?  
T: That’s exactly what I want to know.   
                                                
means foreign to early-period Beethoven (even, as Everett [2012] suggests, to Beethoven’s earliest 
experiments in sonata form, from his Bonn period), nor, for that matter, to Mozart and Haydn, as 
Schmalfeldt (2011) affirms.     
Example 3-3: Beethoven, Piano Sonata in E  , op. 7: opening 
basic idea        sequence 
!
(Continuation? New basic idea/sentence?) 
sequence 
continuation 
modified repeat of continuation 
b 
Very new melodic idea presentation phrase                     introduction? 
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 C: Well, the continuation in m. 5 is clearly linked motivically to the basic idea, right?  In 
fact, much like op. 10, no. 1, the continuation seizes on a short sigh motive from the basic idea.     
 V2: But the idea seems fairly new, what with that distinctive F–D gesture.  
T: So perhaps we might say that the continuation is more novel than that of the 




comparable not just in terms of formal design, but, as you point out, in terms of motivic content as 
well; in fact, both continuations emphasize a D–C sigh figure that harkens back to the opening 
material. 
V1: Cool! 
T (addressing C): So, the continuum you expertly devised makes the formal ambiguity of this 
passage very concrete—we can see that it falls precisely midway between motivically repetitious and 
motivically novel sentential continuations.  You’ve rendered this ambiguity almost calculable—the 
passage is basically “equidistant” from either extreme.   
Table 3-1: a continuum of continuation phrases regarding novelty  
op. 13 (opening) 
 continuation entirely motivically consistent with basic idea 
op. 10, no. 1 (opening) 
 continuation lightly alludes to basic idea 
op. 7 (opening)   
 continuation entirely new—no relation to basic idea 


















T: Well, I think our comparative analysis provokes us to consider the degree to which we 
want to play up the novel elements of this phrase.  How might we do that?  
V1: Maybe sink into those distinctive downbeat figures of mm. 5 and 6?   








incomplete       fill 
 E  –F-mot. 
(E  = first true 
 chromaticism)  
n n 
“appogg.”-mot. 
N.B.: I chose the shapes randomly and they have no iconic significance; they are purely meant to distinguish one motive-type from another.  
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T: Or, to be less literal about it, on might instill the continuation with a more general 
quality of novelty, playing it with a much different color.10  
Group tries it. 
T: And how, by contrast, would we bring out the motivic connection to the basic idea? 
V2: Downplay the downbeat and instead go for the offbeat syncopation, give it a sf so we 
hear it as basically the same sigh figure as in mm. 2 and 4. 
Group tries it. 
T: So, of the two basic choices, which do you prefer? 
V2: I like it the first way. 
V1: Hmmm.  I prefer it the second way. 
T: Fair enough.  We don’t need to agree this minute.  What’s important is to use analysis 
to open up cogent options; equally important is to keep those options open.  As we solidify other 
interpretive elements of this opening, and as we decide how we want to play what comes later, we 
will have more of a context by which to answer questions like these.  If we decide now, lacking that 
context, our choice would be rather arbitrary, don’t you think? 
Violinists nod.  C is flipping back and forth between the Quartet and opus 7. 
T (to C): Do you notice something else? 
C: Yes: in each piece, there is an expansion in the continuation phrase. 
                                                
10 The Cleveland Quartet (2011), of several ensembles I listened to, does this the most saliently and 
effectively, pulling back on m. 5 and playing that phrase more softly than the previous one.     
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T: Right, a common technique.  In the Quartet the expansion is twofold: not only is the 
continuation repeated in modified form, but the repetition is itself elongated due to augmenting 
the E@–D–C–B&–C of mm. 7–81 over two full measures and a beat (mm. 11–131).   
C: So, shall we try to make this gradual, multi-layered expansion tangible? 
Group plays mm. 11–131 with not just a crescendo but also an allargando.  
T: What do you think? 
V1: Well, if nothing else, this analysis helps me to understand the impetus behind  
Beethoven’s crescendo of measures 11–131.  It isn’t just about getting louder for the sake of getting 
louder, but about creating a sense of emergence and expansiveness.   
 T: Yes.  While crescendi and similar markings entail a wide range of possible executions, 
that range shrinks considerably when one surmises the structural motivation for a marking, or the 
structural effect that marking can create.  And I would add that the expansiveness here serves to 
create a sense of arrival on C5 and the I chord in m. 13.  That arrival has a lot to do with 
completing a 5th-progression, as we can see from our voice-leading analysis [Appendix C].  We’ll 
have more to say about that sense of resolution in a moment, but first let us reflect on our analysis 
thus far, which has led both to a question and to an opportunity for embodiment.  The question is 
whether the continuation starting in m. 5 should be played more as a new thematic idea or a 
modification of a previous one; the embodiment has to do with the increasing expansiveness as the 
phrase comes to a close.  Neither entails one fixed way of playing: the former yields a basic binary 
choice, with each choice allowing for various realizations; the latter yields a singular image that, 
however, can likewise be realized in a multitude of ways.   
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*  *  * 
T: Where we left off, the cadence of the first tonal/thematic area arrived with a fifth-
progression into   
€ 
ˆ 1 .  As our voice-leading graph [Appendix C] shows, that progression serves to 
compose-out the Kopfton   
€ 
ˆ 5  (G).  The latter is reached via an initial ascent (Anstieg).  The long 
period of time and wide range we traverse en route to that Kopfton opens up a considerable space 
in which to establish crucial motives, as outlined in Ex. 3-4.  Heck, even the anacrusis-to-downbeat 
figure is significant in being the first in a chain of increasingly wide leaps: a P4, M6, d7, and finally 
a PO in m. 10.  The only deviation from this progression is the d5 in m. 6.  Whereas this leap was 
modest enough to be completely filled, the octave leap in m. 10 is too large to be completely filled 
within this section (even though the section is accommodating enough to stretch an extra bar).  
Because the F6 is not resolved to its lower octave, it is open-ended and must lead to something else; 
and indeed, it is picked up by the G6 in m. 17.11 
  C: I wonder if there is some correlation between the increasing size of the leap motive and 
the acceleration in my part. 
 T: What do you mean? 
 V1: Well, where the figure expands to a sixth in m. 5, I have low Cs at the beginning of 
two consecutive bars, whereas before I had them every other bar. 
 T: Right, which served to establish a two-bar hypermeter, with a rhythmic accent on the 
second hyperbeat, due to the sforzando on each second bar.   
                                                
11 To be clear, the two pitches partake not of a strict voice-leading connection but of an implicative one 
based on registral conspicuity.   
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 V1: And starting in m. 5, maybe the cello no longer has that hyperaccent because the 
syncopation is taken over by the upper strings [Ex. 3-5]. 
 
 
T: Yes!  In fact, that syncopated D leading to C, as we said before, is reminiscent of m. 2.  
So it is as if m. 5 compresses the entirety of bars 1–2, which adds to the sense of acceleration, or 
intensification.  Hence, at that one crucial moment, bars 5–6, we get intervalic expansion, 
accelerated bass motion, and both metric and modular compression. 
 C: Maybe I will accelerate slightly in m. 5 to exemplify the acceleration made clear by our 
analysis. 
 V1: And maybe, at the same time, I will backphrase12 into the D to express the expanded 
interval.  Also, maybe I will crescendo into the D but pull back on the diminished fifth in m. 6, 
                                                
12 “Backphrasing” is a term commonly used by theater singers to denote pulling back the tempo on their 
melodic line while the accompaniment maintains a steady tempo.  It is roughly equivalent to what Sandra 
Rosenblum (1988, 362–92) calls “contrametric rubato,” a form of rubato that (as I explained in the 
Example 3-5: Beethoven, mm. 1–6: rhythmic analysis 
7 
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since that is a more constrained interval that is immediately filled in.  Then I’ll ratchet up the 
tension on the ultra-dissonant diminished 7th in m. 9 and climax on the octave, pulling back on 
the downbeat of m. 11 in order to have room to crescendo into the arrival point.   
 V2: And by exclaiming the octave, pulling back, and then crescendoing, you embody the  
sense, or create an image, of opening a space that you proceed to fill.   
 T: Good thinking, all.  I have just one more question about this opening.  What do you 
make of the somewhat unusual chromaticisms [Ex. 3-4]?  I am referring both to the chromatic 
voice exchanges (cross relations) in m. 7 between the second violin and cello and also to the 
diminished fourth (E@–B&) linearly outlined by the first violin in m. 7 and then condensed by the 
cello in the next measure. 
 C: I don’t know what the larger significance of the E@–B is, but at least for the moment I 
can try to hear and play my figure in m. 8 as a quasi-imitation of the first violin’s in m. 7. 
 V1 (to C): And that cello figure also engages with the part I play over it, as they form a voice 
exchange.   
T: Which is key, since the “transfer” of the cello’s E@ up to your third beat is what keeps 
the phrase open tonally—it creates sort of an imperfect authentic cadence.  This precipitates a 
modified repetition of the phrase that will lead to a perfect authentic cadence.  And what of the 
crunchy chromatic voice exchanges between cello and second violin in m. 7? 
V2: Maybe they too keep the phrase open, since those voice exchanges defer the cadential 
F#–G, supporting a predominant and dominant, until the last moment.  Compare that to m. 12: 
                                                
Introduction) both Mozart and later Chopin advocated for solo piano music, wherein the right hand is 
temporally free while the left hand keeps strict tempo, resulting in the hands being out of sync.  
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there the F# occurs right on the downbeat such that the cadential dominant can now occur on a 
relatively strong beat (beat 3). 
T: Good.  Now, I don’t think we need to be overly fussy about prescribing dynamic 
shadings for all these figures we’ve been discussing.  I know that if you are listening for them, you 
will hear their interplay, their structural functions, their characters.  In fact, I would say that goes 
for almost everything we have discussed and will discuss.  The aim is less to map out the precise 
dynamic and temporal shadings in advance than simply to think through the musical relationships 
as you play.  Then those variances will more or less happen of their own accord.   
Vla: Doesn’t that go against what you have been saying, about using analysis for a visceral 
rather than an intellectual experience? 
T: No, because thinking about these theoretical items ultimately serves to create sensuous 
shadings, and will hopefully do so in a more integrated, natural way than if you were going for the 
shadings directly.  Take this analogy with acting.  The famous acting teacher Stanislavski advised 
his students not to aim directly for the particular emotional state they want to achieve, because 
doing so will make the emotions seem forced and caricatured.  Rather, he admonished his charges 
simply to stay attuned to the thought processes of the character, and to his situation and 
environment, because if the actor is immersed enough in those tangibles, the emotional result will 
produce itself.13  Just so, if our goal is to play with a wealth of dynamic and temporal color (which 
will in turn paint emotional pictures), we should focus on the tangibles of our analytic thought 
process, such that those variances will arise in an unforced way.  Does that make sense?  
Quartet nods tentatively. 
                                                
13 Slanislavski (1935).  
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T: Okay, play through the passage in slow motion so that you have time to think about and 
hear everything that is going on.  And just respond to those thoughts and perceptions in whatever 
way seems natural.  
Quartet plays, sounding something like Ex. 3-6.   
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really drive to cadence! 
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SESSION 2: EXPOSITION, TRANSITION 
T: What strikes you about the beginning of this transition section? 
Quartet contemplates. 
Vla: It seems unusually insistent regarding the tonic.  After all, don’t many expositions 
prefer to leave the first TT area14 harmonically open, saving the big cadence for the second key 
area? 
T: For the moment of “essential expositional closure,”15 yes.  This moment shows 
Beethoven’s tendency, one many scholars have observed, to “overemphasize” the tonic and 
dominant chords—Tovey called this the “tonic and dominant swing.”16  But Beethoven tends to 
do this in codas.  To do so in the transition is a bit unusual for him.  I mean, it is one thing to end 
the first tonal area with a perfect authentic cadence, as he does in op. 10, no. 1, for instance; it is 
another to harp on a cadential progression, as he does here.  So, what do you make of this? 
V2: Well, I’ve noticed that when composers do something formally or stylistically 
anomalous, it is often to make that moment stand out. 
T: Stand out how?  For what purpose? 
V2: To express or represent something particular. 
                                                
14 Rather than choose between “tonal area” and “thematic area”—between essentially an eighteenth-century 
sonata-form paradigm and a nineteenth-century one—I adopt both; hence “tonal-thematic” (or “TT”) area.  
I do so because I think the two primary expositional modules are typically distinguished both tonally and 
thematically.  Put programmatically, the sense of conflicting personae in a sonata derives from both tonal 
and thematic contrast.     
15 Hepokoski/Darcy (2006, 117–149). 
16 Tovey (1945, 111). 
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T: I concur.  So, what might this moment be expressing?  Can you weave a narrative thread 
leading to this point? 
V2 is at a loss. 
C: How about this: the opening theme is about angst, what with the minor mode, the 
motoric drive, the –  motives accented with sforzandi, the angular syncopations, the diminished 
intervals, and the increasing intensity deriving from intervalic and corresponding phrasal 
expansion.   
T: Very Sturm und Drang. 
C: Right.  So, maybe this cadence is sort of emotional overcompensation—a drastic 
attempt to reign in the emotional overflow of the previous section. 
T: I think “overflow” is an apt metaphor, given the expansions you mentioned—the first 
thematic section is positively busting at the seams.  So, your point is that the cadential figures are 
emotionally suppressed by comparison? 
C: I think so.  But then, look!—that octave idea returns in m. 17, reaching up to the G6 










V1 (interjecting): And that previous passage (mm. 9–13) is now intensified in mm. 17 ff., not 
only by the higher apex but also by the string of 4–3 suspensions.  And they spill into or overlap 
with the cadential dominant in m. 19, just as the previous passage overlapped with the cadential 
tonic in m. 13.   
T: Right, but the key difference is that now the octave is completely filled in, which is 
maybe our golden ticket—it allows us to advance in the formal scheme.  We can now pass beyond 
the tonic area and proceed to the preparatory dominant and medial caesura17 (more on which next 
session).   
                                                
17 Hepokoski/Darcy (2006, 23–50). 
Example 3-7: mm. 7–20  
˘!
linkage (?) 
´!́     ´!






V1: Question: given that mm. 10–131 and mm. 17–201 are so similar, and that G
6 picks up 
F6’s thread, maybe what we thought to be an unusually decisive cadential gesture (mm. 13 ff.) is 
actually more an interpolation.  Maybe the cadential emphasis is nothing but posturing! 
T: Interesting point.  And I might note yet a third possibility: given that this section turns 
out to be sentential (basic idea, mm. 13–14; sequence, mm. 15–16; continuation, mm. 17–20), 
perhaps this is a transitional theme.  Let’s step back and consider our three formal possibilities, 
which create a rich ambiguity.  The ostensibly new section starting in m. 13 initially appears to be 
the cadential phrase of the previous sentence.  Yet, upon the sequential repetition of mm. 13–14 
in the following two measures, we retrospectively realize this to be a sentence, and thus possibly a 
new theme—a transitional one, perhaps.  But then Beethoven pulls a stunt with the continuation 
phrase, as he is wont to do: the continuation is a reprise of the previous section.  As Schmalfeldt 
might have it, the passage beginning in m. 13 is a cadential phrase to the previous sentence 
becoming (upon the sequence in m. 15) a new sentential transitional theme becoming (upon the 
repetition of previous material in m. 17) an interpolation within a transition section that 
retrospectively begins at m. 9 [Ex. 3-8].   
V2: So, this is one of those narrative ambiguities, right?  The ambiguity, in Adorno’s terms, 
is not mensural but mimetic.   
T: Well put.  So, we want to play up this ambiguity somehow, and not assume, as Janet 
Levy and Leonard Meyer seem to, that doing “nothing” will somehow convey the ambiguity, or the 
coming-into-being of multiple formal functions.  Any idea of how we might do that?     
C: Play mm. 13–14 as a resolute cadential gesture, with broad bow strokes.  Then, when 
the sequence arrives, come back dynamically.  Since themes tend to be internally differentiated, 
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playing mm. 13–16 with dynamic differentiation will imbue this section with a thematic quality.18  
(Also the softer dynamic will exemplify the sequence, the repetition of the module on the 
dominant, which in turn will exemplify the sentential and thus thematic nature of mm. 13–16). 
That will give us the opportunity to reenergize that ff in m. 164, which will convey the sense of 
picking up where we left off in m. 13.  Playing m. 17 ff. with a burst of vitality greater than that of 
mm. 13–14 will make mm. 13–16, in retrospect, seem like an interpolation!19 
Group tries it (Ex. 3-8).   
 
                                                
18 To expand upon the cellist’s point: It is commonly assumed that main themes are in general rhythmically 
stable and texturally homogenous whereas transitions are rhythmically unstable and texturally 
heterogeneous.  Yet, as Caplin reminds us, precisely the opposite often obtains: “a good number of main 
themes feature discontinuities in durational patterning [and] marked contrasts in textural disposition,” 
while “transitions tend to feature continuity of durational patterning [and] uniformity of textural 
combinations” (2010, sec. 9).  Taking Caplin’s clarification to heart, I might proffer a performative analogy: 
to play with greater-than-usual differentiation is in some sense to play “thematically”—is to imbue whatever 
passage we play (whether, properly speaking, it is thematic or not) with a modicum of thematicity.  
Conversely, to play with minimal differentiation is to imbue a passage with a transitional quality.  Our 
players appear to grasp this principle intuitively.   






T: That’s good.  In your rendition, the ff in m. 17 has a distinct meaning from the ff in m. 
13: it helps us resume the action, advance the plot, move forward.  Now the ff into m. 17 is not 
redundant; it has a different quality from the previous ff.  We see here how not all ffs (or ps, pps, or 
whatever) are created equal, and Beethoven is implying as much by writing two of them in 
consecutive passages, with no intervening dynamic.  This notational anomaly puts you interpreters 
on the hot seat, demanding that you grapple with its possible meanings and, presumably, that you 
find a way to differentiate them. 
Example 3-8: formal becoming as suggested by interpretive decisions  
˘!
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C: So, how does this part of the story end? 
T: Well, what do you take the reiteration and compression in mm. 20–24 of the G-octave 
coupling to express?   
Vla: Perhaps quiet reassurance?   
V1: Until, that is, the second beat of m. 24, where I play a rather angsty figure, what with 
the impatient offbeat accents and those diminished 7ths.  
T: Positively.  And, incidentally, your syncopation (the D) adds yet another rhythmic 
stratum to our series of syncopations, bringing that series to a head [Ex. 3-9].  The structural 
dynamic mm. 20–25 is rather multilayered.  For on the one hand, we are just sort of playing out 
what is arguably the climactic event of the entire piece thus far: the G–G fill (mm. 17–20)—we’re 
just spinning our wheels.  On the other, the entire section comes full circle, with the repeated cello 




strategically recalls the accented dissonances of the opening: A–G of m. 22 recalls D–C of m. 2 
[Ex. 3-10].  So, try playing the passage as a mere echo of what just occurred, such that m. 24 is a 
sudden, unexpected burst of energy; then try playing this passage as a more substantive, reassuring 
return, leading into m. 24.   
Quartet does so; the second way yields a more directed line on the descending scale, a bit of a 
crescendo into m. 24.   
T: You don’t sound convinced yet either way.  Okay, let’s put a pin in that.  By the way 
(speaking to C), why do you think you now play octave-shifts in four consecutive measures, whereas 
before you only got to do it in two, mm. 5–6?  
Example 3-9: Strata of syncopations, mm. 1–24 



































C (after some thought): Maybe because it summarizes and reiterates that G–G octave 
coupling of the first violin.  
T: Nice.  And that insight might compel you to play those notes somewhat melodically, 
with a touch of legato perhaps? 
C: Perhaps. 
V1: In which case the G–G at my entrance might actually sound like an imitation of the 
cello’s [Ex. 3-10]!  













T:  Which suggests that, in retrospect, the octave shifts of the cello, from the very opening 
bar, were always potentially thematic, an impetus to the octave-leap idea that gradually emerges in 
the first violin!  Okay, put this section together and I’ll return in a few minutes.  
 
*  *  * 
T: May I ask you to identify the main second theme of this movement? 
 Vla and C speak simultaneously. 
Vla: M. 26.  
C: M. 34 (pickup). 
 T: Okay, each state your case. 
     Vla: The principal secondary theme (ST1) begins in m. 26; a subsidiary secondary theme 
(ST2) begins pickup to m. 34.  I base this on the pregnant pause in m. 25, which by convention 
delineates the end of the first TT area and the onset of the second [see Ex. 3-11].   
T: I can see that.  And that the preparatory dominant is of C rather than of the relative 
major poses no problem.  The G major dominant connects to E@ by 3rd.  Beethoven began to 
experiment with 3rd-relationships in sonata form, a trait Schubert and Brahms enthusiastically 
adopted.  In the Piano Sonata in F, op. 10, no. 2, to take another instance, his preparatory 
dominant is of A minor (!)—that is, it is an E major chord, which then connects to the secondary 
key of C by 3rd.  (We don’t get that promised A minor until the beginning of the development, and 
even there it is stated rather equivocally.)  An alternate perspective is that the dominant in both 
cases is back-relating—that it has no syntactical connection to the next chord.  Such back-relation 
enhances the effect of a medial caesura—it creates a greater sense of separation between the first 
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and second TT areas, a greater sense of formal fragmentation within the exposition (fragmentation 
being another Romantic feature, along with 3rd-relatedness, to which Beethoven was one of the 
first to give voice).  Now (speaking to C), state your case. 
C: Well, you’ve been saying that starting in m. 26 we get the relative major, but is that 
really true?  It seems to me that Beethoven uses the initial E@ chord as a springboard for A@—the 
local tonic is really a V(7)/IV (just as at the beginnings of the First Symphony and the “Pastoral” 
Sonata).  And then the passage is sequenced, further undermining the supposed E@ tonic.  Not to 
mention, the theme itself is rather insubstantial and fragmentary—not what I would associate with 
a traditional second theme.20  However, in m. 34 Beethoven commits to both a stable key area, the 
relative major, and a stable theme, with a tight-knit, sentential construction.21 
T: Beethoven is generally fond of creating ambiguity at the second thematic zone.  He does 
so here, as you have observed, by supplying a medial caesura but also a theme and key area that are 
both unstable in some sense.22  So the crucial question, for our purposes, is, how would you play 
                                                
20 Beethoven follows an almost identical procedure in op. 10, no. 1, first movement: a medial caesura 
articulates the onset of a theme that is very fragmentary and sequential and whose key center is unstable—
as in the Quartet, he no sooner touches on the relative major than converts it into a V of IV.  Clearly, in 
ops. 10, no. 1 and 18, no. 4, written in close proximity and in the same key, Beethoven was experimenting 
with similar techniques.  His interest in playing with the rhetorical possibilities of medial caesurae, however, 
can be traced back to his earliest work, dating from the Bonn period, as Everett (2012) has shown.     
21 On the distinction between tight-knit and loose-knit formal constructions, see Caplin (1998, 17). 
22 Elsewhere, he tends to favor the latter, tonal procedure.  Two examples are the first movements of the 
Piano Sonata in C, op. 2, no. 3 and of the Eighth Symphony.  In the sonata, the first second theme is 
thematically substantial and characteristically lyrical but is in G minor rather than G major (cf. op. 13, first 
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the passage starting in m. 26 as if it were the “primary” secondary theme?  The same question goes 
for m. 34.23   
Quartet experiments, playing the earlier passage with more tone, more line, and less staccato when 
treating it as the primary second theme.24  In this rendering, the players become aware of tiny motivic cells 
passed off between cello and first violin, as shown in Ex. 3-11.   
T: Now, another factor to consider in cases of musical ambiguity is, does the score itself 
have anything to say about the ambiguity?  To find out, we might look ahead to the recapitulation.  
What do you notice? 
Vla: I don’t see the “first” second theme at all.  We go straight from the cadential passage 
to the “second” second theme.   
                                                
movement).  Only subsequently does he proceed to G major.  In the symphony, he states only one second 
theme but initially in the “wrong key”—vi; he then backtracks in order to restate it in the “right key”—V.  
Generally speaking, Beethoven’s possible motivations for such procedures are complex and need not detain 
us here.  Suffice it to say, I believe they pertain both to pointing up, laying bare, formal conventions (a trait 
Adorno attributes to his late works but which I believe permeates all of his music to some degree) and to 
the desire to create a fluid formal dialectic by allowing thematic identity to emerge gradually and 
retrospectively (on which, see Schmalfeldt [2011]).    
23 It is possible that the passage at m. 26 is retrospectively (upon the arrival of m. 34) the second part of a 
two-part transition, but given the impact of the medial caesura, I think it is more suggestive for performance 
to imagine the ambiguity pivoting on whether this passage represents a “false” versus “real” second theme. 
24 Extending the length of the medial caesura, as the Fry String Quartet (2011) does considerably, enhances 
the thematic effect of this passage—it makes it sound more like a bona fide second theme. 
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C: Does that mean the theme at m. 26 was in a sense illusory to begin with?  Or does that 
mean it begins as “real” and is subsequently exposed as illusory?  In the first case, we would play it 
insubstantially; in the second case, substantially.    
T: That is the sixty-thousand-dollar question in cases like these.  Broadly stated, does the 
subsequent resolution of an initial ambiguity indicate to the performer that the ambiguity is itself  
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illusory—that she should apply her retrospective awareness to it and render it in light of what she 
knows to come later?  Or does the subsequent clarification form an essential part of the narrative 
structure of the composition?  In which case, the performer would approach the ambiguity as a 
“first-time” listener rather than a “second-time” listener.25   
 V2: Is there necessarily a right answer to this question?  Or does it depend on context? 
 T: Oh, I think the latter, for sure.  So, what do you think here? 
 V2: Well, to me, the initial secondary theme is so obviously loose and un-thematic to begin 
with that I think it would be convincing to telegraph its insubstantial nature from the start, rather 
than wait for the recapitulation to tell us.   
 T: We can put a pin in that as well.  What’s important for now is that you are asking all the 
right questions.  Now, go rest.   
 
SESSION 3: EXPOSITION, SECOND THEME 
T: So far, we’ve encountered two significant formal ambiguities, am I right?  They regard 
the formal status of the passages starting at mm. 13 and 26.  Beethoven’s formal inventiveness and 
innovation has drawn us in as listener-performers, implicating us, begging our involvement.  And 
the analytical tools we’ve used—primarily our arsenal of formal prototypes—have focused a 
spotlight on these implicative features.  As we learned from Rosen (see Chapter 1), such prototypes 
are fictions, false generalizations.  But unlike Rosen—who, I suspect, is concerned more with 
“truth” than with interpretation—we don’t necessarily view these fictions as deleterious.  Quite the 
contrary: like the Ursatz, they are backdrops against which the peculiarities and ambiguities of 
                                                
25 See Cone’s (1977) typology of the three kinds of listener.    
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particular pieces stand out, and that, again, compel us interpreters to grapple with various 
interpretive dilemmas, in the process weaving us into the very fabric of the musical work.   
V2: So, for example, there isn’t necessarily one “true” second theme.  But applying the 
template in which there is can elicit fuller engagement, can open our minds to different 
interpretive options.   
T: Exactly.  The score presents a possible scenario by which there is a competitive encounter 
between two second themes—it contains the seed of this imagining, or the material trace onto 
which this scenario can be reasonably imposed.  The formal template is a kind of additional fictive 
layer, a fictional world in which it is true that a sonata form has only one “proper” second theme 
(that is, only two primary, diametrically opposed themes).  The analytical fiction that there is only 
one real second theme brings out the fiction implied in the score that two secondary themes are 
competing for primacy.  The theoretical fiction enhances the fictionality of the work, it concretizes 
this potential.  Am I making myself clear?  Perhaps someone else can restate this crucial point, so I 
know you understand it? 
V1: I volunteer.  We imagine it to be true that there is only one real second theme, and 
imagining this necessitates more rigorous interpretive involvement than if we just took 
Beethoven’s music at face value, devoid of theoretical reflection—it we took the piece to have two 
second themes that are equally secure ontologically.   
T: Well put. 
C: It’s interesting, by the way, that both ambiguities seem related thematically, 
conceptually. 
T: How so? 
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C: Both have to do with Beethoven setting up the expectation of a sentence and then 
problematizing it somehow.   
V1: Yes, in the passage beginning m. 13, what we expect to be the continuation phrase of 
the sentence becomes a reprise of what occurred just prior to the sentence.  In the passage 
beginning m. 26, what we expect to be the continuation phrase (starting pickup to m. 33) turns 





T: Excellent.  Such a “thematic” connection among these instances of ambiguity is, in fact, 
a kind of musical theme in its own right.  But instead of an idea in music, it is an idea about music, 
one arising from the collision of musical potentiality and theoretical reflection.  I have dubbed 
Example 3-12: mm. 32–53: second theme/tonal area 
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such meta-musical motives “conceptual motives,” akin to Schoenberg’s “Idea.”26  Now, does 
Beethoven problematize this sentence, mm. 34–41? 
V2: I don’t think so—seems pretty straightforward.   
T: Very.  In fact, it is the most stable, most tight-knit entity thus far.  Moreover, this 
sentence and its varied restatement comprise the antecedent and consequent phrases of a larger 
period, the consequent being extended . . . 
C: By standing on the dominant of the relative major . . . 
V1: Which is significant because this is the first real dominant preparation of the second 
tonal area, for mm. 19–25 stood on the dominant of the home key, not that of the relative major. 
T: Right.  Which lends the closing theme starting in m. 53 a quality of arrival and stability, 
yes?  So, after the tumult, anxiety, and confusion of our opening 33 or so bars, we are gradually 
coming into the clear: first with a main second theme that is structurally stable, then with a closing 
theme that is tonally stable (because of the preparatory dominant, which the main second theme 
lacked).  So, this marks a (temporary) respite from ambiguity.  So, does that leave us nothing to do 
as interpreters? 
C: Certainly not!  We somehow have to embody the sense of arrival, respite, resolution, 
stability, whatever.  The only agitation will come with the harmonic extension, mm. 49–52, but 
that quickly gives way to, and makes possible, the tonally stable closing theme. 
Quartet plays.  
                                                
26 For more on conceptual motives generally, and on the similarities and differences between this notion 
and Schoenberg’s Idea in particular, see Swinkin (2012).   
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T: Good, that analysis at least covers the overall tone and mood.  It is fruitful to establish a 
context, as we have done, in order to delimit a dynamic and temporal range, one to which the 
smaller details will be relative.  Now let’s get into more detail.  Is this theme at m. 34 entirely new? 
V1: I see what you’re getting at.  It derives from that ascending 6th-figure in m. 5 [Ex. 3-13]. 
C: Or more precisely, from that figure in its intervalically expanded and rhythmically 
extended form, mm. 10 ff., since the figure in the second theme continues down by two steps, not 
just one as in m. 5. 
T: Although, even in mm. 5–6, one could say two downward steps were “waiting to 
happen”—D–C–B&.  There, Beethoven avoided or downplayed the syntactical connection between 
the C and B& by means of a motive-repetition and slur break.  Now, in the second theme, he 
actualizes that foiled implication, and does so by taking the lead of mm. 10–11.  In other words, 
the second theme is a kind of synthesis of two previous forms of the 6th-motive.  And this 
connection is made crystal clear in the continuation phrase (mm. 38–41), which replicates the 
syncope chain of mm. 17 ff.  (I can’t help but wonder, by the way, whether the violin’s D–C–B& in 
m. 12 foreshadows this integrative act; what would it be like to play it that way?)  An interesting 
byproduct of this synthesis is that the tune spells out the 3rd-motive, which also connects it to the 
beginning of the opening theme, a connection Beethoven makes audible by placing an accented 
dissonance in the second bar.  Hence, not only does Beethoven synthesize two different variants of 
the leap motive but also two different components of the opening theme.  Put another way, he 
reveals the underlying similarity between those two parts (between mm. 1–4 and 5–8).  





T: Absolutely.  This, I think, is one of his crucial innovations in sonata procedure.  As 
Dahlhaus has talked about, earlier classicists like Mozart were more inclined to build large, 
symmetrical structures in their sonatas, which meant they often had to rely on stock material, 
especially at cadences, to fill out a phrase, to create symmetrical proportions.  Beethoven, by 
contrast, relied less on this “architectonic” conception and more on a thematic one—he typically 
generates a sonata movement by means of a particular thematic argument, such that, in fact, 
otherwise external conventions come across as byproducts of motivic processes unique to that 
Example 3-13: second theme synthesizes two forms of 6th-mot. (see 3-14a and b) and two parts of opening theme (see 3-14b and c)  
!"
(a) first theme, violin 1  
(b) second theme, violin 2 
potential 3rd 
provisionally realized? 
6th-mot. (expanded) now followed 
by true 3rd motion (no syntactical break)  
(c) first theme, violin 1 
(appogg.-figure clarifies relation 




6th-mot. in original form (not expanded) 
followed by true 3rd motion 
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piece.27  He builds his sonatas from the inside out, as it were.  As a result, very little material is 
conventional. 
C: I see what you mean about how Beethoven managed to render otherwise generic 
material specific to the piece at hand.  Take the cadential swing at m. 13, for example.  It has a 
thematic quality because it comes out of the B&–C of the previous bar—this is motivic linkage, 
right?  [See Ex. 3-7.]  And this thematic quality is affirmed when that passage gradually becomes a 
sentence (the sentence being a form themes commonly assume).  And because this lick is written 
in a quasi-thematic way, Beethoven sets up the opportunity to render big cadences, as in mm. 73–
74 and two bars later, thematically specific, not just generic! 
T: Very perspicacious.  Put another way, the piece—as seen through the lens of developing-
variation theory—directs us to imagine that the cadences are not generic but particular to this 
piece.28  
Vla (slightly annoyed): This has been a stimulating digression, but I’m losing track of how all 
this relates to how we should play the second theme. 
T: Fair enough.  I’m not sure we’ve added anything new in that respect.  I think our 
knowledge of the synthesizing function of the theme simply lends more support for that 
reassuring, resolving mood on which we had already settled.  Then again, maybe every difference 
                                                
27 Dahlhaus (1974, “Issues in Composition”); also see Adorno (1988, 44). 
28 On Beethoven’s propensity to individualize conventions, such that they seem to arise from the exigencies 
of a particular piece, see Burnham (1995, 29–65).  Also, as Kerman memorably put it, Beethoven “was 
eminently capable of dignifying cliché into aesthetic bullion” (1966, 67)—although he grouses that in the C 
minor Quartet, Beethoven did not! 
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makes a difference—every new bit of information, every new structural motivation, will lead to a 
slightly different interpretive result.  How it does, I cannot necessarily codify.  All I can do is don 
my Stanislavski hat and say, “think as hard as you can.  As for the result, it will produce itself.”29  
As he would tell his students, think about what the action is.  This second theme—within the 
fictional world lying at the intersection of the piece and our theoretical systems—explicates, 
clarifies, resolves, synthesizes.  The piece here has really found a home, albeit temporarily.  Don’t 
try to express any these items directly, merely think of them as you play and see what happens. 
Quartet tries. 
T: Okay, in time, you will have more opportunity to synthesize all these insights.  Let’s take 
a break and then get into subtler aspects of this warm theme. 
 
*  *  *   
V1: Earlier, someone mentioned that my C–B in m. 12 provides a link into the section 
beginning m. 13.  By the same token, I wonder if the viola lick in m. 33 is the impetus for my 
counter-figures in mm. 35, 37, and 41.  
T: Good question.  But rather than frame the issue as a factual one (“is the viola’s figure 
the impetus for mine?”), I would trust that the very impulse to ask that question betokens a potentiality.  
So ask, “how might I play my figures so as to actualize that potentiality?” 
V1: Yes, how would I?  Maybe I would shape each with a comparable degree of crescendo to 
how the viola plays it. 
                                                
29 Stanislavski (1935, 43). 
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Vla: Or maybe shape each figure more than the one before, since, to my ears at least, they 
show increasing affinity with my lead-in figure.  (Thinks silently: “I will help out my colleague by slightly 
accenting my initial A& in m. 33 so that the rhythmic relation of her figure to mine will be really clear.”) 
T: Notice, by the way, that m. 37 has the turn-motive from m. 1, inverted and augmented 
[Ex. 3-14].  
V2: And that connection is made crystal clear by following right on the heels of my turn. 
V1: Since mine is augmented, perhaps I can exemplify that by stretching it out a bit, 
backphrasing. 
C: Wow, this second theme really doesn’t let a single morsel of the first theme go to waste, 
does it?  It uses the motives of the 3rd, 6th, and turn.  
V2 thinks: “In fact, my part is like a microcosm of the first theme all in itself, but it reverses the 
sequence of real events, almost as in a dream—within the first two bars, first comes the 6th-motive, then the 
turn-motive; the 3rd-motive falls into place gradually.  I can abstract from that idea an image schema of 
reversal or regression, which I could perhaps embody with a decrescendo, mm. 34–35.  I never hear it played 
that way, so I’m almost afraid to suggest it out loud.  One would usually be urged to treat E&, the focal 
dissonance of the basic idea, as the point of arrival; here, I would taper it instead.  Also, one is usually urged 
to bring out the melody when it is in an inner voice, and with the decresendi I am considering, the theme 





wisdom might just result in exposing a new sentient dimension of this passage, one distilled from structural 
awareness.  I’ll try it next time we play it.  Also, it will help keep my dynamic down so that I can then really 
come out starting in m. 38, which is where a significant portion of my theme’s origin is revealed.  It will also 
enable me to delineate, crescendo on, the successive G–A@–B@, mm. 34, 36, and 38 [Ex. 3-14].  Hey . . .” 
V2 (rejoining conversation): “Hey, I just noticed that my descending third, G–F–E@, which is  
a slower version of the initial 3rd-motive in the first two measures, is itself shadowed by a slower, 
ascending third, G–A@–B@, over the course of the phrase.   
C thinks: “Wait, my E@–D@–C in m. 26 [Ex. 3-11] is this same 3rd-motive. This idea is supported by 
the fact that those notes replicate, in chromatically altered form (due to the tonicization of A@), the pitches of 
the original 3rd-motive.  So, I should play that figure somewhat melodically not just because the first violinist 










imitates it, but because it is motivically significant in the grand scheme.  And it does not just recall the 
opening but it also prepares for the descending third of the second theme (which—oh I see now—is even more 
immediately presaged by the first violinist’s F–E@–D, mm. 32–33.  And what’s more, there is a pattern to all 
these third motives!—a slower ascending third of E@–F–G [Ex. 3-15], which supports the idea that the “real” 
second theme arrives in m. 34.  The connection between this rising third and the second theme is clinched by 
the fact that the rising third E@–F–G leading into the second theme is reiterated in that theme itself—the 




T: What might this suggest for performance? 
V2: Well, this phrase is all about slowness, expansiveness—in relation to the first phrase of 
the piece (it augments its 3rd-motion) and even in the relation among parts within this theme (the 
rising 3rd, mm. 34–38, augments the initial descending 3rd, mm. 34–35).  So, might we actually 
choose a slightly slower tempo for this theme to exemplify that?  Would that be okay with 
everybody? 
3rd-mot. 
 m. 26, cello                   mm. 32–33, vln. 1           mm. 34–35, vln. 2 
Example 3-15: ascending 3rd leading into second theme 
3rd-mot. 
inverts third in compressed time-span 
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Quartet tries it.  
C: The question is, where would we resume the original tempo?  I can’t help but feel it 
should happen when I reenter the picture in m. 39.  Between the slower tempo and my absence, it 
will be as if the theme to the point at which I enter is a kind of interpolation, an alternate realm, 
and my job is to help restore reality.  And that makes sense, because in the consequent phrase, the 
top three strings resound the theme in a quasi-chorale texture, which connotes an intersubjective, 
communal realm, over against the solipsistic individualism of the previous phrase.  (This texture, 
by the way, no doubt recalls that of mm. 5 ff., and that helps elucidate the derivation of the second 
theme from the latter part of the first.)     
T: Does playing the antecedent phrase “solipsistically” fly in the face of treating the theme 
as a more solid, affirmative arrival?  Or can we have it both ways? 
Vla: Sure, why not?  An actor might feel several emotions simultaneously, on different 
levels of consciousness, with maybe one emotion being more at the fore.  Perhaps the primary 
sense here is arrival and affirmation, but the secondary one is ethereality?  What would it be like to 
play it with these apparently contradictory qualities in mind?  Can we try it? 
T: You can.  But one thing I know: the more complex and multilayered the sentient state 
you desire to musically embody, the less you can “try” to do it, the less you can plan it.  The more 
you just need to let it marinate, seep into your psyche, and then, when you come back to it, the 
complex, ambivalent state might just happen naturally, if you’re lucky.  
  
SESSION 4: END OF EXPOSITION 
V1: I think I know why the theme starting in m. 53 has a kind of summational quality! 
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T: Tell me.  
V1: My initial two pitches, G–B@, compactly summarize the second theme, which traces G–
A@–B@.  And that line is made more explicit when my gap is filled in, mm. 53–54, with B@–A@–G 




T: Yes, and many other features from both main themes return in disguised form as well.  
Namely? 
Example 3-16: derivation and features of closing theme 
(a) second theme 




A  –G Nb.-mot. 
(because rhythmically  
 delineated)? 
b A –G Nb.-mot. b 
“undercutting” 
augments 
hypermeter:    1            2                      1                   2                       1                    2 
            
                                    or 1? 
´
(retroactively induces 
 hypermetric “bump” or  
 even shift) 
304 
V2: The syncopation-motive?  
T: Yes. 
Vla: The   
€ 
ˆ 6 –  
€ 
ˆ 5  (A@–G) neighbor motive, I think.  True, A@–G, mm. 54–55, is possibly 
encompassed by the larger third motion, B@–A@–G.  Then again, the A@ and G are rhythmically 
grouped together.  Also, we get into that theme by way of a large A@–G neighbor motion; the high, 
accented A@5 really makes that clear [Ex. 3-16].   
T: Well, at the very least you point up an interesting ambiguity between the 3rd- and 
neighbor-motives—one I don’t think we’ve encountered before in this piece.  Which perhaps 
lends this section an air of novelty.   
C: Notice, by the way, that I play the B@–A@–G figure in chromaticized form in m. 59.  
Once again, however, there is ambiguity, for the rhythmic grouping, the proximity of A@ and G, 
might easily delineate a neighbor-motive within the 3rd-motive, especially if I lean a bit on the A@.   
T: And we can hear the cello figure as augmenting the chromaticized 3rd-motive leading 
into the theme, m. 53 [see bracket in Ex. 3-16].  Holding back on the cello figure a bit, 
backphrasing, might help exemplify that augmentation.  And bringing it out above the other parts 
can signal a narrative crux—that you are undermining at this moment the rustic joviality of the 
theme.  (This theme is “rustically jovial,” I think, due both to the texture—the most homophonic 
and homorhythmic of the piece thus far—and to the diatonic simplicity.)  Robert Hatten calls this 
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undermining trope “undercutting,”30 and it is generally created by precisely such a chromatic slide 
in the bass at a cadence.    
C: And the sense of the rug being pulled out from under us is made even more tangible by 
the crescendo leading to a subito piano, mm. 59–601. 
V2: And isn’t that tension even anticipated in the previous bar (m. 58)?   
T: Why? 
V2: Well, it starts to inject chromaticism into the otherwise purely diatonic theme—in my 
part, in fact.   
V1 thinks: “That E&–F motive is echoed in mine” [Ex. 3-16]. 
V2: We also get a “premature” sf bar.  Something is definitely brewing here.  
T: Also, mm. 57–58 seem to initiate a “Ļ–Ĺ” sequence that is then curbed by the cello’s 
(and second violin’s) chromatic slide.  (T plays Ex. 3-17b; notice the relation of this sequence to the more 
prototypical 5–6 Root sequence, shown in Ex. 3-17a).  Also, notice how the sequential harmonies are 
unevenly distributed, the last two really squeezed in there.  This adds to the sense of acceleration.  
So, let’s try mm. 49–60 a few times and see what we have so far.  
 
                                                





As the Quartet does so, details begin to take shape, as shown in Ex. 3-18.  
T: I heard some effective things.  In particular, the different quality of sforzandi in mm. 52 
and 53 nicely distinguished between the anxiousness of the –  motive and the relative 
contentment of the new theme.  Coming way back on mm. 54 and 56—playing those bars 
murkily, maybe a bit unsteadily—is a nice result of the motivic ambiguity we discussed.  In other 
words, the initial crescendo and rhythmic stability nicely parallel the motivic clarity and confidence 
of the G–B@ summary, whereas the decrescendo and rhythmic instability nicely parallel the 
5                      6                                                                     5                               6          
!""
Example 3-17: (a) generation of       -Root sequence; (b) alignment of sequential model and actual music !  
Asc. 5–6 seq.                                       Asc. 5–6 Root seq. (a) 
5                      6                                                                     5                               6          ##" ##" . . . 
!""
5                          6                                                                       5                               6          8     8 
!  Asc.  "  seq. #" Asc.  "  root seq. #"! 
!  
. . . 
"  "  ____ ____ ____ !  ____ "  "  !  !  





 wide then narrow) 
57 
"  - 
  
! 




confusion as to whether we have a 3rd-motive or a neighbor-motive here.  (Thinks: “most ensembles 
would probably hairpin this passage intuitively, simply on the basis of its contour—up then down.  But our 
ensemble’s hairpin is colored and timed just a bit differently—a bit more uniquely—because they are not just 
doing it for its own sake, not just because it is a generically ‘musical’ thing to do, but in response to the 
emotional connotations of the analysis.  The difference between such an execution and a more generic one may 
be minute, and I may not be able to put my finger on it or notate it precisely, but I know it is there.”)  Also, I 
like how you ratchet up the tension in m. 58.  Just a tiny detail, second violin: if you sock your 
syncopated E@ in m. 58, you will anticipate the syncopation in the cello, and thus in turn the 
syncopation of that entire bar in relation to the hypermetric scheme [see Ex. 3-16b].  
 
 
T: Now, that hyper-syncopation begins to throw off our sense of hypermeter a bit, doesn’t 
it?  In fact, after that, the hypermeter goes askew.   
C: How so? 
Example 3-18: interpretive ideas for mm. 52–59 
sting—sharp, quick attack 
warmer—slower attack 
rhythmically 
a bit wobbly 
simile 
> 
sudden burst of energy 
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T: Well, see for yourselves.  Just say your respective rhythms on “ta” and stomp your feet 
when you hear a larger, hypermetric accent. 




T: Right, the hypermeter shifted not once but twice, didn’t it?   
Vla: Does that mean we should place an accent on the downbeat of m. 63 to indicate the 
new “1”? 
T: No, I don’t think so, because the sf here is actually being delayed relative to its location 
in mm. 60–62 . . . 
V2 thinks: “Hey, my miniature syncopation on my E@ in m. 58, in addition to immediately 
anticipating the larger syncopation in the cello, might also anticipate the syncopations mm. 60–62, all of 
which occur on the “and” of 1.  All the more reason to ‘sock it’!” 
Example 3-19: mm. 60–66: hypermeter and 3rd-mot. 
1                           2                            3                         4      
        
       1                          2                 3                 1 !!!"´
60 
hypermetric accent attenuated  
(retroactively) by delayed sf 
                3rd-mot.  
(summarizes second theme) 
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T: Hence, if anything, this bar should begin very quietly.  But doing so, beginning pp, will 
be striking enough to convey a new hypermetric unit.  Know what I mean?  The metric emphasis 
derives not from a literal accent but from a quality of newness.  Again, we want to avoid the trap of 
pursuing the most obvious or literal implications of an analysis.  Moreover, that hypermetric shift 
is not the main event: it occurs within a broader deformation of what is in essence a single 4/4 




V2: So, more important than any one detail is to infuse the whole passage with a sense of 
gradually distortion, gradual expansion, right? 
T: Exactly.  Especially in mm. 64–65, where the phrase really goes off kilter.  And especially 
in the cello, where you outline a tritone as in the first violin but on a broader scale.  Okay, let’s 
play mm. 53–70. 
Quartet does so, with V1 rendering mm. 66 with much rubato. 
T: Why are you bending the time so much in m. 66? 
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V1: Because this is the first and only time in the exposition the rest of the ensemble falls 
away, implying that my part is a quasi-cadenza. 
T: Nice thought, and I agree, this passage does have that topical connotation.  The 
question, however, is whether it is more crucial to realize that connotation or to reestablish the 
4/4 hypermeter.   
V1: Is there perhaps a way to do both, to strike a balance between the two—maybe initially 
reestablishing the tempo and taking bits of time within it?  
T: Possibly, continue to experiment.  Now, let’s also consider the tonal and motivic 
elements at work.  What do you make of the rising line G–A@–B@ in the cello (shadowed in parallel 
tenths in the first violin), mm. 60–62 [Ex. 3-19]?   
C: It fills in that G–B@ gap with which this theme began (in m. 53)? 
T: Yes, and at the same time retraces the lineaments of the main second theme, do you see 
[Ex. 3-21]?   
C: And in a rhythmically stilted fashion at that! 
T: Which perhaps intimates a quality of . . . 
C: Being pedantic—a heavy-handed “explanation” or summation of what previously 
happened in a more fluid, natural-seeming manner? 
T: Sure.  Now, all that leads to our C6 on the downbeat of m. 63.  We described that bar as 
shifting the hypermeter but in a weightless or suspended rather than emphatic way.  Does our 
voice-leading analysis bear this out [Appendix C]?   






T: So that measure is emphatic in a non-emphatic way, in terms both of hypermeter and of 
voice leading.  Now, let’s talk about that B@.  What overall significance might it have? 
V2: I guess it’s the local Kopfton, the head-tone of the second TT area.  Is that correct? 
T: I don’t know about “correct”—on what basis would we judge such a thing?  True, there 
is a lot of emphasis on B@ in this entire second area, but from a strict Schenkerian view, that is no 
guarantee of structural significance—sometimes, in fact, structural tones are inconspicuous or even 
implied while tones of secondary structural significance are emphasized.  More the question, I 
think, is: does making B@ our “protagonist” tell a good story, a convincing story, one that would 
Example 3-20: mm. 60–66: hypermeter and 3rd-mot. 
1                           2                            3                         4      
        
       1                          2                 3                 1 !!!"´
60 
hypermetric accent attenuated  
(retroactively) by delayed sf 
                3rd-mot.  
(summarizes second theme) 
Example 3-17: derivation and features of closing theme 
(a) second theme 




A  –G Nb.-mot. 
(because rhythmically  
 delineated)? 
b A –G Nb.-mot. b 
“undercutting” 
augments 
hypermeter:    1            2                      1                   2                       1                    2 
            
                                    or 1? 
´
(retroactively induces 
 hypermetric “bump” or  
 even shift) 
Example 3-21: Cello retraces melodic structure of second theme  
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seem to illuminate or be illuminated by various other musical details?  What story can we tell about 
a B@ head-tone? 
C: It kind of resists that role. 
T: What do you mean? 
C: Well, it takes a while to work up to it—we approach it via the G–A@–B@ motive . . . 
T: An initial ascent . . . 
C: Right, which in itself underscores the importance of B@, it makes that tone a point of 
arrival.  But it seems whenever we attempt to descend from it, in the manner of a local   
€ 
ˆ 5 –  
€ 
ˆ 4 –  
€ 





ˆ 1 , we spill over the   
€ 
ˆ 1 , as in mm. 38–41 and the corresponding passage in the next phrase.  Then, 
in the closing theme, it is only able to descend as far as   
€ 
ˆ 3 .  And after both unsuccessful attempts at 
resolution, the line goes up from B@ (starting in mm. 49 and 60) as if to say “descent is not 
possible, we’ll have to find another way.”  And in the end, the first violin makes a big to-do of that 
B@—playing it all over the place registrally (mm. 68–69), kind of summarizing the entire ambitus 
thus far, and then leaping from B@ down to E@ (into m. 70), as if to say, “nope, no linear resolution 
here.” 
T: And this at the primary cadence within the second area, at the point of essential 
expositional closure.  And even if we regard the B@ as progressing down to the second violin’s A@5 
(m. 69) due to the second violin reaching above the first and encroaching on its register [Ex. 3-23],  
it still would only progress at far as G, as in mm. 53 ff.  In other words, in the end, this 3rd-motive 
outweighs structural necessity; the tendency to progress down by a linear fifth is precluded by motivic 
constraints.   
Vla: So, pretty good story about that B@ head-tone.   
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T: I think so.  As in the Chopin C-minor Nocturne we looked at, the Kopfton is less a 
guarantee of structural closure than an agent to be reckoned with, a protagonist to follow along his 
or her search for such closure.  And imagining such a search—as we are directed to do by the 
piece’s potential as provisionally realized by our analysis—happens to enliven the details along the 
way.  The notational domain seems amenable to our imagining the head-tone’s search for closure.   
V2: But, how do we apply that to performance? 
T: I’m not sure we do.  But thinking about this story will inevitably affect how we play this  
section.  So, for example, try your descent from B@ in mm. 38 ff., thinking about the line “spilling 
beyond” the presumptive arrival-tone E@.   
V2 tries it a couple of different ways. 
V2: The first time I was compelled to crescendo, the second to decrescendo.  Spilling past that 
E@ could take two opposing forms.  So, there really isn’t any way unequivocally to convey that idea 





T: Nor are we trying to.  Remember, our job as performers is not to convey propositions.  
It is rather to convey the sensuous elements that underlie propositions.  So, what is important is 
that our analytical story compelled you to experiment with various nuances—of vibrato, dynamics, 
articulation, phrasing, rubato, and so on—which in turn convey shades of sentience to the 
listener.  The listener hears sounds as having meaningful relationships to one another, in the small 
and the large, even if he doesn’t or can’t articulate exactly what those relationships are.   
V1: What of that mysterious, quirky codetta, then? 
T: Maybe we should skip it for now, precisely in order to leave it a mystery. 
V2 thinks: “Hey, these tones might be derived from my G–E@–E&–F–G–A@ in m. 58 [Ex. 3-23].  
That connection doesn’t necessarily mean I should play the codetta passage any particular way.  If anything, it 





“true,” registral resolution 
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might give me some motivation to project my part in m. 58—not just the syncopated E@ that is so important 
for the reasons we discussed, but the following notes as well!  
 
 
SESSION 5: DEVELOPMENT 
 C: I have to confess, I’m feeling a bit frustrated. 
 T: Why? 
C: We’re moving so slowly!  Is this really a feasible way to learn a piece?  I mean, it’s fine 
while we’re students, I guess, but say our quartet goes professional after graduation—we would 
have lots of concerts to prepare for and would have to learn pieces much more efficiently.   
 T: You have a valid concern.  And in part this method is more feasible for students than 
for professionals who are under pressure to concertize.  My hope is that, as a student ensemble, 




you will go through this step-by-step process often enough that eventually you will be able to 
generate analytical imaginings, along with their expressive and performative implications, more 
intuitively, without having to tread every single step.  This is why I have been encouraging you all 
along to allow analytic-expressive insights to manifest themselves naturally wherever possible—to 
develop a sense of when discussion is unnecessary and could even interfere.  
 C nods in acknowledgment.  
 T: That said, I urge you to keep in mind our larger goal: soloists, chamber ensembles, and 
orchestras who can learn music quickly, play competently, and concertize regularly are a dime a 
dozen.  What we are going for is something else: we are seeking to engage pieces in a richer, fuller 
way—to recognize many more of their potentialities and to realize those potentialities in an 
embodied, emotionally powerful way.  This takes time, and yes, sometimes more time than a high-
profile career would allow.  Hence, it is possible that, at some point, you might need to choose 
which road you want to take.   
 Quartet squirms uncomfortably. 
 T (clearing his throat): Think of it this way: a piece is like a person, and you have to choose 
what kind of relationship you want to have with this person. 
 Quartet looks confused. 
 T: Every person—I mean, every person—is incredibly complex, don’t you think?  Everyone 
has an intricate family history, a rich emotional life, thoughts both conscious and unconscious.  
Also, everyone harbors so many potentials, traits that might emerge as the result of particular 
interactions with his or her environment.  Finally, everyone experiences particular problems and 
challenges—and also often presents problems and challenges to others.  Now, we aren’t able to, 
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and probably wouldn’t care to, engage everyone we meet on all of these levels—many relationships 
are somewhat casual and superficial, and that is fine.  But for the people with whom we want to 
build deeper, more fulfilling, longer-lasting relationships, whether platonic or romantic, we would 
want and need to engage more of their dimensions over a period of time.  We would want and 
need to grapple with their various sides, leaving no stone, or very few stones, unturned—don’t you 
agree? 
 Quartet nods in increasing understanding.    
 T: The same goes for pieces.  For each and every one you come across, you need to ask: 
what kind of relationship do I want to have with this piece?  As with people, some pieces may seem 
less worthy of investment than others.  But, as for Beethoven’s opus 18, no. 4, I’m sure we all want 
to know it intimately, to tackle its many sides and challenges, to form an enduring relationship 
with it.  And, if you reflect on the process by which you came to know your best friend, your 
sibling, your romantic partner, whomever—you will admit that this takes time, there are no 
shortcuts.  It is, in fact, a never-ending process. 
 C (coming around): And that is time well-spent.   
 T (smiling): No doubt.  All that said, we will in fact proceed a bit more quickly through the 
remainder of the piece.   
 Quartet seems more reassured and relaxed. 
T: So, would anyone care to offer a thematic synopsis of the development? 
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V2: Aren’t we just recycling through the events of the exposition?31  I mean, we begin with 
the primary theme—now in the minor dominant—and develop that for a while starting in m. 90; 
we proceed to something resembling the transition in m. 108; then the second theme arrives in m. 
112 and is developed starting in m. 120.  After that we sit on the dominant, starting in m. 128, to 
prepare for the recapitulation. 
T: Nice and succinct.  Can anyone offer an equally succinct tonal synopsis of the 
development? 
V1 (drawing Ex. 3-24 on the board): Basically, we have a cycle-of-fifths progression, G–C–F, 
with F serving to prepare the dominant, G.  So, at least on some level, the entire development 
composes out the V—it brings us full circle from a minor V back to a major V, from a local tonic 
back to the preparatory dominant. 
 
 
                                                
31 Kerman calls this type of development “run-through” (1966, 68).  Also see Hepokoski (2002), who argues 




T: So perhaps it would be more accurate to say “full spiral” rather than “full circle”—we 
return to the dominant but in a transformed guise.  I also want to point out that the keys along the 
circle are not all of equal weight: G minor and F major are the main keys since they house the first 
and second themes, respectively; C is a dominant preparation for F.  Hence, the development 
recaptures the sense of tonal contrast evident in the exposition, one necessary to differentiate the 
protagonist and antagonist.  Now, can we get into a bit more detail regarding the formal and 
thematic processes? 
Vla: I seem to remember Caplin partitioning developments into pre-core, core, and 
retransition sections, which I would place at m. 78, 90, and 128, respectively.   
T: Naturally.  What are the main differences in thematic presentation between the pre-core 
and the exposition? 
C: I notice that whereas in the exposition I was stationed on a tonic pedal for the first six 
measures, here I unexpectedly move in the third measure (m. 80).  I definitely want to bring that 
out. 
T: Sure, but let’s go two steps further.  First, simply “bringing out,” sitting on, every note in 
this bar might miss the connotation of the variation, which is to move rather than sit still.  You will 
be much more likely to convey movement if you shape your part, as in (plays cello line of Ex. 3-25 on 
the piano).  Second, if that bar looks back to the exposition from which it deviates, it also looks 
ahead to a later passage: notice that the sequential restatement of the theme in the core (m. 98) is 
in C minor, but now over a dominant pedal point (within that key).  See the irony here?  Where 
the theme is “supposed” to be over a pedal point, it enjoys a mobile, vivacious bass.  Where the 
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theme is “supposed” to be liberated—where it boasts its own, sequence-motivated key—it is 
reigned in by a pedal point, which results from inverting the first violin and cello.   
C (facetiously): So, I’m supposed to express irony now, am I? 
T:  Sure, why not?  Which is merely to say, have some fun with that “walking bass” in m. 
80—we’re not after sterile emphasis or even some generic musical shaping, but a kind of vocal or 
gestural . . . 
C tries it, laughs. 
T: Exactly, a laugh is what we need.  But do it with your bow rather than with your voice. 
Some spiccato perhaps? 




T: Sure.  Enjoy the irony that C minor is, in a sense, a more full-fledged key here, during its 
brief anticipation, than it is within the core.  Now, lest we get carried away, notice that the key is 





quickly foiled by a deceptive motion to A@, which you can imbue with pathos—a subito change of 
dynamic and bow stroke in that measure [Ex. 3-25].   
V1 raises her hand. 
T: Yes? 
V1: I have this really weird G–A& leap, with the A displaced many octaves (mm. 87–88).  
Maybe that enormous leap overcompensates in a sense for the lack of an octave leap in m. 87, 
which, in accordance with the model of m. 10, “should have” happened.  
V2: Yeah, and that bigger leap intensifies the mystery of those open-octave Fs that you had 
in m. 10.  I believe we said that that octave, which was only partially filled, unlocked new territory 
that was the transition.  Here, this much bigger, more dissonant leap perhaps unlocks the rest of 
the development—it is, metaphorically, the chasm or space the development fills, or in which it 
unfurls.   
T: So, the two most significant moments in the pre-core go to the cello and first violin.  
That emphasis anticipates or prepares for the core, in which you two share a duet.  Here, as we 
said, you exchange parts, resulting in a kind of suppressed or stifled C minor (mm. 98 ff.).   
C: So, maybe we should play that sequential restatement with less intensity? 
T: Maybe.  Also, what do you make of the sequential interval within the model: the 
statement on G sequences up a step, contrary to its usual restatement up a fourth (which is being 
saved for the larger sequential restatement).   
Vla: We seem to be retracing that G–A@–B@ motive yet again [see Ex. 3-21], but now with 




T: Right on!  As for the affective dimension, perhaps we are entering into some sort of 
explanatory mode here: instead of the come-what-may leap of a fourth—an interval that, in the 
opening, incited ever wider leaps, ever bolder forays into the unknown—we proceed more 
carefully and systematically by step.  And this “carefulness” is borne out by the imitative-
counterpoint topic that follows in mm. 94–96, which is associated with a cerebral quality, 
especially when compared with the blunt force of the rapid-fire eighth notes and thick homophony 
that began the section.   
Vla: So, how does one play in an “explanatory mode”?! 
Example 3-26: Beginning of core 
90 
97 
a step rather than a 4th above model in  
order to unfold 3rd-mot. 
3rd-mot. (basically same pitches as in second 
TT area but relocated to G minor)  
3rd-mot. is extended, continues on via B to C  
(implied in cello/transferred to vln. 1)  in m. 98, 
 thus filling G–C gap of very opening 
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T: You don’t try to.  You just keep that idea in mind as you play and see what comes out. 
Quartet plays, starting in m. 90.   
T: The statement beginning on A (m. 92) had less power than when you sequenced up a 
fourth.  And the whole passage was very clearly articulated, just as you might articulate (as in 
“enunciate”) clearly if you were trying to ensure that someone understood what you were saying.  
Does anyone detect anything else a bit removed, distanced, cerebral about this passage starting in 
m. 90? 
V2: Well, the main theme is presented as a more tight-knit sentence than we had at the 
opening.  The looseness of the opening sentence came from both the relative melodic novelty in 
the continuation as well as from the modified repetition of the continuation.  In the core, by 
contrast, the continuation phrase sticks much more closely to the basic idea, fragmenting its basic 
idea.32   
T: Good.  Put another way, the theme is now much more like the opening of the 
“Patétique” than that of op. 7.   
V2: Right.  So, the formal concision and motivic economy make this passage seem like a 
more clear-cut, streamlined version of the opening theme, almost an explanation of it.  That, along 
with the learned counterpoint, might compel us to play this in a slightly “cerebral” way.    
T: Precisely.  In a similar vein, the coda of the first movement of the “Eroica” Symphony 
presents a more symmetrical, more tight-knit version of the primary theme than found in the 
                                                
32 The continuation is a bit loose-knit only in lacking a full-fledged cadence in m. 96, which simply has to 
do with the core’s need for propulsive continuity.  A passage will often modify the formal prototype it 
exemplifies in order better to serve a particular formal function. 
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exposition.  In both cases, such formal clarification and stabilization can be seen to generate a 
somewhat distanced, explanatory quality.  The test of whether that quality “works” is if it feels 
convincing to play it that way.   
Quartet tries. 
V1 (skeptical): Well, couldn’t we construe the streamlining process as yielding a more 
muscular, powerful version of the theme, so that it is more visceral than intellectual?  And isn’t the 
former more suitable to the dynamic of a development section anyhow?  
T: Fair question, but keep in mind, it isn’t a matter of either/or.  For example, we might 
whale on mm. 90–93 and then reign in the more cerebral counterpoint of mm. 94–96. 
Vla: But that aggression returns with a vengeance in m. 108.  
V1: Partly because, as we can see by comparing this passage to the model [Ex. 3-27], we cut 




Vla: Yes, we actually invert the sequence of events. 
V1: So a slightly receding tempo and dynamic perhaps?  This will also serve to prepare the 
second theme? 
Quartet tries. 
T: Yes, and the force of that passage also has to do with the added two bars just prior [Ex. 
3-27]—the phrase extension generates energy that discharges upon the transition passage.  This 
energy catapults us beyond the relatively composed q     g    q     g and directly into the  q  q  q    g .  OK, take five. 
  
*  *  * 
Example 3-27: Transition theme in development 
reverses event-sequence of trans. in  exposition 





V2: The first time I heard this piece, my mind wandered a bit around the middle of the 
core and when I regained my attention, for some reason I thought we had somehow gotten to the 
recapitulation, second theme (mm. 112 ff.).  
V1: Yeah, even now that I know the piece well, my mind still plays tricks on me sometimes, 
and I think we are at the second theme of the recap.  Maybe because the theme is so clearly 
presented, so stable, which is kind of rare for a development, isn’t it?  And it would not be 
unheard of to proceed from the development directly to the second theme of the recap, bypassing 
the first theme, right?   
T: Right.  Still, the theme here is presented a bit “off color,” what with the melody in the 
cello’s stratosphere.  (To C)  What does it feel like to play it? 
C: Because it is so high, it feels somewhat taut, tense.   
T: And such tension, albeit soft tension, goes along with the character of the development.  
So, even though the theme is given an expository statement, its instrumentation and the way it 
feels to play it telegraphs a developmental function, if subtly.  Now, where does Beethoven more 
clearly disabuse us of the impression of being in the recap? 
Vla: Starting in m. 120, where the theme is restated in minor. 
T: Correct.  And what is it about the minorized version that says “development”? 
Vla: Developments are associated with darkness, angst, and tension, and hence with an 
abundant use of minor.  
T: Correct—and this is no less true of minor-mode sonatas, since even here expositions 
will typically spend most of their time in major.  So, Beethoven first toys with our conventional 
expectations, by providing very tight-knit versions of both themes that counter, to some extent, the 
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visceral forward-thrust by which developments—cores in particular—are characterized.  But then, 
in m. 120, he adheres to those conventions once again.  
Vla: Yet, there is a disparity here, right?  Because on the one hand, the music, in again 
conforming to expectations and conventions, has a positive connotation, it promotes “cognitive 
consonance.”  Yet, the nature of that conformity, the reversion to angsty minor (with plenty of 
emphasis on the @ – ) promotes a kind of a cognitive dissonance.  See what I mean?  
T: Interesting paradox.  And here’s another: mm. 124–1281 give us the longest syncope 
chain yet [Ex. 3-28].  In this sense, the passage, although highly transitory, is a point of arrival in 





ˆ 6   
! 
ˆ 5 






4 held-over notes 
7 held-over notes 
m. 10, vln. 1 
m. 17, vln. 1 
m. 124, vln. 1 
6 held-over notes 
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C: So we have two dualities somehow to embody here: mm. 120 ff. are at once reaffirming 
and disturbing, mm. 124 ff. are at once overflowing and stable.   
T: Well put.  Experiment for a while. 
Quartet does so. 
T: What did you notice? 
V1: We imbued mm. 120–124 with a quiet tension—one to some extent guaranteed by  
Beethoven’s conjunction of piano and minor, but enhanced and qualified, in maybe incalculable 
ways, by our awareness of the phrase’s duality.  Tense because minor, but contained tension because 
reverting to a formal norm.  As for my part, I was inclined to play it matter-of-factly, as if resigned 
to the return of anxiety, resigned to the return of a formal norm.  And Beethoven clued me into 
that mood by omitting the characteristic suspension-figure.     
T: Yes, I inferred the matter-of-factness or curtness from the way you clipped the final note 
of each subphrase.  I also noticed that you all played mm. 124 with a relative sense of arrival, with 
a big sound right away, yet not so big that you couldn’t still crescendo thereafter.  This I think 
stemmed from your realization that this phrase constitutes the apotheosis of the syncope idea.  
And Beethoven facilitates this sense of arrival by having the upper three strings revel in imitative 
counterpoint right away, then gradually weeding out that figure.33  He thus intimates that, despite 
the crescendo, the real arrival is at m. 124.  You really made the most of this, and I have to say, I 
found it more interesting than the more generic move of backing away at the start of a crescendo (a 
                                                
33 That is, there are three eeh figures in m. 124, two in mm. 125 and 126, then none in m. 127. 
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technique we are all taught to do) and simply crescendoing in a routine manner.  Your choice was 
more specific, more part of a narrative sequence of events.   
 C: Nobody mentioned my part in this passage, but it also helps vary the syncope idea: 
whereas in previous syncope passages I simply shadowed the first violin at the tenth below, here I 
alternate between 10ths and diminished 5ths, which gives the bass more weight [Ex. 3-29]. 
 T: Indeed it does.  In both cases you help create a descending-third sequence, but here you 
create first-inversion rather than second-inversion chords.  The descending thirds-chain, (A@)–F–
D@–B@–G, ends on the home-key dominant which, in turn, initiates the retransition.  Looking 
ahead, do you see any further indication of that 3rds -chain? 
 V1: Yes, in my part, starting pickup to m. 129!  [Ex. 3-30] 
C: Big deal—thirds are ubiquitous in tonal music. 
 T: True.  But the first violin’s correspondence with your part is substantiated by near pitch-
identity (allowing for chromatic alteration). 
 C: Oh, I see.  The violin reverses or inverts the 3rds-scheme, and within a much shorter 
time-span. 
 T: Which might inspire you, first fiddle, to accelerate, which will also create a sense of 





V1: Now I see why my G major arpeggio has an added seventh, an F (decorated by F#).  On 
the face of it, I seem to be merely imitating the cello of m. 128, but that F#/F& is telling: it relates 
my part more to that 3rds-chain of the cello in mm. 124–127 than it does to the cello of m. 128.  
Or at least, it amalgamates the two passages.   
C: Yet, it is interesting that the F# threatens to overshadow the F&, the 7th of a V7, necessary 
for the tail of the retransition.  In fact, in m. 131 we get the F# without the F& (the latter doesn’t fit 
into a C minor chord).  It is not until the passage starting in m. 132 that we weed out that F#, that 
we get F without its chromatic counterpart.  
 
Example 3-29: Sequence, mm. 124–127 
Descending thirds seq. with applied V   chords (reduction/normalization) 
As opposed to descending thirds (5–6) seq. with applied V   chords (transposed reduction of mm. 17–19) !  
V !  V                V                  It.         V  !
V               V !  !  "  "  
#  




T: Right, we quash the chromaticism in order to pave the way for the recapitulation.  And 
right after that decisive moment, m. 133, Beethoven shifts the hypermeter to begin on a new 1 [Ex. 
3-30], which is established by the first violin starting its continuous stream of eighth notes at that 
point; Beethoven also marks that moment with a crescendo.  The confluence of factors at this bar 
makes it cry, “Clear for take-off!” 
Quartet plays from m. 128. 
Example 3-30: relation of 3rds-sequence to retransitional material 
(    ) 
* 
* parenthetical because not in the same register of the other notes in the sequence 
  (parenthetical status reinforced by approximate retrograde, mm. 128–129, which  
   only goes as far as F) 
120 
128 
1             2                    1                   2                   1                     2 
                                          1 
inverts/retrogrades  
(with chromatic alteration) 
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 T: It’s amazing how Beethoven can dramatize and specify such an otherwise pro forma thing 
as attaching a 7th to a V at the retransition, isn’t it?  This is what Beethoven does generally—he 
dramatizes the most basic facets of the high-classical language, brings them to the forefront of 
awareness; he renders them specific to the piece at hand, integrating them into its musical drama.  
And you, in turn, shadow that process by dramatizing and specifying the otherwise generic 
crescendo by imbuing it with a particular purpose.  In our reading, it makes perfect sense to energize 
mm. 133 ff. right away, just as we did the passage starting in m. 125.  From both passages, we can 
appreciate how developing a structural scenario and a concomitant narrative can provide specific 
motivations for dynamics and other expressive indications.  And how, armed with such a 
motivation, one is likely to render such indications in a fresh, novel way, one deriving expressive 
force both from its vocal or gestural quality and its relation to other expressive choices within the 
narrative.   
 
SESSION 6: RECAPITULATION AND CODA 
 T: Last coaching—let’s make it count! 
 V2 (eager): Shall we focus on the ways in which the recap deviates from the exposition? 
 T: Absolutely.  The development, as we saw, basically recycled the events of the exposition, 
but of course with significant variations.  We might even say that this development as a whole is a 
kind of variation of the exposition, the latter serving as a kind a “theme.”  (Beethoven, arguably 
taking Mozart’s lead, was fond of injecting elements of variation form into sonata form; Schubert 
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pursued this idea even more rigorously.34)  This recapitulation is likewise sort of a variation of the 
exposition. 
 C (skeptical): Aren’t all recapitulations? 
 T: Well, sure, to some extent.  But Beethoven here has established a particularly cyclical 
dynamic due to the slavishness with which the development retraces the exposition. Hence, in this 
context—that is, coming after this development—this recapitulation, I would argue, appears to be 
even more of a variation of the exposition than it otherwise would.  The development is like 
variation 1, the recap variation 2.  
 V2 (proudly): I think my part is the first to signal the recap as a variation of the exposition.  I 
almost overshadow the first violin with a new countermelody that crosses over her register.   
 T: Good, but is this countermelody completely new? 
 V2 (considering): I guess not.  The rhythm comes from the accelerated-syncopation motive 
that I initiated in m. 58, and which shortly thereafter came to the fore in all parts in m. 60 [Ex. 3-
31]. 
T: And what about the pitch element? 
V2: Wow, I just noticed this: many of the pitches are the same as well!  The first  
countermelody (mm. 137–38) broaches the E@–E&–F I played when introducing that accelerated-
syncopation motive.  And the sequence of that countermelody (mm. 139–40) has all of those 
pitches except the initial E@ [Ex. 3-31].   
                                                
34 On Mozart’s use of variation procedure within sonata form, see Ivanovitch (2008) and (2010); on 
Schubert’s, see Dahlhaus (1986).  It is also possible to incorporate sonata-like elements into variation form, 





T: Keen insight.  And you might notice that the dyad that is invariant between those two 
figures is none other than E&–F, which is a motive in its own right.  Do you remember what the 
first chromatic pitch in the piece is (excepting & )? 
 V2 (flipping back a page): Oh, E&, which I play! 
 T: Exactly.  Beethoven nicely individuates your part by giving it most of the key instances of 
that motive.  Speaking metaphorically, within this community of four, the E&–F and the 
syncopated motive symbolize a predisposition more or less unique to you, a characteristic that 
preserves your autonomy within a larger group.   
Example 3-31: derivation of vln. 2’s countermelody 
m. 58 
135 





 V2: So, this means I should bring out all the figures containing E&–F? 
 T: I’m not comfortable with such a narrow prescription.  I would say, more broadly, that 
each of you should take stock of what renders your part a unique component of a larger whole, to 
seize upon clues to your individuality.  See, Beethoven, perhaps more than any other composer 
preceding him, sought to greatly expand the notion of musical unity so that it would encompass 
increasingly diverse and seemingly incommensurate elements.  In his late works, for example, he 
often juxtaposes themes that differ in almost every conceivable respect—key, mood, topic, texture, 
rhythm and meter, register—and would then find ways gradually to reconcile them over the course 
of the piece, such that one theme progressively assimilates characteristics of its antipode.  The 
variation movements of the String Quartet, op. 132 (the “Heiliger Dankgesang”) and of the Ninth 
Symphony, as well as the final movement of the Piano Sonata, op. 110 are cases in point.35  But 
these late works only amplify a tendency Beethoven evinced from his earliest works—a tendency to 
test the limits of musical unity, to see how far it could stretch to accommodate the most variegated 
material.  And he was showing us that such unity, arising from the bottom up, built on the backs 
of heterogeneous elements, creates a fundamentally different experience from unity taken as a 
given, as a precondition for a piece—as in many Baroque works, for example.  From an Adornian 
standpoint, moreover, we would say that such differentiated unity is not solely an aesthetic value, 
but an ethical one as well. 
                                                
35 Korsyn discusses all three works in (1983) and (1993a).  Incidentally, that the reconciliation of 
antinomies is a central concern of op. 132 as a whole is supported by the first movement, which, like the 
“Heiliger Dankgesang,” posits salient musical oppositions at the opening and proceeds to unify them on a 
subthematic level.  See Chua (1995, 54–106).    
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C: Ethical? 
T: Yes, in the sense that such music models a society whose cohesiveness does not come at 
the expense of the freedom, autonomy, and individuality of its members.   
C: I’m losing track of what all this has to do with performance. 
T: Sorry, I digress too much.  My point is this: the Beethovenian ideal by which unity arises 
not in spite of differences but precisely as a result of them—this ideal also informs the way in 
which he would individuate parts within an instrumental texture.36  You as an ensemble are a 
community, sure, but one arising from the utter differentiation of your parts in relation to each 
other.  The motivic cohesion of the second violin is merely a window into this broader 
phenomenon, which can affect how you play generally. 
C: How so? 
T: Well, just as an experiment, choose a lengthy passage from anywhere in the piece and 
each play your part as if it were a solo part, a melody completely unto itself, without regard for 
anything else around it. 
Quartet tries the first 25 bars. 
                                                
36 A pointed example of such textural unity-in-difference is Beethoven’s so-called Durchbrochene Arbeit 
technique, in which a principal melodic line is dispersed among various voices or instruments.  The 
thematic idea susceptible to such treatment cannot plausibly be conceived as unified prior to its fragmented 
presentation, but rather is inconceivable without such a presentation.  Dahlhaus states—citing the variation 
theme of the C#-minor String Quartet, op. 131 as paradigmatic—“the inner unity is not given a priori, but 
arises out of motivic dialectics.  The particles must be performed by separate voices or instruments, 
paradoxically, in order for their cohesion to be discernible” (1991, 155).  In this technique, then, 
“separation and connection are thus shown to be two facets of the same process” (ibid).  
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T: Hear how full-bodied that was, with each part shaped individually?  And it was not to 
the detriment of a larger unity.  In fact, I glimpsed a special kind of unity, the kind that arises from 
multifarious elements.  Sure, you weren’t always together, but I don’t think that is necessarily a bad 
thing; to be strategically out of sync on occasion is to enhance the polyphonic richness of the 
texture.37  Now, I’m not saying you wouldn’t need to tone down or modify some things in order to 
clarify relationships among parts, for example.  But use the autonomy of each part as your starting 
point and then tweak things for the sake of the larger ensemble.  The less desirable alternative is to 
start from the assumption that you are a monolithic entity and then find little moments to stand 
out or bring stuff out.  (To V2)  See what I mean now about having to expand your horizons 
beyond bringing out a fragment here, another there?   
V2 nods tentatively.  
T: So I leave you to play that way for a while, and I trust you will enjoy doing it. 
 
*  *  * 
V2: So, can I try to summarize your points from before to make sure I understand them? 
T: Be my guest. 
                                                
37 One might relate this style of playing to Keil’s (1995) concept of “participatory discrepencies.”  Here, the 
players of an ensemble dissonate with each other—they are either temporally or tonally out-of-sync.  For 
Keil, it is precisely such out-of-syncness that creates interest for listeners and draws them in as participants—
as ones who are compelled to move to the groove created by rhythmic disjunction, for instance, or as ones 
(like Iser’s reader) who are compelled to make sense of certain disparities.    
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V2: Concerning the secondary figures that clearly come to fore, as in m. 137 ff.—I should 
not merely seek to bring these out (though I might in some cases) but rather, more broadly, view 
them as a window through which to appreciate the individuality of my part generally.  And I 
should play with individuality throughout, like a soloist.  And when we all do, the performance 
will probably not degenerate into cacophonous chaos but rather will allow at least the possibility of 
a thoroughly heterogeneous unity.   
T: I couldn’t have said it better myself.  Now, where we left off in your part, the A@5 in m. 
140, that pitch was left hanging, wasn’t it?  What does a registrally stranded note lead one to 
expect? 
V2: That that register will be picked up at some point down the road. 
T: Right, that register, or even that particular note or the note to which we expect it to  
resolve.  To what note should the A@5 resolve? 
 V2: To G5.   
 T: Does it ever? 
 V2 (searching): Perhaps m. 157, but 159 would make a better candidate.   
T: Why? 
V2: There the long-range connection is made audible, since, just as in m. 140—and not 
since then—I perch on top of the first violin [Ex. 3-32]. 
T: So, perhaps here, starting in m. 159, would be an especially good opportunity to display 
your autonomy, to play with soloistic shape. 
 V2: Really?  But wouldn’t I drown out the first violin, which has the melody? 
339 
T: Not necessarily—you could shape your part subtly.  But even if the first violin did play 
“second fiddle” to you here, that wouldn’t necessarily be a bad thing.  After all, we had a full-
fledged presentation of the second theme in the development, as you know, so maybe now is the 
time for the variational element to come to the fore—we’ve heard the theme enough!  (By the 
same token, your variation of the first theme can come to the fore, since we also heard that theme 










music-pedagogical “fact”—as in, “never drown out the primary melody with a subsidiary melody.”  
We are more enamored with music-analytical fiction—as in, “hear this sonata form as if it were a 
theme-and-variations form”—a “fiction,” again, that is not imposed willy-nilly onto the music but 
that seems a convincing metaphorical match, one suitably compatible with various musical details 
and the potentials they suggest.  And within this fictional scenario, it makes perfect sense that the 
variant elements would take precedence over the invariant elements, just as they often do in the 
variations of a variation set.    
 Quartet tries. 
 T: Good, we’ll return to that important juncture in a moment.  But first, speaking of 
variation procedure generally, we might distinguish between two broad categories: between 
variations that decorate the theme somewhat superficially and those that alter it more substantively 
or structurally.  In sonata form, the themes are often restated in the recap with decorative 
variation, as is the case here, given the alteration in texture caused by the second violin (although 
even these counter-figures, as we discussed, are not entirely “superficial”—they have larger 
significance in bringing the E&–F motive to the fore).  Now, taking the recapitulation as a whole, 
where might we expect a more structural alteration to occur, generally speaking? 
 Vla: In the restatement of the second theme in the tonic? 
 T: Yes, and before that even? 
 C: The transition.   
 T: Exactly.  Keep in mind, some textbooks have the transition in the recap ceasing to 
modulate or modulating differently than it did in the exposition in order to stay close or lead to 
the tonic key.  But composers such as Beethoven often display some rather bold harmonic 
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maneuvers in this section not to skew close to tonic, but quite the opposite—to create some 
pointed tonal interest and variety precisely because we soon need to restate the second theme in 
the tonic.  And more than just variety is at stake: such tonal divergence in the transition makes the 
return to the tonic in the second area precisely that—a return, an arrival, as befits the structural 
significance of that moment in the overall form.  So what does he do here? 
 Vla: Some kind of sequence. 
 T: Let’s analyze it on the board [Ex. 3-33]. 
 C: Wow, I see what you mean about the harmonic audacity.  The sequence leads to E@ 
minor, quite remote from where we need to end up, in C major—double mixture, right?  If 




T: Right.  Does this sequence bring another similar one to mind from earlier in the piece? 
 Quartet flips through score. 
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 T: Remember the sequence that was presented only tenuously in mm. 57–59?  Tenuously, 
in that it was very brief, and in that its rhythmic presentation was quite uneven and erratic.  Now, 
in the transition, we get that same sequence but in a clear-cut, decisive, rhythmically stable guise.   
 C: So, I assume you would recommend we play it decisively—metrically, marcato, perhaps 
long bow strokes? 
 T: Sure, generally.  But where precisely does that energy kick in? 
 C: Right at m. 148. 
 V1: I disagree.  Because at that point, nothing about the original passage has been altered.  
It is exactly at m. 150 where this passage deviates from the model, where we jettison the first figure 
and harp on the second [Ex. 3-34].  
 T: And does that alteration come out of nowhere? 
C: Actually, no.  We had the same thing in mm. 108–109.   
 T:  Spot on.  The rhythmic idea that we merely touched on in the development is now 
being exploited.  Again, this is typical for variation procedure: our “second variation,” the recap, 
retains and amplifies an element from the “first variation,” the development.  So, our transition 
phrase is not only audacious but triumphant in actualizing not one but two potentialities: that of 
the ascending 5–6 sequence and the q q q idea. 
 Vla (skeptical): Audacious versus triumphant.  What’s the difference in terms of 
interpretation? 
 T: Well, try it first in a blindly aggressive way, with muscular bow strokes—hammer away! 
 Quartet does so. 
 T: Now, think this as you play: “we are bringing nascent ideas to their glorious realization.”   
343 
 Quartet tries. 
 T: Good, that was virile but not violent.  Moreover, there is an additional subtlety here, 
perhaps even an ambiguity.  Look again at that passage in the exposition.  Even though we seem to  
 
  
be shifting indiscriminately between tonic and dominant, the larger progression here is I–V, with 
each harmony being composed out by the other.  Now, when this passage returns, the elision of 
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what was m. 15 shifts the harmonic balance, so that we are in fact returning to I, no longer 
prolonging V.  See?  The rhythmic shift creates a new harmonic emphasis, one sticking closer to I, 
perhaps all the better to depart from it in the audacious way we described.  But, things are a bit 
more complicated when we take the hypermeter into consideration, as we can see here [Ex. 3-34].   
 C: Wait, why does m. 150 get the “1” when it is the same rhythm as the previous bar?  Why 
doesn’t m. 149 get the hyperaccent? 
 T: Because, as we noted, it is exactly in m. 150 where we deviate from the model, drawing 
emphasis to it.  So, even though we thought we are sticking close to tonic here, the hypermeter 
would suggest that the tonic harmony in m. 151 is still subsidiary to V of m. 150, a secondary 
chord in the ascending sequence [Ex. 3-33/-34].   
 C: I see.  So, the layers of tonal/rhythmic ambiguity of this passage, when seen in relation 
to the model, should give us pause—we should think twice about hammering away. 
 T: Yes, on a general level.  More specifically, we might shape it dynamically very carefully so 
as to clarify the tricky metric-harmonic syntax [see hypermetric analysis in Exs. 3-33 and 3-34].   
 V1: So, once again, a close structural reading discloses affective subtlety that we can 
embody with interpretive variances.  The latter convey a novel effect and affect that goes beneath 
or beyond the most obvious and relatively coarse emotion of the musical surface. 
 T: Exactly.  The analysis mobilizes our imagination, it helps us to generate a more nuanced 
intentional object, one that influences our interpretive choices.  Now, after break, we will revisit 




*  *  * 
 Vla: You said you had a “novel reading” of the second theme in the recap? 
 T: I think so.  The conventional sonata-form narrative goes like this: the first and second 
themes/tonalities are contrasting to the point of being antagonistic.  This scenario typifies 
nineteenth-century accounts in particular, such as that of A. B. Marx, for whom the first theme is 
more aggressive or “masculine,” the second more passive or “feminine.”38  The conflict is 
intensified in the development, then resolved in the recapitulation.  “Resolved” not in the sense of 
a real rapprochement between the personae but in the sense of the second theme capitulating to, 
or being dominated by, the first, as symbolized by the former adopting the key of the latter.  My 
reservation about this Procrustean scheme is that we sometimes forget that music-formal dynamics 
are by nature broader and more general than any one particular hermeneutic reading.  The tonic-
transposition of the second theme indicates an abstract dynamic into which we can fit any number 
of more specific actions, ones that are related but by no means identical: synthesis, integration, 
assimilation, domination, and so on.39  Different sonatas, while all employing the “sonata 
                                                
38 Marx was apparently the first to cast the first theme/second theme binarism in gendered terms (in his 
1845 treatise, Die Lehre von der musikalischen Komposition).  This idea, in turn, may have stemmed from 
Hegel, who, in Philosophy of Nature, held the male to be active, the female passive.  See Beauvoir (1949, 
chapter 1).       
39 This is where McClary (1990) errs, in my view; she seems to take the paradigm of domination as a given.  
Even if, moreover, one were to assume this paradigm, instrumental music is not nearly semantically 
determinate enough such that one could see or hear in it an unequivocally gendered type of dominance.  
Dominance is a broad dynamic that could potentially encompass any number of hegemonic relationships; it 
is not necessarily reducible to misogynist ideology.    
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principle,” might well suggest different actions.  Which one a particular sonata uses is, of course, a 
matter of interpretation, something for which one can argue based on a close and imaginative 
reading of the structural and topical fabric of the piece.  Moreover, even within the “domination” 
model, we tend to take it as a given that the first theme ultimately dominates the second.  But 
couldn’t we read the requisite transposition as indicating that the second theme assimilates the 
tonic key, rather than is assimilated by it?  In other words, over against the default scenario in 
which the second theme capitulates to the first on the basis of being assimilated to the tonic, we 
might claim that the first theme capitulates to the second on the basis of the tonic key being 
assimilated to the second theme.  In the former scenario, the second theme is taken over by the 
tonic key; in the latter, the first key is taken over by the second theme.  It could work either way, 
depending on the context, see what I mean? 
 Quartet nods tentatively. 
 T: So, which fictional scenario would seem to apply here?  Does Beethoven offer any clues? 
 Group is tacit; T looks at V2.  
V2: Does my part have anything to do with it? 
T: I think so.  Can you say more about that? 
V2: We discussed how, in the second theme of the recap, and to some extent in the  
first theme as well, my secondary part comes to the fore. 
 T: Good.  Let’s retrace our steps: where do you first supersede the first violin? 
 V2: M. 69, right?  
 T: Yes, with that A@5 left hanging, as also happens later.  But here, the first violin picks up 
that thread right at the beginning of the development, which at once makes the opening of the 
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development follow logically from the end of the exposition, and also gives it a kind of freshness, 
since we had not heard that register for several bars.  Then you take over again . . . 
 V2: At the beginning of the recap, leading again to that hanging A@ . . . 
 T: Which, this time, you yourself regain at the start of the second theme, m. 159.  In other 
words, now you are able to tie up your own loose ends—the first violin doesn’t have to do it for 
you.  Any other instances? 
 V2: How about in m. 183, which is simply a transposition of the end of the exposition? 
 T: Right, although here, since the apex of the entire piece, C7, occurs directly before in the 
first violin, I can’t help but think the voice crossing doesn’t pack quite the same punch it did 
before.  Here I think violin 1 regains its supremacy.  But, the second theme—well, that’s another 
matter. 
 V2: OK, so I predominate in the recap, second theme.  And that predominance is affirmed 
when I play the melody starting in m. 156, with violin 1 singing a descant.  And the chorale 
texture housing my melody is a kind of affirmation, it celebrates my predominance.  
 T: Something like that.   
 V2: So, what does this have to do with the sonata narrative you were talking about? 
 T waits. 
 V2: Oh, I think I see where you’re going with this!  The countermelody I have—which, as 
played by the first violin in the exposition (m. 35) was secondary—now comes to the fore, and not 
just in isolation, but as part of the culmination of a larger thematic process, involving a rivalry 
between the two violins.  And that is maybe a metaphor for the rivalry between the two theme/key 
areas?   
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T: Yes, in other words, this variation—the second violin sitting atop the first violin, the 
countermelody (possibly) superseding the primary melody—might be a cue for us to imagine that 
the second theme in the recap predominates.  That is, the dominance of the countermelody is a 
metaphor (or more precisely, a synecdoche) for the dominance of the second theme.  So 
Beethoven’s sonata, like the novel according to Iser, overturns a more conventional paradigm, 
both musical and ideological, bringing a less standard one to the fore.  Or more precisely, an 
idiosyncratic process in the piece—the second violin’s plight to outshine the first—draws us in as 
interpreters, inciting us to imagine another, less obvious fictional truth.40   
V2: Okay, I think I get it.  But does all this esoteric explanation merely affirm what we had 
already decided, for me to bring out my part in mm. 159 ff.? 
T: By no means.  This reading will affect the entire ensemble.  How do you speak, how do 
you move, when you arrive at a main point, at the crux of an argument, when you have finally 
persuaded someone to accept your view?  Can any of you gesture it? 
V1 quasi-conducts, slowly, grandiosely. 
T: Right, but due to Beethoven’s piano dynamic, the music does not boldly declare “I told 
you so” but rather quietly yet confidently affirms this unexpected predominance. 
Quartet plays it that way.   
T: Yes, I think that a slightly slower tempo will render this second theme a very special 
moment indeed.  Your appropriation of piano here—quiet, yet warm and full-toned—will preclude 
                                                
40 Citron (1992, 120–64) provides an even clearer instance of such role reversal within Marx’s scheme—
Chaminade’s Piano Sonata in C minor, op. 21.  
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the second theme from coming across as cowed.  Rather, it will convey the sense that the theme is 
humbly, graciously rejoicing in the realization of its own power, its own potential.   
 
*  *  * 
T: Where, exactly, does the coda begin? 
Vla: M. 184?  
T (to the group): Agree?  Disagree? 
C: Actually, technically speaking, the coda begins right at m. 192. 
T: Why do you say that? 
C: Well, the passage in mm. 184–191 is really a transposed repetition of the exposition’s 
codetta.  It is not until m. 192 that something really new happens, which, I remember Caplin 





T: But don’t we get a change at m. 1883?  It is more subtle than the one at m. 192, but 
striking nonetheless. 
V1: Oh, I see.  We restate the codetta theme in minor, whereas in the exposition it stayed 
in major.   
!"
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T: Right.  So if we follow Caplin’s principle strictly, the coda would begin right there.41  
But more important than the “fact” of where the coda begins is what happens narratively at that 
point. 
Vla (after some thought): Well, in the exposition’s codetta, major and minor were mixed: the 
E@ major theme contained a hint of E@ minor, with that telltale @ – ; but then the music 
returned to major as if nothing had happened.  In the recapitulation, however, following that @ –
 (now in the tonic key), the music actually responds to that cue—it is altered to minor as if to 
accommodate those scale degrees.   
T: Yes, I think “accommodation” is an apt metaphor.  Can you please play that passage in 
an accommodating manner? 
Quartet does so. 
T: Yes, very different from the hackneyed way of playing a major-to-minor switch—you 
know, from louder to softer.  Here, the minor is not some sort of echo or a weakened version of 
the major but, quite the contrary—this is home, this is where we live.  This moment is a return to 
the tonic minor that we had abandoned for some 40 bars.  Now, if this were a Finale movement, 
perhaps Beethoven would have stayed in the tonic major.  At least in his middle-period works, he 
favors a multi-movement narrative revolving around the idea of overcoming adversity, symbolized 
in minor-key works by ending with major-mode Finale—the Fifth Symphony, in C minor with a 
                                                
41 “The ‘start’ of the coda is best located at that moment when the music of the recapitulation no longer 
corresponds to that of the exposition, even if that moment is not perceived as a structural beginning” 














Finale in C major, and the Ninth Symphony in D minor with a Finale in D major, are two well-
known examples.  And in the Finale of our Quartet, he does gesture in that direction, but does so 
rather tentatively, as we see here [Ex. 3-36].  Notice, by the way, that this figure, with its 
equivocating between E@ and E&, between minor and major, distinctly alludes to the coda of the 
first movement [Ex. 3-36b], which is none other than the violin 2 motive.  So, all this is to say, if 
you were to perform this entire Quartet at some point, you would want to look at the big picture 
and settle on a narrative for the entire multi-movement structure, perhaps looking to these codas 
of the outer movements as “hermeneutic windows.” 
Vla: Hermeneutic windows? 
T: Yes, particularly telling moments, often idiosyncratic ones, that open a vista onto 
meanings that pervade the piece.  And in fact, getting back to the first movement, we have another 
such window in m. 192, with that prominent Neapolitan in second inversion.  This moment is so 
striking that, remember, it led at least one of you to identify it as starting the coda.  So, why does 
that chord pack such a punch? 





T: Yes, but not just that.  It is the first Neapolitan we have had in this movement—fairly 
uncommon for a piece in minor. 
V1: What about the D@ chord in m. 153? 
T: That isn’t a functional Neapolitan, since it is right in the middle of a sequence. 
Example 3-36: comparing ends of first and last movements  
(a) Finale, op. 18, no. 4, mm. 180–189/mm. 200–end  
200 
(b) first movement, mm. 198–202 viol
in 2-motive 
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V1: Isn’t the Neapolitan in the coda part of a sequence as well? 
T: Yes, but it begins the sequence and the phrase, and is thus a point of tonal articulation.  
Also, it is much more emphasized, much more differentiated from the surrounding chords, than 
the D@ chord was in m. 153.  At any rate, Beethoven uses the chord very sparingly in this piece, a 
trait more associated with Mozart, in whose footsteps Beethoven followed in his early works.42  (In 
fact, compare this Quartet to a C-minor piece by Mozart, the first movement of the Sonata, K. 457, 
where he uses the Neapolitan in only a single passage, to startling effect.43)  Used sparingly and 
strategically, it can really enhance the pathos and tragedy of a minor-mode piece.  To appreciate 
how much more readily Beethoven relied on the Neapolitan in his later works, think, for example, 
of the “Appassionata” Sonata in F minor: at the opening, he no sooner states the theme in the 
tonic than he restates it up a semitone, in the key of the Neapolitan (or Phrygian).   
C: Okay, just so I don’t lose the thread of our discussion: C minor in m. 188 is not a 
generic echo but, if anything, is more forceful, because it turns back to the tragic, minor key after a 
hiatus in major.  And we take an even more tragic turn at the Neapolitan, which Beethoven saves 
for this key moment.  And by the way, I think this emotional reversal is also signaled, on a very 
detailed level, by the inversion of the @ –  figure [Ex. 3-35, see brackets].   
T: Good.  Now, I think there is one more significant aspect of this Neapolitan chord, and 
it has to do with the pitch-class D@ in particular.  Looking back to the piece’s opening, a “tonal 
                                                
42 “It was as the incarnate spirit of Mozart, moulded by Haydn’s virile talent, that Beethoven was to appear 
to the musical world when the six quartets of Op. 18 . . . were published” (Marliave [1925, 1]). 








problem,” as Schoenberg would have called it, arises straight away: I am referring to the clash in m. 
2 between the B diminished-7th chord with the C pedal point, and in particular, the D 
“appoggiatura.”  This agogic dissonance is partly what lends such tension and pathos to the theme.  
And we saw how it enters into the semi-new idea in m. 5 as well, which is also infused with 
anxiety.  Much of the piece can be seen, I think, as an attempt to expunge this tension-ridden 
element.  For example, we saw that the “false” second theme subtly altered the pitches of that 
opening third motive [Ex. 3-11]: E@–D–C becomes E@–D@–C.  Moreover, the D@ there was 
rendered metrically inconspicuous (at least until m. 29, where, in its identical rhythmic treatment 
to m. 2, we are reminded of where this pitch comes from).  We might see the D@ as a vehicle by 
which to whitewash the problematic D&, even though the attempt is not entirely successful early on 
(nor would we expect it to be).  Now, as the piece proceeds, while the D dissonance is not always 
present, the angsty dissonance it initially defined is omnipresent and keeps that tonal problem 
alive.  In the turn to the tonic minor in mm. 120 ff., D@ plays a conspicuous role and finds a home 
as @  in F minor.  In the recapitulation, first theme, the angst of that D is somewhat countered by 
the unexpected prominence of the second violin, as we discussed: the latter’s syncopated, accented 
B pulls our attention away from that problematic dissonance in the first violin, as does, in a more 
proactive vein, the A@ in m. 140, where that lingering note might well overshadow the D in the 
first violin.   
V1: I see where you’re heading: the D@ in m. 192, in its definitive presentation—as part of 






T: I think so.  But, of course, we don’t fully appreciate that until the very end of the piece, 
where we get the 3rd-motive multiple times, now without the D appoggiatura [Ex. 3-37]!  The piece 
can conclude because the problematic element has been completely expunged.  And in case we 
miss the point, Beethoven now places sforzandi on all the E@s, whereas previously he had placed 
them on the Ds.   
V2: But wouldn’t the D@, being somewhat foreign to C minor—dissonant in relation to 
it—itself cause a “problem” that would need to be neutralized before we can end? 
T: Good point.  And where, if at all, do you see that happening? 
V2: Perhaps in the chromatic scale, the sequence, starting in m. 194 [Ex. 3-35].  Here the 




T: Sure.  Let me offer an analogy.  Imagine that you have a problem with a friend, that 
something is eating away at your relationship, and neither of you seem to be able to talk about it.   
Example 3-37: end of first movement: D as accented dissonance expunged  
m. 204 
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Then, one day, you decide enough is enough and it’s time to deal with the problem openly.  To do 
so, you have to be somewhat forceful or insistent: you confront your friend and demand that you 
both discuss it candidly, bring this festering problem out into the open, even though doing so 
might be initially awkward or unpleasant.  You are somewhat aggressive about dealing with this 
because you know that is the only way anything is going to change.  So, you and your friend are 
now talking openly about the systemic problem, and have finally come to some deeper 
understanding of its nature.  Is this sufficient for regaining a sense of equipoise in the relationship, 
for things to move forward in a positive way? 
V2: No, because it is not enough to hash things out.  The dust has to settle.   
T: Right, eventually you have to let down your defenses, let go of the adamance that was 
necessary to treat the problem, because you don’t want those qualities to form a part of your 
ongoing relationship.  You can’t continue to play offense or defense if you want the relationship to 
be healthy.  Just so, getting back to the music, the problem is D, the tool by which we countered it 
head on is D@, but even that needs to be purged, put away, because things aren’t really resolved if 
you’re still holding onto something.   
Vla: And that seems to happen for sure by m. 198.   
T: I agree.  But why? 
Vla: Because our “false” second theme comes back, with its innocent gaiety [Ex. 3-36b]!  
And its predominant diatonicism, coming after a densely dissonant and chromatic passage (mm. 
192–196), brings a sigh of relief.  
T: And more than that, the theme fills a gap: it had been omitted in the recap, and so 
alluding to it—albeit fleetingly, as befits its “illusory” quality—provides an added sense of 
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resolution.  A loose end has been tied up.44  So, the theme creates a sense of resolution or 
reassurance not just because of its easy-going demeanor but, maybe more crucially, because of the 
formal dynamic in which it participates 
V1: But I still have a loose end, don’t I?  I’m referring to my A@6 in m. 197, which, being 
unresolved (until m. 203, that is), would seem to cast a shadow over this otherwise problem-free 
passage.   
C: Can we try to put all this analysis into practice? 
T: Sure, just play as you allow the narrative to pass through your mind and see what 
happens. 
Quartet plays from m. 1843.       
T: I particularly liked the attention and slight emphasis you gave to the “false” second 
theme.  Most ensembles I have heard pass it by, because at this point it is easy to be swept up by 
the forward momentum driving to the end.  But, though innocuous in itself, this theme, placed at 
this crux in our narrative, plays a not insignificant role in affirming that “things are okay . . . at 
least for now.”  And yet, you also conveyed the sense of unease created by that unresolved A@ by 
playing it with slight rhythmic unevenness.  I think you were able to get across the emotional 
complexity and duality in a very tangible way, with specific, suggestive nuances of timing and 
dynamics.  The weight you gave to the section, the full rather than anemic piano, conveyed some 
sense of resolution, while the unsteady rhythmic gait conveyed, if subliminally, a lingering concern. 
 
* *  * 
                                                
44 On this and other functions of Beethoven’s codas, see Hopkins (1988).   
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Teacher and Quartet exit the classroom and chat in the hallway. 
T: I am so pleased with how thoughtfully and intelligently you have been working on this 
piece.  Again, you don’t need to make any final decisions as to interpretation now.  Even after 
performing the movement for our end-of-seminar concert, you might decide to change things if 
you perform it again in the future.  The important thing for now is that you are grappling with the 
structural, somatic, and emotional factors that motivate interpretive decisions, rather than 
regarding such decisions as merely the icing on the cake of an self-complete piece.  And I believe 
that ultimately whatever scheme of variances you adopt will be all the more compelling for having 
been motivated by a close structural reading of the piece.   
 Vla: But we don’t always have to practice the way we’ve been practicing in seminar, right? 
 T: Of course not.  Remember the very first thing I said to the class: music theory is far 
broader than the parts of it that have relevance for performance; and performance is far broader 
than the parts of it that are amenable to music analysis.  So much of what will be interesting and 
inspired, affective and effective about your eventual performance will come from working on the 
piece in ways that have nothing to do with deliberate analysis.  
 C: So, what’s our next project in this class? 
 T: We are going to work with Sandra, the singer in our class, on Schumann’s “Du Ring an 
meinem Finger.”  While vocal performance obviously poses some concerns that are unique to it 
and far removed from those of a Beethoven string quartet, I think you will detect some 
overlapping issues.  In particular, in working on the Beethoven, we have encountered several 
situations where a passage, filtered through our analytical prisms, evinced multiple sentient states, 
some of which were even mutually contradictory.  In those cases, we did not necessarily choose one 
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and discard the other but rather attempted to embody both, even if one emotion was more 
dominant than the other.  In vocal music, this kind of psychological complexity can be even more 
defined, due to the presence of a text, and more clearly conveyed, due to the ability of the singer to 
act, to dramatize the music and text, in a more overt way than we can in instrumental music.







MUSICAL STRUCTURE(S) AS SUBTEXT: RESISTING SCHUMANN’S “RING”1 
 
Classical vocalists typically sing with more musical than dramatic nuance.  Operatic singers tend to 
effuse only rather obvious emotions—perhaps because more subtle ones do not “read” in the huge 
halls in which operas are usually performed.  Also, the musical subtleties by which emotional ones 
are conveyed are difficult to project over a large orchestra.  Lied singers do not face these same 
obstacles and hence tend to display greater emotional nuance.  Still, they often prioritize the classic 
traits of beautiful singing—long lines, phrase arcs, vibrato—over acting the song.2  Musical theater 
vocalists, by contrast, are usually actors first, singers second (if not initially trained to be so, they 
are subsequently nudged in that direction).  What distinguishes classical and theater singers is that 
the latter are routinely encouraged to treat a song’s text as primarily a dramatic utterance, as the 
outpouring of a multidimensional character with an elaborate backstory.  They manifest this 
backstory in the form of an inner monologue—an explicit formulation of the song’s subtext, as the 
                                                
1 Previous versions of this chapter were delivered at the Theory Colloquium Series, University of Michigan 
(October, 2012) and The Society For Music Theory National Conference in New Orleans (November, 
2012).  The paper benefitted substantially from the participants in both sessions. 
2 The British tenor Ian Bostridge is apparently a notable exception.  I have not seen him perform, but he is 
reputed to deliver Lied cycles with compelling theatricality.  
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performer construes it.3  When the song is performed outside the show from which it is drawn, as 
in a cabaret or recital, the subtext can still derive from the character and plot of said show.  But 
more often, the performer imagines for the song a very different scenario, one perhaps more 
personally significant to him, one deriving from his own experiences.  The result is often a subtext 
only partially congruent or even sharply at odds with the written text.  Arguably, the richest, most 
compelling performances arise from such incongruity.   
I think the classical singer could benefit from adopting, to a greater degree, the acting 
approach of her musical-theater counterpart.  Such an approach is eminently feasible for the art-
song stylist, in that she has the music-structural complexity and richness of a Schubert, Schumann, 
or Brahms on which to draw.  Such structure, interpreted imaginatively and metaphorically—as 
analogous to emotional and psychological states and processes—can provide fodder for an inner 
monologue, the rendering of which produces certain demonstrable music-interpretive variances.4   
Can a close analysis be fodder for an inner monologue that is dissonant with the text, that 
resists it in some way?  I found myself wondering this in looking at Schumann’s Frauenliebe und -
leben, op. 42 (1840).  Given its evident misogyny, I feel the performer has some responsibility to 
resist the cycle’s ideology.5  This might initially seem a strange notion, because it is usually assumed 
that to perform a work is on some level to tacitly endorse it.  Jane O’Dea, for example, says, “more 
                                                
3 Such a monologue can implicate an addressee and thus be dialogic to some extent, a point to which I 
return momentarily. 
4 Lewin (1994) draws connections between music-structural assertions and subtext in operatic music. 
5 This ideology has already been widely discussed in the musicological literature.  See in particular Cusick 
(1994) and Solie (1992).  For a defense of the cycle, see Muxfeldt (2001).  
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than mere transmitters, more even than explicators, performers may be described as advocates for 
compositions.  Their task is to commend such works to listeners” (2000, 19).  My contention is 
that it is not always ethically laudable to do so.  
This chapter will develop critical, resisting interpretations of “Du Ring an meinem Finger,” 
the fourth song of Frauenliebe.  My process, following some initial exposition, will be to read the 
musical structure as consisting of parametric crosscurrents—counterpoising, in particular, 
hierarchical (Schenkerian) and horizontal (melodic and motivic) domains that cannot be fully 
integrated, thus educing a potential source of unease and resistance.  Generating subtexts incited 
by such methodological tensions, I will offer four versions of the song, performed by soprano 
Jennifer Goltz and myself, that increasingly spurn Schumann’s musicalized enclosure.  I conclude 
by reflecting upon and amplifying the feminist-critical dimensions of my interpretive escapade.  
The overall aim of this chapter is twofold: (1) to continue the project of the preceding 
three chapters, which is to demonstrate how musical structure can be employed in the service of 
musical meaning as expressible in performance; (2) to carry this project one step further, 
demonstrating how approaching art song with greater dramaturgical integrity can yield not only a 
more engaging performance, both theatrically and musically, but also a critical, political statement.  
My primary concern, therefore, is less with vocal pedagogy than with social justice.  
 I begin with some general background on the idea of subtext, then proceed to develop a 








The inner monologue is the text the actor (or his character) “speaks” behind the spoken words.  It 
is a repository of thoughts, feelings, desires, motivations, and intentions that informs what the 
character actually says—or, more precisely, that variously buttresses, lends additional complexity or 
ambivalence to, or even contradicts what he says.  When performing a monologue—a soliloquy or 
song, for instance—the character, by definition, speaks to no one directly, but she may nonetheless 
be addressing someone implicitly.  This someone may be a character who is not onstage at the 
moment or a person from the actor’s actual life.  The character often wants something from this 
implied addressee, and the monologue often implicitly goads the addressee into fulfilling that 
desire.  To this extent, the monologue is performative, a speech act.    
 Virtually all books on stage singing advocate this subtext-oriented approach—it is 
essentially a sine qua non of advanced musical-theater training.6  Typically, they advise the student-
singer to look for subtextual clues in particularly descriptive or unusual words, in the music 
itself—its accompanimental texture or rhythmic patterns, for instance—and in the relationship 
between text and music.  The student is then asked to write out the inner monologue more or less 
word for word—reading between the lines, proverbially, eventuates in writing between the lines, 
literally.  Tracey Moore, for one, instructs, “write out what your thoughts are for each line.  Your 
thoughts might be what you would like to say, but can’t.  Or it might be what you would like to 
                                                
6 See, to cite only two of the more popular texts, Craig (1990) and Moore (2008, 41–206).   
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do.  Or it might be a different thought (perhaps the opposite) about what is being expressed in the 
lyrics.  Try to write it as yourself, the way you would speak and think.”7 
This approach derives from that developed by the venerable Russian acting pedagogue and 
theorist Constantin Stanislavski (1863–1938).  This approach—now universally known as 
“method acting” or simply, “the Method”—was initially disseminated to American students by 
Stanislavski’s protégé Lee Strasberg, along with the latter’s colleagues, Stella Adler and Sanford 
Meisner, among others.  I briefly alluded to Stanislavski’s thought in the previous chapter, but I 
will expand upon it here.  In his classic volume, An Actor Prepares (1936), Stanislavski submits that 
although one cannot always generate genuine emotion deliberately, one can prepare the “fertile 
soil” from which it is likely to arise.  He counsels the student-actor to focus intensely on the 
particular details of his external environment, to execute some action, and to deliberately develop 
or carefully attend to a train of thought in response to these perceptions and actions.  All these, he 
maintains, are likely to activate unconscious processes and thus elicit an authentic emotional 
response.  By contrast, attempting to achieve an emotional state directly leads only to physical 
tension, self-consciousness, and caricature.  In other words, focusing on one’s perceptions, actions, 
and thoughts with minimal preconceptions as to what emotional state these might yield creates a 
realistic situation in which genuine emotions are likely to occur.  For this reason, Stanislavski 
admonishes, “when you are choosing some bit of action leave feeling and spiritual content alone.  
Never seek to be jealous . . . or to suffer, for its own sake.  All such feelings are the result of something 
that has gone before.  Of the thing that goes before you should think as hard as you can.  As for the result, it 
will produce itself” (1936, 43, his italics).   
                                                
7 Moore (2008, 135).  She provides a good example of a subtext (for “Some People” from Gypsy) on p. 159.   
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*  *  * 
I would like briefly to consider the ways in which Stanislavski’s thought overlaps with Schenker’s, 
his almost exact contemporary (not that, to my knowledge, they knew each other’s work).  This 
intersection is relevant to our discussion insofar as below I align the subtextual approach that 
derives from the Method with a Schenkerian one—or, more precisely, I derive various subtexts 
from the way melodic implications and motivic strands interact with Schenkerian structure.  To 
start, both Stanislavski and Schenker obviously valorize depth over surface.8  Both were responding 
to what they perceived to be superficial trends in the practices of their respective arts—Stanislavski 
to acting as mere appearance, to emoting in an affected, artificial manner; Schenker to the 
attribution of musical coherence to surface-level forms rather than to deeper-level linear spans.9  In 
                                                
8 In this respect, the two figures can be triangulated with another contemporary, Freud, to whose thinking 
Schenker’s has also been compared (see Chapter 2).  As for the affinities between Stanislavski and Freud, 
consult Sullivan (1964).   
9 For Schenker, linear progressions transcend what he considers the artificial divisions of form theory 
(Formenlehre).  For example, the exposition and development of sonata form, which from a formal 
perspective are distinct entities, are from a Schenkerian perspective a single entity (at least on a relatively 
deep structural level); that is, the interruption of the Urlinie occurs at some point in the development (see 
Schenker [1926]).  Linear progressions, on Schenker’s view, unify even forms typically regarded as highly 
sectionalized, such as rondo and variation, or as highly determined by formal operations, such as fugue.  
One might say—to employ a patently organicist, and thus fitting metaphor—Schenker viewed pieces more 
in terms of physiological processes than anatomical structure.  Schenker, in short, was the “great antihero of 
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these respective endeavors, each relied upon organicist metaphors: Schenker’s I discussed in 
Chapter 2; as for Stanislavski, recall, for example, his mention of “fertile soil.”   
Yet, both also espoused what may appear the flip side of organicist ideology, in 
emphasizing the need to employ tangible tools and reason in order to attain otherwise intangible 
or spiritual states.10  This is evident in Stanislavski’s insistence that an emotional state may be 
accessed only by means of lucid perceptions and thoughts.  He provides a methodological 
equivalent to the broader aesthetic notion that high artistic achievement is not divined or inspired 
but takes work.  Schenker, despite his metaphysical leanings and frequent invocations of natural 
“genius,” also apparently subscribed to this principle at certain points along his intellectual path.   
                                                
the Formenlehre tradition, for Schenker did more than anyone else to discredit the enterprise of taxonomic 
formal analysis as schematic and empty” (Burnham [2002, 901]).  
10 Strictly speaking, this is not antithetical to organicist aesthetics as originally conceived.  Proto-organicist 
thinkers such as Goethe retained the venerable model by which the artist is inspired by an external, 
immaterial source—the proverbial poetic muse, or some agent of divine intervention.  Yet, at the same 
time, these thinkers transposed the source of inspiration from some external realm to the mind of the artist.  
By this maneuver, organicist philosophers secured for the artist her rightful place in the process of artistic 
creation.  Hence, whereas some eighteenth-century philosophers held that the artist completely succumbs to 
his unconscious, Goethe and other romantic theorists held that the artist consciously triggers these 
impulses—sets them in motion—from which point they undertake their own, natural course.  Others held 
an even stronger view: the artist steadily applies to these impulses the force of his training, knowledge, and 
intentions, hence continually refining, modifying, and shaping them.  For a detailed historical 
consideration of these issues, see Abrahms (1953, 156–225) 
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Kevin Karnes (2005) provides a useful overview of this path.  Prior to studying with 
Brahms (1894–96), Schenker held the view that creativity was mainly instinctual.  Working with 
Brahms made him realize the extent to which sheer workmanship entered into the compositional 
process.  In this, Schenker parted with commonplace early-nineteenth-century theories of creative 
genius and aligned more with the empiricism that dominated late-nineteenth-century German 
thought.  He claimed that one cannot really know the music-creative process through abstract, 
metaphysical speculation, only through the statements of active composers, such as his mentor 
Brahms.  However, when, around 1900, he stopped working with Brahms and then gave up his 
own compositional aspirations, he returned to emphasizing the intuitive element.  In Harmony of 
1906, for example, he claimed that even those purporting to compose in modes were instinctively 
led to write in keys—their unconscious prevailed.11  And in his late, mature work, of course, 
Schenker wholeheartedly embraced the notion of metaphysical genius.  
To zoom in on this middle, Brahms-influenced phase: in an early essay, “Routine in der 
Musik” (1896), as Karnes recounts, Schenker argues that, even though Beethoven followed several 
different artistic paths during his life, he nonetheless displayed a consistent attitude (“routine”) 
                                                
11 See in particular pp. 60–83, in which he considers the Heiliger Dankgesang movement from the String 
Quartet, op. 132, which Beethoven designates as being in the Lydian mode.  Schenker asserts that this piece 
is actually in F major with a perpetually tonicized dominant—hence the B&s; behind Beethoven’s back 
“there stood that higher force of Nature [that] led his pen, forcing his composition into F major while he 
himself was sure he was composing in the Lydian mode” (60–61).  In other words, Schenker concedes that 
Beethoven was creating a Lydian effect, but maintains he did so by purely tonal means—by continually 
tonicizing V.  Brown (2005, 151–58) contextualizes Schenker’s tonal interpretation of the Heiliger.  
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toward his creative process.  Namely, as Karnes paraphrases, “he always strove to master the 
possibilities and respect the inherent limitations of the full palette of expressive means endowed to 
him by his predecessors” (2005, 168).  Beethoven—and also Brahms, according to Schenker—
found his voice by distilling the lessons of his predecessors and minting new ideas by means of 
them.  Beethoven relies upon and modernizes the past because, Schenker asserts, natural talent 
and even inborn genius are insufficient for attaining supreme artistry; for this, one must also 
carefully hone mechanical skills.  Correspondingly, on the level of particular compositional 
endeavors, spontaneous invention and conscious craftsmanship must interact.  Unconscious 
impulses must submit to rational reflection and be modified accordingly.  Hence, as Karnes 
summarizes, “the truly great composers . . . are not those predestined to achieve their greatness 
along a path predetermined by their innate creative talents.  Rather, the truly great artists . . . like 
Beethoven, never tire of exploring, in a carefully deliberating manner, the expressive potential of 
all artistic means at their disposal” (2005, 164).  Beethoven had the wisdom to filter his 
considerable instincts and talents through the models of others.  
I have taken somewhat of an excursion, but the main point for our purposes is that the 
“Method” art-song stylist will diligently fashion a tangible subtext by which she is more likely to 
feel genuine musical emotions.  Moreover, this process, in its balance and tension between rational 
and more intuitive elements, arguably parallels that by which art songs, and great music generally, 






2. THE “RESISTING” PERFORMANCE 
As I mentioned, a subtext may support, problematize, or even (seemingly) contradict the text’s 
most obvious level of meaning.  Perhaps the classic example of the last is Barbara Streisand’s 
version of “Happy Days are Here Again” (originally composed by Milton Ager and lyrics written by 
Jack Yellen for the eponymous film of 1936).12  Streisand contravenes the text not only with her 
famously slow arrangement but also with her acting choices and lugubrious singing (see her 
performance on the Dinah Shore Show—Streisand [1963]).  One might assume that the slow 
tempo would create a persistently sad take on the otherwise happy song, but Streisand’s 
performance actually traverses a wide range of emotions (none of which, however, are outright 
happy).  She begins more wistful than sad, the bridge is defiant, the last verse is grandiose, and the 
coda is angry.  These last three choices suggest that, if one is indeed to glimpse happiness, one 
must actively recover it, claim it, rather than just expect it or take it for granted.  In this way, her 
interpretive approach, which might otherwise seem merely to contradict the text and thus be 
nonsensical, consonates with the text in an unexpected way.  
Streisand’s subtext, then, though incongruous with the text, ultimately does not resist it.  
Her interpretation, though bemoaning a lack of happiness, still subscribes to its possibility.  For 
Frauenliebe, given the ethical concerns it presents, I would like to explore the possibility of 
generating a more critical, more resistant subtext than Streisand perhaps felt compelled to generate 
                                                
12 I thank Brent Wagner for bringing this example to my attention.   
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for “Happy Days”—the political stakes in the Schumann are simply higher.13  Before I do, 
however, I would like to consider the notion of a critical subtext more generally and offer a couple 
of precedents.  A resisting subtext can arise from (a) the context in which one situates a song—
assuming, of course, that one preestablishes that context for the audience in some way; (b) the 
blow-by-blow interpretive choices—the combination of musical and visual cues by which the 
performer telegraphs unease or disagreement with the words she sings (this includes the particulars 
of the arrangement in the case of pop songs); (c) a combination of these.  Ultimately, I will utilize 
option (c), but for now, I offer separate examples of (a) and (b).  The resistance of the first example, 
from an opera-cum-musical, depends almost entirely on context, is to economic and racial 
oppression, and is comparatively subtle and light-hearted.  The resistance of the second example, a 
pop-song cover, depends almost entirely on performance-content, is to gender oppression and 
abuse, and is brazen.  The first example is “I Got Plenty of Nothing” from Gershwin’s Porgy and 
Bess, as performed in the recent Broadway revival;14 the second is “Johnny Get Angry,” as 
performed by k. d. lang.15  
                                                
13 In at least one instance, however, “Happy Days” did in fact assume political overtones: on the Garry 
Moore show, Streisand performed the song within a skit revolving around the Great Crash of 1929, singing 
it ironically as a millionaire who had just lost all of her money. 
14 I shall keep my discussion here very limited, discussing neither the broader controversy over the opera’s 
putative racism, nor the more limited one over the current production’s putative lack of authenticity (as 
alleged by Stephen Sondheim in a now infamous 2011 letter to The New York Times). 
15 In this chapter, I am focusing on resisting performances in the vocal rather than instrumental medium, 
since in the former the semantic content and context on which political resistance relies is clearer.  But 
resisting performances in the instrumental realm are also possible.  In this regard, Korsyn (2009) recounts 
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In a videotaped interview, the playwright Suzan-Lori Parks, the self-described “book 
adapter” for the recent Broadway incarnation of Porgy and Bess, explains that the raison d'être of this 
production was to convert what was conceived as an opera into more an audience-friendly 
musical—one, moreover, that resonates with contemporary mores and is “more truthful to the 
[current] African-American experience” (Parks [2012]).  Speaking in particular of Porgy’s second-act 
anthem, “I Got Plenty of Nothing,’”16 she says the song has long been hard to swallow for many 
people, because 
traditionally, it’s been understood to be a song of the happy ninety-nine percent, if you will.  ‘Our 
pockets are empty but boy we’re happy!’  And I was like, you know, there’s gotta be more to that.  
So I started to think about the word ‘nothing’. . . .  In the African-American tradition, the word 
‘nothing’ is often used to mean ‘everything,’ or when you mean ‘nothing’ you mean ‘something.’  
So what I did is I added some dialogue right before the song, in which Porgy comes out of the 
house—he’s been living with Bess for about a month. . . .  and says ‘good mornin’ everybody’ and 
they say ‘good mornin,’ and they say ‘wow Porgy, you’re lookin’ better than good.  What you been 
                                                
the fascinating circumstances of Haydn’s “Farewell” Symphony, arguing that—contrary to the prettified 
reception history of this piece and the kitschy, comical way in which this piece is often presented—it 
actually constituted a serious act of social protest by Haydn’s Kapelle at Esterhazy.  Korsyn states that 
Haydn’s intermixing of genres, including the theatrical one of pantomime, served to upset and invert the 
power hierarchy of the Esterhazy court.   
16 The Gershwins originally spelled “nothing” as “nuttin’”; the current production changed the spelling 
presumably in order to avoid a perceived racial or cultural stereotype, just as they changed “Dat” (in 
“There’s a Boat Dat’s Leavin’ Soon For New York”) to “that.”   
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up to?’  And he says [with a smirk], ‘nothin.’  Now, all the men [on stage] laugh, and the audience 
laughs too, because ‘nothing’ means ‘something,’ it means he’s getting some love in his life, finally 
. . . .  Then he sings ‘I Got Plenty of Nothing,’ which, now in our production, means, ‘I’ve got 
plenty of love.’ 
So in Parks’s version, the song conveys not “I’m happy to have nothing” but “I’m happy to have 
something,” namely sexual love.  Instead of complying with and even celebrating his own economic 
oppression (just as, in the United States at least, those of lower economic status are often 
persuaded to vote against their own best interests), Porgy celebrates his autonomy.  Granted, this 
autonomy is more carnal than fiscal, but the two are not unrelated: the concreteness of bodily 
experience is some countermeasure against the abstract exchange value of capitalism, much in the 
way Adorno says music itself, if deceptively, “assures man that within the monotony of universal 
comparability there is still something particular” (1962, 48). 
In this example, the resistance derives almost entirely from Parks’ added bit.  The 
performance itself, as far as I can tell from the little I was able to see on YouTube (Parks [2012]), is 
fairly neutral—it does not wear ideology on its sleeve.17  We fully appreciate the irony only if privy 
to Parks’s interpolation—and to the fact that, in African-American slang, “nothing” is 
“something.”  By contrast, k. d. lang’s audacious 1985 cover of Joanie Summer’s 1962 hit, “Johnny 
Get Angry,” does not lie within any particular context that would infuse the performance with a 
particular subtext (she does not verbally introduce her performance, as far as I can tell from the 
                                                
17 Lydia Hamessley offers another example of a performance whose resistance derives almost entirely from 
the explicit context surrounding the song.  The singer Lily May Ledford put a political spin on her 
performance of the Appalachian Murder Ballad “Pretty Polly” (to be discussed later) by means of an 
anecdote she told prior to playing the song live in concert.  See Hamessley (2005, 22).  
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video clip).18  Lang conveys the subtext so powerfully, vividly, and physically, “subtext” here is 
almost a misnomer—she inscribes new meaning over rather than under the words of the song.   
  In the song’s text, the female protagonist expresses disappointment with her partner’s 
(presumably husband’s) apathy toward her threatening to leave him and her dancing with another 
man.  Using the euphemism of “lecture,” she welcomes verbal, even possibly physical abuse, as 
implied by “cave man”: 
Johnny get angry, Johnny get mad, 
Give me the biggest lecture I ever had, 
I want a brave man, I want a cave man, 
Johnny show me that you care, really care for me. 
The song celebrates and lends credence to the false belief often held by victims of abuse that the 
abuser expresses caring through his or her actions.  Incidentally, an even more blatant invitation to 
physical abuse occurs in Act I of Mozart’s Don Giovanni—in Zerlina’s aria “Batti, Batti” (“Beat me, 
Beat me”), which she addresses to her fiancé Masetto, ostensibly to assuage his anger about the 
Don’s advances toward her.  Some performers counter the titular exhortation by delivering the 
song as an ironic or even sexual provocation—as if to suggest, contrary to Zerlina’s otherwise 
cherubic demeanor, that she is soliciting sadomasochistic sex that would be a display of her own 
autonomy, a celebration of her own carnal prowess and power.  Very often, however, performers—
especially when singing the aria in studio class or recital—regrettably fall prey to Mozart’s 
melodious lyricism and thus collude with him in belying the horrifying message of the text.    
                                                
18 Of course, knowing that lang is a self-proclaimed feminist is itself a context, albeit a very general one. 
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Lang, on the other hand, refuses to accept the misogyny of her chosen text.  She resists it 
by explicitly acting out the violent consequences of the authority the protagonist grants the man, 
leaving no doubt that the verbal abuse she invites is in fact physical abuse thinly veiled.  Lang 
basically asks, “is there a fundamental difference between male authority and abuse?” (Burns 
[1997, 97]).  She conveys resistance in part by acting out variously the male and female characters 
in the song’s scenario.  In this, she not only renders the violence more explicit, but, more subtly, 
she opens up the otherwise monologic enclosure of the text, challenging authorial authority, which 
has traditionally been granted to men.  She also provokes her audience—who indeed responds to 
her performance in a gleefully “unruly” way—into a dialogic confrontation with her, thus 
undermining her own monologic authority as a performer.  At one point she does so by means of 
an “uncomfortably long pause,” as Burns describes it (ibid., 98).19  Relatedly, her pervasive 
contrametric rubato could be seen as resisting the authority of meter (the “tyranny of the 
downbeat,” as Kevin Korsyn is fond of saying in seminar, most often in reference to Beethoven’s 
evasion of it).   
Equally significant is the manner in which lang’s arrangement intensifies the binarism of 
the authentic/plagal harmonic systems (on which Harrison [1994] provides a definitive 
exposition).20  This, I would suggest, arguably aligns with the binarism of masculine/feminine, 
insofar as authentic progressions (prototypically V–I) are structurally authoritative and more 
suggestive of abstract musical reason, plagal progressions (prototypically IV–I) are more 
                                                
19 One might view this pause as the performance equivalent to the conspicuous textual gaps described by 
Iser (1978), which likewise dissolve the monologic self-enclosure of the text—or better, expose it as illusory.   
20 On the markedness or otherness of the plagal system in relation to the authentic, see Notley (2005).  
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supplemental, deviant, and embellishmental—at least prior to late-Romantic harmony, where they 
become more normative.  As Burns explains, “Lang exaggerates the inherent features of the 
original song and carries them to their logical conclusion.  By playing on the ‘weaker’ versus the 
‘stronger’ features in the original song’s musical discourse, she exposes the imbalance of power 
ascribed to women and men in patriarchal society” (ibid., 110).   
In summary, Lang, in her physicality, music-interpretive choices, and arrangement, resists 
the song less by furnishing an alternate meaning, as in the example from Porgy and Bess, than by 
vastly intensifying the song’s original meaning, exposing it for the misogynist propaganda it is.    
 
*  *  * 
I want to expound on lang’s approach by recourse to a seemingly incompatible bedfellow—
Beethoven.21  Adorno postulates a fundamental distinction between Beethoven’s middle and late 
styles, in order to set them in dialectical orbit.  This distinction is based upon music-technical and  
-aesthetic factors and the sociological ones they intimate.  His basic contention, to state it simply, is 
that the middle style is characterized by organic wholeness, the late style by fragmentation and 
dissociation.  Concomitantly, the former posits a subject who is compatible with the objective 
sphere, the latter one who is not.  The former subject is thus free—free, that is, in a way consonant 
with nature.  This is no purely formal, Kantian freedom, by which, as glossed by Charles Taylor, “I 
declare my independence . . . from all natural considerations and motives and from the natural 
causality which rules them. . . .  I am free in a radical sense, self-determining not as a natural being 
but as a pure, moral will” (1975, 31).  Rather, Beethoven’s freedom is more Hegelian, whereby 
                                                
21 The following is adapted from Swinkin (forthcoming B). 
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one, in achieving ultimate autonomy, perfectly accords with nature.  Man, on Hegel’s view, is a 
vehicle of spirit without having to abdicate his moral autonomy.22   
To elaborate, in many middle-style works, the theme is de-particularized from the outset, 
such that the subject can be thoroughly immersed in the whole—or, more precisely, can create a 
whole that is but a projection of his own course, his own destiny.23  Burdened by no 
presuppositions, no a priori, he can be self-generating, self-defining, an agent who “shapes and 
seizes history as [his] own narrative of progress and power in the name of liberty” (Chua [2005, 
18]).  If these narratives of self-generation are engendered by the elemental beginnings, so are they 
by the nothingness in which such beginnings eventuate.  Beethovenian form is a dialectical process 
whereby particulars cancel each other out, resulting in a zero-sum game of “self-consuming 
adequations,” a whole that is but “the sum of all the individual negations” (ibid., 21).  Put more 
concretely, middle-style Beethoven is ideally suited to expressing freedom, for, unencumbered by 
demonstrable reference to external reality, it is music first and foremost about itself.  Yet, in that 
very absoluteness and abstractness lies an image of pure being, of unfettered freedom—“absolute 
nothing is the programmatic element of these works”24  A piece about nothing is thereby 
paradoxically a piece about something—namely, the unqualified freedom to forge one’s own 
                                                
22 See Taylor’s magisterial discussion of these issues in 1975 (3–50).  
23 I do not use the masculine pronoun here casually: the Beethovenian subject is indeed arguably primarily 
masculine, as discussed in Pederson (2000) (more on this in conclusion).   
24 Chua (2005, 19).  This paradox of German Romantic music generally forms the central theme of 
Hoeckner (2002).   
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identity, to move uninhibitedly through historical time and social space.  As Adorno declares, “in 
Beethoven everything can become anything . . . because it ‘is’ nothing” (1988, 22 and 26).   
Yet, Adorno insists, insofar as this dynamic purports to reflect that of social reality, the 
middle style harbors an ideological dimension, for, in the real world, the subject is generally 
dominated by, rather than consonant with, the objective sphere, or the ruling stratum.25  In fact, 
the middle style subtextually contains strains of coercion, tiny tears in its supposedly seamless 
organic fabric.  This is evident in, among other things, the overexerted “tonic and dominant 
swings” (Tovey [1945, 111]) of the codas and in “the exaggerated assertiveness of the development 
and recapitulation procedures, in which Adorno discerns . . . the incipient transformation of freedom 
into force” (Subotnik [1991, 22, my italics]). 
Adorno appraises the late style with comparable dialectical ambivalence.  On the one hand, 
Beethoven frames the particular as no longer an integral part of an inviolable whole but rather as 
an autonomous fragment: “the emancipated phrase, released from the dynamic flow, speaks for 
itself” (Adorno [1988, 125]).  Just as the societal subject no longer possesses the power to generate 
objective reality on its own terms, neither can the musical subject generate external forms and 
procedures: “the conventions [are] no longer imbued and mastered by subjectivity, but left 
standing” (ibid.)  Accordingly, overt thematic development and connections between formal 
sections are frequently absent, such that formal conventions are laid bare, and now assume an 
                                                
25 It appears, in fact, that the only style, according to Adorno, whose rapprochement of subject and object is 
consonant with social reality is that of Bach, who integrates archaic contrapuntal devices and subjective 
“reflection on the motivic work”—rational control over the myriad motivic permutations.  Contrapuntal 
formulae are not merely exhibited but thoroughly worked over and assimilated.  See Adorno (1955).  
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arbitrary rather than intrinsic relation to the content.  Absent a dynamic thematic trajectory, the 
subject is no longer embedded in musical processes but is relegated to the exterior of the 
composition—the subject must now enter in surreptitiously, in the cracks and fissures of the 
musical fabric.  The pregnant silences—as throughout the scherzo of the Ninth Symphony or in 
the second movement of op. 109, just prior to the recapitulation—bespeak a musical persona who 
veers into his musical creation from without rather than vitally inhabiting it from within.  
Implicitly invoking Hegel (1820–29, 76–97), Adorno claims that the music’s spirit is no longer 
integrated with material substance, in the manner of a classical symbol, but is segregated from it, in 
the manner of an allegory.  The music is about the subject (read: Beethoven?) rather than infused by 
the subject.  Beethoven is present in his late music by being conspicuously absent: “of the works 
[the subject] leaves only fragments behind, communicating itself, as if in ciphers, only through the 
spaces it has violently vacated” (Adorno [1988, 125]).  In short, “as [a] critical and stylistic term, 
late style [for Adorno] implies the paradox of an authorial signature present in its withdrawal” 
(Rosenthal [2007, 121]).  
Hence it would seem that Adorno denies late Beethoven the possibility of freedom in 
Hegel’s sense; the subject is no longer reconciled with nature but is hopelessly alienated from it.  
In fact, music itself, once a symbol for nature, has devolved into ossified conventions—there is no 
nature with which the subject can seek reconciliation.  Yet—and here is the point to which I have 
been leading—such inorganicism can be seen, paradoxically, as possessing life-affirming potential.  
For, in casting off the appearance of art, of organic seamlessness, it crystallizes the alienation and 
disenfranchisement of the individual, which was menacingly latent in the middle style.  Late 
Beethoven’s “moments of transcendence . . . cut through the aesthetic appearance of unity and 
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expose it as false” (Hoeckner [2002, 22]).  In exposing this condition of alienation, the late music 
implicitly critiques it, pointing toward a more ideal state, if only by (to invoke Nelson Goodman’s 
term) “contrastively exemplifying” such a state.  The late style catalyzes freedom insofar as the latter 
assumes the form, in Fredric Jameson’s estimation, of “a sudden perception of an intolerable 
present which is at the same time, but implicitly and however dimly articulated, the glimpse of 
another state. . . .  The intolerable present of a terrorized world . . . gives us a glimpse of a state of 
freedom where there is no fear.”26  Or as Elaine Showalter says of recent woman’s literature, 
“although the reclamation of suffering is the beginning, its purpose is to discover the new world” 
(1985, 134).  And finally, for Adorno himself, “in the abandonment of the illusion of harmony, 
there is an expression of hope” (1988, 126).  
Late Beethoven, then, on Adorno’s view, catalyzes freedom precisely by crystallizing the 
reality of unfreedom, just as k. d. lang does in her revelatory performance.  And lang does so in a 
manner that could be traced back to late Beethoven, or readily described in terms of a late-
Beethovenian aesthetic: she paralyzes the music with devastating caesurae, exposing organic 
musical continuity or unity as false or illusory; she polarizes the authentic and plagal systems, just 
as late Beethoven does various other musical parameters;27 and she separates out the authorial 
                                                
26 Jameson (1971, 85); quoted by Pederson (2000, 2).  On the notion that freedom exists only 
counterfactually, within some alterior realm, see Chua (2004). 
27 In particular, late Beethoven separates polyphony out from both monody and homophony, all of which 
had been tenuously integrated in earlier classicism.  As Michael Spitzer says, “a texture which is left loosely 
hybrid in the music of Haydn, Mozart, and early Beethoven is radicalized . . . into a clean-cut opposition 
between extremes—unmediated juxtapositions of polyphony and monody” (2006, 141). 
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persona—in her case, her own performing self—from the musical discourse, serving as a puppet 
master who unabashedly manipulates performance conventions from without, just as Beethoven 
does compositional conventions.  In all these ways, though apparently worlds apart, the two musics 
share the same strain of critical potency. 
 
*  *  * 
Yet, an ambiguity lurks behind Adorno’s theory of Beethoven that he does not sufficiently address: 
is it ethically more beneficent to reflect the reality of oppressive social conditions or, conversely, to 
postulate a less hegemonic, even utopian social dynamic?  Is it preferable to show how things are or 
rather the way they could (should) be?  Put differently, is Beethoven’s heroism on its face a 
pernicious obfuscation of the social conditions of his era or rather an impetus to individual 
freedom?  Adorno’s own ambivalence toward this matter has not gone undetected.  Stephen 
Hinton, for one, states, “the question remains whether music’s glory is philosophically ‘acceptable’ 
or ‘false’—whether it is allied with truth or with ideological deception” (1996, 143).  Subotnik, for 
another, muses, “how does one decide when art is doing its best to prefigure a utopian totality in 
the face of despair and when it is trying to conceal inhumanity?  Adorno offers no general guide” 
(1991, 38).   
Put in terms of performance, is it politically more strategic to interpret an ideologically 
dubious song in a way as to expose its dubiousness or in a way to point to a more desirable state?  
Can one do both for the same song, perhaps in different interpretive versions?  It depends on the 
song.  I do not think it is possible to convey anything beneficial through such a toxic vessel as 
“Johnny” other than by taking it apart at the seams, as lang does.  “Du Ring” is another, more 
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complex matter.  In it, I believe, one can both expose the baleful practice of female containment 
within Schumann’s era and also advocate for alternative states.  One can variously display 
displeasure and hope.  I will demonstrate this below, but first I must lay the groundwork for our 
interpretive experiment by taking an overview of the cycle and reviewing some of the literature 
devoted to it.  
  
3. CONTEXT 
Frauenliebe und -leben purports to trace the love and life of the titular protagonist but in actuality 
reduces her life solely to the events deemed significant within the scheme of nineteenth-century 
bourgeois domesticity: basically, falling in love with a man, marrying him, and bearing his 
children.  The other events and relationships that would render a life meaningful are replaced, 
Solie (1992) points out, by narrative gaps.  This is due in part to Schumann having omitted from 
Chamisso’s cycle both a strophe from the sixth poem in which the heroine confides her pregnancy 
to her mother, who proceeds to offer her comfort, and, more significantly, the final poem in its 
entirety, in which “the protagonist looks back on her life . . . and passes on her accumulated 
wisdom to her granddaughter” (ibid., 228).  That her life is lived through the man to whom she 
genuflects is borne out by the end of the cycle where he dies—or perhaps, metaphorically, leaves 
her—and she pronounces herself dead as well (“ich bin nicht lebend mehr”).  Hence, the cycle is a 
portrait less of a woman’s real, multidimensional life than of her life as refracted through a 
masculinist prism.   
The heroine’s potentially rich subjectivity is diminished not just by having to mirror the 
man, but also, and relatedly, by being confined to patriarchal space.  Such containment is arguably 
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enacted both textually and tonally, as can be gleaned from Ex. 4-1, an overview of the entire set.  
Songs 6 and 7, the rare moments where the woman is not fixating upon the man—here she 
focuses on her child—return forthwith, in Song 8, to a preoccupation with the man, whose  
 
 
death/abandonment quashes the woman’s deeply felt joy.  Moreover, these songs are set in the 
only remote, chromatic keys of the cycle.  This renders them other and thus in need of diatonic 
restoration, which the home-key postlude subsequently provides.  On a smaller scale, Song 3, in 
which the man initially reciprocates her affections, is of course morally dubious in itself in its 
sentiment of (to paraphrase) “I can’t believe he actually loves me.”  But it is also dubious in its 
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tonal enclosure: its C minor is enveloped by the E@ key of Songs 2 and 4, as if to suggest that the 
woman’s incredulity is indeed warranted, and that the man’s apparent affection for her is in fact 
illusory (“ein Traum”).   
 Schumann’s heroine, in short, “retains only a generic, ritualized, mythic existence” (Solie 
[1992, 228]).  She is devoid of particularity and serves mainly to mirror her husband’s desires.  
Schumann’s cycle is oppressive not only in adopting Chamisso’s cycle but in exacerbating its 
misogynist tendencies in its textual and musical choices.28 
 
*  *  * 
So a resisting performance, I think, must, above all, particularize the woman, flesh her out, give her 
her own voice.29  In covering a pop song, the arrangement can do this.  Hamessley offers the 
                                                
28 I say the cycle is misogynist rather than Schumann himself because I do not presume to ascribe particular 
attitudes to him.  He could very well have been making these choices without any conscious misogynist 
intent; and even if he consciously held these attitudes, they might be less symptomatic of personal malice 
than of established cultural mores.  It is the value system of Schumann’s culture, not of Schumann per se, 
and the way that system is musically encoded on which I prefer to focus.  Hence, subsequent references to 
“misogynist ideology” and the like can be situated within this culturally mediated stance.  Not to mention 
that, if one were to attribute baleful attitudes to Schumann, it would only be fair also to attribute to him 
the unease and resistance to the text in the various musical moments throughout the cycle on which I seize 
below.   
29 Koskoff’s (1995) documenting of the musical and cultural practices of the Lubavitschers—a sect of 
Hasidic Jews most of whose members reside in Crown Heights, Brooklyn—vividly reveals the extent to 
which the oppression of women can take the form of silencing them, quite literally.   
385 
example of “Pretty Polly,” an Appalachian Murder Ballad.  Traditionally performed, this genre 
recounts the killing of a woman in a dispassionate way, amounting to “a heartless acceptance of 
the ballad’s violent scenario” (2005, 20).  The cover by the New Coon Creek Girls, however, 
strategically uses a fiddle to represent the woman’s sentience: “by closely aligning the fiddle 
melodies with Polly’s experiences, the performers draw attention to Polly’s feelings of suspicion, 
dread, and terror” (ibid., 31).  Granted, the words would seem to give Polly a voice: “Oh Willie, 
please spare my life,” she pleads, just as, on a broader level, Frauenliebe is ostensibly spoken entirely 
by the woman.  But Polly’s words are uttered by the male narrator; in Frauenliebe, a male evidently 
speaks through the woman, expressing his own vision of how her life should be.  So Polly’s violin 
is a much needed, non-verbal venue in which the woman can convey her experience.   
Short of arranging Frauenliebe, can something along these lines be found in the score as is?  





Chamisso’s final poem would have exposed the previous ones as recollections, creating narrative 
distance between the woman and her life, and between us and the woman.  Schumann’s postlude, 
by contrast, intimately depicts her sentience.  It recalls the opening song sans some melody, giving 
us a real sense of the woman’s muted memory.  The initially blinding image of him is now 
softened: “the very inaccuracy of the repetition, its muted passion, imitates the perceptual 
mechanisms of a memory that has no hope of being revitalized” (Muxfeldt [2001, 47]).  Moreover, 
the missing melody directly elicits the listener’s imagination—we must exercise our own memory, 
and in doing so we experience the heroine’s mental process and thus empathize with her.  So, for 
Solie, Schumann, by omitting the last poem, fails to portray the heroine in a multidimensional 
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way.  For Muxfeldt, conversely, Schumann, precisely by replacing the poem with a postlude, 
succeeds in portraying her in a multidimensional way.  
On this basis of empathy, Muxfeldt defends the cycle more generally, claiming that both 
Chamisso’s poetry and Schumann’s setting give the woman a voice at a time where it was rare to 
do so in literature.  Yet, I am ultimately unpersuaded by Muxfeldt’s advocacy, for it does no good 
to give the woman a voice only to speak the words put in her mouth by a man.  An adequate 
defense of this piece, in my view, must devolve upon the music rather than upon the text.  For it is 
music, in its basic ineffability, in exuding general states of being on which no one discourse has a 
monopoly, that furnishes the site where the feminine can assert itself in a way not guaranteed to 
reproduce male desire.  But this is not to say that the postlude is the only place where the woman 
can speak.  I believe she does so, potentially, in myriad musical details throughout the cycle, in 
latencies that connote resistance.  Because these details are very subtle, more potential than actual, 
we require significant analytical intervention to tease them out.  
 
*  *  * 
My method here will be to use Schenkerian structure as a kind of foil, pitting against it motivic 





enclosure (see Fig. 4-1).  In other words, over against tonal structure, I juxtapose “phantom” 
tonalities (a term I will explain), melodic implications, and motivic modules that appear to 
challenge the enclosure of a Schenkerian hierarchy, that seem to exhibit a predilection for 
autonomy or emancipation.  Take this as a metaphor for the female seeking to emancipate herself 
from the enclosure of the proverbial ring.  
The stage for this methodological conflict, needless to say, has already been set.  Eugene 
Narmour (1977), as is well known, challenges “Schenkerism” on many bases, one of which is that 
it subordinates the parameters of melody and rhythm to an all-subsuming Ursatz.  Yet, Narmour 
claims, melody and rhythm often generate implications that cannot be explained or resolved by the 
Ursatz.  He exclaims, “voice leading and melody are not the same. . . .  Melody . . . though influenced by 
harmony, nevertheless remains independent of it” (1977, 80, his italics).  He prefers an 
implication-realization model, since it acknowledges the individuation of distinct parameters by 
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focusing on implications irrespective of their contribution to a preconceived totality.  Narmour, 
then, is concerned with melodic lines that assert an irreducible horizontality, that refuse to be 
subsumed by the putatively all-governing Naturklang.    
Richard Cohn (1992), meanwhile, has championed the autonomy of motives with respect 
to Schenkerian structure (although he ultimately does not view the two domains as irreconcilable).  
As he recounts, Schenker’s concept of motivic unity shifted from recognizing real-time, linear 
correspondences to prioritizing hierarchical derivation.  In the latter, a motive assumes the status 
of an entity by “its derivability from the Ursatz via voice-leading transformations, rather than its 
treatment elsewhere in the piece” (1992, 153).  Consequently, “many surface contiguities which 
were recognized by traditional theorists, including the early Schenker, are [in later Schenker] 
considered false entities” (ibid., 154).  According to this later view, a motive’s description must 
include its voice-leading derivation or origin; if two apparent motives do not share a structural 
description, the hypothesized relation is dismissed.  Yet, Cohn proceeds to note, Schenker himself 
deviates from this standard.  For example, in his analysis of Mozart’s late G minor symphony, 
Schenker dissolves a single third span into two stepwise motives and grants them a motivic 
correspondence even though the entities assume divergent voice-leading functions.  
For the present, I am interested in such polemics not for the sake of unpacking or 
arbitrating them, but rather of using them to harness antagonism between the performers and the 
ideology of Schumann’s cycle.  Schenkerian theory itself is not the problem, and indeed, as Cohn 
suggests, such productive parametric conflict can arise even within Schenker’s oeuvre (or indeed, 
even within a single Schenkerian reading), provided one takes his diachronic development into 
account.  I am staging a confrontation among different methods mainly in order to render more 
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vivid the tensions that reside within any one, well-formulated theory.  Moreover, I impute no 
misogynist agenda to Schenkerian theory, but rather use it merely as a metaphor for the enclosure 
Schumann depicts, and as a heuristic by which to catalyze conflict among parameters.  This 
parametric conflict will function on two semiotic levels.  In terms of Peircean semiotics, iconically 
it will symbolize the conflict between the heroine and the man.  Indexically, the conflict, in the 
subtexts it yields, will precipitate actual tension between the performers and the piece’s ideology.   
My working method was to analyze the music; to construe the results metaphorically, as 
symbolic of emotional states; then to concretize those states in the form of an inner monologue.  
The latter, in performance, then reanimated those emotions in Jennifer and myself, which led to 
musical and physical choices that hopefully convey those emotions on some level.  Fig. 4-2 
schematizes this process.  I want to emphasize that, though we rely on subtext, ours is still basically 
a non-discursive strategy: the subtext produces signs of resistance that come through in non-verbal, 
musical and physical forms.30 
   
                                                
30 To elaborate on our working procedure, I presented subtextual cues to Jennifer after having completed 
my analysis, and she developed her interpretation in response to them.  In some cases she suggested 
modifications to my subtextual thoughts or entirely new thoughts, for which I am grateful.  The subtexts on 
which we eventually settled are basically reproduced in Ex. 4-5 and subsequent examples.  The placement of 
these thoughts in the score (indicated by wedges) is not meant to suggest that Jennifer necessarily thought 
them at those precise moments; they might have entered her mind a little before or after.  Nor, presumably, 
did Jennifer think these exact words.  They are merely a template for a subtext, one needing to be infused 




*  *  * 
Suzanne Cusick offers a possible precedent for a resisting performance of Frauenliebe.  Citing Jesse 
Norman’s rendition of the second song (“Du, der Herrlichste von allen,” Web Ex. 10), Cusick 
opines that Norman sings with uncharacteristic unmusicality (by conventional standards), most 
notably in her “amateurish execution of the vocal turns” (1994, 105).  Cusick also detects her 
wavering between a throaty voice and a more normative feminine head voice—a tactic, I would 
add, that opens up the same sort of dialogic space as we saw with k. d. lang, although with Norman 
less blatantly.  Most generally, Norman exposes rather than conceals the mechanics of vocal 
production.  She seems “ill at ease with her own voice” (ibid., 106), thus subliminally conveying 
discomfort with the text and, perhaps more importantly, with the Heldenmusik Schumann asks her 
to sing.  As Cusick contends, “Norman invites us to hear the Frau’s voice struggling with the 
enforced discipline of enunciating someone else’s seemingly uncongenial words; a voice struggling 
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to perform in the phrase-ending turns the Frau’s coming social role as ornament to her future 
husband’s life” (ibid., 107).  
Cusick, then, does not indict Norman on the basis of these apparent vocal anomalies but 
rather diagnoses them as parapraxes of sorts, ones by which Norman unconsciously resists the 
cycle’s oppressive ideology.  Jennifer and I, on the other hand, approach this endeavor quite 
consciously and deliberately.  If Norman resists Frauenliebe, it is likely unintentional and rather 
subtle.  But many would agree that such a “hateful” cycle, as Cusick puts it, demands a more 
proactive and outspoken performance critique, which Jennifer and I shall provide.  My 
contribution also lies in demonstrating how close analysis can benefit this critical enterprise.  
Admittedly, Frauenliebe generally may be a somewhat facile target for critique, “Du Ring” in 
particular, due to its oozing sentimentality.  But, my goal is less feminist revelation than to 
demonstrate how, once the need for resistance is firmly in place, one can co-opt music analysis to 
facilitate a close, quasi-deconstructive reading that in turn facilitates a resisting performance.   
 
*  *  * 
Table 4-1 provides an overview of our interpretive experiment.  The first interpretation has all the 
classically pretty singing one has come to expect in this song.  This performance—not a resisting 
one but rather a foil for the resisting ones that follow—expresses a somewhat utopian state, one 
that, crucially, belies the violence and brutality on which such a state is built.31  The remaining 
                                                
31 Leppert (1993) frequently makes this point with respect to the musical iconography he surveys.  To take 
just one of his many examples: Johan Zoffany, The Morse and Cator Families (ca. 1784) depicts two women—
a harpischordist and her page-turner—flanked by two men, one playing the cello, one standing.  These men 
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three performances will expose the dehumanization of the female within the nineteenth-century, 
male-centered, bourgeois economy.  The first resisting performance (Version 2) will express 
somewhat subtle ambivalence by seizing upon subtle tensions at the musical foreground.  The 
second (Version 3) will express glimmers of hope, of more ideal states that transcend existing 
conditions.  It will do so by exposing tonal and melodic implications and realizations, which will 
be read metaphorically to imply alternate, heartening scenarios.  The last (Version 4), by looking 
more closely at motivic content, will express outright anger and defiance, which, in this context, is 
a positive thing, for the woman has been emotionally liberated and is no longer ensconced in an 
aura of domestic tranquility.  Hence, our resisting performances utilize three different emotional 








                                                
were real-life Britishmen living in India in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.  Leppert notes the 
portrait was composed in India but India is not at all represented—the geographical reality is suppressed.  
The picture transposes the “social reality of British colonialism . . . into a visual language eminently 
attractive, seamless, and unprovocative” (95); and the conventional curtain behind the subjects prevents us 
from seeing “the foundation of exploitation and suffering on which this cultured scene depends” (105).     
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     Table 4-1: Overview of interpretive approaches 
 
 
II. RESISTING “DU RING” 
FIRST ANALYSIS/PERFORMANCE 
“Du Ring” (Ex. 4-3) delineates a ternary, A1–B–A2 form, A1 nesting a smaller-scale a1–b–a2 (A2, as is 
typical of ternary forms, is a condensed variant of A1, eliding its b section).  Note the affinity 
between the small and large B sections: the latter has a somewhat developmental function in 
condensing and fragmenting the main melodic idea of the former (Ex. 4-4).  B also plays 
extensively with b’s fourth motive—which b actualizes in relation to the a section, as shown in the 
example—first enlarging then diminuting it, as we will later discuss.  The coda alludes to the B 
section, as is typical in all manner of ternary-type forms.  This coda negotiates between the two 
versions of the B-section melodic idea, between the one found in the small B and the large B, as 
shown in Ex. 4-4.  That is, it is true to the linear contour of the former but still breaks it off, 





Schumann, “Du Ring an  
meinem Finger” from  
Frauenliebe und -leben,  










You ring on my finger, my golden little ring,  
I press you gently to my lips, to my heart.  
I had outdreamt the peaceful, beautiful dream of childhood, 
I found myself alone, lost in open, infinite space. You ring on my finger, 











I will serve him, live for him, belong to him entirely, 





Given the thematic relations among the small B, large B, and B-oriented coda, the song can be 
seen basically to alternate between A and B modules throughout.  This generates some ambiguity 
about precisely what section frames what: is perhaps the final A refrain, for instance, framed by the 
B material by which it is flanked?  Such interlaced structure, characteristic of Schumann in 
particular and of the Romantics generally, is redolent of the arabesque, a figure transferred from 
architecture to poetry and music, the last most explicitly in Schumann’s eponymous piece of 1838.  
As Nonnenmann (2001) recounts, Schlegel equated the humoresque of Jean Paul with the 
Example 4-4: some motivic connections among formal sections 
b sec., m. 9 B sec., m. 25  
coda, m. 41 


















arabesque.  Both are fantasies about nothing—the frame (narrative in one case, visual in the other) 
is brought front and center, valorized as primary.  “The accessory ceases to be an external 
component and advances to the precondition of the work’s possibility” (Nonnenmann [2001, 
245]).32  
Precisely how Schumann’s Arabeske instantiates this romantic trope largely exceeds the 
scope of our current discussion.  Briefly, it is manifested on several levels.  On the smallest, in the 
opening figure, anacruses lead to yet more anacruses—an ornament decorates yet another 
ornament, and that in turn decorates another, and so on.  On the next level, the interlaced 
structure yields an ambiguity as to what section frames what—as the piece proceeds, we lose 
confidence that the A section is central, and begin to hear it as subordinate to the interior 
sections.  Finally, on the level of the entire form, the piece is ostensibly a rondo, yet the rondo is 
devoid of real identity—the piece, technically speaking, may have the form of a rondo but not 
really the character of one.  Similarly, the piece could be considered a variation set if not for 
lacking a solid thematic kernel.  Schumann himself memorably referred to the piece as a set of 
“variations but on no theme” [“Variationen, aber über kein Thema”].  In Nonnemann’s gloss, “the 
                                                
32 “Das Beiwerk hört auf, externe Zutat zu sein, and avanciert zur Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Werkes 
selbst” (Nonnenmann [2001, 245]).  This and the following translations of this article are my own.  Here he 
is actually quoting Winfried Menninghaus, Lob des Unsinns. Über Kant, Tieck und Blaubart (Frankfurt a. M., 
1995), 112.  
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entire course of the piece as an unfolding of a micro-structural “nothing” [the opening figure] 
turns out to be a macro-structure equally devoid of a center.”33  
The significance of this trope for the present discussion is that the ornamental has 
traditionally been aligned with the feminine, that which is ornamented with the masculine.  
Insofar as the arabesque pushes the ornamental to the fore, it can be seen to pose a challenge to 
male hegemony.  Moreover, this ornamental center, as Nonnenmann argues, is not vacuous, not 
purely formalistic, as the arabesque has often been thought to be.  On the contrary, according to 
Schlegel and other Romantics, it possesses transcendental content and value.  Schumann’s piece, 
for one, “indicates precisely with its thematic—or, in the Kantian sense—conceptual emptiness an 
infinite bounty of formal possibilities.”34  
As Nonnenmann notes, Schumann employed this trope not just in Arabeske but 
throughout his oeuvre—it formed a core part of his aesthetic sensibility.35  Indeed, I would suggest 
that the arabesque obtains in “Du Ring”—on primarily a formal rather than thematic level—even 
                                                
33 “ . . . erweist sich der Gesamtverlauf des Stücks als Entfaltung eines mikrostrukturellen ‘Nichts’ zu einer 
ebenso kernlosen Makrostruktur” (ibid., 253).  Incidentally, Daverio (1987) expresses uncertainty as to 
whether Schumann’s statement, “Variations but on no theme,” actually refers to the Arabeske.  
34 Extracted from “Auf Schumanns kleines Stückchen angewendet bedeutet das, dass es gerade mit seiner 
thematischen bzw.—kantisch gesprochen—begrifflichen Leere eine unendliche Fülle an 
Gestaltungsmüglichkeiten signalisert” ([Nonnenmann [2001, 254]).  Transcendence, autonomy, 
absoluteness, and so on, though here attributed to the feminine arabesque, are nonetheless, traditionally 
speaking, masculine values.  This fact points up the insufficiency of feminist critique along these lines.  
More on this point below. 
35 Also see Daverio (1987). 
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if in less pronounced fashion than in the Arabeske.  That is, the subsidiary B sections threaten to 
frame the A sections to which they are ostensibly subservient.  Herein lies the seed for feminist 
resistance to this song; the song arguably harbors the potential for its own undoing.  Moreover, on 
the level of the entire cycle, we might say that C minor, which before I claimed matter of factly to 
be subsumed by the flanking E@s, harbors the potential to chart its own independent identity, in 
the process subsuming and challenging the home-key tonic.  I will explore this possibility later on. 
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As for the Schenkerian analysis (Ex. 4-5), I posit an interruption at the end of both the small and 
large B sections, the latter interruption obviously residing at the deeper middleground.  The 
structural interruption is a perceptibly signal event: F5  (  
€ 
ˆ 2 , m. 28) is approached by a broad 5th-
progression and subsequently coupled with F4 (m. 32); all this occurs within an unfolding of V7.  
Within the opening period, I do not read an interruption at the end of the antecedent phrase, but 
unfold. 
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rather prioritize the neighbor motion A@–G, mm. 4–5, connecting the antecedent and consequent.  
I do so because this A@ is by far the longest note to that point and also connects seamlessly to G.  
Finally, I somewhat hesitantly posit at the end an implied structural   
€ 
ˆ 2 , enabling a   
€ 
ˆ 3 -line Urlinie.  I 
think this reading is more justified if the song is sung in isolation, as a self-complete piece.  As part 
of the larger cycle, however, it might make more sense to exploit the B@, downbeat of m. 40, that is 
left hanging, to highlight its connection to the subsequent song (Ex. 4-6).  This tack befits the 
narrative continuity: the engagement, as alluded to in “Du Ring,” logically leads into preparation 
for the wedding, as described in “Helft mir.”  In any case, for our present purposes, it poses no 
problem to assert a linear resolution to   
€ 
ˆ 1 .     
I align the Schenkerian analysis with our first, conventionally attractive interpretation 
(Web Ex. 11).  The former’s long lines and seamless integration of particulars within a larger whole  
symbolize and conduce to musical beauty, to a pretty performance.  It is precisely this analytic 
unity and concomitant musicality—both of which disguise the oppressive structure enabling 






Our second performance (Web Ex. 12/Ex. 4-7), whose basic emotion or mental state is 
ambivalence, begins to detect moments of tension that belie the docility of the surface, however 
subtly.  The first such moment is perhaps the pickup to m. 3, where soprano and bass, voice and 
piano, pull apart in contrary motion, a conventional musical signifier of tension.  Moreover, the 
E@–D–C in the bass inverts, metaphorically “corrects,” the soprano’s C–D–E@ of the previous bar 
(see Ex. 4-9).  We concretize this textural and motivic tension with a scenario in which the man 
had earlier antagonized the woman by correcting her in public, thus degrading her.  Following a 
sinking chromatic gesture in the voice, mm. 3–4, indicating in this context the woman’s dejected 




Example 4-7: subtext for second performance; 
basic emotion: ambivalence He antagonized me the other day, corrected me 
in front of someone.  [tension between pno./voice] 
Now I’m confused— 
I don’t know what I want. 
[omnibus prg.] 
That incident yesterday makes me cringe. 
     [pianist’s strain and diss.] 
No, I’m no waif: before this mess I was more myself;  
given enough time, I may have found what I really wanted. [contrary contours in voice/bass; filling in of open 6th]  
Now I’m not so sure . . .  No, I’d better take his lead; it’ll be okay. 
[minor]                           [imitation]            [enharmonic revision] 
being alone presents  
opportunities 








harmonically disorienting effect, which here serves to wipe the woman’s memory clean of that 
painful incident.  As a consequence, she is once again able to accept her present condition.  Yet 
that memory soon returns: the pianist, last beat of m. 7, is forced to reach a rather awkward and 
This relationship is becoming claustrophobic; I’m  
spinning out of control. [accelerando] 
I’m confused: he can be warm, but also overpowering      I’m losing a foothold, feeling  
                      drowned again 
The feeling is too intense; she shrugs it off for now. [playful figures] 
Gives into the “comfort” of abuse or confinement  
[reharmonization]   [heavy bass] 
Was I more content when I was younger?  No, I won’t obsess about this any  
                        longer, and will be happy with what I 
            have.    
[music reminiscent of b sec.]
[melody less fragmented, 







dissonant trichord in the right hand.  This embodied tension wincingly recalls the painful incident 
just mentioned.     
 In the b section, the incipits of the two phrases (mm. 9 and 13) comprise descending and 
ascending 6ths, respectively.  I read both as relatively affirmative, in that both gaps are subsequently 
filled in; the second 6th is even more affirmative in its bold, ascending leap.  This motivates 
Jennifer to read the “allein” against the textual grain: though she pays lips service to the idea that 
she was lost and alone and thus needed the man to guide her, subtextually she conveys the sense 
that being alone was for her really an opportunity for self-realization, for paving her own way.  
However, this phrase takes a disconcerting detour into E@ minor, whose pathos is enhanced by 
touching on a full-diminished-7th chord—the woman loses her confidence.  This precipitates a 
return to the status quo at the pickup to m. 17, where the voice dutifully follows the piano’s 
figures, unquestioningly complying with its imitative scheme.  In fact, the F# enharmonically 
revises the G@ of the disturbing excursion in m. 15 and thus signifies an emotional reversal.  The 
latter is clinched with the more frolicking uneven rhythm of m. 17, over against the sterner, 
straighter rhythm of m. 1; the rhythmic variant indicates that the woman accepts her fate 
somewhat gleefully.  Then, the heroine seems to lose her composure in the B section, with its 
“Nach und nach rascher” signaling unease at the prospect of “belonging to him entirely.”  Finally, 
in A2, the striking reharmonization, mm. 37 ff., of the opening tune is emotionally ambiguous: it is 
warm yet also potentially overwhelms the voice with its deep, octave-doubled bass.  In our 
performance, the woman loses her verve gradually.  By the postlude, with its allusion to the b 
section and its sentiment, at least on the surface, of naïveté, Jennifer is exuding exquisite 
vulnerability, as if feeling painfully uncertain about her current state.  Then, when in the 
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penultimate bar the motivic fragmentation is alleviated and the complete 4th-motive is restored, 




Our next interpretation (Web Ex. 13/Ex. 4-8) pivots on a deeper reading of musical structures in 
order to tease out alternatives to the domestic entrapment the song ostensibly celebrates.  Whether 
this alternative is a more co-equal relationship with this man, a relationship with another man (or 
woman), or no relationship at all, the music-cum-structural analysis of course cannot specify.  All 
we can ask of the music/analysis here is to intimate alterior states and to tinge those states with 
particular emotional shades.  That said, examining “Du Ring” in relation to other songs in the 
cycle, as I will do here, will perhaps yield greater semantic specificity than would examining the 
song in isolation.     
The triadic outlining of C minor (Ex. 4-9) resonates with that of E@ in Song 2, the 
Heldenmusik.36  This resonance is perhaps strengthened by the fact that both songs (2 and 4) are in 
the same key.  Does this resonance empower the heroine?  This is a complex question, for there 
are two levels of ambiguity with which to grapple.  First, though the allusion to Song 2 is fairly 
clear, Song 4 does, after all, lyricize the fanfare, both with its “innig” and by filling in the third, C–
                                                
36 Rumph detects a remarkably similar tonal ambiguity, involving the same precise keys no less, in the 
opening of Mozart’s E@ Piano Concerto, K. 449, which, though opening in the tonic, arpeggiates an apparent 
C minor triad in the outer parts.  Here, as in the Schumann, the initial tonal ambiguity has far-reaching 
consequences, as Rumph discusses (2005, 167–71). 
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E@, in m. 2, rendering it more melodic.  In this way, “Du Ring” perhaps presents the fanfare more 
weakly and thus reinforces a gender stereotype.  On the other hand, the intimation of 
empowerment is bolstered by the possibility that the C minor fanfare de-interiorizes the C minor 





Example 4-8: Subtext for third performance; 
basic emotion: optimistic about alternative possibilities     I can have some other life entirely; I just got a glimpse of that.  
    [implication of G]            
Maybe I’ll pay lip service for now,  
but I have the freedom to imagine  
another life. 
[quasi-tonicization of C.] 
I’m powerful, I can turn the tables. 
[appropriation of Heldenmusik] 
(mocking him) 
[quasi-bass line in sop.] 
Forget the forlorn, lost thing: I define what my gaps are,  
and how best to fill them in [asc. 6th rather than desc. 6th, and filling in] 
This is not supplicating—this is doing what 











What might have knocked me for a loop before is now a source of  
inner strength; I think I know who I am and what I want! [F5 actualizes 
3rd-implication] 
Yes, this new way of being is so much better, but this is the trigger, the thing that always makes me regress 
[reharmonization]                                     [bass line from C takes over what was triumphant vocal line] 
I’m unsure I can hold on to this sense of new possibility . . . No, I can.  
But now, let go; you don’t need to fight him 
or convince him; you don’t actualize yourself on  












on, if precariously, to the C minor of the previous song, thus mitigating its containment.  To 
elaborate, first C minor is presented melodically (mm. 1–2), then as a harmony (m. 3), then as a 
slightly tonicized harmony (m. 7), and then as more fully tonicized in m. 38 as a result of—or 
perhaps as an impetus to—the aforementioned reharmonization.  This song’s emphasis on C 
minor, then, problematizes the enclosure of Song 3: C minor spills into the frame, it is no longer 
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just an object of the male gaze.  In this way, the man’s affection for the heroine is not so 
patronizingly unimaginable, as she declares in that song.   
The first ambiguity, in short, is that Song 4’s C minor fanfare, though lyricized in relation 
to Song 2 and thus potentially eviscerated, potentially symbolizes empowerment due to the 
increasing importance of C within Song 4 and the way it consequently liberates the tonality of 
Song 3.  The second ambiguity is this: even if the heroine is empowered, she is so, after all, by 
appropriating her male counterpart’s voice.  One might see this as a dead-end enterprise, for the 
power is still being defined in masculine terms.  Put another way, that the woman speaks through 
the man’s voice—within his discursive space—can mean one of two things: that she claims 
authority or, on the contrary, that she is claimed by it (much as, in the previous chapter, I 
suggested that in a sonata recapitulation, the second theme “speaking” in the tonal terms of the 
first theme can mean that the second theme either appropriates the first or is appropriated by it).  
The two, perhaps irresolvable questions we face, then, are: (1) Does the reference to Song 2 
symbolize empowerment?  (2) Even if it does, to whom should we ascribe the power—the man or 
the woman?  
As should be clear by now, I do not view such ambiguities as invitations to discover the 
“truth” of the matter (which ambiguity, by definition, precludes in any case).  Rather, I view them 
as invitations to imagination.  We arbitrate an ambiguity, if at all, only by what seems to be the 
more convincing interpretation given the context and our own subjective predilections.  In this 
case, where I have charged our interpretation with critiquing male hegemony, I think the relation 
of Song 4 to 2 and 3 (Song 4 derives its power from 2, by means of which it “liberates” 3) makes 
for a compelling subtext by which the heroine at the opening of Song 4 gains the upper hand, at 
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least momentarily (see Ex. 4-8).  This reading places much stock in C minor’s potential 
emancipation from E@.  In fact, Jennifer and I agreed she would imagine her opening to be in C 
minor, that she would arrive on the C in m. 2 as if it were a tonic.  And as C minor acquires 
increasing prominence in the manner just described, the protagonist is increasingly emboldened.  
The apotheosis of C minor, as mentioned, occurs in m. 38.  Contrary to the previous 
interpretation, then, in which this passage, based solely on textural considerations, threatened to 
subdue the protagonist further, in this interpretation, the passage realizes a previously latent 
harmonic possibility, one that assumes considerable semantic specificity in light of the cycle as a 
whole.  This moment comprises a locus of female empowerment.37  
Another key that comes increasingly to the fore throughout “Du Ring” is G minor.  In 
nineteenth-century music—late nineteenth-century music in particular, such as Wagner’s—key 
centers are often inferred from subordinate progressions within those keys, without the tonic of 
that key necessarily being explicit.  Following Lawrence Kramer, we might term such tonality 
“horizonal,” but I prefer the “phantom-tonic complex” (my term).38  G minor, I contend, is one 
                                                
37 Things take an unfortunate turn, however, immediately following this C, as I will discuss later.  
38 Kramer’s (1981) “tonal horizon” is basically tonal space, which in classical music, more often than not, is 
evident in the tonal fabric of a piece.  Increasingly in romantic music, conversely, tonal material is set in 
opposition to the piece’s tonal horizon—the material, or “presentational relations,” in Kramer’s 
terminology, assumes relative autonomy with respect to the tonal horizon.  This phenomenon is related to 
the “double-tonic complex” insofar as in both cases the ontological certainty of one or more keys is in 
doubt.  This complex is common in, but not exclusive to, Schubert’s Lieder.  “Erster Verlust,” to take just 
one example, pairs the keys of E@ and C minor.  For other examples, see Krebs (1996) and Samson (1996).  
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such phantom tonality in this song.  Recall that, in the scheme of the entire cycle, G (albeit G 
major) is, like C minor, a key that is framed by or embellishes the tonic and thus, in our 
interpretive scenario, longs for de-containment (see Ex. 4-1).  On a melodic level, G’s ornamental 
subservience to the tonic was telegraphed from the very opening of the cycle, where it served as an 
upper neighbor to F, a chord-tone of the B@ triad (Ex. 4-10).  “Du Ring” emancipates G just as it 
does C.  For example, G, to my ears, is strongly implied in m. 3 by the Ĺ chord over the D bass (Ex. 
4-11): a Ĺ over an elongated or accented bass standardly signifies a cadential dominant, in whatever 
key (of course, in other contexts the Ĺ chord has a passing or arpeggiating function).  This allusion 
to G opens up a kind of hypothetical realm, which, as with C minor, is supported by reference to 
an earlier song: in Song 2, that same chromatic descent happens within an established G context 
(Ex. 4-12).  There the effacement is clear: she is essentially saying to the man, “go about your 
business; I merely want to worship you from afar, for your star is too bright for me to approach it.”  
Evoking that song here testifies to the ring effacing the woman.  At the same time, though, G 
minor is withheld here, setting up the possibility that things might turn out differently.  G—or 
rather, its absence—comes to symbolize an alternate life.  In other words, by alluding to the grim 
condition of Song 2 sans its explicit G minor tonic, “Du Ring” at once evokes its effacement and 
                                                
This complex, in turn, is related to “directional tonality,” in which the two tonics are not paired 
synchronically but rather diachronically, as it were—a piece beginning in one key ends in another, thus 
posing a challenge to traditional monotonality.  Chopin’s Second Ballade, which begins in F major and 
ends in A minor, is just one example (although these two keys are also paired throughout the piece).  On 
this topic, see Korsyn (1996).  The duality between competing tonics in paired and directional tonality 
evokes Doppelgänger, the uncanny, and other related tropes of musical and literary German Romanticism. 
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mitigates it.  Jennifer and I attempt to convey this positive potential by grandly arriving on m. 3 as 
if it were a cadential Ĺ, embracing the idea, as stated in Ex. 4-8, that other, more fulfilling situations 
are possible.   
 Hence, this version presents the opportunity to appropriate the key of G in a more 
affirmative way.  Since the beginning alludes to it only obliquely, we may proceed to approach it 
along an axis of self-realization.  Indeed, G becomes more of a real possibility as the piece proceeds, 
starting with the pickups to m. 17, which hint at the tonicization of G.  These anacruses, which in 
the previous interpretation were mere tokens of conformity, pieceworkers within an imitative-
contrapuntal apparatus, here carry more empowering tonal implications.  Hence our subtext: if the 
woman temporarily returns to the man’s frame of reference, as indicated by the resumption of the 
refrain and of the tonic—well, she does so, as much as is possible, on her own terms.  This 
meaning is bolstered by tracing the motive back to its origins—to that remarkable deceptive 






There, the protagonist extols the image of her beloved (“heller, heller”—similar imagery to that of 
Song 2).  This ostensible glorification is more than subtly undermined or questioned by the 
ominous cadence, which, with its dark, minor harmony rendered pp, blatantly counter-depicts the 
bright image of which she speaks.  Also, the arabesque-like configuration placed at the cadence—
the harmonic evasion is itself evaded, or ornamented—suggests the woman is able to push against 
the constraints that have been imposed upon her.  This indicates a life outside the man—a life of 





anacruses to m. 17 of “Du Ring,” they trade more forcefully on that same possibility, especially 
since G has since been affirmed as a potential tonality in Song 2 and earlier in Song 4.39  Hence, in 
this reading, the woman, though ostensibly following in the contrapuntal footsteps of the male in 
m. 16, seizes upon this motive and its glimmer of hope.  The woman’s role as dutiful imitator or 
puppet is overshadowed by this broader symbol of independence.   
  However, it is not until m. 31 that G appears as a full-fledged tonicized chord (Ex. 4-12).  
And though the G itself is ephemeral, the sense of self-realization here is palpable because the 
reference to Song 4, merely hinted at in mm. 3–4, is now glaring, as the example shows (see dotted 
boxes).  Jennifer thus effuses the warmth and confidence that derive from a sense of self-worth and 
self-actualization (more on our particular subtextual assertion in a moment).   
I note one further, though admittedly tenuous, harmonic implication (Ex. 4-13): the 
soprano’s A@–B@–E@ in m. 12 smacks of – –  
€ 
ˆ 1 within the key of E@—it walks and talks like a 
bass line.  Granted, here we are tonicizing A@, and so one might claim that the impression of E@ 
major is strictly visual.  However, I think this implication derives support from the fact that B@–E@ 
occurred just seconds before, in the bass of m. 10 (see example).  That in turn derives support 
from the fact that the voice part is evidently transferred to the bass.  In this context, the voice 
seems almost to be imitating—or better, taking over—the piano’s bass.  This reading entails an 
obvious irony: to the extent that E@ major is intimated by these vocal pitches, it is enfeebled—it is 
presented in a part and a harmonic environment that render it impotent.  Jennifer conveys this 
irony by singing those pitches somewhat tongue-in-cheek, not as a graceful melodic dip (with 
portamento, say) but as a somewhat disjointed instrumental line, as if slightly mocking it.    
                                                
39 Note, incidentally, the role of this F–F#–G figure in Song 3, where it is treated in retrograde.  
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For that matter, the vocal line in this song often seems to wax instrumental, not least in the 
fanfare with which it opens (even though, as we discussed, it is subsequently linearized and 
lyricized).  This disjunct texture has the effect of emphasizing the lower line traversing G–E@–C, 
which in turn establishes a 3rds-cycle (Ex. 4-14), the implication of a continuing sequence of 3rds, of 
which A@ in m. 4, the longest melodic note thus far, is arguably the temporary terminus.  This 
reading may seem dubious since that A@4 is not in the “obligatory register” of that chain—it is an 
octave too high.  Yet, this is retroactively justified when the note to which that A@4 would pass on, 
F4, is reached in an even higher register (F5) in m. 28.  In other words, as the chain unfolds, a new, 




will be higher than the one before.  The F5 in m. 28 is thus both an intervalic and registral 
realization.  It is also climactic because it is the apex, receives agogic emphasis, and is led to via a 
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stepwise progression that is emphasized by serving as the upper line of a polyphonic melody.40  As 
such, it is the singular climax of the song (see Ex. 4-14). 
The chromatic motive, F–F#–G, here appears in the guise of E@–E&–F (mm. 27–28), which 
was the first variant of this motive in Song 1 (m. 15; see Ex. 4-10).41  This clinches the self-
realization of that moment, not only because of the textual association, but also because of the way 
in which E@–E&–F is transformed: whereas the F–F#–G figure is metrically accented in Song 1 and 
unaccented in Song 4, the E@–E&–F variant, conversely, is unaccented in Song 1 and accented in 
Song 4—in the latter it begins on the downbeat and is dressed in elongated, grandiose rhythms.  
Hence, at this climax the heroine is not only asserting what is becoming to her a real alternative (as 
regards the F realizing long-established implications) but is doing so in an aggressive manner (as 
regards appropriating the chromatic motive leading into the F in such a bold, demarcated fashion).  
The heroine is really staking her claim to independence here.42  
                                                
40 This stepwise ascent is a 5th-progression from a voice-leading standpoint, a 4th-motion from a motivic 
standpoint—insofar as the 4th has by now in the song been established as a bona fide motive (more on 
which later) and as C5 in m. 25 initiates a distinctly new rhythmic grouping.  See Ex. 4-5. 
41 Although E–E@–F occurs prior to F–F#–G in the bass, the latter is planted in the alto as far back as mm. 
6–7, in the form of G–G@–F. 
42 Also notice the B@–B&–C in the tenor voice of m. 7: it adamantly restores the recte version of the F–F#–G 
motive that had been inverted on “Ringelein” in order to reinforce the idea of an alternative being foiled 
(along with the key of G).  (This motivic correspondence and correction, incidentally, is bolstered by the 
inverted motive departing from B@ and descending by semitone, the correction departing from B@ and 




Hence, F5, the point at which the heroine claims to “belong to him entirely” is also, 
scandalously, the moment where she claims a very different identity, one whose thread has been  
                                                
toward the tonal closure within V; and because of the time most hands would require to reach it, it 
threatens to break off from tonal discourse and speak a foreign, virtually atonal language (an [0148]!).  I 
therefore construe this motive as subversive. 
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surreptitiously spun throughout the song.  This moment, I would argue, is the apotheosis of the 
heroine’s self-realization.  The one that happens soon thereafter, in the harmonic realm—the 
tonicization of G in m. 31—is more inner and authentic, more “innig.”  This juxtaposition of 
more external and defiant versus more internal and heartfelt actualizations is crucial, in that it 
negotiates the philosophical conundrum to which I have alluded: if self-actualization is charted 
along pre-defined masculinist paths, is the heroine truly liberated?  Here the heroine has her cake 
and eats it too—she variously adopts both types of authority, one trading on external masculine 
aggression (which, after all, is not unjustified), the other on internal feminine self-
acknowledgment.  In the latter case, she no longer feels the need to convince the man, to argue 
within his discursive space, within the terms he has already preestablished and thus usurped.  The 
realization, if less demonstrative, is also more authentic.  Hence our subtextual choice as stated in 
Ex. 4-8.  Moreover, trying on these different discursive systems, one articulate one tacit, with no 
one assuming precedence, is itself a feminist tack—it refuses the singularity and absolutism of the 
masculine economy. 
A final point: the means by which the F5 is achieved is the bifurcation of the vocal line into 
higher and lower strata.  Such a compound melody, while not unmusical or unidiomatic for the 
voice, is arguably more instrumental in orientation, and thus, by convention, masculine.  This 
accounts for the aggressive—and thus, from a feminist standpoint, ultimately unsatisfactory—
nature of the self-realization.  What is more, that upper line, C–D–E@–E–F, is subsequently 
appropriated by an instrument—the piano, mm. 38–39 (see Ex. 4-15).  One might view this as 
symbolic of the male reclaiming authority after so many gestures in that direction by the woman—
the F5, the C minor chord, and the G minor chord.  This recalls our first interpretation, where the 
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bass gradually overwhelms the singer.  The piano’s bass, then, shifts personae midstream—up to 
m. 383, where C is actualized, it affirms the female perspective, after which it affirms the male one.  
A seemingly indissoluble bass line is wedged apart, rendered dialogic.  I express this by rendering 
the bass line from C rather obtrusively, Jennifer does by retreating from her hard-won confidence.  
In our scenario, the man’s (seeming) warmth that the reharmonization exudes menacingly 
transforms into dominance; the momentary comfort that the protagonist takes in such warmth 
devolves into fear.  This reflects the reality that abusive relationships often have the semblance of 
caring but can turn destructive on a dime. 
 
 
In closing, the emphasis on potentiality in this version, which came from processes going 
against the Schenkerian grain, can be seen as a feminist strategy: Elaine Showalter reminds us that 
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reacting to male injustices is only half the battle; the other half is more proactive.  Her so-called 
gynocritics foregoes “the linear absolutes of male literary history” and focuses instead on “the 
newly visible world of female culture” (1985, 131).  In other words, gynocritics does not resist 
oppressive constraints, an endeavor that, ironically, is bound to keep women in some sense 
constrained.  Rather, it imagines other possibilities, ones grounded in authentic female experience 
and consciousness.  These musical potentials I located can be metaphors for these alterior states, 
given their desire to break free from the reigning Schenkerian discourse.  
 
FOURTH ANALYSIS/PERFORMANCE 
If the previous interpretation offered glimmers of hope based on salient implications/realizations, 
this one (Web Ex. 14/Ex. 4-16) offers only anger and defiance in response to an unhappy and 
unhealthy situation.  Jennifer and I conceived of this version as being more about doing than 
thinking: she sings to provoke and antagonize the man, to openly flout his expectations.  That is to 
say, she sings performatively.  Consequently, the subtext in Ex. 4-16 consists not so much of tacit 
assertions but more a series of intentions and actions.  Our most general physical idea, as evident 
in the video, is that Jennifer continually touches the ring as if threatening to take it off; her 
character apparently no longer considers it indissolubly wed to her hand.  Our most general 
musical idea is to use musical configurations as weapons in order to mar the ostensible idealism of 
the text and beauty of the music—to treat motives as jagged shards to tear at the masculinist fabric 
in which the heroine is ensconced.  






Example 4-16: subtext for fourth performance; 
basic emotion: angry and defiant 
crunch 
[motive contra phrase boundary] 
// 
[4th-mot. in ungainly place] 
(   ) (   ) 
_   _     _ 
what was source of vulnerability (minor)  








[3rd-motive vs. 4th] 






1. We delineate motives, especially 4th-motives, that work at cross-purposes with voice-
leading structure.  Thus delineated, they sit awkwardly within the phrase, impeding its 
lyrical flow. 
[octave-line contra phrase bound.] 
(4th-mot.) 










2. We phrase in opposition to the obvious phrase boundaries, sometimes creating 
exceedingly long lines, not to create beauty but to symbolize evading masculine boundaries, 
both discursive and physical.  Secondarily, doing so pushes the limits of Jennifer’s breath, 
such that she embodies her character’s psychical discomfort.  
 
3. Jennifer mixes chest voice and head voice (just as Jesse Norman alternates between two 
vocal placements in Song 2) in order to eschew a pretty sound—in fact, to embrace the 
dictum, as recently stated by the violinist Christian Tetzlaff, that “beauty is the enemy of 
expression!” (Eichler [2012]). 
 
I derive this interpretation from 4th-motives that contravene voice-leading structure (see Ex. 
4-5).  I also derive the interpretation from the conflict between the 4th- and 3rd-motives, which is 
established from the start: the B@–C–D–E@ that would weave the piano (read: man) and singer 
(read: woman) into a false unity (see top of Ex. 4-4, also Ex. 4-17) is countered by an angular 
emphasis on C–D–E@.  The latter figure is cordoned off by its intervalic content—all steps, over 
against the skips that precede it.  This reading is bolstered by the bourgeoning tonality of C minor, 
as previously discussed.  These three notes thus enjoy a modicum of independence based on both 
melodic contour and implied tonality.   
 The 3rd-motive has the capacity to conflict not only with Schenkerian boundaries, but also 
with phrase boundaries (Ex. 4-17): “Ringelein” (diatonically) describes B@–A@, the latter wanting to 
push onto G, which it does only at the beginning of the next phrase.  The motivic identity of B@–
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A@–G is affirmed by its precedent in the piano’s inner voice, mm. 1–2; the voice realizes this latent 
figure but does so in a deliciously subversive way, transcending a phrase boundary. 
 The 4th-motives also conflict among themselves.  This motive comes to the fore in the b 
section (Ex. 4-18), where it invades both the piano and voice and becomes the subject of an 
altercation of sorts: the descending 4th in the bass is antagonized by the ascending 4th-motive in the 
voice—“antagonized” because the voice (a) retrogrades its model, “correcting” it; (b) corrects it 
quickly, impatiently, not waiting for the bass to finish its expansive statement; and (c) sets it more 
blatantly at odds with voice-leading structure: whereas in the bass the fourth transparently 
decorates the 3rd (G–E@), in the voice the terminus of the motive, A@, is the focal dissonance of the 
gesture and needs to resolve.  Here the incongruity between motivic and tonal function is palpable.    
 In mm. 11–12, the bass aborts its 4th-descent, as if taking its cue from the voice’s 
“correction” in mm. 9–10—it leads up to A@ via F and G just as the voice did in those measures, 
and now makes of A@ a provisional tonic; the voice, meanwhile, takes over the bass’s B@–E@, as we 
discussed.  Thus, the roles of voice and piano, woman and man, are reversed, with the woman 






heroine speaks of having been lost after childhood and needing male guidance, the music in this 
reading tells a different story, one in which the woman takes charge of her own destiny.  In fact, in 
an unplanned but, in retrospect, felicitous interpretive move, Jennifer jumps the gun a bit on the 
G@ in m. 15, as if to usurp it, to preclude it from fomenting the self-doubt it had in earlier 
versions. 
Example 4-17: motive/phrase conflict 
// 
(phrase-break) 





 The end of the song (Ex. 4-19) plays with the 4th in suggestive ways.  In the previous 
interpretation, the bass in mm. 38–39 symbolized the man overpowering the woman in taking 
over her C–D–E@–E&–F from the B section (see Ex. 4-15).  That bass line is also authoritative in 
affirming tonal structure, since it leads to a decisive point of tonal articulation—the structural 
predominant, V/V.  Yet, the voice bumps up against this imposing line with a descending 4th-
motive (E@–D–C–B@, the retrograde of the initial, latent 4th-motive), which, like the one in m. 9, is 
impatient and alights on a dissonant note.  It refuses to conform to tonal structure.  The motive is 
also at odds with the text and the vocal phrase: its initial note, E@5, occurs at the end of a word and 
also at the point where a singer would be inclined to breathe.  For this reason, the motive 
disintegrates—it is perforated with a breath.  In retrospect, this may have been one reason why, in 
previous interpretations, Jennifer’s heroine lost confidence at this point, along with being 
overwhelmed by the bombastic bass.  The potential weapon that is that 4th-motive was neutralized 
and dissolved.  In this version, we refuse to let that happen: Jennifer, against musical “common 
sense,” declines to breathe there and makes a beeline for the cadence.  In this way, the notes of the 
motive are emphasized, since not only are they connected, but due to the long phrase, Jennifer 
starts to run out of breath on the last two notes of m. 40, which are registrally deemphasized in any 
case.  The potency of that fourth in this version is restored.43  
                                                
43 I should acknowledge that breaking up the motive in previous versions could also be seen to have 
resisting potential, insofar as that figure, as fragmented, refuses to fall in line with the piano’s (man’s) 
imitative scheme (see boxes in Ex. 4-19).  Recall that in Version 3, we similarly tried to challenge the 






A related point: the E@5 of m. 29 is led down the octave to E@4 in m. 32 (Ex. 4-20).  At first 
glance, the latter would appear to affirm tonicity, due both to the octave coupling—at least on a 
motivic level—and to taking part in a tonic arpeggiation (see beamed notes).  Yet, it is dissonant 
against the bass—its linear-motivic function is sharply at odds with its tonal function.  We can  
Example 4-19: mm. 36–end 
Cons. Cons. Diss. 
accent dim. 7th chord,  




read this as implying that the protagonist slyly undermines E@’s tonicity, or that she appropriates it 
on her own terms.  Again, we emphasize this by withholding a breath until after “Ring.”  It is  
fruitful to note in this regard Schumann’s varied use of the anacrusis figures leading into the 
refrain phrases: no two are quite the same, as Ex. 4-21 synopsizes.  We have noted the resisting 
potential in particular of the anacruses leading into m. 17 and m. 33.  Indeed—to return to the 
point with which I began, regarding the arabesque’s potential for sexual resistance—these variants 
are anything but superficially decorative: they prove a pivotal means of self-expression, one that 
exists outside of masculine sphere.  
 
 
Example 4-20: octave-transfer of E   
E   as goal of octave-transfer out-of- 









POSTLUDE: THE PIANO’S PERSONAE 
It should be clear from the above analyses that in Versions 2 and 3 the piano did not adopt a 
single persona—neither solely that of the man nor of the woman.  I decided to use the piano 
flexibly and pragmatically, to embody now one persona, now another, depending on the effect I 
thought most necessary to achieve in any one moment.  For example, in Version 3, I adopted and 
reinforced the heroine’s persona leading to the point of self-realization in m. 28, to ensure that 
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crucial moment came across.  Then, however, I switched roles in mm. 38–39, playing the 
overbearing man to Jennifer’s daunted heroine.  In the fourth version, however, I generally 
adopted the petulant tone of the woman.  Even in m. 12, where the man is eviscerated, where the 
bass is cowed by the woman’s own bass-like enunciation, I nonetheless side with the woman, 
demarcating the F–G–A@ figure.   
Two questions arise regarding Versions 2 and 3.  First, would it possibly have been more 
effective for the piano strictly to have played the male persona?  Would that have foregrounded 
and illuminated Jennifer’s character and emotions by giving her something consistently 
oppositional to play against?  In other words, would adopting a starker male/female—piano/vocal 
opposition have rendered our performances more critically potent?  Only further experimentation 
would tell, but, again, my hunch is that it was more efficacious, interpretively and critically, for the 
pianist to don different hats throughout the song.  Another option, incidentally, would be to play 
more “neutrally,” to adopt Edward Cone’s “composer’s persona”—the implicit musical persona, 
not necessarily indicative of the actual composer’s thoughts and feelings—rather than specific 
“vocal personae” (1974, 20–40).  To simplify, the former is a general arbiter of all that occurs in 
the composition as a whole, the latter is a particular character within that whole.  I avoided this 
strategy since, as I established in the first chapter, I am dubious that neutral playing is even 
possible.  To the extent, then, that I vacillate between different vocal personae, the second 
question that arises is: to what degree, if at all, is the listener able to detect the shift from one 
persona to another—to discern these dramatic “beats”—given the semantic indeterminacy of the 
instrumental medium?  I do not have a ready answer to this question, and so remain vulnerable to 
the possibility that the piano, in failing to adopt a single persona, compromised its critical power.  
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While my intuition tells me this is not the case, I would have difficulty proving otherwise, and 
must leave it to the individual listener to determine the degree to which the piano’s various 
personae are discernible.  
 
III. REFLECTING UPON RESISTANCE 
What do Jennifer’s and my performances resist?  (1) Primarily and most obviously, the misogyny of 
Schumann’s cycle—of both its text and musical setting.  More precisely, the performances seize 
upon potentially resisting elements in Schumann’s music—they mobilize the music’s own capacity 
for resisting the text.  (2) Conventional or conservative musicality.  The performances refuse to be 
complicit in masculinist ideology, as would happen if they had passively “instantiated” the score, 
and especially if in a beautiful way.  To sing this song beautifully is to work against one’s own self-
interest.  (3) The potentially oppressive dimensions of music theory, of hierarchical hegemony in 
particular.  (4) Most importantly in the scheme of my entire dissertation, the twin notions of the 
transcendent work and the subservience of interpretation to it (Werktreue).   
What these foci of resistance hold in common is the metaphor of containment: in the first 
case of the female and female desire; in the second of the aberrant or pathological by which 
(according to Brett [1994]) musicality is implicitly framed, as explained below; in the third of 
(quasi-) autonomous, contra-hierarchical musical parameters; and in the last free, corporeal, even 
carnal interpretation—the impulse to be unfaithful or adulterous, as it were, to the work.  
Whereas only the first of these items is connected to feminism in any obvious way, the others 
relate to it by extension, in ways I will amplify in this concluding section.  Yet, I will also point out 
the limitations of the kind of traditional feminist stance I adopted above (in musicalized form), 
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drawing in particular on Judith Butler; I will also acknowledge the limitations of my own particular 
interpretive experiment and its execution.  I should say, I have neither the expertise nor space to 
survey nearly all the literature applicable to these issues, nor to follow these ideas to their ultimate 
conclusions.  What I offer instead is a fairly selective discussion of particular feminist-musicological 
concerns that pertain to the above interpretive project.      
 
1. THE MUSICAL OPPRESSION OF THE FEMALE 
Here I consider the first of the four factors mentioned above: the musicalized oppression of 
women.  Schumann composed his cycle during an era in which music was played predominately by 
amateur musicians in the home, which were mainly women.  It is ironic that, although 
instrumental music in a sense superseded vocal music in the nineteenth century44 and waxed 
rigorous, assertive, argumentative, and thus “masculine,” it was mainly women who played that 
most instrumental of instruments—the piano.  Yet, far from being a gesture of empowerment, this 
practice was apparently rife with voyeuristic overtones, as Leppert (1993) argues in his magisterial 
survey of musical iconography from this period (and earlier).  He reveals that paintings of women 
and pianos, and paintings on keyboard instruments themselves, were commonly affiliated with 
misogyny and death.  Without getting into the details of particular paintings, I enumerate four 
themes of his discussion: (1) These paintings allow music to be appropriated visually.  They subject 
keyboard music—and the women who play it—to the male gaze.  (2) These paintings aestheticize 
                                                
44 “Is singing’s full embodiedness related to the longterm trend in European art music that has deprivileged 
vocal music in favor of instrumental?  Does that long-term trend . . . tell us something important about our 
culture’s responses to the feminine?” Cusick (1998, 50). 
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violence.  The images suggest that “for music to flourish, political pacification must be pursued 
militarily.  In this extraordinary visual conceit, force and imputed violence become the agents of 
art” (ibid., 127–28).  (3) Women at the piano are often depicted as dead and passive, hence more 
amenable to male appropriation.  (4) Visual appropriations of musical phenomena serve to control 
the elusiveness and perceived femininity of sound.   
Indeed, music, considered generally, has traditionally been aligned with the feminine, in 
which respect the masculinization of instrumental music can be seen to resist or repress this 
association.  Such masculinization can arguably be traced back to Beethoven.  In an astute cultural 
analysis, Sanna Pederson posits that Beethoven has long been regarded as quintessentially 
masculine due to (1) his universalist, asensuous aura; (2) his involvement in the political sphere; 
and (3) the heroic character of his middle-period works.45  The last, in their assertiveness or virility, 
can be seen to repress traces of the feminine conventionally associated with the music profession.  
By extension, as Brett notes, these qualities perhaps serve to ward off insecurities about 
homosexuality.  “The appropriation of the feminine and privatization of ‘the muse’ in the figure of 
the male composer, who therefore seems in a special way to reflect the trope of the woman’s soul 
trapped in a man’s body . . . often seems to demand a compensating amount of energy spent in 
holding up the façade of masculinity.  This lethal combination in turn helps to augment the 
legendary misogyny of the profession” (1994, 22).  
                                                
45 Pederson notes that his masculinity thrives on the contradiction, evident in the social contract theories of 
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, that all people are naturally equal, born so, and yet women are prevented 
from enjoying equal rights because of their socially constructed gender.  The latter principle, which could have 
been used to advocate for equality, was instead used to rationalize inequality (see Pederson [2000, 315]).   
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Yet, as Leppert argues, such a tack, evident not just in Beethoven but in much nineteenth-
century music—think of Tchaikovsky’s explosive orchestrations, Brahms’s vigorous thematic 
arguments, and Wagner, given the sheer exertion he demands of singers, players, and listeners 
alike—is patently self-contradictory.  For on the one hand, it “constitutes an impassioned outburst 
by male artists entreating for the centrality of their artistic exercise not only as a protest over their 
own marginalization but also as the sonoric denial of the effeminization the culture attached to 
them as artists” (Leppert [1993,187]).  On the other, “these expressions of sonoric protest serve to 
reenact and thereby sanction the ideology of male hegemony on which artists’ own marginalization 
depends” (ibid.).  Concomitantly, the freedom for which heroic Beethoven ostensibly pleads is 
partially undermined by the very bellicosity with which it does so—recall the above discussion, in 
particular Subotnik’s comment regarding the fine line in this music between freedom and force, 
between equality or solidarity and coercion.  Pederson quotes Maynard Solomon in this regard: 
“Liberty and fraternity—but not equality.  It is on the issue of equality that Beethoven parts 
company with the slogans of the French Revolution and the eighteenth-century utopian 
philosophes” (Solomon [1988a, 203]).  She proceeds to explain that Beethoven was avowedly more 
interested in power than in equality, and that he “did not subscribe to the idea that ‘all men are 
created equal,’ even when only men were indicated,” as in the “Alle Menschen werden Brüder” of 
the Ninth (Pederson [2000, 322]).  The contradiction here, clearly, is that to valorize individual 
liberty but not equality inevitably results in a situation in which some enjoy liberty and others not.  
And without an equitable system in place, the tables can easily turn, such that those who enjoy 
freedom today may well not tomorrow.  Liberty without equality is thus arguably no liberty at all.     
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As self-contradictory, then, as the above enterprise may be, composers who did not 
undertake it often suffered the consequence of being dubbed feminine or effete, and of being 
paired with, and devalued in relation to, a more “manly” counterpart.  The classic example of this 
is probably Liszt and Chopin, a juxtaposition that evokes a constellation of binarisms such as 
masculine/feminine, strong/feeble, forte/piano, arm technique/wrist and finger technique, 
public/private, piano as imitative of the orchestra/of singing, and so on.  In all these, the second 
term, associated with Chopin, is implicitly marked or aberrant.46  The composers who do not 
suppress the assumed feminine association of their craft are restored to that condition; the 
unmarked female gendering of music returns as a marked and dubious characteristic.   
In summary, I have outlined two forms the musical suppression of the feminine assumes: 
one is the voyeuristic containment of the female musician in various pictures and images (as 
surveyed by Leppert), the other is the repression of the composer’s culturally-ascribed femininity.  
The former can be seen as an externalization and projection of the latter.  Schumann’s cycle is the 
sonoric equivalent to those images; it is a tone-picture of domesticized containment that conceals 
the violence on which such containment trades.  And to whatever extent Schumann himself is 
complicit, if unwittingly, in such ideology—though please recall my previous caveat in this 
regard—he too can be seen as distancing himself in Frauenliebe from the femininity, or rather 
homosexuality, about which he evidently fantasized.47  
 
                                                
46 See Eigeldinger (1986, 27 and passim).  For an extensive consideration of the gendered tropes historically 
applied to Chopin and his music, see Kallberg (1996, especially 62–88). 
47 On which see Ostwald (1985, especially 42–43). 
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Counter -Crit ique  
To the extent that my interpretive experiment constitutes an implicit plea for female liberation, it 
is subject to concerns raised by Judith Butler.  From her broad and penetrating critique, I will cull 
only the two points most relevant to our discussion.  First, defending, or purporting to defend, the 
rights of women (even ones of a bygone age) can easily fall prey to an essentialist economy, by 
which women are viewed as a homogeneous, monolithic group.  Obviously, women do not 
comprise a uniform category; to any one person several and overlapping cultural indices apply, of 
which gender is only one.  Coalition politics often assumes unity and also desires it as the 
outcome, which is questionable if the goal is political action and reform.  “Does ‘unity’ set up an 
exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identity that rules out the possibility of a set of 
actions which disrupt the very borders of identity concepts . . . ?” (1990, 21).  In other words, one 
cannot begin with a fixed assumption of identity and unity if such identity is precisely what one 
seeks to change.  Nor do the alleged male antagonists comprise a single category; to view men as 
such itself smacks of masculinist ideology.  “Feminist critique ought to explore the totalizing claims 
of a masculinist signifying economy, but also remain self-critical with respect to the totalizing 
gestures of feminism.  The effort to identify the enemy as singular in form is a reverse-discourse 
that uncritically mimics the strategy of the oppressor instead of offering a different set of terms” 
(1990, 18).  Feminists are not immune to the “the colonizing gesture.”  The second point is that 
aspiring toward subjective autonomy or emancipation—as Jennifer and I did in our performances 
overall—is problematic from the start since that very ideal is a masculinist one, one that assumes a 
natural, pre-discursive individual who may then be culturally stamped.  Not to mention, the ideal 
of complete autonomy is a ruse: no one can be so free so as to elude all cultural constraints and 
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contexts.  In short, the ideals of (female) solidarity and subjective autonomy—in a sense, two sides 
of the same coin—both rest upon masculinist, which is to say foundationalist and hegemonic 
paradigms, and thus undermine the feminist project from the start.  
How do I square these legitimate concerns with both my advocacy of interpretive freedom 
in general (in the first chapter) and of female freedom via interpretive resistance (in this chapter)?  
As to the former, I would clarify that the interpretive liberation for which I argued neither 
assumes nor aspires to a pre-cultural, pre-discursive individual who can (or should) do anything she 
wants to a score.  Rather, I invoked and affirmed Bowen’s (1993) stance that interpretation 
necessarily takes place within a community of interpreters and an established history of 
interpretations.  Any interpreter is inevitably influenced by and on some level must grapple with, 
or respond to, at least some of these interpretations.  Even more crucially, I argued that the 
interpreter ideally exercises his freedom in relation to, within the context of, the exigencies and 
intimations of a score.  Hers is a freedom to make choices within particular constraints, within a 
broad yet finite realm of cogent possibilities.  The performer must dip into her well of natural and 
nurtured proclivities in order to close the gap between herself and the text, in order to fill the 
score with sentience.  Such constrained freedom is arguably the only true freedom, as I have 
discussed above with respect to composition.  We saw how even Beethoven, widely held to 
epitomize the autonomous and self-directed artist, manifested his creative freedom by deeply 
internalizing and also strategically dramatizing, problematizing, and occasionally ironizing the well-
established conventions of his predecessors, particularly Bach, Haydn, and Mozart.   
As to the plea for female liberation, it may well be vulnerable to Butler-esque charges of 
essentialism, coalitional unity, and replicating masculinist ideology.  The last was most evident in 
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the fourth performance, in which the heroine sought recourse to the very masculine aggressiveness 
by which she, by implication, is oppressed in the cycle.  In this regard, the third performance was 
more successful, and not only by adopting a more hopeful stance.  More subtly, it traded heavily 
on potentiality, on moments where the music implied an alternate experience.  This tactic, in turn, 
pivots, to a limited extent, on the non-representationality of women with the masculinist discursive 
system.  I elaborate this point by counterpoising, as Butler does, the views of Beauvoir (1973) and 
Irigaray (1985).  Beauvoir claims that within the terms of masculine signification, the female, in 
her corporeality and particularity, is a marked term; the male, in his incorporeality and 
universality, is an unmarked term.  Irigaray, by contrast, deems women utterly unrepresentable 
within masculine discourse.  As Butler summarizes, “For Beauvoir, women are the negative of 
men, the lack against which masculine identity differentiates itself; for Irigaray, that particular 
dialectic constitutes a system that excludes an entirely different economy of signification” (1990, 
13).  Feminine multiplicity and polysemy—the “sex which is not one”—resists the binaristic 
discourse described by Beauvoir; it rejects the assumption of a singular somatic substance upon 
which masculine discourse can act.  In Butler’s gloss,  
Irigaray would maintain . . . that the feminine ‘sex’ is a point of linguistic absence, the impossibility 
of a grammatically denoted substance, and hence, the point of view that exposes that substance is 
an abiding and foundational illusion of a masculinist discourse . . . .  The female sex eludes the very 
requirements of representation, for she is neither ‘Other’ nor the ‘lack,” those categories remaining 
relative to the Sartrian subject, immanent to the phallogocentric scheme” (ibid., 14, her italics).   
My emphasis on non-material presence, on potentiality, then, served, I hope, to mitigate the 
danger of asserting a female trace that a masculinist system can easily appropriate as Other.  But 
mitigate only to a point, of course: for such potentials or implications, in my reading, were 
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eventually realized, at which point—recall the arrival of F5—the female succumbs to the 
masculinist dynamic of striving, or becomes the Other, asserting a presence but within the terms 
defined by masculinity.  As I implied above, late Beethoven teaches us that the only true freedom 
is potential rather than actual, for once actual, it can easily prove coercive and thus self-effacing.  
In the third interpretation, once the unrepresented state of feminine solace becomes a reality, it 
too easily succumbs to, or threatens to replicate, male hegemony.    
To this extent, the only solution that would probably satisfy someone like Irigaray—the 
only way for the performer to elude Schumann’s/Chamisso’s grasp—is simply to avoid singing the 
cycle altogether.  And indeed, one might reasonably ask, why sing the cycle at all if it is 
ideologically pernicious?  To say, “because it has intrinsic musical value” is to play right into 
masculine essentialism; to say “because it is beautiful” is to accede to the woman/performer 
serving as an innocuous ornament.  Even to have a man sing it, which is not out of the question,48 
is not necessarily to elude charges of misogyny, insofar as sex and gender are not synonymous; men 
can be as easily oppressed by misogynist ideology as can women.  My stance is that there is 
something to be said for challenging the system from within it—as citizens do within a democracy, 
for instance—to push against its constraints rather than pretending it away.  Taking on the debate, 
in my view, is preferable to passivity.  It is true, however, that one must be careful not to be 
hemmed in unwittingly by the terms imposed by the dominant system; often an entirely different 
set of terms is needed.  I would also suggest that resisting the cycle’s misogyny from within the 
                                                
48 No more so than women singing Winterreise, which they seem to be doing ever more frequently.  Christa 
Ludwig, Brigitte Fassbaender, Natalie Stutzmann, and Christine Schäfer have all recorded the cycle.  
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confines of that cycle may not be the optimal or ultimate solution, but it might be seen as at least a 
step along the path to more authentic female identity.  
A related objection is, does Frauenliebe require a resisting performance?  Because, from our 
modern standpoint, it wears its misogyny on its sleeve.  Moreover, if late Beethoven is any model, 
baldly exposing a social imbalance is itself a form of critique.  From this perspective, performing 
the cycle sincerely would suffice to point up its shortcomings.  Muxfeldt, citing Cusick’s diagnosis 
of Norman’s performance, quips, “if there are aspects of these songs which no longer speak to us, 
do we really need a singer’s stiffness to bring this home?  I should think a truly fabulous 
performance would suffice” (2001, 30, fn. 9).  And, of course, as I mentioned, Muxfeldt does not 
actually see the cycle as oppressive to begin with, but rather, in its historical context, as empathetic.  
So, paradoxically, whether the cycle is blatantly misogynist or not at all, arguably it requires no 
resistance.   
In response, I would say that it is unduly optimistic to assume that most audiences, even 
today, would see Frauenliebe as transparently misogynist.  Anecdotally, I can report that the several 
female singers with whom I have discussed this cycle (Jennifer Goltz excepted), and who are 
obviously more privy than the average listener to the inner workings of the poetry and music, tend 
to express knee-jerk enthusiasm for the cycle.  I attribute this, again, to a predilection to view vocal 
music as a species of instrumental or absolute music, and thus as supposedly apolitical.  The ethos 
of musical absolutism, in my view, tends to cancel out the ethos of gender equality that 
(supposedly) characterizes the current political left, on which most artists reside.  Hence, it is not 
surprising that to hear the cycle performed today is typically to hear it performed “beautifully”; and 
devoid of an explicitly critical context, it is doubtful that anyone would hear through the pretty 
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sounds to the pernicious sentiments underlying them.  It is to this notion of “beautiful singing” 
that I now turn.   
 
2. SINGING “MUSICALLY” 
In common parlance, to call someone “musical” is implicitly to say that he plays or sings with a 
beautiful tone; spins long phrases; arches most phrases, dynamically and temporally; delineates 
obvious phrasal and formal boundaries; and, most generally, employs a variety of dynamics, tempi, 
and articulations but also confines them to a relatively modest range, so as not to “detract” from 
the abstract ideas assumed to be embedded in the score and to define an abstract work.  
Institutionalized musicality, as I discussed in Chapter 1, is a safeguard against the subjective 
inclinations that threaten to spiral out of control, to problematize the work in some fashion, or to 
become detached from the perceived purview of the work altogether.   
This is a troublingly hegemonic dynamic generally, but particularly so when the work in 
question is ideologically dubious in some way.  In the cases of “Du Ring” and “Batti, Batti,” for 
instance, their melodious beauty serves to conceal the infrastructure of oppression and violence on 
which they depend.  Culturally sanctioned musicality, in turn, ensures that those performing these 
songs preserve their (ostensible) beauty and thus that the performers comply, if unwittingly, with 
their ideology.  Performing the Schumann with a self-indulgently beautiful sound would in effect 
portray the protagonist acceding to her condition (this tactic, granted, could be critical if over-the-
top saccharine).  Moreover, on an indexical rather than iconic level, it would entail subverting the 
female performer herself and rendering her submissive.  To sing this cycle with conventional 
musicality is to sing against oneself.  
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 If conventional musicality can serve to curb the performer’s subjective impulses perceived 
to be recalcitrant toward composerly reason, or the feminine impulses recalcitrant toward 
masculine reason, it can also serve to control, contain, and alteriorize the psychological pathology 
with which musicality has long been associated.  As Brett (1994) argues, homosexuality is to 
sexuality what musicality is to music.  As ideological cognates, homosexuality and musicality draw a 
line in the sand separating normal from abnormal, sanctioned from deviant.49  Of course, 
“musical” is not used in a pejorative sense as “homosexual” is, but both are associated with 
pathology:   
Though it is not proscribed in the same way as homosexuality, music has often been considered a 
dangerous substance, an agent of moral ambiguity always in danger of bestowing deviant status 
upon its practitioners.  Both Plato and Aristotle saw it in these terms.  Theirs was a legacy of moral 
doubt that infected much of the writing about music in the West, from St. Augustine’s anguish 
about being moved more by the voice than by the words to the attacks of the Calvinists. . . .  
Lurking beneath the objections against music, the ethical question surrounding it, is the long 
tradition of feeling that it is different, irrational, unaccountable (Brett [1994, 11]).     
 
Brett’s assertion might help account for the extremity and voyeurism that Said (1991) 
associates with classical performance.  Said was talking about artists of high technical achievement 
and refinement.  Even more extreme are cases where the artists are not only highly skilled but also 
idiosyncratic or even mentally ill in some sense.  This would explain the continual fascination 
                                                
49 Brett points out that variants of the epithet “musical” have in fact been used as euphemisms for “gay.”  
On musicality as supposed sexual deviancy, also see Cusick (1994, 79).  On the association of musical 
“talent” with Otherness generally, see Kingsbury (1988, 12–13).    
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with—indeed, fetishization of—Glenn Gould, to whom essays, books, and films are continually 
being devoted.50  Another case is David Helfgott, the pianist suffering from schizophrenia who, 
after the biopic Shine was released, enjoyed his fifteen minutes of fame on a concert circuit that was 
treated somewhat like a circus.  The exploitation of such artists, by both scholars and the public 
and sometimes even by the artists themselves, is merely a pronounced instance of the more general 
phenomenon by which, on Brett’s view, we attempt to contain the gendered pathology that we 
associate with musical skill generally.  In music we more often fetishize than denigrate it, but the 
effect of containment is the same.     
 The foregoing suggests that being “unmusical” is not necessarily a bad thing, especially in 
the case of propogandist art.  An illuminating statement by Adorno surfaces in this connection, 
and deserves to be quoted at length: 
Lively music-making, by children, amateurs, entertainers and such like, supplies the theory with the 
most important exemplary material.  Firstly, because here the music appears with all its cracks and 
holes, so to speak, deconstructed into the elements of every dimension of which it is constituted, 
and through it one can observe, as with broken toys, how it “works.”  The tears are so many 
windows onto the problems of interpretation that proficient execution normally conceals, but then 
one can see in the approaches of those subjects all those things that also inspire bad official music 
making, but which are covered up there by good manners, by the “good musician”; the normal 
musical education is nothing other than the history of such concealment (2006, 127, his italics).51 
                                                
50 Besides Bazzana (1997) and Said (2006), whom I have already cited, also see Hafner (2009) and Ostwald 
(1998). 
51 Adorno’s motto might have been, as expressed by psychologist Scott Miller, “The enemy of excellence is 
proficiency.”  Quoted in Greenberg [2010, 30)]).  It also brings to mind an aphorism from Zen Mind, 
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This quote leads us back to the idea that we err in supposing music, whether in its composition or 
performance, to be organic, natural, and inevitable.  Such a view conceals the very real labor of 
both composer and performer, it undervalues the performing body, with its stresses and strains as 
well as pleasures (more on which below).  And, more central to our purposes, it would make 
messages as evident in Frauenliebe seem inevitable and objectively true.  To expose the fissures in 
the compositional fabric, whether unwittingly (as, presumably, with Jesse Norman in Song 2) or 
much more deliberately and self-consciously (as with Jennifer and myself in Song 4) is to telegraph 
the contingency and bias of such messages. 
How would I assess our performances in light of these comments?  In all candor, I feel that 
we could have gone further—there is certainly room for performances even more resisting, more 
problematic, more strategically “unmusical.”  This is not to criticize my colleague or myself; it is 
merely to speak to the difficulty of extricating oneself from conservatory-style training, which, 
certainly in my case, centered around time-honored notions of competent musicianship.  My 
performances, despite concerted efforts to the contrary, bore the stamp of the institutionally 
sanctioned musicality from which I, like countless other musicians, derive a sense of validity and 
acceptance, and which one disavows at his own peril.52  
 
 
                                                
Beginner’s Mind: “In the beginner’s mind there are many possibilities.  In the expert’s mind there are few” 
(Suzuki [1970, 1]). 




3. A CRITIQUE OF MUSIC THEORY? 
The parametric incongruities and conflicts I discerned in Schumann’s score are at once iconic and 
indexical.  That is, on the one hand, these parametric conflicts, within the feminist context I 
explicitly invoked, symbolize, are homologous with, conflict more generally.  On the other hand, 
within the methodology I established, they do not merely represent such conflict but induce it on 
the part of the performers (and are induced by it)—they draw the performers into an antagonistic 
relationship with Schumann’s piece.  My analysis in no way purports to be objective or factual but 
rather aims to be unabashedly performative and provocative, to tease out the strains of resistance 
latent in Schumann’s notations and to serve them up to the performers, who may then realize such 
latencies and challenge the cycle’s ideology in a public forum. 
 I used analysis, then, in the service of critique.  The question here is, in that process did I 
critique analysis itself?  In particular, in placing melodic/motivic threads and hierarchical tonal 
structure in mutual opposition, did I implicitly frame the latter as a hegemonic vehicle?  Are 
Schenkerian analysis and music analysis more generally susceptible to critique on feminist 
grounds? 
 This is a complex, much-debated issue that I cannot and need not extensively rehearse.  A 
few main points will suffice.  Certainly, New Musicologists have been known to subject music 
analysis to feminist and other post-structuralist modes of critique.  Leppert, for one, implies that 
theorizing music, especially in a way as to reduce it to immutable mathematical laws, is a means by 
which to contain it: “only when it remains on paper, so to speak, can it be dealt with in pure 
form—ideally in numbers—and thus totally contained in a logical system otherwise divorced from 
451 
the world” (1993, 99, my italics).  Ascribing rational perfection to music—which goes back to the 
“harmony of the spheres”—is arguably motivated by a desire to quash or at least curb music’s 
potentially unpredictable, disruptive force.  On this view, music theory is not unlike the work-
concept itself, and may be seen as an extension or projection of it.  Both extract music from the 
sensuous and erratic experience of producing it.53  
This strike against theory is rather broad (and of course applies with much less force to 
non-mathematical music theories).  It does not pertain to music theory any more than it does to 
rationalistic discourse generally.  It stems from the general skepticism that the realm of ideas and 
of language, in the process of abstracting from empirical experience, sterilizes or desiccates 
experience.  This skepticism, while particularly pronounced in the case of music/theory, is by no 
means unique to it.  My question, however, is not: does music theory essentialize music?, but 
rather: do we use music theory in an essentializing way?  My concern has been not to do so.  To say 
theory is restrictive, or is x—or even, for that matter, to use “theory” in the singular, given the 
multifariousness of the discipline—is precisely to reproduce the epistemology to which many 
feminists and other post-structuralist factions would object.  My overriding assumption, by 
contrast, has been that the theory of an art can be an art, and can be what we need it to be to 
realize the connotations of musical notations and to enrich the fictionality of musical works.  The 
real masculinist mistake, then, is not the use of theory tout court, but rather using it under the 
                                                
53 “Nor could music theory as I have known it help me tell the story I thought I heard, because it is a 
discipline that identifies nearly totally with the composer as mind, and which identifies music as mind” 
Cusick (1998, 45, her italics). 
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assumption that it possesses and points to immanent properties—using it, that is, in a way as to 
attenuate its potential interpretive and critical potency.   
As for Schenkerian analysis in particular, one can easily fall into the trap of essentializing it 
as well, taking Schenker’s late, Ursatz-driven work as representative of his entire output.  Yet, his 
thought evolved, as we have seen, from avowed anti-organicist assumptions.  But, to take the 
mature thought on its own terms, does tonal hierarchy harbor an unmistakable misogynist 
component?  Does Schenkerian analysis stand to be critiqued on feminist grounds? 
I think not, as I have said before.  But to consider one such argument, McClary (1985) 
begins with the general claim that music theory and history have paradoxically imposed silence 
upon the sonic artform that is music by foisting on it rigid paradigms and taxonomic formalisms.  
Schenker, in particular, who attempted to revitalize motion—it having been, in his view, 
deprivileged by Rameau—ultimately foiled that enterprise by adducing metaphysical truths.  Even 
worse, Schenker’s American appropriators expunged his explicit political polemics, thus treating 
silence with yet more silence.  For McClary, Schenkerian theory, and music theory generally, 
displaces the experiencing subject with a more distant, and silent, abstract reflection.  It displaces 
unique and unrepeatable features of a musical work with universalist paradigms.   
Van Den Toorn (1995, 11–43) retorts that the abstract paradigms of music theory, far from 
prioritizing reflection over immediacy, actually serve as a foil by which to illuminate the unique 
features of a musical surface (a key point from my Chapter 2).  Meanwhile, McClary’s effort, while 
intending to uphold the immediacy of musical perception by eschewing music-theoretical 
paradigms, instead posits alternate essentializing paradigms, ones that detract from the musical 
surface.  In fact, McClary and others use music in support of a larger, and otherwise non-musical, 
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feminist critique, rather than use feminist theory to explicate music.  For Van Den Toorn, then, 
the apparatus of critical feminism is much more of an encumbrance to real-time perception than is 
the Schenkerian apparatus.  
I think Van Den Toorn’s counter-critique warrants careful consideration, but for now, I 
offer a slightly different one.  Feminist musicology, in my view, sometimes fails to acknowledge the 
ineluctable semantic indeterminacy of instrumental music.  To clarify, by “semantic 
indeterminacy,” I do not mean that instrumental works have no meaning.  On the contrary, I 
mean they have multiple meanings—that they are irreducibly polysemous.  To reiterate my 
example from the previous chapter, the tonic-transposition of the second theme in sonata form 
indicates a very abstract dynamic into which one can fit any number of more specific actions: 
synthesis, integration, assimilation, domination, and so on.  And even domination can mean either 
that the second theme is dominated by the first, or, conversely, that it dominates the first (one 
might argue one or the other based on context).  To regard the “domination narrative”—in which 
the first theme ultimately overtakes the second—as a default is to displace a contingency with a 
necessity, a particular with a universal.  It is thus to succumb to the kind of essentialism feminist 
musicologists hope to evade.  We should be equally wary of the conventional first theme/second 
theme binarism: that the first is often in some sense stronger or more assertive, the second in some 
sense weaker or more lyrical, does not equate with the first theme exhibiting a masculine character, 
the second theme a feminine one.  Feminists who rely upon A. B. Marx’s metaphor as the basis for 
critiquing sonata form play right into essentializing hands, taking a particular mode of description 
out of its historical context and conflating it with immanent properties of sonata form.   
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Likewise, Schenkerian hierarchy, if it does have hegemonic overtones, which is possible—
and, of course, Schenker himself projected a rather authoritarian persona in his prose, to say 
nothing of his oppressive political views, which I will not get into—such hierarchical hegemony by 
no means specifies masculinist hegemony.  Above, I endowed Schenkerian theory with this 
meaning only in a deliberate, self-consciously metaphorical way.  I was able to do so because of the 
text and context.  The metaphorical transference was facilitated by masculine/feminine hierarchy 
and tonal hierarchy sharing a common term, an experiential substratum.  Likewise with the 
Schenkerian dynamic of tonal closure/enclosure (which is obviously related to that of hierarchical 
subsumption): I had it represent or parallel physical enclosure, that of the proverbial ring, but I did 
so self-consciously and performatively, not because I truly equate tonal enclosure with feminine 
enclosure.  I think Schenkerian theory parallels the absolute music to which it is primarily devoted 
and from which it emerged: both arguably present general schemata that can be particularized 
given textual affiliations or a deliberately posited context.  Feminist musicology often errs in 
reducing such schemata to the particulars by which they can but need not be exemplified.    
In short, I have used Schenkerian analysis for the purpose of critique, not to critique it.  
(Not that it is not susceptible to critique, even to some form of feminist critique, but just not, in 
my view, on the above grounds.)  My strategy was to extend it metaphorically to facilitate a feminist 
reading, to which end I think it proved a useful heuristic.  In attempting to domesticate ultimately 
incorrigible parameters, Schenkerian structure distilled and crystallized the oppression intimated 





4. THE FEMININE PERFORMER, THE MASCULINE WORK 
To what extent can the plight of the performer, as I have framed it, be considered a feminist 
plight?  When the performer is contained, effaced, compelled to disappear, does this represent the 
suppression of the female generally?  Conversely, when, as in my model, the performer is upheld as 
essential rather than decorative, as more free than constrained, to what extent does this represent 
female liberation?  
One could arguably make such a connection in the context of Frauenliebe and similar 
pieces.  For on the one hand, to deliver the cycle in a traditional, prettified way, to defer to the 
work, is on some level to administer one’s own oppression.  On the other hand, to deliver the 
cycle against the grain, as I have proposed, is on some level to celebrate one’s own (potential) 
liberation.  But what of less propagandist music, and of music hard to pin down semantically, such 
as instrumental music?  In such cases are we justified in aligning the performer and female on the 
one hand, the work (in its traditional formulation) and male on the other?   
One should proceed cautiously here.  For, female oppression is not antecedent to all other 
forms of oppression and is thus not necessarily represented by them—to say it is would be to 
essentialize feminist oppression and thus undercut the very enterprise of liberation.  Indeed, as 
Butler affirms, no one type of oppression, no one oppressed group, holds such a privileged 
position:  
oppressions cannot be summarily ranked, causally related, distributed among planes of “originality” 
and “derivation”. . . .  Indeed, the field of power . . . exceeds and encompasses the axis of sexual 
difference, offering a mapping of intersecting differentials which cannot be summarily hierarchized 
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either within the terms of phallogocentrism or any other candidate for the position of “primary 
condition of oppression” (1990, 19).   
 
Female oppression is but an example or instance of a more general schema.  So, for that 
matter, is the suppression of the performer.  As such, female-suppression and performer-
suppression coexist within a social field, one that contains many other modes of 
disenfranchisement as well.  That is, they are analogous because they exemplify a common schema, 
but they are not directly or causally related.  (Granted, they might be so related within the context 
of bourgeois domesticity to which I have been alluding, but we would not want to assess the 
politics of performance generally in light of that one historical moment.)  To say they are 
analogous is to say they partake of a symmetrical relation: in the proper context, female oppression 
could symbolize performer oppression as easily as the reverse.  Either can serve as the “target 
domain” to which the other is metaphorically extended.  And to the degree that gender is 
performative—as many, most notably Butler, have argued—gender can emanate artistic overtones 
as easily as musical performance can gendered overtones.  Hence, the two domains co-exemplify a 
more general schema of oppression, are analogous and symmetrical, and neither enjoys 
precedence.  This caveat is not to neutralize the political implications of my overall argument—I 
still feel that to advocate for the performer’s liberty is on some level also to advocate, more 
generally, for the societal subject’s.  But I do not align that subject with one or the other gender.     
 
*  *  * 
With that crucial caveat in place, we can proceed to consider the resonances between the two types 
of oppression.  Both trade on the binarism of reason/sensuality, or mind/body: the work is 
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associated with abstract ideas, the performer with sensuality, and that, in turn, traditionally with 
the female.  Both performance and the female have been simultaneously celebrated and denigrated 
on the basis of their presumed constitutive sensuality.  
To frame the matter broadly, as Sabina Lovibond explains, the Enlightenment yielded the 
notion of “unity of reason,” under which reason is held to be pure and abstract, impervious to the 
contingencies of time and culture.  Moreover, the Enlightenment principle seeks consensus among 
factions of a community, so that varying perspectives may ultimately be arbitrated by a single, 
overarching truth.  Postmodernism reacts against such notions of abstract reason and consensus, 
emphasizing instead the particularity of various “language-games,” and refusing to concede that 
“the replacement of one ‘game’ by another can be evaluated according to any absolute standard” 
(Lovibond [1990, 156]).  Feminists, along with postmodernists generally, uphold provisional, 
contextual truths, holding the Enlightenment ideal of transcendence to harbor distinctly 
misogynist connotations.  Indeed, transcendence has often been used as a metaphor for man 
escaping nature—in turn associated with the feminine—in order to emerge into the pure light of 
reason.  
 By analogy, the musical work, as traditionally formulated, is a locus of musical reason and 
consensus: its raison d'être is to define the essential, invariant components of a composition to 
which all executants must adhere.  It seeks to escape the vicissitudes of physical execution, 
suppressing that reality even as it is an absolute necessity for music to be music—for music to be 
heard.  As Dillon Parmer puts it, “it is . . . to rein back the multiplicity generated through 
performing, that musicology [posits] a fixed and stable construct, a point of origin it identifies as 
the ‘work’. . . .  Because performance events differ from and exceed the identity of such a 
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construct, suppressing both their difference and excess is necessary to maintain the stability of that 
object for . . . knowledge production” (2007, 38).  Indeed, as this last clause reminds us, the work 
is rationalistic not only in asserting musical ideas that supposedly transcend and reduce away the 
ineluctable plurality of performance, but also in generating ideas about a piece.  Simply put, we 
could not collect knowledge (at least of an academically-sanctioned sort) about Mozart’s Piano 
Sonata in D, K. 311 if we considered it nothing other than a motley collection of performances.  It 
is only by hypostatizing it as a work—one largely coextensive with the score—that we can generate 
knowledge about it, and thus secure a place for ourselves within the power structure that is music 
academia.  
To the extent, then, that pure reason is associated with the masculine, and sensuous, 
somatic experience such reason transcends with the feminine, the work can be aligned with the 
masculine, performance with the feminine.  
The project of pure reason relies heavily on printed language, just as its musical 
counterpart relies on the printed score, without which the notion of the musical work would likely 
not have arisen.  This logocentric bias is coupled with a phonocentric one that, as Derrida has 
shown, grants the false impression of metaphysical certitude to written language.  By analogy, our 
worship of the musical score is coupled with an implicit belief that the notations “are themselves 
the spoken word,” to recall A. B. Marx’s phrase from a previous chapter—that the notations 
delimit the boundaries of sonic realization.54  The fetishization of the visual in music is evident not 
                                                
54 Such an implicit belief undergirds Brahms’s (in)famous sneer that, to paraphrase, he had no need to go to 
the opera when he could hear a better performance staying at home reading the score; and also 
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just in the printed score but also in musical iconography.  To invoke Leppert one last time, just as 
the pictures he surveys prettify the messiness underlying apparent domestic order and neuter the 
sensuality of their female subjects, so the score along with the work it supposedly represents 
prettify the ineluctable messiness of learning and making music.  They exclude the performing 
body, with its real pleasures and pains that some would soon forget.  (Which, again, is why we 
should heed Adorno’s reminder as to the values of amateur music-making and the dangers of 
music-professionalization.)  Cusick reinforces this link between textuality and sexuality: “a focus on 
texts tends to trick us into staying in a power-over paradigm that is mighty close to the regime of 
compulsory heterosexuality” (1994a, 80).  In short, logocentrism, phonocentrism, and 
phallocentrism all seem to be mutually reinforcing—though, again, by no means necessarily or 
causally connected.   
In summary, though one should be wary of framing the performer’s plight as in essence a 
feminist one, there are undeniable parallels arising from long-standing cultural associations.  One 
might view the subservience of the performer to the work/musicological knowledge and female 
subservience as two instances of a more general schema of domination.  To this extent, to resist 
the performer’s oppression by the work and Werktreue concepts is on some level to resist other 
more distressing forms of oppression.  This, in my view, is partly why interpretive freedom is so 
crucial.  And especially so, of course, when the work itself is ideologically dubious.  Thus, put 
negatively, for the performer to erase herself in deference to Frauenliebe is to enforce both work 
hegemony in general and Frauenliebe’s gender hegemony in particular.  Put positively, to resist 
                                                
Schoenberg’s that performances are only for those hapless individuals who lack the musical intelligence to 
audiate sounds directly from the score.   
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Frauenliebe is to do the aesthetic work of framing the performer as integral rather than decorative; 
it is also to do the cultural work of countering the decorative function Frauenliebe assigns to 
women.  
 
*  *  * 
How, then, can the performer assert his presence, his physicality in particular?  Most obviously, by 
foregrounding, or at least not concealing, the physical act and exertion of playing.  In song 
performance, the singer-as-actor can move around the stage (rather than being glued to the piano, 
which is the norm).  Even (semi-) staging song cycles would not be out of the question.  (It is telling 
that it is commonplace to render staged works in concert form but not the reverse.  This practice 
reveals our penchant for the abstract.)  Foregrounding the body in instrumental music is 
admittedly more challenging, where the size of the instrument and difficulty of producing sound 
on it often force the performer to be relatively stationary.   
Perhaps this is an area in which Jennifer and I could have gone further.  Generally 
speaking, it is easy to pay lip service to physicality while playing right into traditional categories.  
For example, Cusick (1994 and 1998) has bemoaned the “mind-mind game” of music, by which 
music is conceived as being carried from the composer’s mind to the listener’s by a neutral 
performance vessel.  In this conception, the performing body is all but passed over.  Yet, as Maus 
(2009) points out, Cusick valorizes only the physicality necessitated by the score, not one left freely 
to the performer.  Alexandra Pierce (1994) and Roger Graybill (1990) likewise focus on the 
embodiment of the physical states implied by music.  Granted, these movements are interpretive 
rather than prescribed by the composer’s literal notations.  Still, Maus contends, they are 
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concerned mainly with conventional “musicality” and, moreover, assume a universal, fully abled 
body.  Similarly, Keil (2000) notes that Small (1998) resorts to essentializing in his later chapters: 
in his early ones, Small argues (in Keil’s words) “that the gesture language of musicking is always 
open in the moment of performance, meanings flexible or indeed playfully reversible depending 
upon context and listener,” but in the closing chapters, music “the object and text is coded, a 
semiotic built up for centuries is fixed in the score” (162).  And finally, even the pop music 
performance, in which the body has traditionally been celebrated as a tool of sexual resistance, still 
often genuflects to the dominant ideology.  Auslander cites in this connection the “glam” rock of 
the 1970s, which was male-dominated and “took the performance of masculinity as its terrain” and 
was thus “entirely in line with the conventions of rock as a traditionally male-dominated cultural 
form” (2004, 10).   
A liberating piece in this regard is John Corigliano’s Pied Piper Fantasy, which involves 
various movement, such as players entering and exiting the stage.55  That Corigliano penned the 
                                                
55 In a program note, he states: 
A technical problem—the fact that two groups of performers each playing music extremely 
divergent in tempo ideally requires two conductors—thus provoked a theatrical solution: the 
separation and exit of one of the groups.  The children and the exit became an integral part of the 
score.  While originally conceived for musical reasons, these elements started a chain of theatrical 
additions to the performance that followed the world premiere in Los Angeles.  In London (Galway 
with the London Symphony) stage and house lights were slowly dimmed as follow-spots tracked the 
departure of the Piper and the children.  In Puerto Rico the young soloist began the introduction 
to the opening Piper’s Song offstage and entered wearing a cloak.  In Israel the performance began 
in darkness, the lights coming up and growing in brilliance with the orchestral sunrise.  The 
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concerto specifically for James Galway, and claims to have wanted to play to his (avuncular? 
flamboyant?) persona56 raises another means by which performers generally can be recalcitrant to 
effacement: they play not only, or even primarily, the work, but also play themselves, including their 
sexuality.  This is a paradigm classical performers can usefully borrow from film actors and rock 
stars, where such self-performance is commonplace (where performances, as Adorno might have 
said, serve as their own advertisements).  It is evident in cases where actors seem to be “just 
themselves” when playing roles, which we infer from the fact that they always seem to be the same 
in every role.57  Of course, we often criticize performers on this basis—we think that one who 
always just plays himself must not be a very good actor—and yet, for better or worse, the idea of a 
movie star is predicated precisely on the idea that people can count on some degree of consistency.  
We pay to see a Tom Cruise film not because we think he is going to disappear into the role that 
                                                
evolution of theatrical aspects seems to me a healthy and inventive addition to the original concept, 
and I have no doubt that the physical trappings of future performances will continue to change and 
grow.  Because the Fantasy is a truly programmatic and theatrical work, these additions are not 
artificial but grow naturally from the initial idea. 
56 “Galway as the Piper seemed the most natural thing in the world” (ibid.). 
57 Auslander (2004, 6), however, insists that pop musicians are never simply themselves on stage.  Invoking 
Simon Frith, Auslander outlines three types of persona that are simultaneously present in pop musicians’ 
performances: the real person, the performance persona, and the character.  The first draws upon his own 
true experiences; the second merely conforms to an image, one consciously manufactured by the performer 
and/or his producers and mangers; the third derives from the content of the song.  Auslander adds, “that 
these three signified presences admittedly are often difficult to distinguish from one another does not 
diminish their heuristic value” (ibid).   
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he plays, but because we know we are going to see Tom Cruise.  This is, of course, a shameless 
brand-name mentality, one that objectifies and dehumanizes the performer even as it supposedly 
celebrates him.  Moreover, we classical artists have a complex array of notes and an even more 
complex array of structural and emotive connotations with which to contend.  Ours is not a 
medium in which it is even possible to play only ourselves.  However, adopting some variant or 
degree of this mentality, I think, can at the very least ward off the danger of being annihilated, of 
being sucked into the vortex of abstraction that is the musical work.      
But most generally, such presence is maintained simply by not losing one’s interpretive 
voice, not allowing it to be silenced by the score/work and institutions that secure its authority.  
Of course, the mechanisms of this resistance, and the way in which music analysis can be used in 
its service, have been explored throughout this dissertation.  But to add a point, building upon the 
remarks about acting with which I began this chapter: the paradigm of the script can, I think, be 
quite useful for the classical-music performer generally.  The idea of a script often has a kind of 
pejorative connotation, one of prescription—when we say something is “scripted,” we usually mean 
its essentials have been artificially planned out in advance.  Indeed, this is one reason why in 
Chapter 1 I objected to viewing the score as a script.  But actors commonly approach a script as a 
completely malleable, flexible tool.  They take for granted that its words are so many empty shells 
that simply must be filled with the performer’s sentience and personal experience to come to life—
indeed, to have any impact at all.  As Kevin Bazzana aptly states, referring to Glenn Gould’s 
theatricality, “In the theatre . . . creative interpretation is simply how interpretation is done” (1997, 
41).  The neutrality or effacement classical performers are often encouraged to embrace, explicitly 
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or not, would, in the theater world, simply equate with bad performance, or even non-
performance.   
Another way to put this is that an outstanding performance will stand out as a 
performance; a compelling interpretation will, in my view, be an “overinterpretation.”  As 
Jonathan Culler declares (to reuse a quote from Chapter 1), “interpretation is interesting only 
when it is extreme” (1992, 110).  But, as he goes on to say, we should be extreme not for its own 
sake, but because doing so gives us much more room in which to bring out potentialities in the 
work we might not otherwise.  And that includes, as we saw in the Schumann, the potential of a 






































˙ œ œ œ œ
jœ œ œ
˙ œ œ œ œ jœ œ œ
œ œ œ#
œ
˙# jœ ˙nœ œ œ œ













8                                                                                                                                    7                                7             6                       n#^ ^ ^ ^
i                                                                                                                                    V
# ––––––––––––––––    n
    n
4th-motive
i                                                                                                                                      V                                             [V]
# n_____________





































œ œ œ# ˙
œ œ œ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙
˙ ˙ ˙œ œ œ
˙ ˙
Jœ ˙













6                                                         7                                                 8                                          9                                                 10
  4                        3                         2                                                                                            1
^ ^ ^ ^
  iv                     V––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––      i–––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 iv                                                  v                                                                                             i
 iv                        v                                                                                                                      i
6                         6–––––––––––––5
(registral transfer)
467 































































































DISCOGRAPHY AND VIDEOGRAPHY 
Argerich, Martha. 1978/79. Live from the Concertgebouw. EMI 5–56975–2. 
Bell, Joshua. Posted June 19, 2011. “Joshua Bell Beethoven violin concerto no 1 (complete).”  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B1QMwqDlDLA 
Cleveland Quartet. Posted Aug. 1, 2011. “Beethoven Quartet Op. 18, No. 4 –  
 1/4.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnml06sR2P8. 
Elgar, Sir Edward. Posted Sept. 10, 2010. “Conducting his own Symphony No. 1, fourth movt.”  
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Am4gJYezMeI 
The Fry Street Quartet. Posted Jan. 9, 2011. “Ludwig van Beethoven - String Quartet Op. 18 #4,  
 Allegro ma non tanto.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYNwEBFsICk 
Gould, Glenn. Posted Aug. 21, 2008. “ Glenn Gould - Bach - Prelude in C minor, BWV 847.”  
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hkg0aQxsKlU 
–––––. Posted July 18, 2009. “Salzburg's Recital of 1959. W. A. Mozart. Sonata C major, K. 330  
 (1/2).” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGcg7cqrd-s 
Horowitz , Vladmir. Posted Sept. 28, 2006. “Mozart Sonata in C Major K. 330; 1st Movement.”  
 (recorded 1986). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dd7Q7vhNB-I 
lang, k.d. Posted July 25, 2011. “‘Johnny Get Angry’ (Live in Munich).”   
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpuK4R_hPRE.  
Norman, Jesse. 2005. The Jesse Norman Collection. Philips.  
Parks, Suzan-Lori. Posted Jan. 13, 2012. “Suzan-Lori Parks on ‘Porgy and Bess.’”  
 New York Times Video. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1uKy22g7oZc.  
Scriabin, Alexander. Posted March 3, 2008. “Scriabin plays Scriabin Prelude Op.11 No.13”  
 (recorded 1910). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q3KbTSkB8XE 
Streisand, Barbara. Posted March 28, 2006. “Happy Days are Here Again.”   
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fA8OmK3qslw.  
Summers, Joanie. Posted Jan. 8, 2010. “‘Johnny Get Angry’ (Live).”   








Abbate, Carolyn. 1991. Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century.  
Princeton: Princeton UP. 
––––––. 2004. “Music—Drastic or Gnostic?” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 3: 505–36. 
Abrahms, M. H. 1953. The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition. Oxford: 
Oxford: UP. 
Adorno, Theodor W. 1927/1965. “The Curves of the Needle.” Reprinted in Essays on Music.  
Edited by Richard Leppert. Translated by Thomas Y. Levin, 271–76. Berkeley: University  
of California Press, 2002.  
––––––. 1930. “New Tempi.” In Moments Musicaux. Reprinted in Night Music: Essays  
     on Music 1928–1962. Translated by Wieland Hoban, 104–17. New York: Seagull, 2009. 
––––––. 1934. “The Form of the Phonograph Record.” Reprinted in Essays on Music. op. cit.  
277–82. 
––––––. 1938. “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening.” In Essays  
     on Music. op. cit., 288–317. 
––––––. 1955. “Bach Defended Against his Devotees.” In Prisms. Translated by Samuel and Shierry  
Weber, 133–46. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981. 
––––––. 1962. Introduction to the Sociology of Music. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York:  
     Continuum, 1988. 
––––––. 1969. “On the Problem of Musical Analysis.” Translated by Max Paddison. Music Analysis  
     1, no. 2 (1982): 169–87. 
––––––. 1969. “Opera and the Long-Playing Record.” In Essays on Music. op. cit. 283–87. 
––––––. 1973. Philosophy of Modern Music. Translated by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V.  
     Blomster. New York: Seabury.  
––––––. 1981. In Search of Wagner. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. London: Verso.  
––––––. 1988. Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music (Fragments and Texts). Edited by Rolf  
     Tiedemann. Stanford: Stanford UP. 
––––––. 1997. Aesthetic Theory. Edited by Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of  
475 
     Minnesota Press. 
––––––. 1999a. “Classicism, Romanticism, New Music.” In Sound Figures. Translated by Rodney  
     Livingstone, 106–22. Stanford: Stanford UP. 
––––––. 1999b. “The Mastery of the Maestro.” In Sound Figures. op. cit., 40–53.  
––––––. 2006. Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction (notes and draft). Translated by Wieland  
     Hoban. Cambridge: Polity.   
Agawu, V. Kofi. 1991. Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music. Princeton:  
     Princeton UP. 
Allanbrook, Wye Jamison. 1983. Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart: Le Nozze Di Figaro and Don  
Giovanni. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
––––––. 2008. “Mozart’s K331, First Movement: Once More, With Feeling.” In Communication in  
Eighteenth-Century Music. Edited by Danuta Mirka and Kofi Agawu, 254–82. Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP.  
Auslander, Philip. 2001. “Looking at Records.” The Drama Review 45, no. 1: 77–83. 
––––––. 2004. “Performance Analysis and Popular Music: A Manifesto.” Contemporary Theatre  
     Review 14, no. 1: 1–13. 
––––––. 2006a. “Musical Personae.” The Drama Review 50, no. 1: 13–27. 
––––––. 2006b. “Music as Performance: Living in the Immaterial World.” Theatre Survey 47, no. 2:  
  261–68. 
Austin, J. L. 1962. How To Do Things With Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. 
Bakhtin, M. M. 1938. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Translated by Caryl Emerson and  
     Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981.   
Bamberger, Jeanne. 1976. “The Musical Significance of Beethoven’s Fingerings in the Piano 
     Sonatas.” Music Forum 4: 237–80.  
Barolsky, Daniel. 2008. “Embracing Imperfection in Benno Moiseiwitsch’s Prelude to Chopin.”  
Music Performance Research 2: 48–60. 
Barolsky, Daniel and Peter Martens. 2012. “Rendering the Prosaic Persuasive: Gould and the  
     Performance of Bach’s C-minor Prelude (WTC I).” Music Theory Online 18, no. 1. 
Barry, Barbara. 1995. “Recycling the End of the ‘Leibquartett’: Models, Meaning and Propriety in  
Beethoven’s Quartet in B-Flat Major, Opus 130.” The Journal of Musicology 13, no. 3: 355–76. 
––––––. 2009. “In Adorno’s Broken Mirror: Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction.” 
    International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 40: 81–98. 
476 
Barth, George. 1992. The Pianist as Orator: Beethoven and the Transformation of Keyboard Style. 
     Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
Bazzana, Kevin. 1997. Glenn Gould: The Performer in the Work. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Beach, David. 1988. “The Fundamental Line from Scale-Degree 8: Criteria for Evaluation.”  
 Journal of Music Theory 32, no. 2: 271–94.  
Beauvoir, Simone de. 1973. The Second Sex. Translated by E. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage. 
Berry, Wallace. 1989. Musical Structure and Performance. New Haven: Yale UP. 
Bonds, Mark Evan. 1991a. “Haydn, Laurence Sterne, and the Origins of Musical Irony.” Journal of the  
American Musicological Society 44, no. 1: 57–91.  
––––––. 1991b. Wordless Rhetoric: Music and the Metaphor of the Oration. Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard UP. 
Bowen, José A. 1993. “The History of Remembered Innovation: Tradition and Its Role in the  
     Relationship between Musical Works and Their Performances.” The Journal of  
     Musicology 11, no. 2: 139–69. 
Braunschweig, Karl D. 2012. “Disciplining Knowledge in Music Theory: Abstraction and the  
Recovery of Dialectics.” Gamut 5, no. 1: 39–91.  
Brett, Philip. 1994. “Musicality, Essentialism and the Closet.” In Queering the Pitch: The New Gay  
     and Lesbian Musicology. Edited by P. Brett, et al., 9–26. New York: Routledge.  
Brown, Matthew. 2005. Explaining Tonality: Schenkerian Theory and Beyond. Rochester: University of  
Rochester Press.  
Brown, Matthew and Douglas Dempster. 1989. “The Scientific Image of Music Theory.” Journal  
of Music Theory 33: 65–106.   
Brown, Matthew, Douglas Dempster, and David Headlam. 1997. “The #IV (@V) Hypothesis: Testing 
 the Limits of Schenker’s Theory of Tonality.” Music Theory Spectrum 19, no. 2: 155–83. 
Burkhart, Charles. 1983. “Schenker’s Theory of Levels and Musical Performance.” In 
    Aspects of Schenkerian Theory. Edited by David Beach, 95–112. New Haven: Yale UP. 
Burnham, Scott. 1995. Beethoven Hero. Princeton: Princeton UP. 
––––––. 2002. “Form.” In The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory. Edited by Thomas 
 Christensen, 880–906. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Burns, Lori. 1997. “‘Jonnie Get Angry’: k.d. lang’s Feminist Revision.” In Understanding Rock:  
    Essays in Musical Analysis. Edited by John Covach and Graeme M. Boone, 93–112. Oxford: 
Oxford UP. 
477 
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. 
Caplin, William E. 1998. Classical Form: A Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of Haydn, 
Mozart, and Beethoven. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
––––––. 2010. “Beethoven’s ‘Tempest’ Exposition: a Response to Janet Schmalfeldt.” Music Theory 
Online 16, no. 2. 
Christensen, Thomas. 1993. “Music Theory and its Histories.” In Music Theory and the  
     Exploration of the Past. Edited by Christopher Hatch and David W. Bernstein, 9–39. Chicago:   
     University of Chicago Press. 
Chua, Daniel K. L. 1995. The “Galitzin” Quartets of Beethoven. Princeton: Princeton UP. 
––––––. 2004. “Adorno’s Metaphysics of Mourning: Beethoven’s Farewell to Adorno.”  
The Musical Quarterly 87: 523–45.  
––––––. 2005. “The Promise of Nothing: The Dialectic of Freedom in Adorno’s Beethoven.”  
Beethoven Forum 12, no. 1: 13–35. 
Citron, Marcia J. 1993. Gender and the Musical Canon. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.  
Clague, Mark. 2005. “Portraits in Beams and Barlines: Critical Music Editing and the Art of  
     Notation.” American Music 23, no. 1: 39–68. 
Cohn, Richard. 1992. “The Autonomy of Motives in Schenkerian Accounts of Tonal Music.”  
     Music Theory Spectrum 14, no. 2: 150–70. 
Cone, Edward T. 1968. Musical Form and Musical Performance. New York: W. W. Norton. 
––––––. 1974. The Composer’s Voice. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
––––––. 1977. “Three Ways of Reading a Detective Story—Or a Brahms Intermezzo.” The Georgia  
Review 31, no. 3: 554–74. 
––––––. 1995. “The Pianist as Critic.” In The Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical  
     Interpretation. Edited by John Rink, 241–53. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Cook, Nicholas. 1987. “The Perception of Large-Scale Tonal Closure.” Music Perception 5: 197–205. 
––––––. 1989a. “Music Theory and ‘Good Comparison’: A Viennese Perspective.” Journal  
     of Music Theory 33, no. 1: 117–42. 
––––––. 1989b. “Schenker’s Theory of Music as Ethics.” The Journal of Musicology 7, no. 4: 415–39. 
––––––. 1995. “The Conductor and the Theorist: Furtwängler, Schenker and the First Movement  
     of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.” In The Practice of Performance. op. cit., 105–25.  
––––––. 1998. Music: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP.   
––––––. 1999a. “Analysing Performance and Performing Analysis.” In Rethinking Music. Edited by  
478 
     Nicholas Cook and Mark Everist, 239–61. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
––––––. 1999b. “At the Border of Musical Identity: Schenker, Corelli and the Graces.” Music  
     Analysis 18, no. 2: 179–233. 
––––––. 1999c. “Words About Music, or Analysis Versus Performance.” Theory Into Practice:  
     Composition, Performance, and the Listening Experience, 9–54. Leuven UP. 
––––––. 2001. “Between Process and Product: Music and/as Performance.” Music Theory Online 7,  
     no. 2.   
––––––. 2002. “Epistemologies of Music Theory.” In The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory.  
op. cit., 78–105.  
––––––. 2006b. “Playing God: Creativity, Analysis, and Aesthetic Inclusion.” In Musical Creativity:  
Multidisciplinary Research in Theory and Practice. Edited by Irène Deliège and Geraint A. Wiggins,  
9–24. New York: Psychology Press.  
––––––. 2007. The Schenker Project: Culture, Race, and Music Theory in Fin-de-siècle Vienna. New York:  
    Oxford UP.  
––––––. 2009a. “Methods for Analysing Recordings.” In The Cambridge Companion to Recorded  
     Music. Edited by Nicholas Cook, et al., 221–45. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
––––––. 2009b. “Squaring the Circle: Phrase Arching in Recordings of Chopin's Mazurkas.” Musica  
Humana 1: 5–28. 
––––––. 2010. “The Ghost in the Machine: Towards a Musicology of Recordings.” Musicae  
     Scientiae 14, no. 2: 3–19.   
––––––. 2011. “Off the Record: Performance, History, and Musical Logic.” In Music and the  
Mind: Essays in Honour of John Sloboda. Edited by Irène Deliège and Jane W. Davidson, 291– 
309. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Corigliano, John. Program notes for Pied Piper Fantasy.   
http://www.schirmer.com/default.aspx?tabId=2420&State_2874=2&workId_2874=26994 
Craig, David. 1990. On Singing on Stage. New York: Applause Theatre Books.  
Culler, Jonathan. 1992. “In Defence of Overinterpretation.” In Interpretation and Overinterpretation.  
Edited by Umberto Eco, 109–24. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Cumming, Naomi. 2000. The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Signification. Bloomington: Indiana  
     UP. 
Cusick, Suzanne G. 1994a. “On a Lesbian Relationship with Music: A Serious Effort Not to Think  
     Straight.” In Queering the Pitch: The New Gay and Lesbian Musicology. Edited by P. Brett, et  
479 
     al., 67–84. New York: Routledge. 
––––––. 1994b. “Gender and the Cultural Work of a Classical Music Performance.” repercussions 3,  
no. 2: 81–95.  
––––––. 1998. “Feminist Theory, Music Theory, and the Mind/Body Problem.” In Music/Ideology:  
     Resisting the Aesthetic. Edited by Adam Krims, 37–56. Amsterdam: G and B Arts.  
Dahlhaus, Carl. 1974. Between Romanticism and Modernism: Four Studies in the Music of the Later Nineteenth  
Century. Translated by Mary Whittall. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 
––––––. 1975. “Some Models of Unity in Musical Form.” Translated by Charlotte Carroll Prather.  
Journal of Music Theory 19, no. 1: 2–30. 
 ––––––. 1986. “Sonata Form in Schubert: The First Movement of the G-Major String Quartet, op.  
161 (D. 887).” Translated by Thilo Reinhard. In Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies. Edited  
by Walter Frisch, 1–12. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
––––––. 1989. The Idea of Absolute Music. Translated by Roger Lustig. Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press.  
––––––. 1991. Ludwig Van Beethoven: Approaches to His Music. Translated by Mary Whittall. Oxford:  
Clarendon Press. 
Dare, Richard. 2012. “The Awfulness of Classical Musical Explained.”  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-dare/classical-music-concerts_b_1525896.html. 
Daverio, John. 1987. “Schumann’s ‘Im Legendenton’ and Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘Arabeske.’” 19th- 
Century Music 11: 150–63. 
Davies, Stephen. 1994. Musical Meaning and Expression. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. 1987. A Thousand Plateaus (vol. II of Capitalism and  
Schizophrenia). Translated by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
Dodson, Alan. 2009. “Metrical Dissonance and Directed Motion in Paderewski’s Recordings of  
Chopin’s Mazurkas.” Journal of Music Theory 53, no. 1: 57–94. 
––––––. 2012. “‘Solutions to the Great Nineteenth-Century Rhythm Problem’ in  
     Horowitz’s Recording of the Theme from Schumann’s Kreisleriana, Op. 16, No. 2.” Music  
Theory Online 18, no. 1.  
Dogantan-Dack, Mine. 2006. “In the Beginning was Gesture: Piano Touch and the  
     Phenomenology of the Performing Body.” In New Perspectives on Music and Gesture. Edited by  
     Anthony Gritten and Elaine King, 243–65. Burlington: Ashgate. 
––––––. 2012. “The Art of Research in Live Music Performance.” Music Performance Research 5: 34– 
480 
48. 
Dreyfus, Lawrence. 2007. “Beyond the Interpretation of Music.” Dutch Journal of Music Theory 12,  
     no. 3: 253–72. 
Dubiel, Joseph. 1990. “‘When You Are a Beethoven’: Kinds of Rules in Schenker’s Counterpoint.”  
Journal of Music Theory 34: 291–340. 
Echard, William. 2006. “‘Plays Guitar Without Any Hands’: Musical Movement and Problems of  
Immanence.” Music and Gesture. Edited by Anthony Gritten and Elaine King, 75–90.  
Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Eichler, Jeremy. 2012. “String Theorist: Christian Tetzlaff Rethinks How a Violin Should Sound.”  
The New Yorker (August 27): p. 34. 
Eigeldinger, Jean-Jacques. 1986. Chopin: Pianist and Teacher as Seen by His Pupils. Cambridge:  
     Cambridge UP. 
Ellis, John S. 2003. “A Narrative Analysis of Schumann’s Kinderszenen.” In Musical Semiotics  
    Revisited: Approaches to Musical Semiotics. Edited by Eero Tarasti, 303–19. Imatra, Finland:  
     International Semiotics Institute.  
Everett, Walter. 2012. “Bonner Zeit Transitions: Rhenish Things Not Put Away.” University of  
Michigan Theory Colloquium Series (October).   
Fink, Robert. 1999. “‘Rigoroso (e=126)’: The Rite of Spring and the Forging of a  
     Modernist Performing Style.” Journal of the American Musicological Society 52, no. 2: 299–362. 
Fish, Stanley. 1980. Is There a Text in This Class? Cambridge: Cambridge UP.  
Fisk. Charles. 1996. “Performance, Analysis, and Musical Imagining (Part I: Schumann’s  
    Arabesque).” College Music Symposium 36: 59–72. 
––––––. 1997. “Performance, Analysis, and Musical Imagining (Part II: Schumann’s Kreisleriana,  
No. 2).” College Music Symposium 37: 95–108. 
Fleshner, Nathan E. 2012. “The Musical Psyche: Interactions Between the Theories of Heinrich  
Schenker and Sigmund Freud.” Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Rochester, Eastman 
School of Music.  
Folio, Cynthia. 1992. “Analysis and Performance of the Flute Sonatas of J. S. Bach: A Sample  
     Lesson Plan.” Journal of Music Theory Pedagogy 5, no. 2: 133–59. 
Freud, Sigmund. 1900. The Interpretation of Dreams. Translated by James Strachey. New York:  
     Avon, 1965. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1960. Truth and Method (second, revised edition). Translation revised by  
481 
    Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Continuum, 1993.  
––––––. 1976. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Translated by David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of  
California Press. 
Godlovitch, Stan. 1998. Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study. London: Routledge. 
Goehr, Lydia. 1989. “Being True to the Work.” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47, no. 1: 55– 
    67. 
––––––. 1992. The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music. Oxford:  
    Clarendon.  
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. 1790. Goethe: Scientific Studies. In The Collected Works, vol. 12.  
     Edited and Translated by Douglas Miller, 76–97. Princeton UP, 1995.  
Goodman, Nelson. 1976. Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indianapolis:  
     Hackett. 
Graybill, Roger. 1994. “Prolongation, Gesture, and Musical Motion.” In Musical Transformation and  
 Musical Intuition: Eleven Essays in Honor of David Lewin. Edited by Raphael Atlas and    
 Michael Cherlin, 199–224. Dedham, Mass: Ovenbird Press.  
Green, Lucy. 1988. Music on Deaf Ears: Musical Meaning, Ideology, Education. Manchester:  
Manchester UP.   
Greenberg, Gary. 2010. “The War on Unhappiness: Goodbye Freud, Hello Positive Thinking.”  
Harper’s, p. 321. 
Guck, Marion. 1993. “Taking Notice: A Response to Kendall Walton.” Journal of Musicology 11: 45– 
51. 
––––––. 1998. “Analytical Fictions.” In Music/Ideology: Resisting the Aesthetic. op cit., 157–78.  
Hafner, Katie. 2008. A Romance on Three Legs: Glenn Gould's Obsessive Quest for the Perfect Piano. New  
York: Bloomsbury. 
Hamessley, Lydia. 2005. “A Resisting Performance of an Appalachian Traditional Murder Ballad.”  
     Woman and Music 9: 13–36.  
Harrison, Daniel. 1994. Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music: A Renewed Dualist Theory and an Account of  
Its Precedents. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  
Hatten, Robert. 1993. “Schubert the Progressive: The Role of Resonance and Gesture in the  
     Piano Sonata in A, D. 959.” Intégral 7: 38–81. 
––––––. 1994. Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation.  
     Bloomington: Indiana UP. 
482 
––––––. 2004. Interpreting Musical Gestures, Topics, and Tropes: Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert.  
     Bloomington: Indiana UP. 
––––––. 2010. “Performance and Analysis—Or Synthesis: Theorizing Gesture, Topics, and Tropes  
in Chopin’s F-minor Ballade.” Indiana Theory Review 28: 45–66. 
Hegel, Georg W. F. 1820–29. Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Translated by Bernard Bosanquet.  
London: Penguin, 1993.  
Heller, Marguerite. 1949. “Goethe and Music.” The German Quarterly 22, No. 4: 205–08  
Hepokoski, James. 1991. “The Dahlhaus Project and Its Extra-Musicological Sources.” 19th-Century  
Music 14, no. 3: 221–46. 
–––––––. 2002. “Beyond the Sonata Principle.” Journal of the American Musicological Society  
55, no. 1: 91–154. 
Hepokoski, James and Warren Darcy. 2006. Elements of Sonata Theory: Norms, Types, and Deformations in  
the Late-Eighteenth-Century Sonata. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Hinton, Stephen. 1996. “Adorno’s Unfinished Beethoven.” Beethoven Forum 5: 139–53. 
Hoeckner, Berthold. 2002. Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-Century German Music and the  
Hermeneutics of the Moment. Princeton: Princeton UP.  
Hopkins, Robert G. 1988. “When a Coda is More than a Coda: Reflections on Beethoven.”  
In Explorations in Music, The Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer. Edited by  
Eugene Narmour and Ruth Solie, 393–410. Stuyvesant: Pendragon. 
Howell, Tim. 1992. “Analysis and Performance: The Search for a Middleground.” In Companion to  
     Contemporary Musical Thought, vol. 2. Edited by Tim Howell, 692–714. New York:  
     Routledge. 
Hudson, Richard. 1994. Stolen Time: The History of Tempo Rubato. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Irigaray, Luce. 1985. This Sex Which Is Not One. Translated by Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke.  
Ithaca: Cornell UP. 
Iser, Wolfgang. 1978. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. 
Ivanovitch, Roman. 2008. “Showing Off: Variation in the Display Episodes of Mozart’s Piano  
Concertos.” Journal of Music Theory 52, no. 2: 181–218. 
––––––. 2010. “Recursive/Discursive: Variation and Sonata in the Andante of Mozart’s String  
Quartet in F, K. 590.” Music Theory Spectrum 32, no. 2: 145–64. 
––––––. 2011. “Mozart’s Art of Retransition.” Music Analysis 30, no. 1: 1–36. 
Jameson, Fredric. 1971. Marxism and Form. Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature.  
483 
     Princeton: Princeton UP. 
––––––. 1983. “Postmodernism and Consumer Society.” In The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern  
Culture. Edited by Hal Foster, 111–25. Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press. 
Johnson, Mark. 1987. The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason.  
     Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Kallberg, Jeffrey. 1996. Chopin at the Boundaries: Sex, History, and Musical Genre. Cambridge, MA:  
     Harvard UP. 
Kant, Immanuel. 1781. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. Buffalo: Promethus  
Books, 1990. 
––––––. 1790. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews.  
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. 
Karnes, Kevin C. 2005. “Schenker’s Brahms: Composer, Critic, and the Problem of Creativity in  
Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna.” Journal of Musicological Research 24: 145–76. 
Kassler, Jamie Croy. 1983. “Heinrich Schenker’s Epistemology and Philosophy of Music: An Essay  
on the Relations Between Evolutionary Theory and Music Theory.” The Wider Domain of  
Evolutionary Thought. Edited by D. Oldroyd and I. Langham, 221–60. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Keil, Charles. 1995. “Participatory Discrepancies and the Power of Music.” Cultural Anthropology 2,  
no. 3: 275–83. 
––––––. 2000. Review of Christopher Small, Musicking. Ethnomusicology 44, no. 1: 161–63. 
Keiler, Allan. 1983–84. “On Some Properties of Schenker’s Pitch Derivations.” Music Perception 1,  
no. 2: 200–28. 
Kenyon, Nicholas. 1988. “Authenticity and Early Music: Some Issues and Questions.” In  
 Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium. Edited by Nicholas Kenyon, 1–18. Oxford: Oxford  
 UP.  
Kerman, Joseph. 1979. The Beethoven Quartets. New York: W. W. Norton.  
––––––. 1985. Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology. Cambridge: Harvard UP.  
Kingsbury, Henry. 1988. Music, Talent, and Performance: A Conservatory Cultural System. Philadelphia:  
Temple UP. 
Kivy, Peter. 1989. Sound Sentiment: An Essay on the Musical Emotions. Philadelphia: Temple  
UP. 
––––––. 1993. “Platonism in Music: A Kind of Defense.” In The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in  
     the Philosophy of Music, 59–74. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
484 
Klein, Michael. 2004. “Chopin’s Fourth Ballade as Musical Narrative.” Music Theory Spectrum 26:  
     23–56. 
Korsyn, Kevin. 1983. “Integration in Works of Beethoven’s Final Period.” PhD diss., Yale. 
––––––. 1988. “Schenker and Kantian Epistemology.” Theoria 3: 1–58.  
––––––. 1993a. “J. W. N. Sullivan and the Heiliger Dankgesang: Questions of Meaning in Late  
Beethoven.” Beethoven Forum 2: 133–74. 
––––––. 1993b. “Schenker’s Organicism Reexamined.” Intégral 7: 82–118. 
––––––. 1996. “Directional Tonality and Intertextuality: Brahms’s Quintet op. 88 and Chopin’s  
Ballade op. 38.” In The Second Practice of Nineteenth-Century Tonality. Edited by William  
Kinderman and Harald Krebs, 45–86. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
––––––. 2003. Decentering Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
––––––. 2009. “Reception History and the Trauma of Real History: Decoding the Pantomime in   
     Haydn’s ‘Farewell’ Symphony.” Muzikoloski Zbornik 45, no. 2: 143–58. 
Koskoff, Ellen. 1993. “Miriam Sings Her Song: Self and Other in Anthropological Discourse.” In  
     Musicology and Difference: Gender and Sexuality in Music Scholarship. Edited by Ruth Solie, 149– 
     63. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Kramer, Lawrence. 1981. “The Mirror of Tonality: Transitional Features of Nineteenth-Century 
Harmony.” 19th-Century Music 4, no. 3: 191–208. 
––––––. 2002. Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Krebs, Harald 1996. “Some Early Examples of Tonal Pairing: Schubert’s ‘Meeres Stille’ and ‘Der  
Wanderer.” The Second Practice of Nineteenth-Century Tonality. op. cit., 17–33.  
––––––. 1999. Fantasy Pieces: Metrical Dissonance in the Music of Robert Schumann. Oxford:  
     Oxford UP. 
Langer, Susanne K. 1953. Feeling and Form. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons. 
––––––. 1957. Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art.  3rd ed.  
  Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP. 
Larson, Steve. 1993. “On Analysis and Performance: The Contribution of Durational Reduction 
     to the Performance of J. S Bach’s Two-Part Invention in C Major.” In Theory Only 7, no. 1:  
     31–45. 
––––––. 2007. “Musical Gestures and Musical Forces: Evidence from Music-Theoretical  
     Misunderstandings.” In New Perspectives on Music and Gesture. op. cit., 61–90.  
Leech-Wilkinson, Daniel. 2009. The Changing Sound of Music: Approaches to Studying Recorded    
485 
     Musical Performance. London: CHARM (eBook). 
––––––. 2012. “Compositions, Scores, Performances, Meanings.” Music Theory Online 18, no. 1. 
Le Guin, Elisabeth. 2006. Boccherini’s Body: An Essay in Carnal Musicology. Berkeley: University of  
California Press. 
Leikin, Anatole. 1996. “The Performance of Scriabin’s Piano Music: Evidence from the Piano      
    Rolls.” Performance Practice Review 9, no. 1 (online journal). 
––––––. 2011. The Performing Style of Alexander Scriabin. Burlington: Ashgate. 
Leppert, Richard. 1993. The Sight of Sound: Music, Representation, and the History of the Body.  
     Berkeley: University of California Press.   
Lerdahl, Fred and Ray Jackendoff. 1983. A Generative Theory of Tonal Music. Cambridge, MA:  
MIT.  
Lester, Joel. 1995. “Performance and Analysis: Interaction and Interpretation.” In The Practice of  
     Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation. Edited by John Rink, 197–216. Cambridge: 
     Cambridge UP.  
Levin, Thomas Y. 1990. “For the Record: Adorno on Music in the Age of Its Technological  
     Reproducibility.” October 55: 23–47. 
Levinson, Jerrold. 1980. “What a Musical Work Is.” Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 1: 5–28. 
––––––. 1993. “Performative vs. Critical Interpretation in Music.” In The Interpretation of Music  
     Philosophical Essays. Edited by Michael Krausz, 33–60. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Levy, Janet M. 1995. “Beginning–ending Ambiguity: Consequences of Performance Choices.” The  
Practice of Performance: Studies in Musical Interpretation. op. cit., 150–69. 
Lewin, David. 1986. “Music, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception.” Music Perception 3, no. 4:  
327–92.  
 ––––––. 1992. “Musical Analysis as Stage Direction.” In Music and Text: Critical Inquiries. Edited  
by Steven Scher, 163–76. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.   
Lidov, David. 1987. “Mind and Body in Music.” Semiotica 66: 70–97. 
––––––. 2006. “Gesture in Music and its Contraries.” In Music and Gesture. op. cit., 24–44. 
Lippman, Edward A. 1999. “Theory and Practice in Schumann’s Aesthetics.” In The  
Philosophy and Aesthetics of Music, 136–78. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Lovibond, Sabina. 1990. “Feminism and Postmodernism.” In Postmodernism and Society. Edited by 
R. Boyne and A. Rattansi, 154–86. New York: St. Martin Press. 
Lowinsky, Edward. 1956. “On Mozart’s Rhythm.” The Musical Quarterly 42, no. 2: 162–86.  
486 
MacDonald, Claudia. 2002. “Schumann’s Piano Practice: Technical Mastery and Artistic Ideal.”  
The Journal of Musicology 19, no. 4: 527–63. 
Margolis, Joseph. 1993. “Music as Ordered Sound: Some Complications Affecting Description  
     and Interpretation.” In The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays. Edited by Michael  
     Krausz, 141–56. Oxford: Clarendon.   
Marliave, Joseph De. 1961. Beethoven’s Quartets. Translated by Hilda Andrews. Mineola, NY: Dover.  
Maus, Fred Everett. 1993. “Masculine Discourse in Music Theory.” Perspectives of New Music 31,  
    no. 2: 264–94.   
––––––. 1999a. “Concepts of Musical Unity.” In Rethinking Music. op. cit., 171–92. 
––––––. 1999b. “Musical Performance as Analytical Communication.” Performance and  
     Authenticity in the Arts. Edited by Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell, 129–53. Cambridge:     
     Cambridge UP. 
–––––. 2009. “Feminism, Music Theory, Time, and Embodiment.” Dichotonies: Gender and Music.  
Edited by Beate Neumeier. Universitätverlag Winter Heidelberg. 61–73. 
McClary, Susan. 1985. “The Politics of Silence and Sound.” Afterward to Jacques Attali, Noise: The  
     Political Economy of Music, 149–58. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
––––––. 1990. Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
Press. 
McClelland Ryan. 2004. “Brahms’s Capriccio in C Major, Op. 76, No. 8: Ambiguity, Conflict,  
    Musical Meaning, and Performance.” Theory and Practice 29: 69–94. 
McCreless, Patrick. 2006. “Anatomy of a Gesture: From Davidovsky to Chopin and Back.”  
Approaches to Meaning in Music. Edited by Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall, 11–40. Indiana  
UP. 
Mengozzi, Stefano. (unpublished). “Pathetic Reminiscences: A New Hypothesis on the Origin of  
Beethoven’s op. 13.”  
Methuen-Campbell, James. 1992. “Chopin in Performance.” In The Cambridge Companion to  
     Chopin. Edited by Jim Samson, 191–205. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Meyer, Leonard. 1973. Explaining Music: Essays and Explorations. Chicago: University of Chicago   
     Press.   
Mickelsen, William C. 1977. Hugo Riemann’s Theory of Harmony. Lincoln: University of Nebraska  
Press. 
Moore, Tracey with Allison Bergman. 2008. Acting the Song: Performance Skills for the Musical  
487 
     Theatre. New York: Allworth. 
Muxfeldt, Kristina. 2001. “Frauenliebe und Leben Now and Then.” 19th-Century Music 25, no. 1: 27–48. 
Nachmanovitch, Stephen. 1990. Free Play: Improvisation and Life and Art. Los Angeles: Jeremy P.  
     Tarcher. 
Narmour, Eugene. 1977. Beyond Schenkerism: The Need for Alternatives in Music Analysis. Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press. 
–––––. 1988. “On the Relationship of Analytical Theory to Performance and  
     Interpretation.” In Explorations in Music, The Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B.  
Meyer, 317–40. Stuyvesant: Pendragon. 
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques. 1990. Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music. Translated by Carolyn  
Abbate. Princeton: Princeton UP. 
Neff, Severine. 2006. “Schenker, Schoenberg, and Goethe: Visions of the Organic Artwork.”  
     Schenker-Traditionen: Eine Wiener Schule der Musiktheorie und ihre internationale Verbreitung.  
     Edited by Martin Eybl and Evelyn Fink-Mennel, 29–50. Vienna: Böhlau. 
Neumeyer, David. 1987. “The Ascending Urlinie.” Journal of Music Theory 31, no. 2: 275–303. 
Nietzsche, Fredrick. 1887. The Genealogy of Morals: An Attack. Translated by Francis Golffing. New  
York: Doubleday, 1956. 
Nolan, Catherine. 1994. “Reflections on the Relationship of Analysis and Performance.” College  
     Music Symposium 33/34: 112–39. 
Nonnenmann, K. Rainer. 2001. “‘Variationen, aber über kein Thema.’ Die romantische ‘Arabeske’  
als ästhetische Kategorie in Robert Schumanns op. 18.” Die Musikforschung 54, no. 3: 243–54. 
Notley, Margaret. 2005. “Plagal Harmony as Other: Asymmetrical Dualism and Instrumental Music  
by Brahms.” The Journal of Musicology 22, no. 1: 90–130. 
O’Dea, Jane. 2000. Virtue or Virtuosity: Explorations in the Ethics of Musical Performance.   
  Westport: Greenwood Press.   
Ostwald, Peter. 1985. Schumann: The Inner Voices of a Musical Genius. Boston: Northeastern  
UP.  
–––––. 1998. Glenn Gould: The Ecstasy and Tragedy of Genius. New York: W. W. Norton.  
Parmer, Dillon R. 2007. “Musicology as Epiphenomenon: Derivative Disciplinarity, Performing, and  
the Deconstruction of the Musical Work.” repercussions 10: 8–56. 
–––––. 2011. “Musicology, Performance, Slavery: Intellectual Despotism and The Politics of Musical  
Understanding.” American Musicological Society, New York State Chapter Meeting.  
488 
Pastille, William. 1984. “Heinrich Schenker, Anti-Organicist.” 19th-Century Music 8, no. 1: 29–36. 
–––––. 1990. “Music and Morphology: Goethe’s Influence on Schenker’s Thought.” In Schenker  
Studies. Edited by Hedi Siegel, 29–44. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.  
Pederson, Sanna. 2000. “Beethoven and Masculinity.” In Beethoven and His World. Edited by Scott  
Burnham and Michael P. Steinberg, 313–21. Princeton: Princeton UP. 
Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols. Edited by Charles  
Hartshorne, et al. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.  
Philip, Robert. 1992. Early Recordings and Musical Style: Changing Tastes in Instrumental Performance 
     1900–1950. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Pierce, Alexandra. 1983. Spanning: Essays on Music Theory, Performance, and Movement. Redlands:  
     Center of Balance. 
––––––. 1994. “Developing Schenkerian Hearing and Performing.” Intégral 8: 51–123. 
Proctor, Gregory. 1980. Review of Heinrich Schenker, Free Composition. Notes 36, no. 4: 879–81. 
Rabinowitz, Peter J. 1992. “Chord and Discourse: Listening Through the Written Word.” In Music  
     and Text: Critical Inquiries. op. cit., 38–56.  
Raffman, Diana. 1993. Language, Music, and Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Ratner, Leonard G. 1980. Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style. New York: Schirmer. 
Reti, Rudolph. 1951. The Thematic Process in Music. New York: MacMillan. 
Ricoeur, Paul. 1978. “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling.” Critical  
Inquiry 5, no. 1: 143–59. 
Rifkin, Deborah Anne. 2000. “Tonal Coherence in Prokofiev’s Music: A Study of the 
Interrelationships of Structure, Motives, and Design.” Ph.D. Diss., University of Rochester.  
Rink, John. 2003. “In Respect of Performance: The View from Musicology.” Psychology of Music  
31, no. 3: 303–23. 
Rosen, Charles. 1988. Sonata Forms. New York: W. W. Norton  
–––––. 1997. The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven (expanded edition). New York: W.  
W. Norton. 
Rosenblum, Sandra P. 1988. Performance Practices in Classic Piano Music. Bloomington: Indiana UP. 
Rosenthal, Lecia. 2007. “Between Humanism and Late Style.” Cultural Critique 67: 107–40. 
Rothfarb, Lee. “Energetics.” In The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory. op. cit., 927–55.  
Rothstein, William. 1984. “Heinrich Schenker as an Interpreter of Beethoven’s Piano Sonatas.”  
     19th-Century Music 8, no. 1: 3–28. 
489 
––––––. 1989. Phrase Rhythm in Tonal Music. New York: Schirmer. 
––––––. 1995. “Analysis and the Act of Performance.” The Practice of Performance:  
     Studies in Musical Interpretation. Edited by John Rink, 217–240. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.  
Rumph, Stephen. 2005. “Beethoven and the Ut Pictura Poësis Tradition.” Beethoven Forum 12, no. 2:  
113–150. 
––––––. 2005. “Mozart’s Archaic Endings: A Linguistic Critique.” Journal of the Royal Musical  
Association 130, no. 2: 159–96. 
Said, Edward. 1991. “Performance as an Extreme Occasion.” In Musical Elaborations. New York:  
Columbia UP.  
––––––. 2006. “The Virtuoso as Intellectual.” In On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain,  
     115–33. New York: Vintage.  
Salzer, Felix. 1952. Structural Hearing: Tonal Coherence in Music. New York: Dover. 
Samson, Jim. 1996. “Chopin’s Alternatives to Monotonality: A Historical Perspective.” In The Second  
Practice of Nineteenth-Century Tonality. op. cit., 34–44. 
Saslaw, Janna K. 1998. “Life Forces: Conceptual Structures in Schenker’s Free Composition and  
Schoenberg’s The Musical Idea.” Theory and Practice 22/23: 17–33.  
Schachter, Carl. 1975. “Introduction to the Dover Edition” of Beethoven’s Complete Piano  
Sonatas, vol. 1, viii-ix. New York: Dover. 
––––––. 1990. “Structure as Foreground: ‘das Drama des Ursatzes.’” Schenker Studies. Edited  
     by Heidi Siegel, 298–314. New York: Cambridge UP. 
––––––. 1991. “20th-Century Analysis and Mozart Performance.” Early Music 19, no. 4: 620–29. 
––––––. 2001. “Taking Care of the Sense: A Schenkerian Pedagogy for Performers.” Tijdschrift  
voor Muziektheorie 6, no. 3: 159–70. 
Schenker, Heinrich. 1895. “The Spirit of Musical Technique.” Translated by William Pastille.  
Appendix to Nicholas Cook, The Schenker Project: Race, Culture, and Music Theory in fin-de-siècle 
Vienna. op. cit., 319–32. 
––––––. 1906. Harmony. Translated by Elisabeth Mann Borgese. Chicago: University  
   of Chicago Press, 1954. 
––––––. 1911 (pub. 2000). The Art of Performance. Edited by Heribert Esser. Translated  
     by Irene Schreier Scott. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
––––––. 1912. Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony: A Portrayal of its Musical Content with  
     Running Commentary on Performance and Literature As Well. Translated by John Rothgeb.  
490 
     New Haven: Yale UP. 
––––––. 1921. Erläuterungsausgabe of Beethoven’s Op. 101. Translated by David P. Goldman.  
Master’s Thesis, Queens College, 1990. 
––––––. 1925a. “Abolish the Phrasing Slur.” Translated by William Drabkin. The Masterwork in  
     Music: A Yearbook, vol. I, 20–30. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 
––––––. 1925b. “Bach: Twelve Short Preludes, No. 6 [BMV 940].” In The Masterwork in Music, vol. 1.  
Translated by Hedi Siegel, 54–57. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994. 
––––––. 1925c. “Further Consideration of the Urlinie: I.” Translated by John Rothgeb, The  
Masterwork in Music: A Yearbook, vol. 1. op. cit., 104–111. 
––––––. 1926. “On Organicism in Sonata Form,” The Masterwork in Music, Volume 2. Translated by  
William Drabkin, 23-30. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.  
––––––. 1935. Free Composition (Der Freie Satz). Translated by Ernst Oster. New York:  
     Schirmer, 1979.  
Shelemay, Kay Kaufman. 2001. “Toward an Ethnomusicology of the Early Music Movement:  
    Thoughts on Bridging Disciplines and Musical Worlds.” Ethnomusicology 45, no. 1: 1–29. 
Schindler, Anton Felix. 1860. Beethoven As I Knew Him, 3rd edition. Translated by 
Constance Jolly. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. 
Schmalfeldt, Janet. 1985. “On the Relation of Analysis to Performance: Beethoven’s Bagatelles  
     Op. 126, No. 2 and 5.” Journal of Music Theory 29, no. 1: 1–31.  
–––––. 1995: “Form as the Process of Becoming: the Beethoven-Hegelian Tradition and the 
“Tempest” Sonata.” Beethoven Forum 4: 37–71.  
–––––. 2011. In the Process of Becoming: Analytic and Philosophical Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-
Century Music. Oxford: Oxford UP.  
Schoenberg, Arnold. 1911. Theory of Harmony. Translated by Roy Carter. Berkeley: University of  
California Press, 1983.  
-–––––. 1975. Style and Idea. Edited by Leonard Stein. Translated by Leo Black.  
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Shields, Carol. 1993. The Stone Diaries. New York: Penguin. 
Showalter, Elaine 1985. “Toward a Feminist Poetics.” In The New Feminist Criticism: Essays on  
     Women, Literature, and Theory. Edited by Elaine Showalter, 125–43. New York: Pantheon.  
Small, Christopher. 1998. Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening. Middletown:  
     Wesleyan UP. 
491 
Smith, Charles J. 1996: “Musical Form and Fundamental Structure: An Investigation of Schenker’s 
‘Formenlehre.’” Music Analysis 15, no. 2/3: 191–297.  
Snarrenberg, Robert. 1997. Schenker’s Interpretive Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Solie, Ruth. 1980. “The Living Work: Organicism and Musical Analysis.” 19th Century Music 4, no.  
2: 147-56. 
–––––. 1992.“Whose Life? The Gendered Self in Schumann’s Frauenliebe und –leben.” In Music  
     and Text: Critical Inquiries. Edited by Steven Scher, 219–40. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Solomon, Maynard. 1977. Beethoven. New York: Schirmer. 
–––––. 1988a. “Beethoven’s Magazin der Kunst.” In Beethoven Essays, 193–204. Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard UP. 
–––––. 1988b. “The Creative Periods of Beethoven.” In Beethoven Essays. op. cit., 116–25.  
–––––. 1991. “Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony: The Sense of an Ending.” Critical Inquiry 17: 289–305. 
Sontag, Susan. 1967. Against Interpretation and other Essays. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 
Spitzer, Michael. 2006. Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style. Bloomington: Indiana  
UP. 
Stanislavski, Constantin. 1936. An Actor Prepares. New York: Routledge.  
Stein, Erwin. 1962. Form and Performance. London: Faber and Faber.  
Sterne, Lawrence. 1767. The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman. Edited by Melvyn  
New and Joan New. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. 
Stevens, Daniel Brian. 2008. “Brahms’s Song Collections: Rethinking a Genre.” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Michigan.   
Stravinsky, Igor. 1947. Poetics of Music in the Form of Six Lessons. Translated by Arthur Knodel and  
Ingolf Dahl. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP. 
Subotnik, Rose Rosengard. 1991. Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music  
     Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Sullivan, John J. 1964. “Stanislavski and Freud.” The Tulane Drama Review 9, no. 1: 88–111.  
Suzuki, Shunryu. 1970. Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind: Informal Talks on Zen Meditation and Practice. New  
York: Weatherhill.  
Swinkin, Jeffrey. 2007. “Keyboard Fingering and Interpretation: A Comparison of Historical and  
     Modern Approaches.” Performance Practice Review 13 (online journal). 
––––––. 2008. “Schenkerian Analysis, Metaphor, and Performance.” College Music  
492 
     Symposium 47: 76–99.  
––––––. 2012. “Variation as Thematic Actualisation: The Case of Brahms’s Opus 9.” Music Analysis  
     31, no. 1: 37–89. 
––––––. Forthcoming A. “A Theory of Emotional Specificity in Classic-Romantic Music.” Current  
Musicology 92. 
––––––. Forthcoming B. “The Middle-Style/Late-Style Dialectic: Problematizing Adorno’s Theory  
of Beethoven.” The Journal of Musicology 30, no. 1. 
Tanner, Mark. 2000. “The Power of Performance as an Alternative Analytical Discourse: The Liszt  
     Sonata in B Minor.” 19th-Century Music 23, no. 2: 173–92. 
Taruskin, Richard. 1995. Text and Act: Essays on Music and Performance. New York: Oxford UP. 
––––––. 2009. “Shall We Change the Subject? A Music Historian Reflects.” Stanford Presidential  
Lecture.  
––––––. 2010. “Introduction: The History of What?” The Oxford History of Western Music, xi–xxiii.  
Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Taylor, Charles. 1975. Hegel. Cambridge UP. 
Taylor, Timothy D. 2007. “The Commodification of Music at the Dawn of the Era of ‘Mechanical  
     Music.’” Ethnomusicology 51, no. 2: 281–305. 
Terrigno, Loretta. 2009. “Schenker’s Interpretive Fingerings: A Comparison of Two Beethoven  
Piano Sonatas.” Music Research Forum 24: 1–24.   
Thakar, Markand. 2011. Looking for the “Harp” Quartet: An Investigation into Musical Beauty. 
     Rochester: University of Rochester Press.  
Thom, Paul. 1993. For an Audience: A Philosophy of the Performing Arts. Philadelphia: Temple  
     UP. 
––––––. 2007. The Musician as Interpreter. University Park: Penn State UP. 
Tomlinson, Gary. 1984. “The Web of Culture: A Context for Musicology.” 19th-Century Music 7,  
     no. 3: 350–62. 
Tovey, Donald Francis Tovey. 1945. Beethoven. London: Oxford UP. 
Treitler, Leo. 1997. “Language and the Interpretation of Music.” In Music and Meaning. Edited by  
Jenefer Robinson, 23–56. Ithaca: Cornell UP.   
Turino, Thomas. 1999. “Signs of Imagination, Identity, and Experiences: A Peircian Semiotic  
493 
Theory for Music.” Ethnomusicology 43, no. 2: 221–55. 
Tusa, Michael. 1993. “Beethoven’s ‘C-minor Mood’: Some Thoughts on the Structural Implications  
of Key Choice.” Beethoven Forum 2: 1–27.  
Van den Toorn, Pieter C. 1995. Music, Politics, and the Academy. Berkeley: University of California  
     Press. 
Walton, Kendall. 1988. “The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns.” In Human Agency:  
     Language, Duty, Value. Edited by Jonathan Dancy, 237–57. Stanford: Stanford UP.  
–––––. 1990. Mimesis as Makebelieve: On the Foundation of the Representational Arts. Cambridge: 
     Harvard UP. 
–––––. 1993. “Understanding Humor and Understanding Music.” The Journal of Musicology 11, no. 1:  
32–44. 
–––––. 1994. “Listening with Imagination: Is Music Representational?” The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 52, no. 1: 47–61. 
Watkins, Holly. 2004. “From the Mine to the Shrine: The Critical Origins of Musical Depth.” 19th- 
     Century Music 27, no. 3: 179–207.  
Webster, James. 1991. Haydn’s ‘Farewell’ Symphony and the Idea of the Classical Style: Through-Composition  
and Cyclic Integration in His Instrumental Music. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Zbikowski, Lawrence M. 2003. Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, and Analysis.  
     Oxford: Oxford UP. 
Zuckerkandl, Victor. 1973. Man the Musician (vol. II of Sound and Symbol). Translated by  
     Norbert Guterman. Princeton: Princeton UP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
